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Abstract 
Influences on the Cross-cultural Transferability of Management Control 
Systems: The Case of Major Taiwanese Information Technology Multinationals 
By Cheng-Li Huang, Warwick, UK, January, 1999 
This study attempts to explore how national culture, leaders' financial control 
factors, and other situational factors affect the transference of management control 
systems (MCSs) within MNCs. If national cultural factors are important, then a 
"fitting" policy may be better than a "shared" policy and the corporation would take 
into account the host national culture and so adjust its MCSs in foreign operations. 
However, if a firm's leader keeps tight financial control, then a "shared" policy may be 
maintained and its headquarters can more easily transfer its system to its foreign 
operations. In addition, some situational factors of the overseas operation could affect 
the transference of MCSs from headquarters. This study not only controls for some 
contingencies but also carefully selects relevant situational factors to observe the 
relationship between MCS transfer and those contingencies. 
This research uses the comparative case study method with a qualitative 
approach to explore the relationships of MCS transfer and national culture, leaders' 
financial control factors and other situational factors. In particular, the study strongly 
emphasises the elements of national culture and financial control factors. For 
achieving the research purposes, four main propositions in the research are explored. 
Using Hofstede's cultural dimensions, the first proposition compares the MCSs 
of Taiwanese and European operations of four Taiwanese case firms. However, only 
five out of the ten components of MCSs are shown to be influenced by cultural 
factors. Within a MNC, national culture may often be imbedded in relevant 
contingencies. The second proposition representing the relationships between national 
culture and leaders' financial control factors was also examined, but these 
relationships were not found to be strong in this research. 
A leaders' financial control style is based on operating philosophy representing 
special management values. The third proposition, the relationship between leaders' 
financial control style and the transference of MCSs, showed a strong relationship. 
Overall, except for the rewarding process, the leaders' financial control factors had 
obvious impacts on the transference of MCSs. 
Four situational factors including size, age, approach to acquisition, and 
business focus of European operations were observed in the research. The fourth 
proposition assesses whether these factors will significantly affect the transference of 
MCSs from Taiwanese operations to European operations. The results show that 
significant impacts from the factors of size and business focus exist. 
The main conclusions from the research are, firstly, that the higher the degree 
of the leaders' financial control in a MNC, the more the MCSs were transferred to 
overseas operations, and vice versa. Secondly, the higher the degree of financial 
control in one MNC, the lower the impact of MCS design from host cultural factors, 
and vice versa. Finally, the more favourable the situational environment in a firm's 
overseas operation, the more the MCSs could be transferred to the operation. 
Key words: MCSs, System transfer, MNCs, Cross-cultural comparison 
v 
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With increasing business globalisation, multinational corporations (MNCs) 
have more opportunities to own and control profit-making activities in more than one 
country. These activities may include not only the more familiar marketing and 
distribution operations, but also such potentially high value activities as R&D and 
innovation (Pearce, 1987; see Nobes and Parker, 1988: 1). It is becoming an 
increasingly important issue to MNCs to consider the feasibility of transferring 
management control systems (MCSs) across borders, i.e. whether those companies 
can transfer their domestic MeSs into overseas operations. If not, do they need to 
redesign or adjust their Mess to fit what is necessary for the host nation? 
No nation holds a monopoly of technical knowledge or managerial know-how. 
Most advantages in technology or managerial approach can be transferred from one 
country to another without great difficulty, since only a few people need to have this 
knowledge to make it available for general use (Koontz 1969: 417). If the managerial 
know-how is regarded as science, why cannot the managerial control system be 
transferred abroad? Actually, the export of American managerial know-how as well as 
technological know-how has yielded great dividends (Gonzalez and McMillan 1961: 
39; also see Koontz 1969: 419). A great number of progressive local firms in 
developing countries often import management systems and techniques from the more 
industrialised nations. Indeed, such importation may be encouraged by educational 
institutions and consultants (Frucot and Shearon, 1991: 81). One of the major post-
war aspects is the standardisation of managerial technologies and strategic recipes 
(Whitley, 1994: 106). Many management techniques so completely reflect underlying 
proved principles that cultural differences often have little effect on their applicability 
(Koontz 1969: 422). If the MeS is regarded as an internal system in a MNC. there is 
no reason to doubt the transferability of MeS, at least on the level of the theory. 
principle, and framework of the MCS. 
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However, those who take the position that management is behaviourally or 
culturally bound reason that, since management practices differ and people and their 
cultural environments vary, management theory and principles are not applicable in 
materially different cultural environments (Koontz 1969: 418). Cultural interface can 
occur between the management of the subsidiary and that of the parent company. The 
diverse cultural backgrounds translate into a lack of cognitive similarities which can 
significantly hamper communication (Stening, 1979; also see Frucot and Shearon, 
1991: 82). As principles are only descriptive and predictive, they do not become 
normative (i. e., state or imply what 'ought' to be) until the user applies them with a 
system of values (for example efficiency or effectiveness of a group effort) in mind 
(Koontz 1969: 421). Qualified managers need to identify many constraints in the 
environment and culture which significantly influence management effectiveness 
when they design their management systems. Management controls that work 
effectively in one national setting will have a different level of effectiveness if used in 
a different national setting (Chow, Shields, and Wu, 1996: 1). This does not mean that 
the fundamentals of management are different, but it does mean that the researcher 
must carefully distinguish between these fundamentals and their application. This is 
the essence of "design" as engineers have found who must design a "black box" to 
operate in difficult environments (Koontz 1969: 417). The structure of a MCS can be 
viewed not only as an institutional answer to handle these power relationships but also 
as the rules of the game members have to play. Within the limits of the game, the 
players' strategies are rational; but the game itself is a man-made construct which is 
heavily dependent on the cultural capacities and attitudes of the people concerned 
(Crozier, 1973: 49-50; Negandhi, 1975: 339). There is no single form of 
internationalisation that has taken place in all sectors and there is no particular reason 
to expect firms and markets to follow a single pattern of international development 
(Whitley, 1994: 106). 
There are two main strands of comparative MCS research. One of them is the 
approach of contingency theory which emphasises the relationship between the 
environment and organisation. A great number of contingent variables are selected in 
the cross-border comparative research. Under this approach, optimal MCSs depend on 
the relevant elements of a firm's environment, and cultural factors are embedded in 
different contingencies. The best contribution of contingency theory is that managers 
need to keep a dynamic role in monitoring and achieving an effective "fit" with their 
environment. However. because of drawbacks such as the piecemeal nature of 
contingencies (Fisher, 1995: 24), futurism and the posture of value neutrality 
(Wooton, 1977: 435; Birnberg et al., 1992: 117), it is often difficult to get a sufficient 
explanation (Drazin & Van de Yen, 1985: 514) in cross-border comparative research. 
3 
Another main strand of comparative MCS research is cross-cultural research. 
Cross-national or cross-cultural organisations or systems are compared by some 
cultural attributes, especially Hofstede's dimensions. Some culturalists have argued it 
is easier to explain differences and similarities by cultural attributes or dimensions 
than by contingent variables. Over the last decade, cultural research on MCS design 
was much more extensive than research into contingency theory, and the trend seems 
to be increasing, at least to date. However, most cultural research may still be 
considered exploratory and most researchers use Hofstede's cultural dimensions and 
scores to explain their findings. Different explanations, the giving of different 
priority, or weight among Hofstede's cultural dimensions have made comparison 
difficult. As a result, there has been a frequent failure to explicate the theoretical link 
between the cultural dimension and MCS characteristics (Harrison and McKinnon, 
1996: 38). In addition, most cultural researchers select the quantitative survey as their 
research approach. Only a few researchers use the qualitative approach to probe an 
informant's view. Collecting source data through mu!!iple approaches seems a better J 
way to strengthen research reliability. Finally, some culturalists found many 
contingent variables really affecting the design of MCSs in cross-cultural comparison. 
Some of them controlled for contingencies by selecting their sample carefully, and a 
few researchers also considered those variables in their cross-cultural research. 
An overview of cross-cultural or cross-national research on MCS transfer in 
the literature shows most researchers used an indirect approach based on cultural 
dimensions or attributes, or contingent variables, for their inferences. Some 
researchers compare intensely MCSs from different countries within one country. A 
few researchers themselves contributed directly to a system transfer within MNCs, but 
most of them emphasised the organisational system or structure. No literature was 
found concerning comprehensive MCS transfer within MNCs, especially combining 
cultural theory and contingency theory with a qualitative approach. Until now the 
direct observation of MCS transfer within MNCs is still virgin territory. 
1.2 Purpose of the Research 
This study attempts to explore how national culture affects the design of MeSs 
within a MNC. If culture matters, an organisation's policies can lose their 
effectiveness when its cultural environment changes (Hofstede, 1980). If national 
cultural factors are important, then a "fitting" policy to overseas operations may be 
better than a "shared" policy. The corporation would consider the host national culture 
to adjust its MCSs in foreign operations. In contrast. if national cultural differences 
are minor factors, then headquarters can more easily transfer its system to its foreign 
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operations. 
According to Hofstede's survey (198011984) and the Chinese value survey 
(1987), Taiwan and West European countries have important cultural differences. 
Because of great differences in power distance, individualism, and Confucian 
dynamism between European countries and Taiwan, it is possible that their systems 
exhibit some differences. The next question is which components or functions are 
influenced by national culture? This study will compare the MCSs of Taiwanese and 
European operations by qualitative interviews. 
National culture affects not only the behaviour of managers both in domestic 
and foreign operations, but also the behaviour of senior managers at headquarters. 
Does the national culture have close relationships with leaders' financial control 
factors? Do the thoughts of these senior managers affect the MCSs of foreign 
operations? Does the leadership philosophy significantly affect the MCSs? How do 
leaders' financial control styles affect the transference of MCSs? This study will 
explore not only the relationship between the national culture of the home company 
and financial control factors, but also the relationship between financial control 
factors and the MCSs through in-depth interviews. 
In addition to national culture and financial control factors, other situational 
factors such as size, age, approach to acquisition, and business focus of the overseas 
operation also could affect the transference of MCSs from headquarters. How great is 
the impact from these contingent factors? According to contingency theory, this study 
not only controls some contingencies but also carefully selects relevant situational 
factors to observe the relationship between MCS transfer and those contingencies. 
Overall, for examining the transferability of MCSs to European operations 
from Taiwanese operations, this research has the following research purposes: 
• To compare the MCSs between Taiwanese and European operations within the 
case firms and to find which components of MCSs of European operations are 
affected by local culture. 
• To examine the relationships between national culture and financial control 
factors. 
• To explore how the financial control style of the senior managers at headquarters 
affects the MCS transfer between the Taiwanese and European operations in the 
case firms. 
• To explore the relationships between other situational factors and MCSs of the 
case firms. 
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For the purposes of achieving the above objectives, this research uses the 
comparative case study with a qualitative approach to exploring the relationships of ,., 
MCS transfer and national culture, financial control factors and other situational 
factors. Especially, the study strongly emphasises the elements of national culture and 
leadership factors. Also, four main propositions in the research are established by the 
first four purposes mentioned above. 
Throughout the research extensive quotations from the interviews conducted 
are used to present MCS descriptions, design rationales, and reactions in the 
managers' own terms as much as possible. In effect, these quotations serve as direct 
and powerful evidence of choices the managers have made, the reasoning behind 
them, and the outcomes (Merchant, 1989: 20). 
1.3 Research Scope 
The following three limitations have served as the boundaries of the research. 
First, in the selection of cases and samples, this study chose four Taiwanese MNCs as 
the case firms. Except for a few interviews with outside people, almost all interviews 
were conducted within the case firms. The interviewees contain those managers both 
in operations and at headquarters. The reason for choosing cases and samples will be 
discussed in detail in chapter 3. Secondly, in the selection of geography, this study 
chose to compare Taiwanese and European MCSs. The four case firms in the research 
are global firms and cover broad business geography. Different areas or nations may 
face different cultural and environmental factors and may have different phenomena in 
MCS transfer. Owing to the limitation of time and funds, this research concentrates on 
Taiwan and Europe only. Thirdly, in the selection of variables, most research variables 
are chosen either from the literature review or even from interview responses, but the 
research could not cover all relevant variables. It is possible that other variables may 
have a direct influence on MCS design or transfer. A more detailed discussion about 
choosing relevant variables will be found in the next chapter. 
1.4 Significance of the Research 
The exploration of MCS transfer is important for several reasons. First. 
investigating the relationships between MCS transfer and national culture, financial 
control factors, and other situational factors can help to discover some variables or 
elements which are important to the transference of MCSs within MNCs. Secondly, 
comparative research between Taiwan and Europe will be able to assist our 
understanding of how to tackle the MeS design in European operations as well as 
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helping Taiwanese MNCs to learn how to succeed in MCS design in their European 
operations. Thirdly, because the research collects data from different sources, findings 
from the research could not only enrich the knowledge of real-world practice but also 
be useful for theory development. Fourthly, as the research framework can reasonably 
reflect the extent to which different elements affect the transference of MCS 
components, each MNC can make the optimum decision for its MCS design 
according its unique financial control style and situational factors. Fifthly, the findings 
of the research can assist in building a criterion for evaluating the successful extent of , 
MCS design in European operations. Finally, as the research covers national culture, 
financial control factors and situational factors simultaneously, it can be classified as 
an exploratory and pioneering research in the area of MCS transfer. 
1.5 Organisation of the Thesis 
As figure 1.1 shows, the thesis deals with MCS transfer in the context of three 
elements: national culture, financial control factors, and other situational factors. 
These elements will be integrated in a comprehensive framework to show the 
transference of MCSs in overseas operations. 
As shown in figure 1.1, the thesis will be organised as follows. Chapter one 
will present a review of the research problem. The purposes of the research and 
research scope will be introduced. In addition, the significance of research will also 
be discussed. Chapter two will review significant literature about comparative 
management and MCS transfer or design. Relevant theories will be systematically 
explored, and elements and variables important to the MCS transfer will be 
highlighted. With the progress of the review, research propositions will be 
established on the relevant theories or previous literature. Finally, a research 
framework will be constructed. Chapter three will develop the methodology 
employed in the research. Research approaches will be presented and different data 
collected from different resources with qualitative approaches. In addition, the 
reliability and validation with data analysis techniques will be discussed in detail. 
Chapters four to nine cover the empirical analysis. Chapter four will examine 
the development of Taiwanese information technology (IT) industry and its 
investment in Europe. Chapter five will present four IT MNCs that will make up the 
case studies in the research. Chapter six will compare MCSs with qualitative in-depth 
interviews through cross-cultural research. Based on Hofstede's cultural dimensions, 
a series of SUb-propositions will be examined. Chapter seven will explore the 
relationships between financial control factors and national culture. With the 
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differences in leaders' financial control factors, each case firm owns its managing 
values and then forms its control style which will affect its MCS transfer. Chapter 
eight will discuss the relationships between fmancial control factors and MCS 
transfer. The dynamic analysis will be observed. As well as an integrated 
examination, each financial control factor will also be examined separately. Chapter 
nine will follow contingency theory, and the relationships between situational factors 
and the transference of MCSs will be examined individually. 
Influences on the Cross-cultural Transferability of Management Control Systems 
Why can or cannot MCSs be transferred? 
What elements could affect MCS transfer? 
Research purposes and scope 
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Why case study and comparative research? 
Collecting data from multiple sources 
Reliability and validation 
+----~Ch. 5 IT case firms 
~ .-----'f--~-, 
!Ch 6 Nfl IturJ [Ch. 7 Financial contr~1 
. . d M~l~~a cu factors and managena 
an values 
" __ -- --- """':""::':':"="":-=-----;--1 --~ 
Cross-culturall analysis Dynamic~ analysis 
(Ch. 8 'Financial control: 
l: factors and MCS transfer ) 
Case identification 
Ch. 9 other situational) 
factors and MCSs 
Contingent analysis 
i 
r ~h. 10 Summary an~ l Conclusions) Summarising findings Suggestions 
Figure 1.1 Organisation of the Thesis 
8 
Chapter ten consists of the summary and conclusions. A brief summary of the 
research will be presented first. Then the contribution and managerial implications of 
the research will be discussed. Also, the limitations and future research suggestions 
will be provided. 
Finally, some relevant instruments and data are also presented in appendices, 
including interview questions (Appendix 1), a list of interviewees (Appendix 2), 
group organisations of the case firms (Appendix 3), and fmancial data of the case 
firms (Appendix 4). 
2. Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
2.2 Overview of MCS Transfer 
2.3 Culture, National Culture, and Corporate Culture 
2.4 A Comparison of MCSs between Europe and Taiwan 
2.5 Financial Control Factors as Dynamic Variables in MCS Transfer 
2.6 Other Situational Contingent Factors and MCS Mechanisms 
2.7 A Conceptual Framework of the Research 
2.8 Conclusion 
2.1 Introduction 
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This chapter explores relevant literature with three main purposes. First, it 
relates to the ongoing dialogue in the literature about cross-cultural comparisons and 
MCS transfer. It provides a chronological, historical picture of what has been learned 
in MCS transfer. Secondly, it provides a strong base for establishing propositions and 
research purposes. Furthermore, a conceptual research framework could be built. 
Thirdly, it provides an opportunity to compare relevant literature and to understand 
the importance of the research. Through literature review, a novel research design and 
benchmark could be conducted. 
The research strategy here focuses on literature reviewing the relationship 
between "cause and effect." In other words, the research emphasises the relationship 
between dependent and independent variables. Except for overviewing the relevant 
literature of MCS transfer, three important independent elements in the research are 
strongly emphasised. According to the process of literature review, the research has 
built a series of propositions, the basis of an integrated final framework. 
2.2 Overview of MCS Transfer 
2.2.1 Comparative Management Model 
The comparative management jungle of today is one in which various 
management orientations share some of the same root systems. This is most 
apparent with respect to the contingency management orientation, because it 
is heavily influenced by behavioural research, methodology, and 
conceptualisation. (Miller, 1984: 80) 
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2.2.1.1 Environmental (Ecological) Orientation 
Comparative management studies did not appear until the 1950s and were not 
accepted as a distinctive discipline until the 1960s. Following in the steps of some 
antecedents (such as Roy Blough and Edward T. Hall, see Schollhammer, 1969: 85-
86), Farmer and Richman firstly considered culture as an important variable 
influencing managerial effectiveness in their macro model (Farmer and Richman, 
1965: 35; Kelley and Worthley, 1981: 166; Chen 1995: 12). The model identified 
management as a dependent variable, and it indicated the universality of basic 
management theory and principles (Koontz, 1969: 428). They attempted to segregate 
environmental factors from the basics of management (Koontz, 1969: 423). The 
ecological orientation stressed the importance of external environmental factors, 
including sociological, educational, legal and political, and economic characteristics, 
on managers behaviour. The ecological orientation highlights the importance of 
cultural and national factors and their impact on managerial effectiveness 
(Schollhammer, 1969: 84-85; Miller, 1984: 70). Individual companies are passive 
agents of the external environment (Negandhi, 1975: 336). However, it is basically a 
static model in a dynamic environment and also overemphasises external factors to the 
complete neglect of internal organisational dynamics (Schollhammer, 1969: 86; 
Negandhi, 1975: 336; Chen, 1995:13). 
2.2.1.2 Behavioural Orientation 
In due course, some micro behavioural models were developed (such as 
Negandhi and Estafen 1965, Haire et aI., 1963, Perlmutter 1965, Thorelli 1966, see 
Schollhammer, 1969: 87-90; Davis 1971, Barett and Bass 1970, see Chen 1995: 13). 
Behavioural orientation stressed the development and elucidation of human behaviour 
theory and the test of hypotheses by means of rigorous research design and data 
analysis (Schollhammer, 1969: 87; Chen, 1995: 14). This school focuses on typical 
behaviour patterns of managers in different cultures (Schollhammer, 1969: 87; 
Negandhi, 1975: 336). Culture is used as an independent variable. Topics such as 
leadership styles, motivation and job attitudes, managerial values, and job satisfaction 
have been the locus of the behavioural orientation to comparative management 
conceptualisation and synthesis (Miller, 1984: 71). This school espouses 
operationalised cultural variables and divides them into different categories, but 
culture has not been explicitly defined and the differences found have been attributed 
to culture (Negandhi, 1975: 337; Miller, 1984: 71; Chen, 1995: 14). 
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2.2.1.3 Contingency Management Orientation 
An open system model was developed by Negandhi and Prasad (1971: 23; also 
see Chen, 1995: 15). They conclude that the management process is dependent not 
only on external environmental constraints and culture but also on management 
philosophy. The-model identifies management philosophy as an independent variable 
(Koontz, 1969: 425). They argued that if environmental and cultural factors were the 
main determinants of management practices, the management practices of two 
comparable business enterprises in the same culture should be similar (Kelley and 
Worthley, 1981: 166). However, although it includes culture as a variable, the model 
does not recognise the importance of culture as much as it does managerial 
philosophy. The research may have truly established the importance of managerial 
philosophy, but any successful managerial philosophy cannot go against the cultural 
environment in which a corporation operates (Chen, 1995: 16). Related to the open 
model, a contingency model was developed by Lawrence and Lorsch in 1969. They 
argued there is no optimum type of management system, which is advocated by 
traditional management theory and practice. With many academics participating (such 
as Child, 1972, 1981; Hickson et ai., 1974; Gordon and Miller, 1976; Wooton, 1977; 
Waterhouse & Tiessen, 1978; Ginzberg, 1980; Maurice et ai., 1980; Merchant, 1981, 
1985a; Rockness and Shields, 1984; Govindarajan, 1984, 1986, 1988; Govindarajan 
& Gupta, 1985; Govindarajan & Fisher, 1990; Gresov, 1989; Fisher & Govindarajan, 
1993; Simons 1987, 1990; Dent, 1990, Shields and Young, 1993; Wong and 
Birnbaum-More, 1994; Punnett and Shenkar, 1994; Fisher, 1994, 1995), contingency 
theory has become one of the dominant paradigms for research into management 
control design (Wooton, 1977; Dent, 1991; Fisher, 1994, 1995). Contingency 
management orientation highlights an active interrelationship between environmental 
factors or situations and the manager's response to them (Miller, 1984: 75). However, 
the definition of the manager's role and the operationalisation of environmental 
variables still challenge contingency management scholars (Negandhi, 1975: 339). 
2.2.1.4 Behavioural Orientation: Cultural Emphasis 
Before 1980, there was a large amount of cultural research orientated towards 
contingency theory, which, however, relegated culture to a residual variable, that is to 
say, that which is unexplained by the more common contingency variables (Sorge and 
Warner, 1986; 7). Rohner (1984: 111) described it as "a packaged, unexamined 
variable." Culture was regarded theoretically as just as another contingency, or as an 
independent variable (Smircich, 1983: 343). Differences were explained in terms of 
cultural variables and the cultural factors were considered the most important 
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influence variables (Negandhi, 1975: 335). Pondy and Mitroff (1979) developed a 
"cultural model", which would be concerned with the higher mental functions of 
human behaviour, such as language and creation of meaning, to advocate organisation 
theory (Smircich, 1983: 353-354; Cyert and March, 1992: 214-215). In 1980, 
Hofstede published his influential study of cross-cultural differences in work-related 
values and identified four cultural dimensions: individualism, power distance. 
uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity. Culture was not a "black box" any more: more 
and more culturalists devoted themselves to cultural studies. For the past decade, 
many researchers have generated a large amount of literature to validate the constructs 
and to test various implications of the theory (such as Hofstede & Bond, 1984; Hui 
and Triandis, 1986; Harrison and McKinnon, 1986; Leung and Iwawaki, 1988; 
Birnberg and Snodgrass, 1988; Dorfman and Howell, 1988; Triandis, 1989; Hui and 
Villareal, 1989; Moore and IsHak, 1989; Hui, 1990; Punnett and Withane, 1990; Ueno 
and Sekaran, 1992; Cohen et aI., 1992; Harrison, 1993; Wong and Birnbaum-More, 
1994; Chow, Shields & Wu, 1994; Bochner, 1994; Bochner and Hesketh, 1994~ 
O'Connor, 1995; Lau et aI., 1995; Smith et al., 1996; Chow, Shields & Wu, 1996). 
Also, Hofstede's work is illustrated by the citations, reviews or as a paradigm 
(Semdergarrd, 1994). Many behaviourally-oriented researchers have been initiated to 
identify similarities and differences in managerial phenomena across cultures. The 
cultural model seems to have become mainstream in cross-cultural comparison in the 
past decade. 
2.2.2 Cross-Cultural Comparison of Management Control Systems 
Over the past two decades, many researchers have devoted themselves to the 
cross-cultural comparison of management control systems. The cross-cultural analysis 
is based solely on the positioning effect1 of culture (Leung and Bond, 1989: 141) and 
a strong etic2 dimension would emerge from it (Leung and Bond, 1989: 147). Most of 
them used the comparison between nations or areas, especially Pacific-rim countries 
or areas, such as between USA and Japan (Daley et al., 1985; Lincoln et al., 1986; 
Snodgrass & Grant ,1986; Birnberg & Snodgrass, 1988; Snodgrass and Szewczak, 
I The term "positioning effect" is on the relative location of the responses made by the average 
individual from a particular culture, whilst the term "patterning effect" can be detected with a set of 
intracultural analyses. A pancultural analysis can reflect both the patterning effect and positioning 
effect, but the cross-cultural analysis is based solely on the positioning effect of culture (Leung and 
Bond, 1989; 140-141). 
2 Kenneth Pike formed the words "etic" and "emic" from the suffixes of the words phonetic and 
phonemic (Harris, 1979: 34).Theories developed by social scientists observing behaviour are referred 
to as "etic," whereas those held by participants are called "emic." The value of emic research is based 
on the identification of categories and rules actually held by participants and used to guide thinking and 
action. Further detail is given in chapter 3. 
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1991; Ueno & Sekaran, 1992; Ueno & Wu, 1993; Chow, Kato & Shields, 1994; 
Chow, Kato & Merchant, 1996), between Singapore and USA (Chow et al., 1991), 
between Japan and Korea (Lie, 1990), between Britain and Germany (Sorge and 
Warner, 1986), between Singapore and Australia (Harrison, 1992, 1993), between 
Europe and America (Ayman and Chemers, 1983), between China and Taiwan (Fuller 
and Peterson, 1992), between South Korea and Taiwan (Li, 1993), between the United 
States and India (Agarwal, 1993), between Taiwan and the United States (Merchant et 
aI., 1995) and between two areas (such as Meindl et aI., 1989 Sino-American; Vance 
et aI., 1992, ThailandlIndonesia/Malaysia vs. USA; Harrison et al., 1994, 
USAf Australia vs. SingaporeiHong Kong). In addition, a few researchers built their 
cross-cultural research on the level of multi-countries (such as McMillan et al., 1973 
for the United States, Canada, and Britain; Maurice et al., 1980 for France, West 
Germany, and Britain; Chinese Cultural Connection, 1987 for 22 countries; Ali, 1988 
for five Arabic countries; Coates et aI., 1992 for Britain, Germany and the United 
States; Pratt et aI., 1993 for the United States, Britain, and Holland; Chow, Shields & 
Wu, 1996 for Taiwan, Japan, and the United States; Smith et al., 1996 for 43 
countries). It appears that countries can be clustered according to similarities in certain 
cultural dimensions (Ronen and Shenkar, 1985: 452). Among them, except for some 
researchers who used different cultural dimensions or attributes (such as Maurice et al, 
1980; Lincoln et aI., 1981; Lincoln et al., 1986; Snodgrass & Grant, 1986; and 
Birnberg & Snodgrass, 1988; Ali, 1988; Coates et aI., 1992; Li, 1993; Agarwal, 1993), 
most researchers selected the theoretical taxonomy developed by Hofstede 
(198011984, 1991), especially after 1989 (Harrison and McKinnon, 1996: 48-50). In 
addition, except for a few researchers who used in-depth interviews (such as Coates et 
aI., 1992; Merchant et al., 1995), almost all researchers selected the survey 
questionnaire as the main instrument of quantitative analysis. The effect of national 
culture was tested by comparing MCSs between nations or areas which have 
obviously different national cultures. While some support has been found for the 
predicted effects, the results of many of these tests have been either nonsignificant, or 
significant but either the sign of mean difference or the form of the detected 
interaction is opposite to the prediction (Chow et al. 1996: 2). According to the 
analysis of Harrison and McKinnon (1996, 51-53), the planning process and 
evaluating process seem easily predictable by Hofstede's cultural dimensions rather 
than the organisation process and rewarding process. Past empirical research still 
could not get any predicted effect from the test of the rewarding process of MCSs 
(such as Chow et al., 1991; Vance et al., 1992; Chow, Kato & Shields, 1994; 
Merchant et al., 1995) . 
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There are many factors to cause these mixed or reversible results. An 
important cause of these mixed results may be inadequacy or ineffectiveness of 
contingent variables, like size and industry (Child, 1981: 305; Chow, Shields & Wu, 
1996: 2). If some contingent variables were suitably controlled by researchers, the 
reliability of the research results would be naturally increased. Control mechanisms 
were selected from different levels, including corporate control, formal control, and 
even operational control (Fisher, 1995; 25), and some of those are influenced by a 
wide variety of contingent variables. Another reason is that some authors had made 
different interpretations and potentially inconsistent applications of Hofstede's cultural 
dimensions (Smith, 1992: 41; Chow, Shields & Wu, 1996: 6). Cultural differences 
and their implications for organisations have been studied by many researchers, but 
how that culture has been treated as a variable central to the study differs quite 
considerably (Tayeb, 1994: 433). There is a dearth of theoretical research in which a 
systematic study of culture, work attitudes, and management system is carried out in 
independent stages to examine the consistency between culture and management 
(Child, 1981: 305; Adler, 1983: 231; Tayeb, 1994: 435). Limited by funds, time, 
difficulty in accessing samples and complex methodology, it is frequently impossible 
to pursue cross-cultural studies with the rigour usually required of within-cultural 
studies (Triandis, 1972; Adler, 1983: 231; Ronen and Shenkar, 1985: 453; Hofstede, 
1980). In addition, the definition of "culture" and the "aspect" of management control 
systems of research methodology could also significantly affect data collection and 
interpretation (Tayeb, 1994: 439-442). 
2.2.3 Approaches to Examine MC,s Transfer within a MNC 
As described above, many culturalists used cross-cultural compansons 
between countries or areas to indicate indirectly the possibility of the transference of 
management control systems. In addition, for overcoming the problem of cross-border 
data collection and/or language problems, some scholars acutely compared cross-
cultural differences within one country only (such as Lincoln et al., 1978 in USA; 
Lincoln et al. 1981 in USA; Soeters and Schreuder, 1988 in Holland; Frucot & 
Shearon, 1991 in Mexico; Pratt et aI., 1993 in Holland and Britain; Wong and 
Birnbaum-More, 1994; Chow, Shields & Wu, 1994 in Taiwan; Lau et al., 1995 in 
Singapore; O'Connor, 1995 in Singapore; Chow, Shields & Wu, 1996 in Taiwan). 
Among them, Chow et al. ( 1994, 1996) even compared the Japanese and U.S. firms 
in Taiwan. Their findings, including similarities and differences, could indirectly offer 
references in respect of MCS design to multinational corporations. Culturalists 
assume that if culture is important to the design of MCSs, then the control 
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mechanisms used in different countries will differ from one another. As mentioned 
above, some scholarly experiments showed that it is possible to transfer specific 
management controls. Those indirect research studies, however, were only nation-
specific, lacking any company-specific content. 
Hofstede (1980, 1984) carried out his large survey, covering 53 countries, 
within the IBM corporation. This approach attempted to reflect directly different 
national cultures within a multinational firm. Through controlling for industrial and 
organisational climate variables, national differences in work values could be found 
(Ronen and Shenkar, 1985: 453). As a result, four national cultural dimensions were 
found under the same environment of corporate ·culture. However, Hofstede did not 
empirically investigate the relationships between the four dimensions of work-related 
values and attitudes and the structures of the organisations whose managers 
participated in the study (Tayeb, 1994: 434). Culture has thus been treated as a 
residual factor which is presumed to account for national variations that have neither 
been postulated before the research nor explained after its completion (Child, 1981: 
306). In addition, through controlling for corporate culture, his national cultural theory 
was also built upon the nation-specific level. All units studied shared the same IBM 
corporate culture, and there were no outside points of comparison (Hofstede, 1990: 
289). It is still a mystery for a specific multinational firm to understand the 
transferability of its MCSs. 
Multinational corporations are increasingly interested in promoting corporate 
culture to improve control, co-ordination, and integration of their subsidiaries 
(Schneider, 1988). As Negandhi and Prasad (1971) proposed, management philosophy 
is a very important element in multinational management. In addition, multinationals, 
when going abroad, have to impose universal accounting rules for consolidation 
purposes. Many leaders attempt to decrease or eliminate cultural differences through 
human resource management. Cunningham (1978) argued that multinational 
corporations can be viewed as living social systems because they show obvious 
tendencies toward purposeful behaviour, adaptation, evolution, self preservation, and 
self-perpetuation, even though their component subsystems may die or change. 
Soeters and Schreuder (1988) found two of Hofstede's four cultural dimensions (also 
see Schreuder, 1987), i.e. uncertainty avoidance and masculinity, having significant 
effects in respect of the U.S. culture upon the organisational cultures of the Big Eight 
firms. Hofstede and his colleagues (Hofstede et aI., 1990: 312) also found 
considerable differences in practice for people who held similar values (also see 
Tayeb, 1994: 436; Pratt, 1993: 627). A great deal of research showed the close 
relationship between MCS design in a multinational corporation and its leaders. In a 
multinational corporation, managers are increasingly interested in knowledge about 
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whether a control system can be transferred from one country to another. Obviously, 
nation-specific and company-specific comparative research is very important to 
understand directly the transferability of MCSs within a multinational corporation. 
However, research needs to face the challenge not only from national cultures but 
from the leadership and situational contingent variables. Designers of MCSs in 
multinational firms need to consider not only location-related variables, technology 
and uncertainty (as proxied by industry), organisational size, and other variables 
present which differ between firms with the same national ownership, but also the 
variables including organisational culture, competition and competitive strategy 
(Coates et ai., 1992; Chow, Shields & Wu, 1996). 
2.3 Culture, National Culture, and Corporate Culture 
2.3.1 Definition of Culture 
Culture is defined as "the distinctive way of life of a group of people, their 
complete design for living" (Kluckhohn, 1951). People having different living 
circumstances have their differences in the value orientation of individuals. Parson 
and Shils (1950) proposed the universalism and partiCUlarism value orientation3. In 
any given social situation, where an individual has to choose between particularism or 
universalism, his choice will be guided by his cultural background (Jaggi, 1975: 78). 
Rokeach (1973) developed his Rokeach Value Survey (RVS) in order to 
measure the relative importance that respondents consciously attach to 36 values, 
divided into 18 "terminal" and 18 "instrumental" values. His instrument was designed 
and tested only in the U.S.; in other words, the RVS was not designed as an 
instrument for cross-cultural research (Hofstede and Bond, 1984). Although it belongs 
to the emic research, his culture value analysis caused some scholars to become 
interested in comparing studies with other cultural dimensions (such as Hofstede and 
Bond, 1984; Bond, 1988). 
Hofstede defined culture as a "collective programming of the mind which 
distinguishes the members of one human group from another" (Hofstede 1980/1984: 
25; 1991: 5). Based on his cultural definition, four national cultural dimensions were 
proposed. Societal or national culture is shared among the group within a society and 
across social systems within a given society (Hofstede 1980/1984: 15). Culture is a set 
of historical values and attitudes and meanings shared by the members of a given 
community that influences their material and non-material way of life (Tayeb, 1988: 
3 Universalism is defined as a value orientation toward institutionalised obligations to society, and 
particularism is a value orientation toward institutionalised obligations of friendship (Zurcher, Jr. et al.. 
1965, see Jaggi, 1975: 78). 
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42). Culture is a pattern of basic assumptions - invented, discovered, or developed by 
a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal 
integration (Schein, 1991: 9). Culture, in this sense, is a learned product of group 
experience and is, therefore, to be found only where there is a definable group with a 
significant history. Culture influences (1) the norms and values of such systems; and 
(2) the behaviour of groups in their interactions within and across systems (Harrison 
and McKinnon, 1986). In 1987 the Centre of Asian Studies in Hong Kong proposed a 
survey of Chinese values constructed and administered to university students in 22 
countries around the world. In their analyses, four factors were correlated with those 
derived from a Western survey of work-related values by Hofstede. Three of the 
factors from the survey correlated at high levels with three of Hofstede's four factors, 
but the factor of Confucian work dynamism which correlated 0.70 with economic 
growth from 1965 to 1984 was unrelated to any of Hofstede's values (Chinese Values 
Survey, 1987). Because the factor of Confucian work dynamism has a significant 
relation with economic growth, it has caused many scholars to study this aspect 
(Hofstede and Bond, 1988; Bond, 1988; Franke et aI., 1991). 
Comparative researchers disagree on how to define culture (Richman, 1977: 
15; Smircich, 1983: 339-342; Miller, 1984: 74; Alder, 1984: 49; Moore, 1990: 4-6; 
AAA, 1991: 182-183; Tayeb, 1994: 430; Gray, 1995: 274). To some "culture-specific" 
(Tayeb, 1994: 438) researchers, culture related to norms, values, feelings, thinking, 
roles, behaviour, beliefs, attitudes, expectations, meanings, and so on. It is quite 
impossible to locate culture in a particular subjective area, and it seemed to be "here, 
there, everywhere" (Sorge and Warner, 1986: 33). Cultural realists assign culture an 
independent existence in its own ontological realm, whilst cultural nominalists hold 
that culture exists solely as a set of inferences or abstractions made by the investigator 
and drawn from regularities observed in the behaviour of multiple individuals within a 
population (Rohner, 1984: 115-116). Smircich (1983: 347) described "culture as a 
root metaphor." To "culture-free" others (such as Hickson et aI, 1974; Maurice et aI., 
1980; Sorge and Warner, 1986), culture is defined as having nothing to do with 
economics, politics, law, religion, language, education, technology, industrial 
environment, society, or the market, etc. The relationship between organisational 
characteristics and their contextual variables is stable across societies. "Culture" 
resists operational definition, not because it is a particularly intractable area of human 
affairs, but because the idea is tied to a particular context (Tayeb, 1994: 431). The 
appearance of culture "nowhere and everywhere" was seen to make it unsuitable for 
the demarcation of a distinguishable range of explanatory variables (Sorge and 
Warner, 1986: 40). Culture concerns the selection and social definition of all manner 
of variables and their dimensions, rather than one set of variables only (Sorge and 
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Warner, 1986: 35). Even with simple behaviour it is rare that a single independent 
variable is sufficient for explanation, so where more complex behaviour is involved it 
is a chance to account for the segmentary process in terms of one or more independent 
variables (Jahoda, 1984: 148). 
2.3.2 National Cultural Dimensions 
This study contains Hofstede's four cultural dimensions and Confucian work 
dynamism, which is called a fifth dimension by Hofstede (1991: 164), as the national 
cultural dimensions: 
2.3.2.1 Individualism/Collectivism 
This refers to the relationship one perceives between one's self and the group 
of which one is a member (Ueno and Sekaran, 1992: 661). Individualism pertains to 
societies in which the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look 
after himself or herself and his or her immediate family. Collectivism as its opposite 
pertains to societies in which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, 
cohesive in-groups, which throughout people's lifetime continue to protect them in 
exchange for unquestioning loyalty (Hofstede, 198011984: 213, 1991: 51; Hofstede 
and Bond, 1988: 11; Triandis, 1989: 509). Members of individualistic societies, 
having an "I" rather than "we", are more self-centred and competitive, pursuing their 
own goals. They show low loyalty to the organisations they work for and low need for 
dependency upon others. More collectivist societies, on the other hand, call for greater 
emotional dependence of members on their organisations; in a society in equilibrium, 
the organisations should in return assume a broad responsibility from their members 
(Hofstede, 198011984: 217). Members of collectivistic societies have high loyalty for 
the organisation working toward its goals, interact with one another in an 
interdependent mode, and take action jointly as a group in a co-operative fashion 
rather than on an individual competitive basis, thus subscribing to the moralistic 
values of joint efforts and group rewards (Veno and Sekaran, 1992: 661). 
The relationship between the individual and collectivity in human societies is 
not only a matter of ways of living together, but it is intimately linked with societal 
norms (Hofstede, 1980/1984: 214). For an individualist, the relationship between 
employer and employee is a contract supposed to be based on mutual advantage; in 
contrast, a collectivist perceives the relationship in moral terms, like a family link. 
The level of individualism/collectivism in society will also affect what type of persons 
will be admitted into positions of special influence in organisations (Hofstede. 
1980/1984: 218). The hiring process in a collectivist society always takes the in-group 
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into account. Usually preference is given to hiring relatives, first of all of the 
employer, but also of other persons already employed by the company ( Hofstede. 
1991: 64). The distinction between in-group and out-groups which is so essential in 
the collectivist culture pattern has far-reaching consequences for business 
relationships, beyond those between employers and employees (Triandis, 1989: 509-
510; Hofstede, 1991: 66). Management in an individualist society is management of 
individuals. Subordinates can usually be moved around the individual; if incentives or 
bonuses are given, these should be linked to an individual's performance. Management 
in a collectivist society is management of groups. The extent to which people actually 
feel emptionally integrated into a work group may differ from one situation to another 
(Hofstede, 1991: 65). 
2.3.2.2 Power Distance 
Power distance relates to how power is distributed among organisational 
members at various hierarchical levels in different societies. Power distance can be 
defined as the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and 
organisations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally 
(Hofstede and Bond, 1988: 10; Hofstede, 1991: 28). It affects the feasibility of socio-
technical interventions (Hofstede, 1984: 395) and has a close relationship with the 
dimension of collectivism (Hofstede, 198011984; Smith et al., 1996). Within 
organisations as units of society, we inevitably find inequality of members' abilities 
and inequality of power (Hofstede, 1980/1984: 96). In most utilitarian organisations, 
the distribution of power is formalised in a hierarchy. The basic element from which 
hierarchical pyramids are built is the relationship between a boss and a subordinate 
(Hofstede, 1991: 97, 99). In the large power distance situation superiors and 
subordinates consider one another as existentially unequal; the hierarchical system is 
felt to be based on this existential inequality. Organisations centralise power as much 
as possible in a few hands (Hofstede, 1984: 395). There are a lot of supervisory 
personnel, structured into tall hierarchies of people reporting to each other. 
Subordinates are expected to be told what to do (Hofstede, 1991: 35). In the small 
power distance situation subordinates and superiors consider one another as 
existentially equal; the hierarchical system is just an inequality of roles, established 
for convenience; and roles may be changed, so that someone who today is my 
subordinate may tomorrow be my boss. Organisations are fairly decentralised with flat 
hierarchical pyramids and limited numbers of supervisory personnel. Subordinates 
expect to be consulted before a decision is made that affects their work, but they 
accept that the boss is the one who finally decides (Hofstede, 1991: 36). 
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2.3.2.3 Uncertainty Avoidance 
Uncertainty avoidance is defined as the extent to which the members of a 
culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations (Hofstede, 1991: 263). It 
denotes the extent to which members of a society are able to cope with the uncertainty 
of the future without experiencing undue stress (Ueno and Sekaran, 1992: 661). eyert 
and March (196311992: 121) use the expression "uncertainty avoidance", and they say: 
"The firm looks for procedures that minimise the need for predicting uncertain future 
events. One method uses short-run feedback as a trigger to action, another accepts 
(and enforces) standardised decision rules." In uncertainty avoiding societies there are 
many formal laws and/or informal rules controlling the rights and duties of employers 
and employees. There are also many internal rules and regulations controlling the 
work process (Hofstede, 1991: 120). They try to minimise the possibility of 
unstructured situations4 by adhering to strict laws and rules, safety and security 
measures, and (on the philosophical and religious level) a belief in absolute Truth: 
"There can be only one Truth, and we have it." (Hofstede and Bond, 1988: 11). 
Organisational members who have a predisposition for strong uncertainty avoidance 
try to engage in activities such as long-range planning and creating protective 
structures around them, which they expect will allay the anxiety of facing the 
unforeseen future (Ueno and Sekaran, 1992: 661-2). Uncertainty-avoiding rituals, 
including memos and reports, certain parts of the accounting system, a part of 
planning systems and control systems, in organisations do not make the future more 
predictable, but they relieve some of the stress of uncertainty by creating a pseudo-
certainty within which organisation members can continue functioning (Hofstede, 
198011984: 159-160). Sometimes, their laws and rules are even clearly nonsensical, 
inconsistent, or dysfunctional (Hofstede, 1991: 121). In countries with very weak 
uncertainty avoidance there rather seems to be an emotional horror of formal rules. 
People are more tolerant of behaviour and opinions that differ from their own; they try 
to have as few rules as possible, and on the philosophical and religious level they are 
relativist, allowing many currents to flow side by side (Hofstede and Bond, 1988: 11). 
Rules are only established in case of absolute necessary. People in such societies pride 
themselves that many problems can be solved without formal rules (Hofstede, 1991: 
121). 
2.3.2.4 MasculinitylFemininity 
This refers to a culture group's dominant values in regard to the job. 
Masculinity pertains to societies in which social gender roles are clearly distinct (i.e .. 
4 Unstructured situations are defined as novel. unknown. surprising. or different from the usual. 
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men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success whereas 
women are supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of 
life); femininity pertains to societies in which social gender roles overlap (i.e., both 
men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of 
life) (Hofstede 1991: 82-83). 
According to Chinese Yin-Yang theory, which receives some affinnation from 
both modem physics and analytical psychology, there are two overall principles, the 
masculine and the feminine, inherent in all phenomena and responsible, by their 
interaction, for the emergence and dissolution of all things. The masculine principle 
provides people with a way of understanding the world instead of being enslaved by it, 
of directing and planning their own lives instead of being unwitting participants in 
nature's designs. It also offers them the chance of discovering their own individuality 
instead of being compelled by the collective impulses of the group (Lessem, 1989: 
63). The feminine is, in fact, a bridging influence. It bridges the individual and the 
external worlds, one department and another, the conscious and subconscious minds, 
corporate strategy and corporate culture. In this capacity it acts as an agent of renewal 
and transformation. (Lessem, 1989: 64). Yin and Yang describe a world in which 
people and things, structures and processes, make up different expressions of a 
continuum, rather than irreconcilable opposites (Lessem, 1989: 61). What appear 
logically as opposites are actually the same in reality (Sarachek, 1990: 151). Whereas 
the masculine principle promotes a subject-object relationship, the feminine principle 
encourages an experience of unity between subject and object (Lessem, 1989: 64). 
They are like the two sides of our brain. The left side of the brain, represented by the 
right hand, is the "masculine" and aggressive side that wants to control, to determine 
what is, to decide what is right. The right side, represented by the left hand, is the 
"feminine" and sensitive side that wants to respond, to adapt to what is, and to 
recognise what is right (Lessem, 1989: 67). 
In more masculine cultures, men dominate the society, people consider big as 
beautiful and they have a need to perform and show off (Ueno and Sekaran, 1992: 62). 
The masculine manager is, of course, assertive, decisive, and aggressive. He stresses 
equity. competition among colleagues, and performance. People tend to show a more 
sceptical view of others, which is demonstrated by their lesser rejection of Theory X 
(Hofstede, 1980/1984: 284-294; 1991: 94-96). On the contrary. in more feminine 
culture, the dominant values are for members to play more androgynous roles, 
consider small as beautiful, and care for the quality of life and the environment rather 
than for money (Ueno and Skaran, 1992: 62). The women have the same neutralising 
values as the men. The manager in a feminine culture is less visible, intuitive rather 
than decisive, and accustomed to seeking consensus. He stresses equality, solidarity, 
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and quality of work life. Theory X is strongly rejected by such people (Hofstede, 
198011984: 284-294; 1991: 94-96). 
2.3.2.5 Confucian Work Dynamism 
According to Chinese Cultural Connection (1987: 150), there are four factors 
in Chinese culture: integration, Confucian work dynamism, human-heartedness and 
moral discipline. With the exception of Confucian work dynamism, these correlate 
with Hofstede's cultural dimensions. The dimension of Confucian work dynamism is 
identified as polarising societies on a set of values derived from the teaching of 
Confucius in China. It comprises eight values: ordering relationships by status and 
observing this order, thrift, persistence, having a sense of shame, reciprocation for 
greetings, favours, and gifts, personal steadiness and stability, protecting one's "face", 
and respect for tradition. Hofstede (1991: 165-166) regards the former four values as 
the pole of "long-term orientation" and the latter four values as the pole of "short-term 
orientation." The values on the pole of long-term orientation are more oriented 
towards the future (especially perseverance and thrift); they are more dynamic. The 
values on the opposite pole are more oriented towards the past and present; they are 
more static (Hofstede, 1991: 166). Societies which regard the first four as relatively 
important tend to regard the second four as relatively unimportant, and vice-versa 
(Harrison et ai., 1994: 247). Compared to the values of long-term orientation, the 
values of short-term orientation are low endorsement to facilitate economic growth 
(Hofstede and Bond, 1988: 18). Hofstede and Bond said those countries which ranked 
high within 22 nations on this dimension reflected "a dynamic future-oriented 
mentality" (Hofstede and Bond, 1988: 12-13). That is, the values of the long-term are 
more important to those countries. 
Confucianism is a collectively oriented philosophy which presents a 
hierarchical view of the social order (Fuller and Peterson, 1992: 186; Chow et ai., 
1995: 37). The shared value of "ordering relationships by status and observing this 
order" is quintessential Confucianism in action. Chinese culture has a high regard for 
hierarchy in which everyone has hislher assigned place, and in which individuals in 
superior positions are accorded a wide range of prerogatives and authority over those 
below them (Bond and Hwang, 1986; King and Bond, 1985; Merchant et al., 1995). 
The essence of Confucianism lies in the family system (Chow et al., 1995: 37). 
Children are taught to keep filial piety to their parents and family members are 
assigned proper hierarchical order according to age and generation. The leader of the 
family owns supreme power with full control over all decisions relevant to family 
members. This family culture forms the foundation for loyalty and obedience to the 
superior and ruler. The stability of society is based on unequal relationships between 
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people (Hofstede, 1991: 40). Hierarchical dualities and interrelatedness lie at the heart 
of the Chinese conception of being human (the "wu lun"s ). This sense of hierarchy 
and complementarity of relations undoubtedly makes the entrepreneurial role easier to 
play (Hofstede and Bond, 1988: 18; Hofstede, 1991: 168-169). The senior managers at 
headquarters and their subordinates have ordering relationships in their mind, that is, 
senior managers have a powerful degree of control and they select important managers 
from their in-group by order. The value of having a "sense of shame" supports 
interrelatedness through sensitivity to social contracts and a stress on keeping one's 
commitments (Hofstede and Bond, 1988: 18; Hofstede, 1991: 169). It has a significant 
effect on budget evaluative style and the reward system. The value of thrift leads to 
savings and availability of capital for reinvestment. Persistence, tenacity in the pursuit 
of whatever goals, is an essential asset for a beginning entrepreneur (Hofstede, 1991: 
168-9). The values of "thrift" and "persistence" have deep relationships with economic 
growth and long-term objectives. However, Yeh and Lawrence (1995: 656) remarked 
that Hofstede used two dimensions of culture (individualism and Confucian 
dynamism) as independents and that culture is not a sufficient condition to explain 
economic growth (also reference to The World Bank, 1993: 79-81). 
2.3.3 National Culture and Corporate Culture 
Corporate culture is sometimes called organisational culture. Because it is not 
easy to define organisations in time and space (Schein, 1991: 7), corporate culture 
may be used in preference to organisational culture but they are still interchangeable 
in this research .. 
Corporate culture typically is defined as a complex set of values, beliefs, 
assumptions, and symbols that define the way in which a firm conducts its business 
(Barney, 1986: 657; Reimann, 1987: 168). Corporate culture also can be defined as 
the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one 
corporate body from another (Hofstede, 1987: 1, 1991: 180). Culture is patterned, 
potent, and deeply embedded in people's thoughts, perceptions, and feelings. It 
provides an integrated perspective and meaning to situations; it gives group members 
a historical perspective and view of their identity (Greenley, 1989: 204-205; Schein, 
1991: 44; Kotter, 1992: 6-7). Managers and others throughout the organisation pay 
extraordinary attention to whatever matters are stressed in the corporate value system 
(Deal and Allen, 1982: 33). Flamholtz (1983: 158, 168) argued for an organisation's 
5 Wu lun means five basic relationships: ruler-subject, father-son. old brother-younger brother, 
husband-wife. and senior friend-junior friend. These relationships contain mutual and complementary 
obligations: the junior partner owes the senior respect and obedience; the senior owes the junior partner 
protection and consideration (Hofstede. 1991: 40). 
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culture as a mechanism of control (also see Ray, 1986: 294-295). Differing cultures of 
organisations interpret or structure the problems in different ways, and a cultural 
feature that is an asset for one purpose is unavoidably a liability for another (Hofstede 
et aI., 1990: 314). A strong culture enables people to feel better about what they do, so 
they are more likely to work harder (Deal and Kennedy, 1982: 16). Culture can be 
divided into three levels: artefacts which comprise the most visible level, values 
which reflect people's sense of what "ought" to be as distinct from what is, and basic 
underlying assumptions which come to be taken for granted when a solution to a 
problem works repeatedly (Schein, 1991: 14-8). National cultures reside mainly in 
deeply-rooted values, while organisational cultures are a more superficial 
phenomenon (Hofstede et aI., 1987: 9, 1990: 312, 1991: 182; Smith, 1992: 45-48; 
Hodgetts, 1993: 56). Organisational cultures are mainly expressed not in members' 
values but in more superficial manifestations like common symbols, heroes, and 
rituals (Hofstede, 1991: 236). At the national level, cultural differences reside mostly 
in values, less in practices; at the corporate level, cultural differences reside mostly in 
practices, less in values (see Figure 2.1): 
Level 
Nation 
Occupation 
Organisation 
Values 
Practices 
L-_-=--______________ _ 
Figure 2.1 The Nature of Cultural Differences 
Data sources: Hofstede, 1991: 182 
Place of 
socialisation 
Family 
School 
Workplace 
The values of founders and key leaders undoubtedly shape organisational 
cultures, but the way these cultures affect ordinary members is through shared 
practices. Founders-leaders' values become members' practices (Hofstede, 1991: 183). 
The national cultural impact on organisations is profound and affects both business 
and government (Hofstede, 1991: 236). The attitude towards strong organisational 
cultures is partly affected by the national culture element (Hofstede, 1991: 180). 
Organisational cultures reflect nationality, demographics of employees and managers, 
industry and market; they are related to organisational structure and control systems, 
but all of these leave room for unique and idiosyncratic elements (Hofstede, et al .. 
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1990: 306, 313). 
In recent decades, some multinational companies' managers believe that a firm 
which has a valuable, rare, and imperfectly imitable culture enjoys a sustained 
competitive advantage that reflects that culture (Barney, 1986: 659). Yet these 
subsidiaries are embedded in local national cultures wherein the underlying basic 
assumptions about people and the world may differ from those of the national and 
corporate culture of the multinational (Schneider, 1988). According to Hofstede 
(1980/1984), when faced with cultural diversity among home cultures a viable new 
organisation can only be created through the development of a strong organisational 
subculture or common entity (also see Olie, 1994: 386). Negotiations between the 
intergroup elements become even more complex because intergroup issues get 
combined with issues of national cultural differences (Schein 1991: 40). Rentsch 
(1990) argues that shared interpretations and understanding of organisational events 
are a component of most definitions of culture. Corporate culture, rather than national 
culture, seems most relevant to management issues that focus upon organisational 
tasks and technologies; where management issues pertain to an organisation's 
relationship to its environment, broader national cultures become more relevant 
(Robey and Rodriguez-Diaz, 1989). Actually, the management in a multinational firm 
will be a function of both the national culture and the corporate culture (Schein, 1991: 
40). 
The question is how to identify the corporate culture and national culture in 
cross-cultural research. Cultural differences among national subsidiaries easily lead to 
conflicts over corporate policies. Such conflicts arise not only between headquarters 
and local managers in the subsidiaries, but also between headquarters and expatriates 
from the home country nationality (Hofstede and Bond, 1988: 20). Theoretically, it is 
very difficult to make a demarcation between national culture and corporate culture. In 
pragmatic experiments, however, scholars attempted to control one of them to get 
their research results. As mentioned above, most cross-cultural researchers used 
aggregate samples as a means of controlling for corporate culture to observe the 
similarities and differences between different nations or areas. Some researchers (such 
as Hofstede, 1980/1984; Boyacigiller, 1990) explored different national cultural 
dimensions also by controlling under a single corporate culture. Conversely. if 
companies were compared within a same nation or area (such as Hofstede et aI., 1990; 
Pratt et al., 1993), the characteristic of different corporate cultures would be observed 
more easily. 
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2.3.4 Taiwanese and European Cultures 
According to Hofstede's (1991) five dimensions of national culture, Taiwan 
and west European countries have important cultural differences (see Table 2.1). 
Because of great differences in power distance, individualism, and Confucian 
dynamism between European countries and Taiwan, it is possible to assume that their 
systems show some differences. 
As this study covered Britain, Germany, and Holland in Europe, these three 
countries could be aggregated for the purposes of comparison with Taiwan. 
Integratedly speaking, as the parts in grey in Table 2.1 show, the three European 
countries are high in individualism but low in power distance and Confucian 
dynamism, whilst Taiwan shows low individualism but high power distance and 
Confucian dynamism. Except when comparing one specific country with another to 
discuss the dimensions of masculinity and uncertainty avoidance, these three cultural 
dimensions will be used as directional predictions in the hypotheses. When the 
directional predictions based on cultural dimensions involve individual conflict, the 
priority will not be decided in advance (such as Chow, Shields & Wu, 1996: 8), but be 
solved component by component. 
Table 2.1 Scores on Hofstede's Five Dimensions for E n Countries and Taiwan 
Source: Summarised from Hofstede's (1988) " The Confucius Connection: From Cultural Roots to 
Economic Growth", p.12-13. 
This study will compare the case firms' management control systems of 
Taiwanese and European operations through the qualitative analysis of in-depth 
interview with managers. If there are differences between managers' interviews, a 
deeper probing will be held to understand their real reasons. The reliability can be 
strengthened by triangulation with different measurement methods or sources (Chow, 
Shields & Wu, 1996: 25). As a result, a consistent or reconciled result of each 
component will be tested with its directional prediction of propositions. 
27 
2.4 A Comparison of MCSs between Europe and Taiwan 
2.4.1 Management Control System 
The management role in control is called "management control" (Anthony et 
aI., 1985: 5), and an organised systematic process and structure that management uses 
in management control is called a "management control system" (Anthony et aI., 
1985: 4). From a decisional purpose, a management control system is a means of 
gathering information to aid and co-ordinate the process of making planning and 
control decisions throughout the organisation (Horngren et aI., 1994; 466); whereas 
from a controlling purpose, a management control system is a mechanism designed to 
limit the decision space of individuals within an organisation so as to affect their 
behaviour (Birnberg and Snodgrass, 1988: 447). The idea of an objective of an 
instrumental organisation6 is an aggregation of individual objectives (Otley & Berry, 
1992: 31). Rationality is basically behaviour that strives to achieve organisational 
goals (Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1991: 107). A major aim of a management control 
system is to induce individuals to behave in ways which contribute to overall 
organisational performance (Emmanuel et aI., 1990: 69). MCSs are tools used by 
management to convey the goals of the organisation, and ensure these goals are 
pursued by organisational members (Merchant, 1985a; McNair, 1991; Abernethy and 
Stoelwinder, 1991). Motivation is the desire to attain a selected goal (the goal-
congruence aspect) combined with the resulting drive or pursuit toward the goal (the 
effort aspect) (Horngren et aI., 1994: 469). Management control in an organisation is a 
social process in a social, or maybe socio-technical system (Hofstede, 1978), and 
control systems are dependent upon power relationships within organisations 
(Emmanuel et aI., 1990: 66). 
While some experimental research followed the whole cycle of management 
control system, including the planning process, organising process, evaluating 
process, and rewarding process (such as Otley, 1980; Daley et aI., 1985, Simons, 
1987, 1990; Chow, Kato & Shields, 1994; Chow, Shields & Wu, 1996), most 
researchers emphasised part of the cycle, such as the planning process (Lincoln et aI .. 
1986; Demirag, 1987; Frucot & Shearon, 1991; Ueno & Sekaran, 1992; Ueno & Wu, 
1993; Harrison et aI., 1994; O'Connor, 1995), the organising process (McMillan et aI., 
1973; Child, 1973; Lincoln et aI., 1978; Ginzberg, 1980; Maurice et aI .. 1980; Lincoln 
et aI., 1981; Birnbaum & Wong, 1985; Lincoln et aI., 1986; Chow et ai, 1991; 
Agarwal, 1993; Harrison et aI .• 1994), the evaluating process (Snodgrass & Grant. 
6 In an instrumental organisation individual goals are neutral towards organisational goals; in a 
normative organisation there is a wide area of agreement on and commitment to organisational goals 
(Otley & Berry. 1992: 31). 
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1986; Bimberg & Snodgrass, 1988; Merchant, 1985~ 1990; Vance et al. 1992; 
Harrison, 1992, 1993; Ueno & Sekaran, 1992; Ueno & w~ 1993; Chow, Kato & 
Merchant, 1996; Hamilton et al., 1996), or the rewarding process (Vance et al, 1992; 
Snodgrass & Grant, 1986; Merchant et aI., 1995). From those experiments, three 
important phenomena could be found. First, while most of them chose formal 
mechanisms of management control systems in their research, other researchers 
covered informal mechanisms (such as Snodgrass & Grant, 1986; Birnberg & 
Snodgrass, 1988; Snodgrass and Szewczak., 1991; Chow, Kato & Merchant, 1996), 
general control concepts from top level (such as Simons, 1987, 1990; Hamilton, 
1996), or environmental contingent variables (such as Chow, Kato & Shields, 1994). 
In other words, the scope and definition are not consistent. Control in organisations is 
inevitably partial and imperfect (Emmanuel, et aI., 1992: 3). Another fact is the 
importance of budget in management control systems. Plenty of experiments 
(especially such as those of Kenis, 1979; Brownell, 1985; Simons, 1988, 1990; Frucot 
& Shearon, 1991; Frucot and Shearon, 1991; Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1991; Ueno 
and Skaran, 1992; Harrison, 1992, 1993; Shields and Young, 1993; Lau et al., 1995) 
focused on budget planning and evaluating. Finally, compared to other processes, only 
a few researchers touched the formal rewarding systems, and almost all of their 
hypotheses based on national cultural dimensions could not be supported. It seems a 
valuable topic to explore in depth. 
According to the above research and general control theories, this study 
followed the definition of management control systems. The study chose formal 
mechanisms only and covered the whole cycle of management control systems. Ten 
components were selected for comparing and examining, including the planning 
process (objective setting, participation, long-term and short-term planning), the 
organisation process (decentralisation, formality), the evaluating process 
(controllability-filters, feedback extent and frequency) and the rewarding process 
(contingent reward, group rewards, long-term rewards). Each component will be 
defined or described further in the next section. 
2.4.2 Differences in MeSs between Taiwan and Europe 
As Hofstede (1980: 383) says: "Planning represents an attempt to reduce 
uncertainty; control implies the exercise of power ... " As planning and control are two 
main functions in a management control system, so culture has a close relationship 
with it. Culture at the national level may be expected to permeate through to 
organisational subculture, though with varying degrees of integration (Radebaugh & 
Gray. 1993: 54). Members of different culture groups may react differently to the 
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same control mechanism designed to achieve the same behaviour. Accounting and 
management control systems are manifestations of culture and reflect basic cultural 
assumptions (Hofstede, 1991: 155). Thus, with a polycentric attitude (Radebaugh & 
Gray, 1993: 32), there is no reason to believe that a single management control system 
is appropriate for all culture groups (Bimberg and Snodgrass, 1988). 
A few researchers (such as J aggi, 1975; Riahi -Belkaoui and Picur, 1991) 
indicated the relationship between cultural differences and the development of 
accounting principles or concepts. Some researchers (such as Saffold ill, 1988; Gray, 
1980, 1995) improved the traditional framework and developed a culture-performance 
framework, a more sophisticated understanding of the tie between culture and 
organisational outcomes. The appreciation of organisations as cultures provides a rich 
insight into organisational life, and it also invests accounting with symbolic meaning 
(Dent, 1991: 728). Scholars must combine more appropriate measures of culture's 
impact with careful attention to intrinsically cultural, performance-related 
organisational processes. Neimark and Tinker (1986) addressed many of the 
deficiencies found in the existing literature by incorporating inter-organisational and 
social systems. Gray (1988) also developed a theory framework of culture, societal 
values and the accounting sub-culture as a basis of classification of accounting 
systems (also see Radebaugh & Gray, 1993: 54, 56). Social values existing in different 
culture areas affect accounting values, and then accounting values impact on the 
accounting system. A great deal of cross-cultural research as described above has 
indicated different systems between two specific countries or areas. In addition, some 
experiments have also proved the relation between culture and performance, such as, 
in identifying emic theories of individual and group influences on the performance 
and control process. American workers tend to see groups as reducing poor 
performance and Japanese workers tend to see groups as enhancing good 
performance. (Sullivan et al., 1986). 
According to the above arguments, if the national culture is a major 
determinant of the effectiveness of the MCS, the use of components of the MCS does 
differ between different countries. This expectation leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: The use of components of the management control system 
differs between Taiwanese and European operations. 
According to the elements of the management control system, this study 
develops ten SUb-propositions as follows: 
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2.4.2.1 Planning Process 
The process of objective-setting, the budget participation, and the horizontal 
time span in the planning function are deeply affected by different national cultures. 
The process of objective-setting is to measure the extent to which employees 
at lower hierarchical levels are allowed to have input into the development and 
selection of the plan for which they will be held responsible for achieving (Bimberg et 
aI., 1990; Shields and Young, 1993; see Chow, Kato & Shields, 1994: 386). There are 
many reasons to believe Taiwanese operations will employ more top-down planning 
in their objective-setting. Firstly, organisations centralise power as much as possible 
in a few hands. Subordinates are expected to be told what to do (Hofstede, 1991: 35). 
The greater degree of power distance between levels of Taiwanese society leads their 
people to a greater preference for the top-down planning approach. Secondly, in 
Chinese society the senior managers and their subordinates have ordered relationships 
in their mind. The senior managers' wishes are easily followed by their subordinates 
and their subordinates always show maximum perseverance in pursuing objectives. 
Thirdly, members of collectivistic societies have high loyalty to the organisation 
working toward its goals. This leader-centred manner tends to use the top-down 
planning approach with ease. Therefore, the objective-setting SUb-proposition of 
directional prediction is set as follows: 
Proposition 1-1: Taiwanese operations will employ more top-down planning 
in objective-setting than their European counterparts. 
Motivation is more necessary in European operations than in Taiwanese 
operations. In the individualist society the task is supposed to prevail over any 
personal relationships and the management is management of individuals (Hofstede, 
1991: 67). In contrast, in the collectivist society the personal relationship prevails over 
the task and the management is management of groups (Hofstede, 1991: 67). 
Obviously, the individualist society needs more and broader motivation than the 
collectivist society. Next, Taiwanese society involves greater distance between the all 
powerful and subordinates than European societies. The hierarchy in organisations 
reflects the inequality between higher-ups and lower-downs. Centralisation is popular 
and the ideal boss is a benevolent autocrat or good father (Hofstede, 1991: 37). 
Compared to decentralised and democratic European societies of smaller power 
distance, Taiwanese society has less need to communicate than European societies. 
Finally. because Taiwanese society is more greatly motivated by Confucian work 
dynamism, subordinates expect to be told what to do. The relationships ordered by 
status and the observation of this order allow the superior to make decisions quickly 
after analysing the conditions. There are fewer communications in Taiwanese society 
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than in European societies. The sub-proposition of participation between two areas is 
predicted as follows: 
Proposition 1-2: Taiwanese operations will be less participative than their 
European counterparts. 
It is expected that such a situation will be accepted by individuals in societies 
placing low emphasis on individualism with the consequence of a greater 
preparedness to emphasise long-term planning (Harrison et al., 1994: 251). To obtain 
long-term benefits, some decisions need to sacrifice short-term performance. A 
collective and high power distance society such as Taiwan's makes it easier to set 
long-term planning than European society. In addition, in Confucian work dynamism 
"persistence" or "perseverance" suggests a general tenacity in the pursuit of whatever 
goals a person selects for himself or herself, including economic goals (Hofstede and 
Bond, 1988: 18; Chow et ai, 40). This society is very suitable for a long-term planning 
orientation. 
Planning represents an attempt to reduce uncertainty (Hofstede, 1980/1984: 
383), It is also reasonable to predict the direction based on the dimension of 
uncertainty avoidance (such as Ueno and Wu, 1993). Compared to European 
countries, especially Britain, Taiwanese society has higher uncertainty avoidance, so 
Taiwanese operations focus more easily on long-term planning than their European 
counterparts, especially Britain's. 
According to the above analysis, the SUb-proposition of short-term and long-
term planning is defined as follows: 
Proposition 1-3: Taiwanese operations will focus more on long-term 
planning than their European counterparts. 
2.4.2.2 Organising Process 
Power distance significantly affects organisational decentralisation. The higher 
power distance of the Taiwanese operations is predicted to produce a higher 
preference for centralisation because this would be consistent with power differentials 
in which individuals higher in the hierarchy would direct those below (Chow, Kato & 
Shields, 1994: 388). Hierarchy in organisations reflects the existential inequality 
between higher-ups and lower-downs. Subordinates expect to be told what to do, so 
centralisation is popular (Hofstede, 1991: 37). In contrast, European societies are 
predicted to prefer decentralisation as a sequence of their lower power distance. 
Hierarchy in organisations means an inequality of roles, established for convenience. 
Subordinates expect to be consulted, so decentralisation is popular (Hofstede, 1991: 
37). Collectivism also significantly affects centralisation. In collectivist society, the 
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purpose of education is learning how to do, not how to learn (Hofstede, 1991: 67). 
The relationship between employer and employee is perceived in moral terms, like a 
family link (Hofstede, 1991: 67). Compared to Taiwanese society, most of the 
European countries prefer freedom to equality. Their people pursue "doing one's own 
thing." In a collectivist culture, what will be actualised is the interest and honour of 
the in-group which may very well call for self-effacement from many of the in-group 
members (Hofstede, 1991: 73). It is easier to execute centralisation in a collectivist 
society than in an individualist society. Because Confucian teaching emphasises that 
the stability of society is based on unequal relationships between people, the junior 
partner owes the senior respect and obedience and the senior owes the junior partner 
protection and consideration (Hofstede and Bond 1988: 8; Hofstede, 1991: 165). A 
sense of a harmonious and stable hierarchy and complementarity of roles undoubtedly 
makes the entrepreneurial role easier to play (Hofstede, 1991: 168-169), so the 
centralised organisation is easily accepted by Chinese society. Therefore, the sub-
proposition of decentralisation could be built as follows: 
Proposition 1-4: Taiwanese operations will have less decentralisation than 
their European counterparts. 
Formality means more formal rules (e.g. standard operating procedures, policy 
manuals) to provide guidance on how to operate in uncertain situations (Chow, Kato 
& Shields, 1994: 388). In countries with very weak uncertainty avoidance there rather 
seems to be an emotional horror of formal rules. Rules are established only in case of 
absolute necessity (Hofstede, 1991: 121). In contrast, in uncertainty avoiding societies 
there are many formal laws and/or informal rules controlling the rights and duties of 
employers and employees. There are also many internal rules and regulations 
controlling the work process (Hofstede, 1991: 120). Because Taiwanese society has 
higher uncertainty avoidance than British society, Taiwan is expected to have a higher 
preference for greater formality than Britain. However, as Germany and the 
Netherlands have only a little lower uncertainty avoidance than Taiwan, it seems hard 
to predict the direction of their cultural dimensions. However, the dimensions of 
individualism, power distance, and Confucian dynamism could also assist in 
predicting direction. In a collective society, people easily build their common way of 
making decisions or solving problems, but in an individualist society the procedures 
and rules seem more important in leading people to understand. Also, in the society of 
high power distance and the ordering of Confucian dynamism, people easily follow 
the orders of their seniors instead of rules, more than those in the society of low power 
distance. 
From the above analysis, the sub-proposition of formality is set as follows: 
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Proposition 1-5: Taiwanese operations will have less fomullity than their 
European counterparts. 
2.4.2.3 Evaluating Process 
A controllability-filter is intended to eliminate or reduce a person's exposure to 
the (adverse) effects of uncertainty (Demski, 1976; Merchant, 1989; see Chow. 
Shields & Wu, 1994: 9). There are many controllability-filters in management 
practice, such as a flexible budget, responsibility centre and controllable items. 
Hofstede argues that, in uncertainty avoidance societies, people have an emotional 
need for rules, even if these will never work (Hofstede, 1991: 125). Uncertainty 
avoidance is positively related to the preference for being insulated from uncertainty 
and its effects (Chow et al., 1995: 9). From this point of view, Taiwanese operations 
will employ more controllability-filters than their British counterparts. However, as 
Germany and the Netherlands have only a little lower uncertainty avoidance than 
Taiwan, it seems hard to predict the direction of their cultural dimensions. Three other 
cultural dimensions could lead Taiwanese operations to put less emphasis on 
controllability-filters. First, because Taiwanese society is more power distanced, the 
senior manager owes the junior managers protection and consideration. The senior 
managers always like to play the role of being a good father. Secondly, because 
Taiwanese society is more collectivist, many high-level managers come from the in-
group. The senior managers always believe these people more than the system. Even 
though they emphasise the budget objective, they still put more emphasis on the whole 
company objective rather than specific units' objectives. Finally, under Confucian 
work dynamism, virtuous behaviour towards others consists of treating others as one 
would like to be treated oneself. People keep aware of shame and the need to keep 
one's "face." This human benevolence induces the managers to neglect controllability-
filters. As a result, Taiwanese operations use fewer controllability-filters than their 
European counterparts. Hence, the Taiwanese use a more relaxed formal feedback 
system, including frequency and extent, than their European counterparts, but they 
may use more informal monitoring systems, like meetings, instructions, and procedure 
controls (Chow, Kato & Merchant, 1996). 
According to the above analysis, two sub-propositions in the evaluating 
function are set as follows: 
Proposition 1-6: Taiwanese operations will have fewer controllability-filters 
than their European counterparts. 
Proposition 1-7: Taiwanese operations managers will employ a more 
relaxed feedback system, including frequency and extent, titan their 
Eu~peanco"n~rpa~ 
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2.4.2.4 Rewarding Process 
The term "contingent rewards" or "reward-dependency" means a preference for 
proportionally more monetary rewards tied to performance. According to some 
literature which compared Asian countries and America or Australia with Hofstede's 
cultural scores, Taiwanese society seems to be less reward-dependent than European 
societies. First, compared to European individualist societies, Taiwanese collectivist 
society is predicted to have a greater preference for relatively equal pay. That is, their 
people show more preference for preset pay. Secondly, Taiwanese society has a 
somewhat higher score in uncertainty avoidance than European countries, especially 
Britain. People in uncertainty avoidance societies tend to show higher preference for 
preset pay to reduce pay uncertainty due to uncontrollable influences on performance 
(Daley et aI., 1985; Chow, Kato & Shields, 1994: 389). Thirdly, unlike Holland, 
Germany and Britain which have an obviously higher score on masculinity than 
Taiwan, dominant values in Taiwanese societies are caring for others and preservation 
for their managers (Hofstede, 1991: 96). However, as West European countries have 
been managed under socialism for a long time, the preset pay approach has become a 
very popular economic practice. In contrast, Taiwan has followed capitalism from 
America for a half-century and the contingent rewarding approach could be easily 
found in many companies. The rewarding system will be deeply affected by political 
and social-economic factors, so this study considers political and social system as a 
first priority and assumes the preset pay approach will be more popular in the 
European operations. For the above reason, the sub-proposition of contingent rewards 
could be set as follows: 
Proposition 1-8: Taiwanese operations will give more contingent rewards 
than their European counterparts. 
Group rewards have a strong relationship with the dimension of collectivism. 
In collectivist society people have a higher preference for team co-operation and they 
like to share the team-based rewards. "Management in a collectivist society is 
management of the group" (Hofstede, 1991: 65, 67). From the view of the Confucian 
dynamism dimension, because people have a sense of shame they do care about 
getting fewer rewards than others. If one receives a lower reward than other people, 
they would regard him as lacking ability. In addition, the dimension of uncertainty 
avoidance could also affect group rewards. Because Taiwanese society has a higher 
score of uncertainty avoidance than its European counterparts, it is assumed that 
Taiwanese people prefer group rewards more than European people. Based on these 
reasons, a SUb-proposition of group rewards could be set as follows: 
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Proposition 1-9: Taiwanese operations will be more group reward oriented 
than their European counterparts. 
Long-tenn rewards mean that the company promises its managers or 
employees different rewards (such as bonus and stock options) according to their 
long-tenn perfonnance. The dimensions of individual and Confucian dynamism have 
been used as a basis to predict the possible direction between USA and Taiwanese 
dynamism (Merchant et aI., 1995), and Taiwanese firms are assumed to use fewer 
long-tenn incentives than American firms. However, although this study uses the 
same dimensions to predict, it gets a contrary predicted direction. First, the "long-term 
orientation" is the most important energy to facilitate long-term economic growth in 
the higher Confucian dynamism of Taiwanese society. With the characteristics of 
thrift and persistence, people will easily sacrifice short-term benefits for their long-
term interests (Chow et aI., 1995: 40). Secondly, in such a collectivist society as 
Taiwan, people are born into extended families or other in-groups. The personal 
relationship ("guanxi") prevails over the task and should be established first 
(Hofstede, 1991: 67). Many employees hope to become a partner or own their own 
business. Under this condition, sharing risk, profits, and shares in long-term planning 
and long-term rewards in a firm seem very necessary. With the predicted direction, the 
proposition is also more in harmony with the proposition of short-term and long-term 
planning. 
According to the above description, the SUb-proposition could be set as follows: 
Proposition 1-10: Taiwanese operations will place more emphasis on long-term 
rewards than their European counterparts. 
2.5 Financial Control Factors as Dynamic Variables in MCS 
Transfer 
2.5.1. Cultural Theory of Organisation and Leadership 
In attempting to examine the implications of culture for management practices 
in cross-cultural studies, researchers have generally followed two lines of thought. 
The ideationalists have directed their attention to the attitudes and values expressed by 
organisational members; on the other hand, the institutionalists in the limited amount 
of research they have conducted so far have concentrated upon structural aspects 
within organisations, such as the division of labour, career, status and reward 
structures (Tayeb, 1988; 34; also see Whitley, 1992; 3). The culturalists, such as 
Hofstede, believe that the major strength of the cultural perspective as a whole is its 
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recognition of (a) the important role that culture plays in shaping work-related values, 
attitudes and behaviours of individual members of various societies; (b) the fact that 
cultural values and attitudes are different in degree from one society to another; and 
(c) the fact that different cultural groups behave differently under similar 
circumstances because of the differences in their underlying values and attitudes 
(Tayeb, 1988: 40). The culture and values of the organisation are crucial for matching 
the organisation's resources to its environment (Thompson, 1993: 77). 
Stories, sagas, metaphors, myths, and the like are the means of organisational 
members when playing the power game of corporate culture (Schultz, 1992: 30). 
Leadership is intertwined with culture formation, evolution, transformation, and 
destruction (Quinn et aI., 1988: 346; Schein, 1991: 316). Without leadership, groups 
would not be able to change environmental conditions. The assumptions of leaders or 
founders of a group, the authority relationships formed in the group, and the manner in 
which leaders and members interact at an emotional level will determine both the 
evolutionary stages of the group and its cultural "style" (Schein, 1991: 171; Wright et 
aI., 1994: 221, 226). Although corporate culture can be manipulated like other matters 
under the control of managers, culture controls the manager more than the manager 
controls culture (Webber, 1977), through the automatic filters that bias the manager's 
perceptions, thoughts, and feelings. As culture arises and gains strength, it becomes 
pervasive and influences everything the manager does, even his own thinking and 
feeling (Schein, 1991: 314). 
Thomas (1989) used five main elements which are symbols, language, 
ideology, rituals and myths (Pettigrew, 1979) to examine the effects of organisational 
culture on choices of accounting methods, but the results contain a number of 
inconsistencies. Recent research suggests that these may be due to differences in 
leadership style and management philosophy (Bimberg and Snodgrass, 1988). Due 
attention must be given to the agency of decision choice by whoever has the power to 
direct the organisation (Child, 1972: 2). As in the emerging paradigm of dialectical 
contextualism, human choice is elevated to its proper position in the context of 
management (Wooton, 1977: 435). A power culture has strong central leadership as a 
key feature and power lies with an individual or a small group at the centre who 
control most of the rules and procedures and individual managers are expected to 
work within these (Kotter et al., 1992: 150; Thompson, 1993: 90). The players 
activate their personal-human theory of control in order to remain "in control" 
(Argyris, 1990: 503). A value culture would have to be established to create sustained 
commitment to the new approach among key executives (Reimann, 1987: 174). 
Instead of observing corporate culture directly, this study selects evaluating 
three critical variables from leaders' financial control factors as the symbol of the 
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leaders' financial control style to observe how they affect the transference of MCSs. 
2.5.2 Selection of Critical Variables of Financial Control Factors 
Nahavandi and Malekzadeh (1993) built a framework which considers the 
leader to be key to both the formulation and implementation of strategy. Nohria and 
Ghoshal (1994) maintained that differentiated fit and shared values are not mutually 
exclusive ways of effectively managing headquarters-subsidiary relations. The 
personality, beliefs and philosophy of the central figure, or leader, of the organisation 
is the principal determinant of control style (Stacey, 1990: 126). From the leader's 
control aspect, three variables are selected as follows. 
2.5.2.1 Degree of Control 
Authority is essentially the institutional code within which the use of power as 
medium is organised and legitimised. It is a basis of power, in fact the only basis of 
power, rather than a kind of power (Pettigrew, 1973: 24). From the organising view, 
the degree of control is the most important cornerstone in organising a corporation. 
"Degree of control" is the control a leader wants to have over internal organisational 
functioning (Nahavandi and Malekzadeh, 1993). Degree of control has a deep 
relationship with the leader's philosophy and education or experience background. A 
leader may maintain high control over his organisation through high centralisation and 
little delegation; in contrast, a leader who maintains less control may allow for 
decentralisation and delegation of many activities. 
2.5.2.2 Budget Emphasis 
From the view of financial control, the leadership style frequently reflects on 
the "budget emphasis." The beliefs and philosophy of the central figure, or leader, of 
the organisation are a principal determinant of control style. If the views and beliefs of 
the leaders on control are ably articulated by word and deed, such beliefs will 
permeate through the organisation (Stacey, 1990: 126). Budgets have been viewed as 
a major tool for organisation control. The high and low budget emphasis can be 
imposed in four budget evaluative styles, namely budget-constrained (BC), budget-
profit (BP), profit-conscious (PC), and non-accounting (NA) (Brownell, 1982; Hirst, 
1986; Dunk, 1989; Emmanuel et al., 1990: 179; Brownell and Dunk, 1991; Lau et aI., 
1995). Budget evaluative style is defined as the way in which a unit manager 
perceives the budget to be used in evaluating his performance, in relation to other 
relevant information (Otley, 1978). Whether an organisation emphasises accounting 
measure or non-accounting measure has different influences on performance in 
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different cultural areas (Harrison, 1992, 1994). Budget evaluative style has a deep 
relationship with the strategy and its implementation, so that a corporation needs to 
match a different budget evaluative style with different strategies (Simons, 1987, 
1990). Hopwood (1972) found that a leadership style characterised by an emphasis on 
budget-constrained performance was significantly associated with job-related tension 
(JRT). He went on to speculate that JRT would be dysfunctional for performance. 
Otley (1978) attempted to replicate and extend Hopwood's work, but his results were 
inconclusive. Yet he still suggested that superior performance levels were associated 
with a budget-focused leadership style. Brownell (1982) suggested the tendency for 
high performance was associated with a de-emphasis on the budget by supervisors. 
His results are consistent with Hopwood (1972), but contradictory to Otley (1978) 
whose results suggested that a better performance tends to be associated with a 
budget-constrained style. Brownell and Hirst (1986) found that compatible 
combinations of participation and budget emphasis (high/high and low/low) are more 
effective in reducing job-related tension (JRT) in low as opposed to high task 
uncertainty activities. For performance, however, the failure to support, or to confrrm 
Brownell's(1982) result, is perplexing. Dunk (1989) remarked that their research data 
collected from a single company were based on non-random sampling. Brownell and 
Dunk ( 1991 ) chose samples carefully and their results further contributed to a 
reconciliation of the Hopwood/Otley conflict with the explanation of high and low 
task difficulty. Kren (1992) found that budgetary participation facilitates job relevant 
information (JRI) acquisition by managers and that JRI, in turn, is more associated 
with improved performance than the motivational effects. 
This study will observe the budget emphasis from the views of senior 
managers at headquarters and managers at operational level. In addition, it will also be 
observed among top managers, senior financial managers, and other senior managers 
at headquarters. 
2.5.2.3 Selection of Managers 
Expatriate managers are very important bridges, especially to those "cross-
national isomorphism (Ferner, 1996: 10)" multinational firms. Wright et al. (1994: 
222) argued that a group of compatible managers can provide a very powerful sense of 
direction for the company. Transfer of managers was a process for specialisation and 
for creating a verbal information network (Edstrom and Galbraith, 1977: 249). They 
could play an important interpretative role bridging host country nationals and 
nationals in headquarters' offices (Boyacigiller, 1990: 360). However. where there is a 
greater utilisation of local nationals in managerial posts, especially those at higher 
level, firms are less likely to experience problems involving friction and poor 
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communication between expatriates and local personnel, as well as complaints by 
local nationals of lack of opportunities for advancement (Kopp, 1994: 594). An open 
or closed managers' selection philosophy will impact greatly on the management 
control system. For facilitating the communication and control process, the use of 
parent country nationals allows for greater control in certain segments of the system 
while maintaining the flexibility for less control in other parts (Boyacigiller, 1990: 
373). Many American, European and Japanese companies send their expatriate 
managers to their overseas operations. Owing to the elaborate system of detailed 
financial controls, British and American MNCs' have in place an international system 
of performance management (Coates et al. 1992). American fmns are much more 
likely than Japanese firms to have standardised world-wide systems of performance 
evaluation (Smith, 1992: 45; Kopp, 1994: 587-589; also see Ferner, 1996: 12; Walsh, 
1996: 635). The selection of managers in foreign operations has a close relationship 
with whether the company system transfers. 
A material difference in the philosophy of human resource management exists 
between Western and Eastern countries (Tung, 1982; also see Smith, 1992, 45-46). 
The policy of managers' selection has contingent problems, but the choice of policy 
may also be influenced by cultural factors (Smith, 1992: 46). Western thinking is 
more analytical, concerned with processing the Truth (Hofstede, 1991: 173) and more 
dependent on systems. In contrast, Eastern thinking is synthetic, concerned with 
respecting the demands of virtue and more dependent on people. Hiring the right 
people is far more important than having the right organisation, because the people 
will adjust the organisation to the requirements of place and time. In the individualist 
society the task is supposed to prevail over any personal relationships. The distinction 
between in-group and out-group which is so essential in the collectivist culture pattern 
has far-reaching consequences for business relationships, beyond those between 
employers and employees (Triandis, 1989: 509; Hofstede, 1991: 66-67; Fuller and 
Peterson, 1992: 187; Li, 1993: 67). "Selection of managers" should be explored in 
studying Taiwanese corporations, for many corporations are held in large proportion 
by family groups. Many corporations are still particularist 7. Hiring and promotion 
decisions take the employees' in-group into account (Quinn et al., 1988: 348; Hofstede 
1991: 67). In addition, many Taiwanese leaders still have traditional notions and 
would rather believe a man than a system (Whitley, 1992: 62-63). 
7 As the distinction between "our group" and "other group" is at the very root of people's consciousness. 
treating one's friends better than others is natural and ethical, and sound business practice. Sociologists 
call this way of thinking particularism (Hofstede. 1991: 66). 
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2.5.3 National Culture and Financial Control Factors 
Culture is the distinctive way of life of a group of people, their design for 
living (Kluckhohn, 1950). The collective programming of the mind (Hofstede, 
198011984) influences the behaviour of the group in the interaction within and across 
a system. Because the corporation leader's philosophy is deeply rooted in his cultural 
background, it is reasonable to assume that the leader's financial control style is easily 
influenced by his national culture. Hence, the proposition between national culture 
and leaders' financial control factors could be built as follows: 
Proposition 2: National culture has a significant effect on the main leaders' 
financial control factors of Taiwanese corporation headquarters, including 
degree of control, budget emphasis and selection of managers. 
2.5.3.1 Degree of Control 
Compared with European countries, Taiwanese cultures have higher power 
distance, lower individualism, and have more Confucian dynamism. People who have 
high power distance tend to prefer, or are at least more willing to accept, greater 
centralisation of the decision making authority and less participation in the decision 
process (Merchant et aI., 1995). Under this condition, senior leaders of the 
headquarters are more likely to be authoritative, because their subordinates have 
strong dependence needs and expect superiors to behave autocratically and not to 
consult them (Hofstede, 1980/1984). In addition, "keeping harmony like a family link" 
in a collective society and "maintaining an ordered system" under Confucian thinking 
also greatly facilitate greater centralisation. Naturally, the sub-proposition of degree of 
control can be inferred as follows: 
Proposition 2-1: The leaders of Taiwanese headquarters affected by their 
cultures have high degrees of control in their corporations. 
2.5.3.2 Budget Emphasis 
Individualists believe that the self is the basic unit of survival while 
collectivists hold the view that the unit of survival lies in a group or several groups 
(Hui, 1989). Collectivists will regard themselves as less differentiated from, and more 
connected with, other people, especially those whom they regard as significant. and 
will put much value on harmonious interpersonal relationships (Bochner, 1994). 
Overall, hierarchy and harmony are important defining attributes of collectivists 
(Triandis et al., 1990). In such circumstances, the senior manager of headquarters 
would take a flexible and conservative method of evaluative style to maintain the 
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hierarchical structure. They tend to give their subordinates more flexibility; in other 
words, they prefer choosing a profit-conscious style or a non-accounting style to a 
budget-constrained style or a budget-profit style. In a society with large power 
distance such as Taiwan, might prevails over right, and whoever holds the power is 
right and good (Hofstede, 1991: 43). The middle management level is small and the 
budget normally could not be emphasised by leaders. In addition, in a society with 
Confucian dynamism, people frequently tend to focus on long-term orientation so they 
easily tolerate the short-term variances. According to what is discussed above, the 
sUb-proposition of budget emphasis could be set as follows: 
Proposition 2-2: The leaders of Taiwanese headquarters affected by their 
cultures use a low budget emphasis approach to evaluate their operational 
performances. 
2.5.3.3 Selection of Managers 
Organisations vary in their managers' transfer policies: to fill positions, to 
develop managers, and to develop integrated organisation (Child, 1973: 3; Edstrom 
and Galbraith, 1977: 252-253). However, in the collectivist society, people tend easily 
to use relatives or in-group staffs who have served for a long period and who seem to 
be absolutely loyal to them in important positions, especially in the foreign 
subsidiaries. Members of collectivist cultures perceive their in-groups as more 
homogeneous than their outgroups and they perceive more intimate and subordinate 
social behaviours as what are required toward their in-group members (Triandis and 
McCusker, 1990: 1006). In addition, because Confucian work dynamism emphasises 
the ordered relationship in society, the senior managers at headquarters and their 
subordinates have ordered relationships in their mind. In a large power distance 
society such as Taiwan'S, an ideal leader is a benevolent autocrat or good father 
(Hofstede, 1991: 37), and he always selects important managers from his in-group by 
rank. 
According to the above discussions, the sub-proposition of selection of 
managers could be set as follow: 
Proposition 2-3: The leaders of Taiwanese headquarters affected by their 
cultures choose their important managers from their in-groups. 
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2.5.4 Financial Control Factors in MCS Transfer 
As mentioned above, the management control system is a function of national 
culture and leadership factors. If the national culture is a major determinant of the 
effectiveness of the MCS, the use of components of the MCS does differ between 
different countries; that is the MCS lacks the possibility of transfer in total. In contrast, 
if the financial control factors are major determinants of the effectiveness of the MCS, 
transferring MCS between countries becomes possible. 
Because the leader's philosophy has significant impacts on the financial control 
factors, it is possible that corporation leaders would transfer their MCSs to foreign 
operations. A series of literature has found that leader's philosophy has significant 
impacts on MNC system design. Ferner (1996: 7) even remarked that the Hofstedian 
approach to national culture brings the danger of exaggerating the persistence of 
national factors. Actually, whether to transfer a system or not can be viewed as a 
choice between two strategies: to adapt to the environment of the host country or to 
attempt to introduce the country-of-origin's system into the host operation. As 
mentioned above, many transferences of financial systems have been found In 
American and European MNC firms (such as Coates et al., 1992; Kopp, 1994). 
In cross-national comparison based on the cultural dimension, if parts of 
components, or even all components, are not different, it may indicate that financial 
control factors may have more significant impacts on the components of the 
management control system than national cultures. In that case, for the purposes of 
continuing to examine how financial control factors affect the differences, we make 
the conditional proposition as follows: 
Proposition 3: Financial control factors including degree of control, budget 
emphasis and selection of managers have a significant impact on the 
components of management control system. 
2.5.4.1 Degree of Control 
The greater the leaders' authority, the greater the degree of control they have 
over the management control systems so that they may have more power to reduce the 
system differences. The greater the degree of control, the fewer the differences on the 
components of MCSs between their domestic and European operations. 
Proposition 3-1: The greater the degree of control by the headquarters' 
leaders, the fewer the differences between the Taiwanese and European 
operations. 
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2.5.4.2 Budget Emphasis 
Budget evaluative style reflects the leaders' management philosophy. Budget 
planning and controlling processes easily become common management language 
within a firm. If leaders emphasise operating budgets more, a strict fmancial control in 
their firms will emerge naturally. On the other hand, if leaders emphasise long-term 
visions and multi-strategies at both corporate level and operational level, they need to 
match these with a more flexible control of bUdgets. The less they emphasise budgets, 
the more the differences between their domestic and European operations. In contras~ 
the more emphasis they put on their budget, the fewer the differences in the 
components of the MCSs between their domestic and European operations. 
Proposition 3-2: The greater the budget emphasis by the headquarters' 
leaders, the fewer the differences between Taiwanese and European 
operations. 
2.5.4.3 Selection of Managers 
The philosophy of cross-national isomorphism and local isomorphism 
significantly affects human resource management in MNCs (Ferner, 1996). Expatriate 
managers, especially those in top positions, find it is possible to keep their leaders' 
philosophy and to introduce country-of-origin systems into host country operations. 
Many multinational corporations are increasingly interested in promoting corporate 
culture to improve control, co-ordination, and integration of their subsidiaries 
(Schneider, 1988). Some leaders attempt to decrease or eliminate cultural differences 
through human resource management. In addition, the Chinese pride themselves on 
their acquisition of knowledge and skill, so they have low resistance to change and 
have high productivity (Latham and Napier, 1989: 193). Because of facing the high 
velocity of the technological environment, it seems necessary for IT firms to send 
some Chinese managers to overseas operations. If Taiwanese leaders were to use more 
relatives or in-group staff in European operations, there would be fewer differences in 
components of MCSs. 
Proposition 3-3: The more relatives or in-group subordinates used in 
European operations, the fewer the differences between Taiwanese and 
European operations. 
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2.6 Other Situational Contingent Factors and MCS Mechanisms 
2.6.1 Contingency Theory in MNCs 
Since Lawrence and Lorsch (1969) developed the contingency model. the 
contingency theory has significantly influenced management theories. Contingency 
theory is a broad concept. It emphasises that an organisation should fit its environment 
(Child, 1972; Gordon and Miller, 1976; Govindarajan, 1986; Gresov, 1989; Abernethy 
and Stoelwinder, 1991; O'Reilly III, 1991; Kay, 1993; Wright et aI., 1994; Punnett and 
Shenkar, 1994: 41). Typically, the manager has a dynamic role in monitoring and 
achieving an effective "fit." Implications of this are that there is no one best way to 
organise and no one best management control system, and the nature of that system 
depends on the degree of differentiation in a particular company (Child, 1972: 3; 
Anthony et aI., 1985 47). Hence, the more complex and uncertain are the 
environmental influences, the more the organisation needs to differentiate and 
specialise its structure and system to fit the environment. 
Optimal management control systems depend on the particular elements of a 
firm's environment. Gordon and Miller (1976) discussed uncertainty as a contingency 
variable. They hypothesised that as dynamism increases, the effective accounting 
information system begins to deliver more non-financial data to managers with 
information on competitor actions, and increases in the frequency of reporting. 
Waterhouse and Tiessen (1978; 74) argued that an increase in environmental 
uncertainty may influence the design of performance reports in such dimensions as 
frequency of reporting and level of aggregation. They also argued that increases in 
uncertainty lead to a decrease in reliance on highly specified procedures and also to 
increased decentralisation. Otley (1980) suggested that accountants have not devoted 
enough effort to analysing the limitations of the organisation theory literature and to 
questioning its application to the management control context. In addition, he also 
suggested a more careful theory of the management control process is needed. Evans 
et al. (1986) proposed a primary conclusion to their analysis, that the effect of 
uncertainty on the optimal management control system depends on the specific 
circumstances in which the firm operates. It is argued that while a more explicit theory 
is needed, the development of relatively simple models is a major step in the 
construction of an all-inclusive model of management control. Govindarajan (1988) 
focused on what is perhaps the most critical aspect of strategy implementation in 
larger, multinational corporations. He found that high managerial internal locus of 
control and low emphasis on meeting a budget are associated with high performance in 
SBUs employing a strategy of differentiation. Simons (1990), based on a 2 year field 
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study, presented a new model to show how interactive management control systems 
focus the organisation on strategic uncertainties. 
One of the major weaknesses of contingency control research is the piecemeal 
nature in which it is done (Fisher, 1995: 24). Explanation in terms of contingency is 
unlikely to be sufficient (Child, 1981: 320). A great number of control variables, 
including external environment (such as uncertain vs. certain, static vs. dynamic, 
simple vs. complex), competitive strategy (such as product life cycle, stage of 
development, operating strategy, global strategy), technology (such as type of 
production, producing interdependence), firm and industry variables (such as industry 
structure, finn diversification, size, SBU) and other contingent variables (such as 
organisational culture, leader philosophy, knowledge of the transformation process), 
could influence management control design. The ultimate goal of contingent control 
research should be to develop and test a comprehensive model that includes multiple 
control systems, mUltiple contingent variables, and multiple outcome variables (Fisher 
1995: 24), but owing to the weaknesses of its futurism and its posture of value 
neutrality (Wooton, 1977: 435) it is very difficult to reach the target, at least up to date. 
Many Hofstedian culturalists even argued one gets a better result based on cultural 
dimensions than based on contingent variables in cross-national comparison. By 
controlling for some contingent variables, it is possible to help study the influence of 
culture (Child, 1981; also see Snodgrass and Szewczak, 1991: 160), but sometimes it 
is very difficult for cross-national comparison within multinational firms. Until now, 
the only way for researchers of contingency theory is to refine the identification of 
contingency factors for their special purposes. 
2.6.2 The Selection of Other Situational Factors 
Mintzberg (1988) proposed contingency or situational factors including size 
and age of organisation, technical system of production, various characteristics of 
environment (such as stability and complexity) and the power system. This study 
focuses on information technological (IT) corporations, which have a similar 
environment and techniques of production. In addition, the power system has a deep 
relationship with leaders' financial control factors which have been regarded as 
dynamic variables in this study, so here only size and age are retained as situational 
factors. Size is strongly associated with structural differentiation and the design of 
control mechanisms, and it is the most popular contingent variable in the literature of 
control systems (such as Hickson et al., 1974; Negandhi, 1975; Lincoln et al., 1978; 
Rockness and Shields, 1984; Lincoln et al., 1986; Demirag, 1990; Wong and 
Birnbaum-More, 1994; Dedoussis, 1995). Although the operational scale was also 
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chosen and carefully controlled pairs for purposes of comparison within a 
multinational firm, it is still not so easy to choose case samples freely, for example for 
a cross-cultural comparison between firms in two countries or areas but with different 
owners. Sometimes, the problem of different sizes still exists there. In addition, even 
when pairs have already been chosen very carefully, when comparing the effect of 
MCS transfer among the case firms the problem of size will still emerge. 
As well as the factors of size and age, from the desk research and in-depth 
interview another two critical contingent factors were used to test propositions in this 
study. One is the approach to acquisition. Much literature indicated that serious 
cultural conflicts happened in those companies purchased by or merged with 
multinational firms (e. g., Olie, 1994). The diverse cultural backgrounds translate into 
a lack of cognitive similarities which can significantly hamper communication at the 
interface (Frucot and Shearon, 1991: 82). Many interviewees in this study also 
complained of cultural conflicts caused by purchase or merger. Another critical factor 
is business focus which relates to corporate global strategy. Many researchers (such as 
Child, 1972; Govindarajan and Gupta, 1985; Snodgrass and Grant, 1986; 
Govindarajan, 1988; Govindarajan and Fisher, 1990; Daniel and Reitsperger, 1991) 
have focused on linkages between strategy and control system. Many Taiwanese 
multinational firms use the strategy of global collaboration. Within a multinational 
firm, an operation may be defined as manufacturing oriented, marketing oriented, or 
production-marketing oriented. Different orientations also represent different extents 
of interdependence between an operation and its parent company. The definition of an 
operation, of course, will have a significant impact on the MCS transfer. 
2.6.3 Propositions of Other Situational Factors 
According to the contingency theory mentioned above, a general proposition of 
other situational factors could be built as follows: 
Proposition 4: Situational factors of European operations, including size, 
age, approach to acquisition, and business focus, will significantly affect 
their MCS transfer from their Taiwanese operations. 
2.6.3.1 Size of Operation 
Owing to marketing and historical reasons, the scales of European operations 
of the case firms normally could not compare with their Taiwanese counterparts. 
According to a great deal of literature, the factor of size is an important variable in the 
design of management systems. Owing to their small scale, it was difficult for some 
European operations to learn MCSs from their parent companies. As European 
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operations grow in size, they are able to specialise their tasks more finely; as a resul~ 
they can easily use the management control systems transferred from the home 
country. 
Proposition 4-1: The size of European operations has a relative impact on 
firms management control systems. The larger the European operation, the 
fewer MCS differences between European and Taiwanese operations. 
2.6.3.2 Age of Operation 
When an overseas operation is established or bought, owing to its being a small 
business or to cultural conflict, its survival normally is the most important thing. The 
parent company also needs to observe which systems are better for the operation. The 
longer the history of European operations, the more firms' managers tend to repeat 
their behaviours; as a result, they become more predictable and so more amenable to 
their management control systems. Gradually, the parent company will transfer some 
systems to the operation. 
According to the above analysis, the proposition of age of operation is as 
follows: 
Proposition 4-2: The age of European operations has a relative impact on 
firms management control systems. The older the European operations, the 
fewer MCS differences between the European and Taiwanese operations. 
2.6.3.3 Approach to Acquisition 
The method of acquiring a business may significantly affect the MCS transfer 
within a multinational firm. When an operation is set up through greenfield, the fmn 
can easily arrange the employment of managers and set up new systems from the 
home country; in contrast, if an operation is bought or merged with other company, it 
is more difficult to change their old system at once. Hence, this research predicts the 
sub-proposition of acquiring approach as follow: 
Proposition 4-3 The acquiring approach has relative impacts on firms' 
management control systems. With the greenfield approach, there are fewer 
MCS differences between the European and Taiwanese operations than with 
the purchase or merger approach. 
2.6.3.4 Business Focus 
Global structure and strategy are getting more important for multinational 
firms. If a foreign operation's role is very close to its headquarters' operation then their 
systems are easily similar. In other words, MCS transfer is more possible. Many 
Taiwanese IT companies set up their EW'Opean operations only as market-oriented 
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units which significantly differ from their Taiwanese counterparts, normally 
production-marketing oriented. The study will predict that the closer the business 
focus, the more the MCS transfer. 
Proposition 4-4 The business focus of European operations has relative 
impacts on their management control systems. Under the production-
marketing orientation, there are fewer MCS differences between the 
European and Taiwanese operations than under the marketing orientation. 
2.7 The Research Framework 
The relative contribution of cultural, contingency, and political-economical 
factors cannot be separated since they are different sides of the same coin, of 
non-rational problem-solving. (Sorge and Warner, 1986: 34-35) 
Based on Hofstede's cultural dimensions, four research propositions were 
established as described in sections 2.4-2.6. The first proposition concerns the impact 
of cultural differences on the MCSs of the Taiwanese and European operations of 
Taiwanese firms. The second proposition examines the influences of national culture 
on leaders' financial control style. The third proposition examines the relationship 
between leaders' financial control style and the uniformity of MCSs. The fourth 
proposition examines the relationship between local situational factors and MCS 
transfer from the home country. The relationships between MCS transfer and national 
culture, financial control factors, and other situational factors, make up the research 
framework. This framework shows the linkage between the influential variables, 
impacting on MCS transfer to host country operations, and the related research 
propositions, which are hypothesised as shown in Figure 2.2. The variables used in the 
research are summarised in Table 2.2. National culture, financial control factors, and 
situational factors represent cultural values, managerial values, and situational values 
respectively. Basically this framework sets MCS transfer as a function of cultural 
values, managerial values, and situational values. However, this study focuses more on 
the function of financial control factors and national culture (expressed by heavy black 
arrows). Although a great deal of literature has touched upon cross-cultural research 
and system transfer, there has been a lack of a comprehensive approach or framework 
to explain the phenomenon of MCS transfer. Cultural theory and contingency theory 
were used by many scholars to support comparative research, but few researchers' have 
used leaders' financial control factors as dynamic variables to explain how they 
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influence MCS transfer. In addition, this framework fIrstly compares MeSs within 
MNCs and then considers the transferability of MeSs with national culture, financial 
control, and situational factors together. 
Figure 2.2 Research Framework 
National culture Proposition 2 F' . I I 
..... InanCla contro 
(Home country) ~ factors 
Proposition 3 
~ , 
Proposition 1 ....... National culture MeSs (Host) JHost country) ~ 
.. ~ 
Proposition 4 
Other situational 
factors 
Table 2.2 The summary of the Research Variables 
Dimensions of 
national culture 
Power distance 
Individualism 
Masculinity 
Uncertainty avoidance 
Confucian dynamism 
Financial control 
factors 
Degree of control 
Budget emphasis 
Selection of managers 
Other situational 
factors 
Size of operation 
Age of operation 
Approach to acquisition 
Business focus 
Components of MCSs 
Objective setting 
Participation 
Long-term and short-
term planning 
Decentralisation 
Formality 
Controllability-filters 
Feedback extent and 
frequency 
Contingent rewards 
Group rewards 
Long-term rewards 
Table 2.3 The summary of the Research Propositions 
Proposition Purpose Independent variable Dependent variable 
Proposition I The impact of local national Hofstede's national Components of MCSs 
culture on MCSs cultural dimensions 
Proposition 2 The impact of home national Hofstede's national Financial control 
culture on financial control cultural dimensions factors 
factors 
Proposition 3 The impact of financial control Financial control factors Components of MCSs 
style on MeSs 
Proposition 4 The impact of local situational Situational factors Components of MCSs 
factors on MCSs 
so 
The four research propositions as described in Table 2.3 are established to 
provide the basis for this exploratory study. In this context, the main aim of the 
research is to explore the relevance of a more comprehensive understanding and the 
transferability of MCSs within multinational firms. 
Propositions 
According to the diagram shown in figure 2.2 and Table 2.3, four important 
propositions are established as the basis for the research. Proposition 1 is set to explore 
the relationship between host national culture and host MCSs. A cross-cultural pair-
comparison between European operations regarded as the host country and Taiwanese 
operations seen as the home country will be made. Following in the steps of the 
culturalists, Hofstede's cultural dimensions will be used firstly to compare MCSs 
within a MNC. Ten components of MCSs will be chosen for comparison. Differing 
from past cultural studies using a quantitative survey, qualitative in-depth interviews 
will be conducted at operational level to support the research findings. Proposition 2 is 
set for testing the relationship between the national culture of the home country and 
financial control factors. Hofstede's cultural dimensions will be used to examine the 
relationship between the two elements. For the purposes of understanding the financial 
control styles of the case firms, in-depth interviews will be conducted at each 
headquarters of the case firms to examine key financial control factors. Proposition 3 is 
designed to examine financial control factors as dynamic variables to see how they 
affect host MCSs. For the purposes of probing the dynamic process, the in-depth 
interviews described in proposition 2 will cover key senior managers at each 
headquarters of the case firms. In the context of different financial control styles, the 
extent of uniformity of MCSs will be examined. The final research proposition is set to 
examine the impact on MCS transfer arising from other situational factors. From the 
interviews conducted at the case firms' headquarters and at the operational level, and 
from relevant data, four relevant situational factors will be examined in the process of 
MCS transfer. 
Operational Definitions of Variables 
The management control system (MCS), which is the focus of this research, is 
defined as a formal mechanism of gathering information to aid and co-ordinate the 
process of making planning and control decisions throughout the organisation. Based 
on the whole cycle of the management control system. ten components are selected for 
comparing and testing including: objective setting, participation. long-term and short-
term planning, decentralisation, formality, controllability-filters, feedback extent and 
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frequency, contingent reward, group rewards, and long-term rewards. 
National culture is defined as a "collective programming of the mind which 
distinguishes the members of one nation from another (Hofstede 1980/1984, 1991)." 
Hofstede's five cultural dimensions were compared between Taiwan and Western 
European countries and three of them were clearly different, including 
individualism/collectivism, power distance, and Confucian work dynamism. 
Financial control factors such as the leaders' financial control style are defined 
as the critical variables of leaders' financial control. By evaluating three financial 
control factors, including degree of control, budget emphasis, and the selection of 
managers, different financial control styles will be classified in this study. "Degree of 
control" is the control a leader wants to have over internal organisation (Nahavandi 
and Malekzadeh, 1993), and is the basis of power. This research will assess it through 
evaluating decision-making systems between headquarters and the operational level. 
"Budget emphasis" represents the attitude of budget evaluative style within a 
corporation. In this research, the case firms' budget evaluative styles will be probed 
and budgeting practices in each of the case firms will be compared. The "selection of 
managers" represents the attitude of hiring expatriate managers in foreign subsidiaries. 
This study will assess it by evaluating the extent of an "in-group" within a MNC. 
Other situational factors represent contingency factors in the research. Four 
situational factors, including size, age, approach to acquisition, and business focus, 
will be treated as moderating variables between the relationship of financial control 
factors and the uniformity of MCSs. Greenfield and purchase approaches will be 
compared in the approach to acquisition, and marketing orientation and production-
marketing orientation will be discussed in the business focus. 
2.8 Conclusion 
Reviewing literature is like reading history which operates as a mirror and 
reflects some pictures. Through the literature review, researchers' learn the extent of 
academic development, and what its drawbacks are. It easily highlights directions for 
future research and also helps researchers' to design their own particular research 
approaches. 
In this chapter, the relevant literature about cross-cultural MCS comparison 
has been reviewed, and three important elements affecting MCS transfer have been 
fully probed. Based on the literature review, a series of propositions has been built and 
a novel research design developed. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
3.2 Research Design 
3.3 Case Firms and Data Collection 
3.4 Validity and Reliability 
3.5 Summary 
3.1 Introduction 
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The last chapter contained a review of important relevant literature and built 
up the conceptual framework in order to highlight the factors impacting on the transfer 
of the management control system, including leadership factors, national cultures, and 
other situational factors. 
This chapter discusses the methodology for achieving the research objectives 
and inferring experimental propositions. Altogether, the research used case study and 
comparative methods to analyse multiple sources of data collected from desk research, 
in-depth interviews, and document data sources. 
As Table 3.1 shows, the research was divided into three phases, (1) a literature 
review and framework build-up, (2) field work research, and (3) generalisations and 
conclusions. Of course, most of the literature review was finished by initial desk 
research, but some continuing desk research and initial interviews from academics and 
managers (especially pilot interviews) still significantly changed the research 
framework. At the field research stage, different interviews were used for different 
purposes but cross-checking was conducted at the headquarters and operational level. 
Multiple data sources with qualitative research can be helpful in building up the 
triangulation and the one most obvious advantage of the triangulation is to check the 
validity of findings (Bryman, 1989: 175). In the whole process of the field research, 
research validation and reliability were continually concerned with making sure that 
the generalisations and conclusions could be crystallised and interpreted reasonably. 
In addition to the above, the selection of case firms and the methods of data 
collection are also contained in this chapter. 
Table 3.1 Outline of Research Design 
Step Method 
Phase I : Literature review and framework build-up 
I. Identification of the relevant factors of • Review of the literature 
MCS transfer and organizing research • Consulting academics and senior 
framework managers. 
• Connecting research framework 
Phase II: Field research 
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section 
.2.2-2.6 
• 3.3 
.2.7 
2. Exploring IT industry in Taiwan and 
case firms in the research 
• Review of the literature • Ch. 4-5 
• Collecting data from internal documents .3.2-3.3 
• Interviewing senior managers • 3.3 
3. Developing the interview content • Review of the literature .3.2, ch. 2 
4. Understanding the similarities and 
differences of operations' MCSs within 
each case firm, and their influences 
from national culture 
• Consulting academics and senior managers .3.3 
• Initial visits and pilot work 
• Interviewing senior managers of operations 
• Verbatim interview tape recordings and 
building data bases for different 
purposes and variables 
• Verifying the relationship between national 
culture and operation's MCSs 
.3-3 
.Ch.6 
• 3.3 
.3.3 
.Ch.6 
5. Exploring the relationship among 
national culture, fmancial control 
factors, and MCS transfer 
• Interviewing senior managers at 
headquarters 
• Ch. 7-8 
• Verbatim interview tape recordings and 
building data bases for different 
purposes and variables 
• Verifying the relationship between national 
culture and leadership factors 
• Verifying the relationship between 
fmancial control factors and MCS 
transfer 
.3.3 
.Ch.7 
.Ch.8 
6. Understanding the impact of other • Review of the literature • 2.6 
situational factors on MCS transfer • Interviewing senior managers of operations • 9.2-9.5 
Phase III: Generalisation and conclusion 
7. Conclusion, recommendation, and 
limitation 
• Crystallisation and interpretation of the 
analysed results 
• Logical thinking and inference 
3.2 Research Design 
3.2.1 Research Approaches 
3.2.1.1 Case Study 
• 10.1 
• 10.2-10.5 
Many of the features of the case study approach are summarised in the 
definition proposed by Yin (1981: 59; 1989: 23; 1993: 59): 
itA case study is an empirical inquiry that: 
investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context when the 
boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in 
which multiple sources of evidence are used." 
54 
Mitchell (1983: 192) characterises the case-study approach in terms of "a 
detailed examination of an event (or series of related events) which the analyst 
believes exhibits ( or exhibit) the operation of some identified theoretical principle." In 
replication logic, cases which confirm emergent relationships can often provide an 
opportunity to refine and extend the theory; cases which disconfirm the relationships 
can often provide an opportunity to refme and extend the theory (Eisenhardt, 1989: 
542; Tsoukas, 1989: 555). The case study may also clarify concepts and variables for 
further research. Because the research process generates considerable data, a 
comprehensive research report may contain information useful to investigators in 
several other areas (Arkava and Lane, 1983: 188). The case study approach uses 
multiple methods which, in their most methodologically self-conscious manifestation, 
are oriented towards strategies of multiple triangulation I for dealing with problems of 
validity and bias (Rose, 1991: 201). That is, the triangulation made possible by 
multiple data collection methods provides stronger substantiation of constructs and 
hypotheses (Eisenhardt, 1989: 538). Theory building seems to require rich description, 
the richness that comes from anecdote (Mintzberg, 1979: 587). 
Because this research involves the interrelationship of the MeSs among 
national cultures, leadership factors, and other situation factors, whose boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident, we wish to gather evidence 
from multiple sources, including interview, document review and other direct and 
indirect data, to investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context. 
The research process is not one of establishing empirical "fact", but rather involves the 
interpretation of observed social practices (Scapens, 1992: 371; Tsoukas, 1989: 556-
557). It is expected that the more direct methodology (Mintzberg, 1979: 583) can yield 
more useful "soft" data (Mintzberg, 1979: 587) so that the relationship of 
transferability of management control systems among national cultures, leadership 
factors, and other situation elements can be explained. The design was what Yin 
(1989: 46) has termed "embedded multiple-case" design which denotes several units 
of analysis. Investigation was conducted at two levels in multinational corporations: 
(1) The corporation headquarters level (senior managers' leadership philosophy and 
strategies); and (2) The operational level (management control system). 
3.2.1.2 Comparative Method 
Comparison provides a basis for making statements about empirical 
regularities and for evaluating and interpreting cases relative to substantive and 
theoretical criteria (Ragin. 1987: 1). The comparative method aims at the analysis of 
I Triangulation means the combination of methods or resources of data in a single study (Denzin, 1978; 
Patton, 1980; see Taylor and Bogdan, 1984: 68). A triangulated methodology is used to gatber different 
types of data which can be used as cross checks (Pettigrew, 1990: 277). 
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the genus and the "differentia specifica" of a social system; that is, similarities and 
differences (Lane, 1990, p.196). In any study of a part of human relations, there is a 
more general idea of comparison in which social researchers constantly engage (May. 
1993: 155): 
"Actually, no social phenomenon can be isolated and studied without 
comparing it to other social phenomena ... Trying to understand and explain 
variation is a process which cannot be accomplished without previous 
reflection on similarities and dissimilarities underlying the variation." 
0yen (1990: 4) 
On a more general level, researchers make comparison within societies (intra-
societal comparison) and between societies (inter-societal comparison) (May, 1993: 
155). By examining different societies, researchers can ask why some have developed 
in similar ways and others in diverse ways. This adds to an understanding and 
explanation of the complicated relationship between economic, social and political 
systems (May, 1993: 157). Comparative sociology is distinct from noncomparative 
sociology because it uses a particular explanatory uni~, the society or system (Ragin, 
1981: 107). In comparative research, different organisational units of analysis 
constitute the local points of inquiry (Tsoukas, 1989: 554). Most comparativists, 
especially those who are qualitatively oriented, are interested in specific historical 
sequences or outcomes and their causes across a set of similar cases (Ragin, 1987: 
13). Comparative analysis in sociology has attracted a growing interest in recent 
decades, as reflected in the number of publications and journals. New study 
programmes dealing with different areas of the world have emerged. Area specialists 
claim that cross-national studies are a legitimate concern, although area studies are 
more oriented towards case study analysis than the use of the comparative method 
proper (Lane 1990: 188). In case studies the empirical findings tend to tum out 
stronger than the true comparative3 findings, because of the lack of a set of theoretical 
concepts and models with which to build true comparative hypotheses (Lane, 1990: 
192-193). The aim of cross-national research is to reduce unexplained variance and 
find patterns and relationships (0yen, 1990: 3). The global ising trend has changed our 
cognitive map. While some cultural differences are diminishing, others are becoming 
more salient. Comparative research may have to shift its emphasis from seeking 
uniformity among variety to studying the preservation of enclaves of uniqueness 
among growing homogeneity and uniformity (0yen 1990: 1). 
2 Explanatory unit refers to the un.it that i~ used to acco~t for the pattern ~f results obtained; 
observational unit refers to the unat used 10 data collection and data analYSIS. 
3 The true comparative type is the theoretical comparison of a number of countries on the basis of an 
explicit model structuring the data in a systematic fashion (Ragin. 1982). 
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Cross-national research provides a specially useful method both for the further 
development of sociological theory, and for establishing the generality of findings and 
the validity of interpretations derived from studies of single nations (Kohn, 1989: 77; 
see 0yen, 1990: 3). Richman (1977: 20,35) encourages researchers to use the 
comparative case study model in multinational corporations. He argued (1977: 20): "It 
would be theoretically possible to compare and even measure significant differences 
in the way that various elements of the management process tend to be perfonned in 
firms in different countries by using a common classification scheme." 
This study adopted the comparative case study method to compare 
management control systems across different operations within the same corporation, 
different corporations in the same industry, and different countries with different 
national cultures. This cross-sectional study, like a single snapshot, cannot follow 
changes in time, and sometimes even draws a conclusion from a single occasion. 
Because of the constraint caused by shortage of resources, the research was unable to 
use a longitudinal approach. But to avoid the cross section bias, time is captured as 
much as possible in the interview field work through a retrospective analysis over 
several years. The longitudinal comparative case method (Pettigrew, 1990: 271) 
provides the researcher with the opportunity using a set of similar cases to examine 
why and how senior managers transfer or not transfer their systems to another country. 
One of the primary problems with comparative analysis is not just the ability of a 
researcher to understand adequately cultures and societies which are different from 
their own, but more specifically, to generalise and explain social relations across 
societies and social contexts (May, 1993: 159). 
3.2.1.3 Emic and Etic 
The aim of scientific research strategies in general is to account for observable 
entities and events and their relationships by means of powerful, interrelated 
economical theories subject to correction and important through empirical testing 
(Harris, 1979: 26-27). Emic research and etic research are two main approaches in 
cultural and behavioural research. 
Emic operations have as their hallmark the elevation of the native infonnant to 
the status of ultimate judge of the adequacy of the observer's descriptions and 
analyses, the insider's or, as anthropologists call it, the "infonnant's" view of reality. 
Thus, the emic approach emphasises native or respondent categories and meanings in 
general and native rules, or respondent behaviour, in particular (Morey and Luthans, 
1984: 27). It is a micro focus (Smircich, 1983: 343). Structure is discovered by the 
analyst and criteria are relative to internal characteristics (AAA, 1991: 187). Extreme 
adherents of the emic viewpoint insist that the subject and not the researcher is the 
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best judge of the adequacy of the research and analysis. The subject's acceptance of 
the results of research is the only necessary and sufficient validation of them (Frake, 
1980; Sturtevant, 1964; see Morey and Luthans, 1984: 29-30). The test of the 
adequacy of emic analyses is their ability to generate statements the native accepts as 
real, meaningful, or appropriate (Harris, 1979: 32). An idiographic perspective is one 
that is individual-centred and uses naturalistic environmental contexts and qualitative 
methods to recognise the particular and unique experience of the subject (Morey and 
Luthans, 1984: 27). Idiographic studies do have an epistemologically valid position, 
and this stems from the distinction between (a) causal laws and empirical 
generalisations and (b) real structures, actual events, and experienced events (Tsoukas, 
1989: 559). 
Etic operations have as their hallmark the elevation of observers to the status 
of ultimate judges of the categories and concepts used in descriptions and analyses. 
The test of the adequacy of etic accounts is simply their ability to generate 
scientifically productive theories about the causes of socio-cultural differences and 
similarities (Harris, 1979: 32). Etics are the universals, usually as viewed from afar, 
while emics are locally meaningful elements (Tayeb, 1994: 439). Extreme adherents 
of the etic approach believe that the researcher is the best judge of the adequacy of 
description or analysis. The subject's opinion may be interesting, but it is not really 
relevant (Harris, 1979; see Morey and Luthans, 1984: 30). Etic designates the 
orientation of outsider researchers, who have their own categories by which the 
subject's world is organised. The analytical descriptive categories of outside 
researchers generally are organised with a view to explanation in the broader sense 
traditionally used in organisational research (Morey and Luthans, 1984: 29). It is a 
macro focus (Smircich, 1983: 343). Structure is created by the analyst and criteria are 
considered absolute or universal (AAA, 1991: 187). A nomothetic perspective is one 
that is group-centred and uses standardised, controlled environmental contexts and 
quantitative methods to establish general laws (Morey and Luthans, 1984: 27). 
As a matter of practical necessity, observers must frequently rely on native 
informants to obtain their basic information about who has done what. Recourse to 
informants for such purposes does not automatically settle the epistemological status 
of the resultant description. When the description is responsive to the observer's 
categories of time, place, weight and measure, actor types, numbers of people present, 
body motion, and environmental effects, it is etic (Harris: 1979: 36). The universal 
aspects of organisations could be conceived of as the visible structure, as defined in 
tenns of dimensions such as centralisation of decision-making, specialisation of roles 
and functions, standardisation of procedures, and fonnalisation. The emic aspects 
would, then, be the ways by which these dimensions are achieved, in other words, the 
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internally meaningful and sometimes invisible processes which lie behind them. 
(Tayeb, 1994; 439). The level of structural characteristics (internal characteristics) is 
"emics" because there are absolute differences between organisations from different 
cultures. However, the evidence indicates that the patterns of relationships (criteria) 
between structural characteristics are "etics" since they appear to be culturally 
universal (Segall, 1986; see AAA, 1991: 187; Wong and Birnbaum-More, 1994: 100). 
An etic, or universal, relationship emerges only from an individual analysis. A 
strong etic dimension would emerge from cross-cultural analysis as well as individual 
analysis (Leung and Bond, 1989: 147). In the cultural materialist research strategy, 
etic analysis is not a steppingstone to the discovery of ernie structures, but to the 
discovery of etic structures. Observers necessarily begin their analysis of social life 
with etie categories, but the whole thrust of their analytical task oUght to be the 
replacement of such categories with the emic units that constitute structured systems 
within the minds of the social actors. (Harris, 1979: 35). Idiographic research 
conceptualises the causal capability of structures, while at the same time it sheds light 
on the contingent manner through which a set of postulated causal powers interacts 
and gives rise to the flux of the phenomena under study (Tsoukas, 1989: 551). The 
emic categories are added to the etic categories to allow for a testing of propositions 
about human behaviour (Morey and Luthans, 1984: 30; AAA, 1991: 188). As Pelto 
(1970) indicates, there is an "imbedded emicism" in all anthropological research at the 
fieldwork level (Morey and Luthans, 1984: 30). Cross-cultural research in accounting 
will also be best served if it includes more emic (subjective / idiographic / qualitative / 
insider) perspectives to be later generally translated into etie (objective / quantitative / 
nomothetic / outsider) terms (Morey and Luthans, 1984: 27, 30; AAA, 1991: 188). 
This study was designed not only to use a universal view to establish 
categories, theories, propositions, and framework, but also to use an informant's view 
with qualitative interviews in operations and at headquarters to probe the insider's 
native view of reality. Both emic and etic were used in the research, but emic was 
emphasised more. As a result, it is very helpful in finding the truth to compare their 
results. With the progress of interviews, some categories, propositions, and even the 
integrated framework have been changed or replaced continually. Combining the emic 
and etic in the study, the reliance of the research should be satisfactorily strengthened. 
3.2.2 Methods of Data Collection 
Since this research plans to tackle the problems of management control 
systems in multinational corporations, a number of data-gathering techniques 
including desk research, in-depth interviews at headquarters and operational level, and 
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document collection will be used to collect and analyse the content. This research 
divides the data by data source, and uses in-depth interviews to understand how and 
why MCS can be transferred. The researcher's claims for the validity of his or her 
conclusions are enhanced if the evidence from different sources can be shown to 
provide mutual confrrmation (Bryman 1992: 131). When evidence conflicts, it can 
sometimes be reconciled through deeper probing of the meaning of differences. 
According to the principle of triangulation, data were gathered by the following 
methods: 
3.2.2.1 Desk Research 
No matter how a systematic theory is built, by understanding the sequence or 
flow of case firms' events over time, or verifying the field interviews, the starting 
point of research is to review the literature to find out what academicians or 
practitioners think about the transferability of management control systems. Most of 
the important research and theories found in the literature have been discussed in 
chapter 2. Archival data or stories of case firms from institutes' reports, government 
agencies' reports, company pamphlets, news media, business journals, or some special 
books concerning the case firms will appear in the following chapters to check or 
support the research findings. 
According to the initial findings from the desk research, the research design 
draft, including interview problems, was formed and proposed. It was used as the 
basis of the following pilot study. 
3.2.2.2 In-depth Interviews 
In-depth interviewing is a data-gathering technique used in qualitative research 
when the goal is to collect detailed, richly textured, person-centred information from 
one or more individuals (Kaufman, 1994: 123: also May, 1993: 99, 91). It is modelled 
on a conversation between equals, rather than a formal question-and-answer exchange 
(Taylor and Bogdan, 1984: 77). A core feature of the qualitative research method is 
that satisfactory explanations of social activities require a substantial appreciation of 
the perspectives, culture and "world-views" of the actors involved. (Allan, 1991: 177-
178). According to Easterby-Smith et al. (1991: 74), interviews, semi-structured or 
unstructured, are therefore appropriate methods when it is necessary to understand the 
constructs that the interviewee uses as a basis for his opinions and beliefs about a 
particular matter or situation. 
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Interviews with senior managers at headquarters 
This research uses a semi-structured but open-ended approach (See questions 
in Appendix 1), similar to the focused interview (May, 1993: 99), to interview the 
senior managers at headquarters in order to highlight national cultural effects on 
leadership factors and, in tum, their impact, compared with national cultures, on 
management control systems. The semi-structured interview is geared to allowing 
people the freedom to respond in any way they choose ( Layder, 1993: 41; Kaufman, 
1994: 124; May, 1993: 93; Jones, 1991: 204). These types of interviews are therefore 
said to allow people to answer more on their own terms than the standardised 
interview permits, but still provide a greater structure for comparability over the 
focused interview (May, 1993: 93). 
As Figure 3.2 shows, the purpose of the interviews is to examine propositions 
2 and 3. The three factors, degree of control, budget emphasis, and the selection of 
managers, will be examined in the context of their relationship with national culture in 
proposition 2. In addition, the three factors represent power, money, and personnel 
respectively. These factors significantly influence a firm's financial control system. 
The research will try to categorise leaders' financial control style through evaluating 
the three factors. Then, in proposition 3, the leadership factors will be used to connect 
the components of MCSs in each of the cases to assess the existence, if any, of 
different patterns. 
Figure 3.1 The purpose of Interviews at Headquarters 
National culture Proposition 2 .. Financial control 
... 
(Home country) factors 
Proposition 3 
~ r 
MCSs (Host) 
It is extremely important that the investigator should have a clear idea of the 
research questions before embarking on the construction of both the interview guide 
and interviewing itself (Kaufman, 1994: 124). While interviewing at corporation 
headquarters, the researcher prepared a list of topics and questions that identify and 
specify the phenomena to be studied on leaders' financial control factors (for 
questions, see Appendix 1), although this list will be flexibly used to, in an open-
ended way, according to the emergent demands of the interviewees' response. 
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Adhering to the leadership philosophy on management control systems, basically, the 
questions were developed with three factors in mind - degree of control, budget 
emphasis, and managers' selection. The questions are derived primarily from readings 
of contemporary management literature, especially from Johnson and Gill (1993). 
Hofstede (1991), Naharandi and Malekzadeh (1993), Stacey (1990), Kotter and 
Heskett (1992), Deal and Kennedy (1982), Goold and Campbell (1987), Brownell 
(1982), Dunk (1989), Brownell and Dunk (1991), Otley (1978), Hoopwood (1972), 
Koop (1994), Smith (1992), Whitley (1992). Of course, initial visits and pilot work 
are also very helpful in designing and revising relevant questions. The content and 
purpose of questions designed to discuss each factor are broadly outlined as follows: 
Degree of control: This factor involves a series of main questions, such as 
"How do you use management control systems to manage the whole company?" "How 
do you convey the company policy and operating philosophy to the operations' 
managers?" "Does your company have a clear decentralised decision making system? 
How do you decentralise?" "What decisions are controlled by headquarters? What 
decisions belong to the manager of operations?" The purpose of these questions will 
be to try to probe the attitudes to centralised leadership, strategic management style, 
decentralised decision making, and the relationship between headquarters and 
subsidiaries in each case firm. Based on these themes, the pattern of the "degree of 
control" of case firms can then be determined. 
Budget emphasis: This factor contains an assessment of the budget evaluative 
style used by prior scholars (Hopwood, 1972; Otley, 1978; Brownell, 1982; Hirst, 
1986; Dunk, 1989; Brownell & Dunk, 1991) and some questions relating to the 
budget system, including the role of the budget, formal planning, the process of 
budget setting, budget evaluation, tightness of budget control, and the linkage between 
the budget and incentives. The purpose of assessing budget evaluative style is to 
establish whether a firm comes in the category of high budget emphasis or not. 
Questions related to budget system will be analysed as another criterion to support the 
classification of the budget emphasis. 
Selection of managers: This factor contains a series of main questions, such as 
"What is your company's policy of manager selection?" "In a foreign operation, how 
do you organise its operating managers? Do you consider their nationality? Is there 
any rule? Why?" "When your company selects managers, are cultural and age factors 
important considerations? Why?" and "Under what conditions, do you think the 
company will change a manager?" The main purpose of these questions is to appraise 
the extent of in-group in the selection of managers, especially in European operations. 
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Interviews with operations' managers 
At the same time, this research used a semi-structured but, compared to 
interviewing the senior manager at headquarters, less open-ended approach to 
investigate the MCS components in different operations within a company in order to 
compare management control systems across different national cultures and corporate 
cultures. 
As Figure 3.2 shows, the main purpose of the interviews is to examine 
propositions 1 and 4. The relationship between national culture and MCSs will be 
examined in proposition 1 in chapter 6. Then the relationship between local situational 
factors and MCSs will be explored in proposition 4 in chapter 9. 
Figure 3.2 The purpose of Interviews at Operational Level 
Proposition I." National culture MCSs (Host) 
(Host country) ..... 
~~ 
Proposition 4 
Other situational 
factors 
The questions (see appendix 1) were designed with regard to ten variables 
relating to planning, organising, evaluating, and the rewarding process within the 
management control system. Some relevant literature was used in the process of 
question design. Studies by Johnson and Gill (1993), Horngren (1994), Daley et al. 
(1985), Simons (1988), Milani (1975), Shields and Young (1993), Gorden and Miller 
(1976), Merchant (1981), Abernethy (1991), Kenis (1979), Kren (1992), Chow, 
Shields, & Wu. (1994), Birnberg and Snodgrass(1988), Ueno and Sekaran (1992) and 
Hofstede (1968) were particularly helpful in designing relevant questions. Field 
studies with in-depth interviews allowed the researcher to modify some propositions 
in the early development stage and to explore more important "How" and "Why" 
questions (Yin, 1989: 20; Pettigrew, 1990: 279). Each component contains from three 
to seven main questions. The content of the questions is broadly discussed on a 
component (variable) by component basis as follows: 
Objective setting: A series of questions, including the determining of company 
objectives, developing new budgets, the extent of impact from the senior managers, 
participating in objective setting, and policy consideration, is included in this 
component. 
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Participation: This component contains a series of questions, relating to budget 
committees, participants, discussion meetings, and communication between upper and 
lower management. 
Long-term and short-term planning: This component contains a series of 
questions, relating to budget time span, long-term planning, and matching short-term 
budgeting with long-term planning. 
Decentralisation: This component contains a series of questions, relating to 
the decentralised decision making system, transparency of decentralisation, and 
independent decision-making for managers. 
Formality: This component contains a series of questions, relating to 
documentation, budget process, written performance, and the stability of regulations. 
Controllability-filters: This component contains a series of questions, relating 
to the evaluation criterion, the consideration of uncontrollable items, and budget 
control. In this regard, the extent of controllability-filters will be compared between 
firm's operations. 
Feedback extent and frequency: This component contains some relevant 
questions, such as the period of management appraisals, performance reports, budget 
variance, and usefulness of budget information. 
Contingent rewards: This component contains a series of questions, relating to 
the measurement of subordinates' performance, linkages between budget and financial 
rewards, percentage of pre-set rewards, and the relationship between performance and 
contingent rewards. 
Group rewards: This component contains a series of questions, relating to the 
incentive base, bonus participants, and main factors in the system design. 
Long-term rewards: This component contains a series of questions, concerning 
types of long-term rewards, linkage between performance and long-term rewards, and 
future plans about the long-term rewards system. 
Based on the questions of each component, relevant themes will be built 
component by component in chapter 6 as a framework for the purposes of comparison 
between Taiwanese and European operations in each case. Different MCS patterns 
between the case firms will be assessed and linked with the financial control styles 
described in chapters 7 and 8. 
Compared to participant observers, interviewers lack the first-hand knowledge 
of how people act in their day-to-day lives. It is difficult to sort out the difference 
between purposeful distortions and gross exaggerations. The researcher has the 
responsibility for imposing cross-checks on the informants' stories (Taylor and 
Bogdan, 1984: 99). Sometimes, memories are very likely to be distorted for one's self-
esteem (Stem 1979: 75), and most respondents have difficulty accurately reporting 
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events from their past unless the events were either outstanding or recent (Emory 
1980: 86). No matter whether this post hoc bias or response error happened 
intentionally or unintentionally, it seriously affects research validation and reliability. 
In this study three layers were designed for cross-checks; first~ sufficient time with 
different unit managers to "read between the lines" of their remarks (Taylor and 
Bogdan, 1984: 99). Different questions were prepared to interview different functional 
managers, but each question was repeated at least once to different managers. If they 
were fabricating a story this could be probed. Secondly, to some important questions, 
a cross-checking interview between headquarters managers and operational managers 
was designed. Thirdly, this study drew on as many different sources of data as 
possible to check out informants' statements. In addition to interviews which can 
provide depth, subtlety, and personal feeling (Pettigrew, 1990: 277), cross-references 
with desk research and documents could provide facts but are subject to dangers of 
selective deposit and survival (Pettigrew, 1990: 277). If there were still any doubts, 
this research would continue to probe until a better understanding was reached. 
3.2.2.3 Document Data Source 
In addition to interviews, the research continually observed and gathered some 
valuable data during the field studies. Some documents can be used to add to 
interview data or even constitute the sole source of information for the study. The 
collected data were divided into three types: (1) general information: including a chart 
detailing organisation, an introduction to the corporation, historical documents, 
minutes of relevant meetings, strategy and policy documents, internal pamphlets or 
magazine etc.; (2) financial information: including the annual financial report, 
performance report samples, compensation structure, etc.; (3) rules and procedures: 
including the budgeting manual, decentralisation in the decision making system, 
feedback extent and procedure, the incentive system, etc. 
3.3 Case Firms and Data Collection 
3.3.1 Case Firms 
There is an intentional or design component in the process of choosing and 
gaining access to research sites, but the practicalities of the process are best 
characterised by the phrase "planned opportunism" (Pettigrew, 1990: 274). All 
research is inevitably influenced by the beliefs and values of the researcher (Scapens, 
373-4). A long term planning research activity is linked to matters of academic and 
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practitioner relevance, funding strategies and explicit network building to open up site 
options (Pettigrew, 1990: 274). 
As a cost and managerial accounting teacher in a university and a consultant in 
a CPA firm for a long period in Taiwan, the researcher is interested in the 
management control system, especially for the multinational corporation. In this 
research, Taiwanese corporations were thus chosen as the case firms. Considering the 
timing and funding factors, it was finally decided to compare the corporations' MCSs 
between their European and Taiwanese operations. 
Once the research sites were decided, many reasons influenced the choice of 
the information technology (IT) industry as the target industry. First, most European 
investments from Taiwan are information technology companies so they provide a 
reasonable number of case firms. Secondly, they are all private companies, compared 
to other industries controlled by government or dominated by monopolistic or 
oligopolistic concerns (Hung, 1995: 64), so objective comparison and observation of 
their MCS is possible. Thirdly, the Information Technology industry has already 
become the leading industry in Taiwan and gained third position, next to America and 
Japan, in the world. Global companies are easy to find in the information industry. 
Fourthly, comparison within the same industry is intended to eliminate differences in 
the industrial environment. 
To make it easy to observe the operations of components of the management 
control system, case samples were chosen according to three conditions: (1) they offer 
shares for public purchase on the Taiwan Stock Exchange, (2) they have plant(s) for 
manufacturing or assembling in both Taiwan and Britain or other European countries. 
and (3) they are big global corporations. According to the above terms, only six global 
companies, Acer, Mitac, Tatung, Lite-On, CMC, and FIC4, had plants in Europe 
before 1995, but only the first five companies had plants in Britain. For ease of 
contact and access to data, the first five companies were chosen as case studies for this 
research, but when visits to their senior managers began, it became obvious that the 
scale of CMCs could not compare with that of other companies. Thus, the case was 
dropped from the research. Finally, Tatung, Lite-On, Mitac and Acer were selected as 
the four case fmns (Table 3.2). All ranked within the top 100 of Taiwan's 
manufacturing industries in 19956 • In addition to Acer Incorporated which has plants 
4First International Computer Inc. 
S According to Common Wealth June 1996, the company was ranked 332nd in Taiwan manufacturing 
industries in 1995. 
6 According to June 1996 Common Wealth Magazine, Acer Inc. was ranked 5th, Tatung Co. 8th, Mitac 
International 59th, and Taiwan Liton Electronic Co. 77th in Taiwan manufacturing industry; and 
according to August 1996 Common Wealth Magazine, four groups of Acer, Tatung. Mitac. and Lite-On 
were all ranked in the top ten groups among electronic and information technology industries. 
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in the Netherlands, Germany and Britain but is organised as a regional business unit 
(RBU) in the group, the other companies' plants are all in Britain. 
Table 3 2 C . ase FO Inns s ummary 
Case firms European operation(s) Taiwanese operation 
Tatung Tatung (UK) Ltd. Taipei Electronic plant of Tatung 
Co. 
Mitac Mitac Europe Ltd. Hsin-Chu Plant of Mitac 
International Corp. 
Acer Acer Computer B. V. 
Acer Computer GmbH Acer Global Inc. 
Acer UK Limited 
Lite-On Lite-On (UK) LTD. Power Supplier Plant of Taiwan 
Liton Electronic Co. 
Although there is no ideal number of cases, a balance is needed between very 
careful comparison and easy to generate theory. Eisenhardt (1989: 545) suggests a 
number between 4 and 10 cases usually works well. Likewise, Pettigrew (1990: 276) 
suggests that the researcher conduct no more than four to six cases. Due to the 
demands of this study, involving in-depth comparison of different operations' MCS 
within each corporation, and considering each operation independently, four case 
firms is a suitable number. 
Once the case firms had been chosen, plans to gatn access to these 
corporations were made. Traditionally, it is difficult to access details of management 
control systems in Taiwanese corporations, especially when many interviews at both 
headquarters and on the operational side are needed. A simple but formal written 
research proposal (Powell and Lovelock, 1991: 137) for a key representative was 
prepared each time and then the interview negotiated. 
The field studies were conducted in the four case firms. This study chose not 
only to interview operation's senior managers for understanding the similarities and 
differences of MCS of each paired operation, but also to interview senior managers of 
the headquarters in each company in order to highlight cultural effects on leadership 
factors and their impact on the MCS components. This study, according to the size 
and product content of the European subsidiaries of each corporation, carefully 
selected their domestic operation as a paired sample also for the purpose of controlling 
relevant confounding effects of contingency variables (for comparisons between the 
paired samples see next chapter). All European operations are independent companies, 
but their paired samples contain an independent company, strategy business unit 
(SBU) or independent profit centre. For simplification, the term "operation" is used to 
cover different organisations. 
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3.3.2 Data Collection 
3.3.2.1 Initial Visit and Pilot Work 
When initially contacting the case firms, the researcher had chances to visit 
their headquarters, including Tatung, Mitac, Acer and CMC. Discussions with their 
representatives covered not only the interviewees, time, and interview content, but 
also their MCSs and leadership control styles. It offered opportunities to do the initial 
interview with those representatives, all senior managers at their headquarters. The 
initial interview enriched the design of the draft interview questions. After the 
completion of the initial research design, two companies were chosen, the subsidiaries 
of Tatung and Mitac at Telford, UK, as pilot and pre-test samples. During nearly two 
months' pilot work at their UK operations, chances arose to exchange some valuable 
ideas with their managers and for discussing interview questions. Finally, a series of 
interview questions (Appendix 1) was determined. 
3.3.2.2 Field Work Interviews 
After the pilot work, field work interviews across Taiwan and European 
countries, including Britain, Germany and Netherlands were undertaken. Over a 
period of six months interviews with 74 managers (Table 3.3) took place, including 
senior managers at headquarters and managers at their operations. Interviews (see 
Appendix 2) were conducted at the headquarters and each operation of four 
corporations, about five managers being interviewed at each site. Basically, structured 
samples by hierarchy and function were used, but sometimes convenient samples, 
even snowball samples, were included. Each interview was strictly controlled to finish 
within the one hour promised in the research proposal when contact was first made 
with agency representatives. 
At the headquarters of each corporation, if possible, the preferred choice of 
informants came from the leader(s) (the chairman of the board of directors or the 
president) or both. The controller and/or accounting manager were always covered, 
because normally they know their management control system better than other 
people. In addition, if necessary or convenient interviews were covered with other 
senior managers willing and able to talk about their experiences and articulate their 
feelings. 
At each operational level informants also included the general manager or 
managing director, operation controller or accounting manager, and divisional 
managers from different divisional levels. Almost all general managers or managing 
directors at all operations participated. The practice of field research is the art of the 
possible. It is necessary to exploit the opportunities offered in the circumstances 
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(Buchanan et ai., 1988: 55), so the opportunistic approach was also used to choose 
suitable informants, ask relevant questions and sustain contacts in organisation. 
Table 3 3 Profde of Interviews . 
Description Tatune; Acer Mitac Liton Others Total 
At headCluarters: 
Top managers· 2 4 4 1 1 12 
Financial managers 3 2 I 2 1 9 
Other managers I - - 1 - 2 
Sub-total 6 6 5 4 2 23 
At operations: 
Head or vice-head 3 6 2 3 1 15 
Financial managers 3 6 3 2 - 14 
Other managers 5 8 5 4 - 22 
Sub-total 11 20 10 9 1 51 
Total manae;ers 17 26 15 13 3 74 
• Including Chairman, vice-chairman, president, and Vice-president. 
In addition to field notes, an audio tape was used in all, except some special 
cases, in interview. These tapes were transcribed verbatim after interview for 
comparative analysis. One of the keys to successful interviewing is knowing when and 
how to probe (Taylor and Bogdan, 1984: 96). Throughout the interviews, sensitive 
follow up questions were included and further questions probed for clarification of 
doubtful issues. 
Data were continually collected from personal interviews and a variety of 
archival documents in the field work. Interviews can uncover more valuable 
documents, which in turn lead to some critical lines of inquiry for other interviews. 
3.3.3 Data Analysis 
A series of steps of basic data analysis was used in the research. First, 
because the interview tapes were transcribed verbatim, the data bases could be 
established for each interview. Secondly, interview data were sorted into broader 
themes and issues (Maxwell, 1996: 79). New data bases were built by the factors 
(financial control and situational factors), components of MCSs, and issues in the 
research. Thirdly, following the sequence of propositions in the research, systematic 
analyses from these data bases were used to examine the propositions. Data were 
rearranged as required into relevant themes selected from relevant issues. 
For comparing MCSs within case firms in chapter 6, interview contents were 
analysed by the component of MCSs. Based on the relevant issues in each component, 
content lists embedding units of analysis were presented under different themes. 
Unlike prior scholars who used "content analysis" to count key phrases or themes 
(Easterby-Smith et al., 1991: 105), this research used a more open approach to data 
analysis. Content lists in each component were organised according to the main 
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themes of the questions. Some themes were compared in detail, but some in summary. 
The main purpose of the content lists was to fmd the reality, not to count the 
frequency of items. There were two main reasons for using this approach. First, owing 
to the use of semi-structured interviews in the research, the large amount of non-
standard data made content analysis problematic. Secondly, a few key managers 
participated in the interviews in each operation, and selected managers replied to 
relevant questions only. The main purpose was to understand the real systems. To 
count the frequency seemed unsuitable in this research. For probing financial control 
style in chapters 7-8, except for the content lists described above, matching pattern 
logic, one of the most desirable strategies (Yin, 1989), was used in this research. In-
depth interview data are difficult to use in determining a precise figure or position for 
comparison, but ranking the sequence for matching patterns between the case firms 
seems easier and more reasonable. In addition, the technique of cross-checking was 
fully used in chapter 9 to link the situational factors to operations' MeSs. Most data 
were cross-checked from the relevant interviews analysed in chapters 6 to 8. 
Nevertheless, it must be emphasised that the results are limited by the subjective 
judgements made by the researcher in the data ranking and classification process. 
3.4 Validity and Reliability 
In-depth Interviews 
Qualitative interviewing has been referred to as nondirective, unstructured 
nonstandardised, and open-ended interviewing. Sometimes the phrase "in-depth 
interviewing" can be used to refer to this qualitative research method (Taylor and 
Bogdan, 1984: 77). By in-depth qualitative interviewing we mean repeated probing 
toward understanding informants' perspective on their lives, experiences or situations 
as expressed in their own words. 
3.4.1 Validity 
Has the researcher gained full access to the informant's knowledge and 
meaning (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991: 41)? Validity is a question of how reliably a test 
or instrument measures the attribute which it is supposed to measure (Easterby-Smith 
et ai., 1991: 121). The validity can be defmed as "the capacity of a test to tell us what 
we already know" (Bannister and Mair, 1968). Patchen (1965 see Easterby-Smith et 
al.. 1991: 121) proposes three ways of estimating validity, including face validity. 
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convergent validity and validation by known groups'. According to Yin (1989: 40-45; 
1993: 39-40), there are three tests in case study designs: 
3.4.1.1 Construct Validity 
Construct validity deals with the use of instruments and measures that 
accurately operationalise the constructs of interest in a study (Yin, 1993, p.39). 
Because most instruments and measures are not necessarily as accurate as desired, a 
common strategy is to use multiple measures of the same construct as part of the same 
study. 
Researchers use mUltiple sources of evidence to build construct measures, 
which define the construct and distinguish it from other constructs (Eisenhardt, 1989: 
542). This study uses the technique of multiple sources of evidence, including 
interviewing, observing documents and desk research data. The converging evidence 
gives confidence about the conclusion. As Yin (1993: 69) said: 
"This type of triangulation is the most desired pattern for dealing with case 
study data, and you should always seek to attain such sources of evidence; if 
all sources point to the same answer, you have successfully triangulated your 
data. " 
When a pattern from one data source is corroborated by the evidence from 
another, the finding is stronger and better grounded. When evidence conflicts, the 
researcher can sometimes reconcile the evidence through deeper probing of the 
meaning of the differences (Eisenhardt, 1989: 541). 
A second tactic is to establish a chain of evidence as each interview and each 
case are concluded. Within-case analysis can help investigators cope with the deluge 
of data. This process allows the unique pattern of each case to emerge before 
investigators push to generalise patterns across cases (Eisenhardt, 1989: 540). 
Through establishing relevant data bases by each interview and each case, the unique 
pattern of each case was formed and is useful to check the construct validity. 
A third tactic is to have a draft case study report reviewed by key informants. 
A major way of improving the quality of case studies and assuring their construct 
validity is to have the draft cases reviewed by those who have been the subjects of 
study (Yin, 1989: 144). This review was carried out in this current research. 
3.4.1.2 Internal Validity 
Internal validity establishes a causal relationship as distinguished from 
spurious relationships (Yin 1989: 40). The researcher can achieve internal validity 
, Face validity explores whether the instrument or its items is plausible; convergent validity means 
confirmation by comparing the instrument with other independent measurement procedures; validity by 
known groups is comparing groups otherwise known to differ on the factor in question. 
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through the specification of the units of analysis, the development of a priori rival 
theories, and the collection and analysis of data to test these rivals ( Yin, 1993: 40 ). 
Eisenhardt (1989: 542) argues: 
"At this point, the qualitative data are particularly useful for understanding 
why or why not emergent relationships hold. When a relationship is supported, 
the qualitative data often provide a good understanding of the dynamics 
underlying the relationship, that is the 'why' of what is happening. This is 
crucial to the establishment of internal validity." 
This study strove to search for the "why" behind relationships, including 
pattern matching and explanation-building in the data analysis. Theoretically 
propositions were built up and examined. Pattern matching between MeSs and 
leaders' financial control styles were reasonably linked. Explanations concerning 
propositions examination and pattern matching were fully given as possible. It is 
important to discover the underlying theoretical reasons for why the relationship exists 
(Eisenhardt, 1989: 542). This helps to establish the internal validity of the findings. 
3.4.1.3 External Validity 
External validity establishes the domain to which a study's finding can be 
generalised (Yin, 1989: 41). A researcher can achieve external validity through the 
specification of theoretical relationships, from which generalisations can then be made 
(Yin 1993: 40). 
Selection of cases is an important aspect of building theory from case studies 
(Eisenhardt, 1989: 536). In this study research cases were selected from information 
companies which have similar environmental conditions. Selection of an appropriate 
population controls extraneous variation and helps to define the limits for generalising 
the findings ( Eisenhardt, 1989: 537). 
In this study some cultural theories and leadership theories have been tested 
through replications of the findings in a second or even a third neighbourhood. This 
replication logic is the same that underlies the use of experiments (Yin, 1989: 44-45). 
3.4.2 Reliability 
Will similar observations be made by different researchers on different 
occasions (Easterby-Smith, 1991: 41)? Reliability is defined as the absence of 
measurement error. A reliable instrument will measure the same object with consistent 
and error free results (Bailey et al., 1983: 535). It can be reliably demonstrated that 
operations of study - such as data collection procedures - can be repeated, with the 
same results (Yin, 1989: 41). If an instrument is administered to the same individual 
on two different occasions, will it yield the same result? The main problem with 
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testing this in practice is that no one can be sure that the individual, and other factors, 
have not changed between the two occasions. It is more common to examine 
'equivalent reliability,' which is the extent to which different items intended to 
measure the same thing correlate with each other (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991: 121-
122). While a multiple case design is more demanding than a single case, it permits 
induction of more reliable models (Bourgeois ill and Eisenhardt, 1988: 818). A 
researcher can achieve reliability through the use of formal case study protocols and 
the development of a case study database (Yin, 1993: 40). 
In this study the design of the draft interview questions came first, followed by 
consultation with academics and managers in the pilot interview. In the field work, all 
firms and informants were subjected to the same sequence of entry and exit 
procedures and main interview questions. In the analysing processes, similarly 
organised case data bases for each firm visited were created and then some data bases 
were developed by different variables to generalise all cases. Actually, many 
conclusions converged through the establishment of a series of data bases in this 
research. However, the limitations of the interviewed-based approach used in this 
research must be recognised and the results therefore treated as indicative and 
exploratory. 
3.5 Summary 
The transferability of management control systems within a multinational 
corporation is a highly complicated topic. It needs careful planning in order to find the 
reality. This chapter fully justifies the methodological method used, especially 
concerning the operation of triangulation. 
This chapter firstly described the research design, including research 
approaches and methods of gathering data. It aims to offer a bridge between the 
theory framework and empirical research. Because the research approaches are case 
study and comparative method, multiple methods of gathering data are needed to test 
the research theory and even build the theory patterns. Secondly, some empirical 
practices, covering the selection of the case firms and the process of data collection, 
have been noted. Thirdly, issues concerning validity and reliability have been 
examined and evaluated. 
4. Information Technology in Taiwan 
4.1 Introduction 
4.2 IT in Taiwan 
4.3 Taiwanese IT Industry in Europe 
4.4 Summary 
4.1 Introduction 
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Because information technology (IT) compames are used in this research. 
information technology in Taiwan will be described in this chapter first and then the 
case firms discussed in the research will be presented case by case in the next chapter. 
The open IT environment and some potential successful factors such as 
abundant and professional highly-skilled engineers, strong entrepreneurial spirit in 
Taiwan. dynamic component infrastructure, and correct government policy han~ made 
Taiwan an information empire. At present. Taiwan is the third information technology 
country next only to America and Japan. Acer group has been listed as thc seventh 
most powerful PC company in the world since 1994. Some information firms haye 
bccome multinational companies very quickly. Despite the rapid gro\\th of the IT 
industry, Taiwan has continued to expand by integrating other local sectors, such as 
semiconductors and telecommunications. Taiwan is likely to grow continually in the 
future. creating another miracle. and becoming a "technology island." 
4.2 IT in Taiwan 
.... 2.1 ~cy Factors of Successful IT Industry 
The following fivc elements are the key factors leading to the dc\eIopment of 
the successful IT industry in Tai\\'an: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Opcn environment in the PC industry. 
Dynamic component infrastructure 
The entrepreneurial spirit in Tai\\·an. 
-\ bunoant hil!hlv-sk i lied cn!!incL'rs 
. ...... .. '--
G()\l'rnment policics 
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4.2.1.1 Open Environment 
The open environment trend is a key factor for Taiwan's success in the world 
IT industry. Large companies like mM, Microsoft and Intel establish PC standards and 
third parties build the infrastructure. Under the influence of open environment, the 
barrier to entering the industry has been drastically reduced and the role of outsourcing 
is prevalent in the PC technology industry. With access to standardised components 
and a well-defined standard architecture, a number of computer firms can work 
together within the "value-chain" , from components, system and software to 
distribution. The consequence of this has been radical price competition and this leads 
to emerging market opportunities for original equipment manufacturers (OEM) whose 
advantage is on the cost side. Due to owning abundant, cheap, and highly-skilled 
labour at the beginning of the 1980s, Taiwan naturally became the best OEM base for 
big computer firms to pursue a low cost strategy. 
4.2.1.2 Dynamic Component Infrastructure 
Based on the excellent accumulation of experience of the electronics industry, 
many information companies had cultivated the ability to supply components and parts 
quickly by excellent production techniques, product development and improvement. 
The component manufacturing infrastructure in Taiwan is extremely dynamic, 
innovative, highly competitive, and quick to learn. This is due to wide engineering 
resource availability, and is helped by the fact that most essential components are 
designed and produced within a 50 km radius in Northern Taiwan. Within this well-
developed component infrastructure, companies are able to operate on a smaller 
economic scale and concentrate on gaining speed in development and production. 
4.2.1.3 The Entrepreneurial Spirit in Taiwan 
There is a saying that Taiwanese people would rather be the head of a chicken 
than the tail of an ox. This means that Taiwanese people like to work for their own 
benefit or be their own boss instead of for a large organisation, and this 
entrepreneurial spirit is a major factor in Taiwan's role in the IT industry. According 
to Wong (1988), this strong entrepreneurial desire stems from the combination of 
equal inheritance of the family property in Chinese families and the belief that men 
are naturally equal and should attempt to realise their own potential (Pelzel, 1970, see 
Whitley, 1992: 203). The patriarchal character of relations in authority in the Chinese 
fanlily business (CFB) is limited by the "conditional" or "rational" (SHin, 1976: 127-
31) nature of employee commitment and the attractiveness of self-employment as an 
alternative to continued subservience in Taiwan (Tam, 1990, see Whitley, 1992: 23 ). 
Many factory workers in Taiwan view employment as merely a temporary status 
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before starting their own business, a view which rapid economic growth and the 
prevalence of small frrms encourages (Deyo, 1989: 162; Gold, 1986: 89; Greenhalgh~ 
1984, 1988; Whitley, 1992: 156). 
For the Taiwanese, work is one of the highest virtues. Most businessmen and 
workers jump at the chance to work longer hours and earn more money and it is 
common for people to work ten or more hours every day, especially if they are self-
employed (Hinkelman, 1994: 129). As the integrated business model "dis-integrated". 
traditional big players acquire burdens that cause them to lose their market share. The 
most important elements for success in today's environment are speed and cost. In 
Taiwan, where entrepreneurial spirit is very strong, almost all businesses are small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs). These SMEs are run with characteristic fast speed, great 
flexibility, and easy adaptability to change in the information environment. Generally 
speaking, strategic performance in the Chinese family business (CFB) focuses on the 
intensive use of resources, short pay back periods for new investments, reliance on 
price and cost competition and a reluctance to share control or responsibility 
(Redding, 1990: 177-81, Whitley, 1992: 55). The critical role of family ownership and 
control of the CFB, together with these strategic preferences, results in a highly 
personal decision-making style which is very flexible and responsive to environmental 
change (Whitley, 1992: 55). 
Businessmen in Taiwan are always searching for any opportunity, any niche in 
which to do business (Li, 1993: 68). They are very fast followers; as soon as an 
industry creates a standard, or whenever a new product is accepted by a market, they 
will come out with some innovation, either a new function or a major cost reduction. 
The key competitive weapon of Taiwanese firms is an early move in the dynamic 
marketplace (Li, 1993: 69). This was the main reason why Taiwanese information 
companies could take advantage to develop when the information market began in the 
early 1980s. Because of this mentality, in Taiwan there are about three thousand very 
active information technology export companies. T AC (Taipei Computer Association) 
is the biggest association with a membership of 5,000 in 1993. Through merger and 
fiercely competitive price cutting, some companies were forced to close their 
operations, but at the end of 1995 4,075 companies were still on record in the electric 
and electronic association of the Taiwan area I. About 85% of them are SMEs. 
Because of this, Taiwan has also attracted a lot of Chinese talent from the US, the so-
called "reverse brain drain2". 
I From "ROC 1996 Infonnation and Electronic Industry Annual Report" by the Taiwan Institute of 
Economic Research. p.123. 
2 From the speech of Stan Shih. the chainnan of Acer group. 
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4.2.1.4 Abundant Highly-skilled Engineers 
After the ruling party, Kuomintang, withdrew to Taiwan in 1949 from 
Mainland China, education became an important policy, especially in the basic 
scientific and engineering fields. Abundant scientific and engineering talents 
motivated many American and Japanese electronic companies to invest in Taiwan in 
the 1960s. More and more highly-skilled engineers left those companies and 
transferred to the IT industry after 1980. The high flow of engineering manpower 
impels rapid diffusion of technical knowledge and the result is a lot of small PC 
firms. Also, as Taiwan has excellent highly-skilled talents and the ability to design key 
components, it naturally has become a leading IT area among the Asian countries. 
4.2.1.5 Government Policy 
Government policy has also accelerated the development of Taiwan's 
infrastructure by supplementing budgets for engineering programs, funding of 
research institutes such as the Institute for Information Industry and the Industrial 
Technology Research Institute for target technology development/transfer, and 
establishing science-based industrial parks. The information technology industry has 
become a strategic industry of Taiwan's government since the early 1980s. In addition 
to tax incentives for investment in key segments which built up high-tech resources, 
the government offered several services, including special finance and training of 
talented personnel for information companies. 
4.2.2 IT Industry in Taiwan 
Business is the life of modem Taiwan. For both economic and political 
reasons, the Taiwanese view business with the outside world as the key to their 
country's growth and stability. The IT industry in Taiwan has been described by many 
industrial analysts and academics as fragmented, dynamic, innovative, highly 
competitive and quick learning (e.g. Kraar, 1994; Schive & Hsuech, 1987). Over 12 
years before 1993, its growth rate exceeded more than 400/0 and it created today's 
world position. With the labour cost increasing, some companies which manufacture 
low-end products like monitors, keyboards, exchange power suppliers, and the mouse 
started gradually moving their manufacturing bases to neighbouring countries, like 
Malaysia, Thailand, Mainland China and the Philippines. The production value in 
overseas manufacturing bases already attained US$3.003 billion and comprised 20.60/0 
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of total production value. It will attain US$7.880 billion and comprise 32.9% in 19973. 
But over the past 10 years before 1995 the domestic information industry still 
maintained a high growth rate both in hardware and software industry (Table 4.1). In 
1995, the production value of the information hardware industry in Taiwan already 
attained US$14.156 billion, but combined with the production value in overseas bases 
it achieved, in total, US$19.6 billion.4 The growth rate attained 35% and retained third 
position in the world, next only to America and Japan. How could the Taiwan 
information industry continually maintain fast growth? First, the market continually 
expands , especially in third world countries. The fashion of the Internet is also one of 
the important factors which stimulate PC demand. Secondly, Taiwan has faster 
production and lower prices than other Asian countries. Thirdly, big computer 
companies, especially the top ten including Compaq, IBM, Apple, Packard Bell, Dell, 
and NEC, continually give OEM orders to Taiwan information companies. At present 
the number one PC company, Compaq, purchases about 50% of its monitors from 
Taiwan and its notebook PCs are produced by Taiwanese manufacturers through 
OEM/ODM contract. It is expected that the top ten PC companies will purchase over 
US$5 billion of their PC and peripheral components in 1996.5 Fourthly, due to the 
scale of expansion, better quality increases customer confidence. Fifthly, more and 
more information companies emphasise synergy products, marketing channels and 
stepping into global operations. Without a large home market, the global demand for 
PC applications was the major inducement for specialisation in the information 
industry in Taiwan. IT industry became a strategic industry and at present is a top 
industry in Taiwan. 
Table 4.1 The Growth Trend of the Domestic IT Industry (Unit: US$billionJ 
year Hardware industry Software industry Total value 
1986 2.134 0.178 2.312 
1987 3.839 0.288 4.127 
1988 5.324 0.397 5.721 
1989 5.484 0.690 6.174 
1990 6.149 0.699 6.848 
1991 6.908 0.855 7.763 
1992 8.390 1.030 9.420 
1993 9.568 1.251 10.883 
1994 11.579 1.401 12.980 
1995 14.156 1.643 15.799 
. Data resource: ROC Institute for Infonnatlon Industry: MIC (Marketmg Infonnatlon Centre) 
3 From "ROC 1995 Infonnation Industry Annual Report" by the Institute for Infonnation Industry. 
1995. 12, p.25. 
4 From "ROC 1996 Infonnation and Electronic Industry Annual Report" by the Taiwan Institute of 
Economic Research, 1996.7, p.173. 
S From Macroview Weekly. 1996.6.26. 
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Among the IT products, many already lead the world (Table 4.2), such as the 
monitor, mother board, image scanner, mouse and keyboard. In addition, Notebook 
computer production in Taiwan has exceeded Japan to become the world's largest 
supplier since 1996 and its world market share has increased to 35%.6 Due to Intel's 
input in the production of mother board in 1995, although market share dropped from 
80% to 65%, output was maintained. In addition, total image scanner sales occupied 
64% of world market share, but handy-type scanner sales comprised nearly 94% 
(Desktop-type occupied 49%). Enjoying exceptionally rapid growth through the past 
15 years, Taiwan has continued to expand by integrating other local sectors, such as 
semiconductor and telecommunications. Following the IT industry, at present the 
semiconductor industry has become another big industry in Taiwan. It is estimated that 
the Taiwan semiconductor industry will occupy about 8% of market share in the world 
in 2000.7 Taiwan is expected to become the top 4M DRAM producing country in 
1997.8 
Table 4.2 Taiwanese Information Products in the World 
1995 1994 
Products Quantity Market Quantity Market 
(unit:OOO') share (unit: 000') share 
in the in the 
world world 
Monitor 31,216 59% 24,028 56% 
Portable (notebook) 2,592 27% 2,057 28% 
computer 
Desktop computer 4,567 10% 3,090 8% 
Keyboard 32,780 65% 22,800 52% 
Mother board 20,846 65% 17,545 80% 
Image scanner 2,481 64% 1,663 61% 
Exchange power supplier 34,320 35% 25,960 31% 
Painting card 9,300 32% 8,770 32% 
Network card 10,264 38% 6,120 34% 
Mouse 40,904 72% 29,800 80% 
Data resource: Institute for Information Industry: MIC 
The analysis of production value (Table 4.3) shows pes, monitors, and mother 
boards are most important items and altogether occupied 78% of product value in 
6 From Macroview Weekly. 1996.7.9. 
7 From "ROC 1996 Information and Electronic Industry Annual Report" by the Taiwan Institute of 
Economic Research, 1996.7. p.12S. 
8 1996.4. 18 Central Daily News (overseas). 
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1995. PCs including notebook and desktop occupied 39%, then monitors at 30%, and 
mother board at 9%. 
Table 4 3 Val St to • ue ruc re 0 fT . , IT I d t . 1995 alwan s n us ry In 
product value percentae;e 
Monitor 30% 
Mother board 9% 
Portable (notebook) computer 24% 
Desktop computer 15% 
Image scanner 4% 
Paint card 3% 
Network card 2% 
Other 13% 
Data resource: ROC Institute for Infonnation Industry: MIC 
According to the analysis of brand, OEM/ODM occupied 66% of production 
value and own brand occupied 34% in 1995. Only a few big companies, such as Acer 
and Mitac have their own brands, but they still accepted lots of OEM/ODM orders. As 
Taiwan's information companies have accumulated relative techniques and abundant 
experience and enough R&D and engineering talents to support manufacturing and 
designing ability, many famous information companies in the world, including 
American, European, Japanese, and Korean big companies, all place their orders in 
Taiwan. Those companies which have integrated network marketing channels around 
the world could easily order everything they want at one time in Taiwan. As 
OEM/ODM suppliers, information companies bring the business a great deal of trade, 
but they gradually lose their own brand market. OEM production can enlarge the 
production scale, improve production technique, and improve quality, but too much 
dependence on OEM will increase the risks. 
As to the area analysis, North America comprised 44%, then Europe 31 %, 
Asia 15%, and other areas 10% in 1995. It shows North America and Europe 
constitute the main sales area, but as those markets are nearly full and competition is 
great, other areas are more and more important to Taiwan information exporters. 
Actually Acer have been quite successful in third world countries, including south-
east Asian countries and Latin South-America, and that is why Acer ranks as the 
seventh PC company in the world. 
In the analysis of domestic and foreign values, domestic product value 
occupies 72%, but foreign product value had already increased to 28% in 1995. In the 
past two years the increment in labour cost in Taiwan exceeded not only that of 
America and Japan but also Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore. Besides, the 
increment in land cost and an unstable exchange rate also became serious problems. 
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Many IT companies are moving their production bases to neighbouring countries, 
such as mainland China, Thailand, and Malaysia. More than 50% of monitor 
suppliers, 90% of mouse suppliers, and 60% of keyboard suppliers currently have 
foreign plants.9 
With continuous high growth and expansion over the past 15 years, some 
small information companies, such as Acer, FIC, Mitac, and Lite-On, have gradually 
become big groups and entered the stage of globalisation. Among them, Acer has 
become the national star and has topped private manufacturing companies in Taiwan 
since 1995. Entering the top five world brand companies in the next two years does 
not seem a mere dream to the Acer group. The information industry has become the 
leading industry of all technology industries in Taiwan. "Becoming a technology 
island" has been the Taiwanese government's goal for the last two years. 
4.2.3 The Challenges of Taiwan's IT Industry 
4.2.3.1 Lacking Manufacturing Abilities of Key Components 
Although the PC industry spurred the development of a wide range of related 
sectors, some key components like CPUs, LCDs of notebook, HDDs and printers still 
rely on foreign companies. Intel dominates the global supply of CPUs; whereas, 
though Taiwan had overtaken America to become the largest exporter of notebook PCs 
after 1995, its LCD sources remain heavily reliant on the supply from Japan. The local 
HDD industry, too, has failed to flourish, with most of the domestic demand being 
imported. In PC products, key components including LCD, CPU, and HDD comprise 
more than 75% of production costs. Lacking key components, Taiwan's PC companies 
can merely earn a little from the conversion cost and it is difficult to compete with 
American and Japanese information companies. Besides, the domestic printer sector 
has been dominated by Japanese and US products, especially Japanese. In addition to 
hardware industries, Taiwanese software companies have acquired only a limited share 
of the market in the Chinese application packages and game software, leaving the 
system software to be dominated by US firms such as Microsoft and Lotus. 
4.2.3.2 Losing the Cost Advantage 
Although Taiwan's information industry continually increases its production 
value, its operating cost increment still exceeds the growth of production value. 
Dramatically increasing operating costs include production cost (land and wages). 
components purchase cost, patent franchise, rising foreign exchange, R&D, and 
international marketing. With the product cost increment of production cost, most 
9 1996, 7,6 Central Daily News (overseas). 
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low-end product companies are gradually moving out of their producing bases to 
neighbouring countries. The rest of the companies must face fierce competition. 
However, most companies owing to small investment size, cannot undertake big R&D 
expenditure. As a result, they can only emphasise improvement of product design 
while lacking long-term planning in R&D. 
4.2.3.3 Lacking Experience of Globalisation Talents 
The information industry is a highly globalised industry in Taiwan. If 
information companies want to handle the added value from the international market, 
they need more international marketing talent. As most information companies' 
pioneers came from a technical background, they often put emphasis only on technical 
research and manufacturing activities, not on handling marketing channels and 
establishing brand image. As a result, most companies are mere OEM suppliers, 
producing information products for famous large companies in the world. They lose 
not only the long-term abundant added-value in the marketing stage but also the 
contact with end-consumers to understand what they need and create new products for 
them. 
In addition, in the globalisation process, some international talent including 
professional managerial talent, financial talent, and law talent is also very important. 
How to cultivate those talents is an urgent matter in globalisation. 
4.2.3.4 Weakness in Intellectual Property Rights Protection 
Although Taiwan's government is already dedicated to improving intellectual 
property rights protection, the copying and learning of intellectual property are still 
very serious. Because of complicated information techniques and the lack of radical 
execution, it is still difficult to eliminate. 
4.3 Taiwanese IT Industry in Europe 
4.3.1 European IT Industry 
The market value of the information industry in Europe attained 136.3 billion 
ECU in 1995 and it grew 5.2% more than in 1994 (Table 4.4). Compared to the 1994 
growth rate (4.4%) and 1993 growth rate (2%), the European economy seems in 
recovery. Its main products are computer hardware and peripheral products. Its total 
market value occupied 34% of the world market share, next only to America 39% but 
better than Japan (16%). Because only 26% of European families own personal 
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computers, significantly less than American families 35%10, it shows the European 
market still has great potential growth. From the view of market value structure (Table 
4.5), the German market comprised 29%, then French 17.6%, and then the British 
17%. 
With the coming of the European Union, American and Japanese enterprises 
have continually merged European computer companies in recent years. In addition, 
suffering from the economic recession from 1991 and the impact of competitive 
prices, most computer companies faced a very difficult time. Among the big four local 
computer companies, except for ICL (UK), other companies like Siemens-Nixdorf 
Information Systems (Germany), Olivetti (Italy), and Bull (France) all suffered losses 
in 1993 and 1994. About 60,000 Europeans lost their jobs in the information industry 
market. Recovery from economic recession seems still not complete. 
T bl 44 M k tV I a e . ar e a ueo fth E e uropean IT I d t n us cry 
1993 1993 1994 1994 1995 1995 
Items 1 billion growth 1 billion growth 1 billion growth 
ECU rate (%) ECU rateJo/~ ECU rate (%) 
Hardware 54.7 -0.1 56.5 3.2 59.3 4.9 
market 
Software 23.7 5.5 25.3 6.7 27.2 7.5 
market 
Information 45.6 2.9 47.7 4.6 49.8 4.4 
servIce 
Total market 124.0 2.0 129.5 4.4 136.3 5.3 
value 
Data Resources: EITO 
Table 4.5 The tructure 0 t e uropean • ar e aue ~ oun rles • s f h E IT M k t V I bet' 
1995 1994 
Country Market value Percent Market value Percent 
I billion ECU (%) I billion ECU (%) 
German~ 39.1 29.0% 37 28% 
France 24.0 17.6% 23 18% 
Britain 23.2 17.0% 22 17% 
Other countries 50.0 36.4% 48 37% 
Total 100.0 100.0% 130 100% 
Data Resources: from EITO 
Most European information companies are SMEs. According to a 1993 survey. 
78% of information companies hired fewer employees than 9 people, 11 % of 
10 1996.6.6 Central Daily News (overseas). 
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companies hired 10 to 19 people, and only I % of companies hired more than 500 
employees. II Some famous American and Japanese companies like mM, Apple, 
Compaq, DEC, HP, Unisys, NEC etc., especially mM and Compaq, occupied a 
dominant position in Europe. The more important local companies are the German 
Siemens-Nixdorf, Vobis, and Escom, the French Bull group, British ICL, and Italian 
Olivetti, but most cannot compare in size with those American and Japanese 
companIes. 
At present, the more important manufacturing bases are concentrated in 
Britain, Ireland, Germany, Holland, Italy, and France. In particular, the British 
government used an excellent incentive policy through government subsidies to attract 
foreign investment. Many famous information companies have been attracted to invest 
in Britain. "Europe Silicon Valley" in Scotland and "Silicon Corridor or M4 Corridor" 
in the South of England have already become famous information industry areas. In 
1995 British PC production volume attained 8.92 million which was almost triple 
German production volume and attained half the total European market volume. 12 The 
British growth rate of the information industry attained 7.7% in 1994 significantly 
better than other European countries. 
4.3.2 Taiwan IT Companies in Europe 
Though Europe continually suffered economic recession from 1991, due to its 
information industry comprising 34% of world market share in 1995, next only to 
North America, it is always an important competitive battlefield for information 
companies. Of course, Taiwan could not exclude itself from the competition. Europe, 
next only to America, is Taiwan's second export area for information products. In 
1992, Taiwan exported almost 38% of information hardware to the European area, but 
with strong price competition in this area and success in third world countries 
Taiwan's exports to Europe grew only marginally. However, it maintained almost the 
same market share in its total exports (Table 4.6). 
II From "ROC 1995 Information Industry Annual Report" by the Institute for Information Industry. 
1995. 12, p.503. 
12 From 1996.6.6 Central Daily News (overseas). 
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Table 4.6 Market Analysis of Taiwanese IT Industry by Area 
1993 1994 
Products North Europe Other North Europe Other 
America areas America areas 
Notebook PC 49.0% 29.0% 22.0% 49.0% 28.()% 23.0% 
Desktop PC 43.0% 41.0% 16.0% 45.0% 37.0% 18.0% 
Monitor 46.0% 32.1% 21.9% 45.7% 33.7% 20.6% 
Mother board 38.2% 39.0% 22.8% 39.2% 39.5% 21.3% 
Data resources: see footnote}3 
More than 80% of Taiwanese companies investing in Europe are electronic 
and computer companies. Most of the information companies are OEMIODM 
manufacturers of European information companies, or just export their products to 
Europe; some companies having more business in Europe have set their sales offices 
or warehouses for marketing necessity, and most have fewer than 20 employees. Only 
a few global information companies like Tatung, Acer, Mitac, Lite-On, FIC, and CMC 
are relatively large scale and have manufacturing or assembly plants in the area. A 
factory ground-breaking ceremony was held on 19th February 1996 by Chunghwa 
Picture Tube Company, a subsidiary of one of Taiwan's largest electronic companies, 
Tatung. The owners will invest 260 million pounds, which is the biggest investment 
project from a foreign country, in Scotland and it is expected to start manufacturing 
cathode ray tubes in mid-1997 and will create 3,300 jobS.14 
Most Taiwanese information companies chose their manufacturing bases or 
companies in Britain first, then Holland, and then Germany. In other countries, most 
companies are still very small. 
4.4 Summary 
The Taiwanese people have made excellent use of the opportunity to work to 
create today's information empire. The IT industry has become a leading concern in 
Taiwan and the dream of a future "technology island" seems possible. The 
development of the IT industry has already created many multinational information 
groups. Four case firms in this research are fully presented in the next chapter and that 
is the basis for further comparing their MCSs and discussing their transferability in 
later chapters. 
13 From "ROC 1995 Information Industry Annual Report" by the Institute for Information Industry. 
1995. 12. pp. 144-152. 
14 Macroview Weekly. 1995. 11. 21. 
5. Case Studies of Taiwanese IT Companies 
5.1 Introduction 
5.2 Case 1: Tatung 
5.3 Case 2: Lite-On 
5.4 Case 3: Mitac 
5.5 Case 4: Acer 
5.6 Summary 
5.1 Introduction 
Table S 1 The Case Firms . 
Items Tatun2 Lite-On Mitae 
Start time 1918 1975 1974 
Main products Highly integrated Electronic PCs and monitor 
components 
Key leader • S. C. Lin • Y. M. Tsen. • C. S. Ho 
• T. S. Lin • Raymond Soong • Matthew Miau 
(after 1942) (after 1990). (after 1976) 
Start-up mode Local entrepreneur Local partners as Local entrepreneur 
entrepreneurs and a then supported by 
financial supporter Lien-Hua group 
Management More Japanese and More American More American 
style Chinese style style style 
Corporate culture Extremely strong weak medium 
Leadership • Patriarchal style • Separated • Professional 
and more management management 
hierarchical. • Professional • Centralising 
• Limited management fmancial 
decentralisation management 
Operating Education-and- Professional Developing 
strategy industry integration management strategic alliance 
Authorisation Low-medium High Medium-hi2h 
Risk attitude Moderate Moderate- Conservative 
conservative 
Ownership • Controlled by • Joint venture with • Controlled by 
Lin's family. founders, Miau's family. 
• Employees own professional 
20%. managers, and 
individuals. 
8S 
Aeer 
1976 
Highly integrated 
Stan Shih 
Local partners as 
entrepreneurs 
More Chinese style 
strong 
• Decentralisation 
• Client-server 
system 
Continue 
enterprising 
operation 
Extremely high 
Aggressive 
• Joint venture with 
founders. 
supporters, and 
employees. 
• Local touch 
The research covers four case firms (see Table 5.1). Each firm has its 
background and management style which are very important factors in comparing its 
intra-operations' management control system. Integratedly speaking, Tatung puts more 
emphasis on system management, research and quality, and deep corporate culture; 
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Lite-On depends on professional management and high technology; Mitac has 
professional management and PC technology, but is more conservative on 
decentralisation, especially in financial management. As to Acer, the fully 
decentralising client-server system allowing its managers to take risks with 
entrepreneurial spirit on the basis of a common culture seems to be the basis of its 
success. 
5.2 Case 1: Tatung 
The Tatung business was founded by chairman Shan-Chih Lin in 1918.1 The 
founder dedicated himself to the civil engineering and architectural industry. He 
managed his individual business under the motto - honesty, integrity, industry, and 
frugality, and earned an outstanding reputation by completion of more than 600 
construction projects. In 1942 he wound up his individual business. He reserved 10% 
of his shares in Tatung Co. for his family and 10% for all his Tatung colleagues so 
that they were able to become employee-stockholders. The remaining 80% were 
donated to the Hsieh-Chih Association for the Advancement of Industry which 
appropriated funds for the Tatung Vocational School of Industry, Hsieh-Chih 
Publishing Co., Hsieh-Chih Scholarship, Tatung Co., and the project establishing 
Tatung Institute of Technology. His son, T. S. Lin was then concurrently appointed 
president of the School and chairman of the Tatung company. Since then T. S. Lin has 
devoted himself to industrial construction through the education-and-industry co-
operation programme between Tatung School and the Tatung Co. In 1956, the Tatung 
Institute of Technology was formally established to implement the co-operation 
programme between education and industry. 
With the educational foundation investing in Tatung Co., Tatung Institute of 
Technology and Tatung Vocational School owns about 12% of Tatung shares and they 
use the dividend to pay about 75% of general expenses.2 To maintain a high standard 
of excellence, Tatung Institute of Technology keeps its student population at a 
minimum level3• It is able to provide for its students "internship" opportunities to 
integrate classroom theories and practical work experience at all the company's 
factories and offices. 
Over the past fifty years and more, the inspiring figure, T.S. Lin, the chairman 
of Tatung corporation and the president of Tatung Institute of Technology, has been a 
key person in the company's development. After he graduated from Taiwan 
I Most of the data are taken from the internal documents, company introductions, annual reports, and 
interviews. 
2From the Tatung Magazine. Augus~ 1995 
3 There were only 2.427 students in 1995. 
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University, he inherited his father's business. Tatung from a small company has 
become a top ten big company in Taiwan. From 1969, he started to enter politics. He 
became the Speaker of Taipei city and of the central committee of the ruling party, 
Kuomintang. He is still a consultant to the president. He performed excellently and at 
random in the business, political, and educational areas. 
He insists on his philosophy but he takes a benevolent interest in workers' 
concerns. He handles senior personnel and significant decisions himself. He controls 
the company through authorisation in the hierarchical organisation and always gives 
some directives in the meetings. He invites his employees to purchase Tatung stock at 
a favourable price and supports them in purchasing their house by a low-interest loan. 
He asks his employees to contribute their whole life to their job as government staff. 
For himself, he follows his father's lesson, the Tatung motto of "honesty, integrity, 
industry, and frugality." He takes a "didactic' leadership role in which he conveys to 
subordinates the methods by which he has achieved success. He teaches and trains his 
employees in a weekly seminar how to keep high quality productivity and how to 
manage the business. Besides, he works hard 16 hours every day, even now when 
nearly 80 years old and strictly keeps himself frugally. To Tatung's employees, he is 
omnicompetent, remote and morally superior. 
Tatung was established in Taiwan during the period of Japanese colonisation. 
Its leaders accepted Japanese education and this deeply affected their operating 
philosophies. In addition, with long-term technical co-operation with some big 
Japanese companies, Tatung has learned lots of operating philosophies from them. 
Naturally, its management style is nearer to the Japanese spirit, but traditional 
Confucian thinking still deeply affects its management philosophy. The name 
"Tatung" means "the great commonwealth4" in Chinese, and it is a dream of its 
chairman to pursue a Confucian ideal society. He often disseminates Confucius' 
thinking in his operating management course in which every student of Tatung 
Institute of Technology and manager of Tatung corporation has to take part. The 
deputy of the auditing committee said: "Tatung culture belongs to traditional Chinese 
Confucian culture, so we emphasise orderly work. Basically, the chairman respects 
each employee and all employees respect him too. We are greatly influenced by his 
philosophy and behaviour." Its deputy controller also said: "Tatung corporation 
strongly emphasises business order. There is a clear order among all employees." 
Compared to other Taiwanese companies, Tatung has a strong corporate 
culture. The company always directly recruits high-level employees from college or 
university. especially from the Tatung Institute of Technology. and insists that they 
learn everything in the factory from the beginning; that is to eliminate their old ideas 
4 The name comes from Confucius's "The great commonwealth of peace and prosperity." 
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and completely accept the Tatung culture. The deputy chairman of its auditing 
committee explained the critical reason: 
"Because most managers came from Tatung Institute of Technology where the 
chairman, the president of the institute, continually educated them in the 
management concept and philosophy in school and corporation, Tatung culture 
is deeply implanted in their minds." 
Tatung's management motto - honesty, integrity, industry, and frugality is 
continually cultivated in every employee's mind. The chairman with patriarchal 
leadership pursues the highest ideals of truth, perfection, beauty, and sacrosanctity, and 
aims to carry out obligations to colleagues, shareholders, and bankss. 
As regards business policy, basically, the chairman has a strong mission to 
follow government policy and shoulder his share of social obligations. Tatung was a 
pioneering company in industrial equipment and home appliances before 1980. 
Passing through the Chungshan North road of Taipei city, everyone still can see a big 
slogan, "developing industry for the country", on the roof of Tatung's headquarters 
office. With the government policy of encouraging IT, Tatung started to transfer its 
business focus on information products from the early 1980s. T. S. Lin expended 
substantial money on R&D, no matter how much the short-term benefit, but 
emphasising only long-term strategy. One special case was investing in Chunghwa 
Picture Tube Company in 1970. Although the company had continually suffered 
losses before 1986 and other partners like RCA all gave up the business, Lin insisted 
on continuing with investment. Now the company has become one of the most 
profitable companies in Taiwan and the biggest picture tube company in the world. In 
addition to the picture tube, the monitor is another important product of the company. 
At present Tatung is actively stepping into the semiconductor industry and a new 
semiconductor company investing nearly NT$0.8 billion will start production in 
1997.6 A new network technology company owning NT$O.l billion capital will also 
be set up to support the group's marketing service and administrative efficiency.7 At 
the moment Tatung information product value already exceeds more than 70% of their 
total product value.8 In effect, Tatung has become an information company. 
On operating philosophy, Lin persists in stable and long-term operating 
management principles. Since its establishment, Tatung has adhered to the 
management principle of "education-and-industry integration9 and research-and-
5Quotation from Tatung managerial objective in the reception office ofTatung UK Company. 
6 From 1996.9. 14, Economic Daily News. 
7 From 1996. 7. 27 Economic Daily News. 
8From Management Magazine, No. 258, December, 1995 and according 1996.7.29 Central Daily 
News (overseas) the precise ratio is 67.4%. 
9The education-and-industry cooperative programme between Tatung Company and Tatung Institute of 
Technology was conceived and created by the founder Chairman Shan-Chih Lin in 1941. 
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development, management-labour unification for achieving autonomous management 
of industry; creating and sharing profits with customers; social investment and 
publicly-owned company. 10" Through education-and-industry integration, Tatung 
could continually contribute to research and development for the past fifty years and it 
has to date innovated over 300 products. I I Its production strategy always emphasises 
high quality, as the chairman said that quality is the best advertisement 12. Tatung 
continues to pursue its goal in industry and to focus on product design and 
development, quality control, and system management. 
The chairman is a patriarchal and paternalistic leader. Even though the 
corporation already has the system of profit centres and is basically decentralised in 
decision making, all significant decisions need to be sent to headquarters for approval. 
The headquarters plays a strong role in the whole management system. Headquarters 
directly controls all important functions including finance and accounting, personnel, 
internal aUditing, purchasing, and some marketing and sales activities. Its deputy 
controller said: "Tatung's employees accept instructions from senior management and 
they have a strong mission to follow the instruction." One of its managers also 
described the situation: 
"We have relatively clear decentralisation in decision making between 
headquarters and centres, but the whole corporation operating policy is still 
handled by the chairman and significant decisions still have to be made by the 
chairman. " 
On risk attitude, Tatung seems to maintain neutrality, being neither too 
aggressive nor too conservative. They set their plan according to the economic 
environment, marketing situation, and industry conditions. They emphasise both 
short-term projects and long-term projects, but owing to its huge organisation, each 
centre cannot easily make its decisions independently, so "it is impossible to make 
decisions quickly and speed of operation is not goOd. 13" This may be a reasonable 
explanation why Tatung is unsuccessfully developed in the PC area. 
Passing over 50 years of struggle and expansion, Tatung controls more than 
30,000 employees around the world and more than 170,000 stockholders, a really 
"public" company. Tatung owns almost 40 investing companies and has become a big 
group. Its group achieved NT$119.4 billion revenue and NT$136.8 billion total assets 
in 1995. Its branches and subsidiaries are scattered around the world. Tatung 
products and services exist almost everywhere. As to the ownership, as well as having 
nearly 170,000 stockholders, its employees own altogether almost 20% of the shares. 
10Quotation from the 1994 Tatung annual report. 
II From the interview with the chainnan T. S. Lin of Tatung group. 
12Quotation from the interview with the deputy controller. 
13Quotation from the interview with the chief accountant ofTatung Electronic Plant. 
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However, Lin's family still essentially controls the group through owning shares, by 
schools, investment companies, and retaining family members. At present, Tatung is a 
real employees' company, a social public company, and a global multinational 
company. But sometimes the chairman still needs to show concern for his family 
interests and he prudently controls the group operations, such as gradually arranging 
for his five sons to take critical positions in the group and further appointing them and 
his first daughter in law as directors of the board14• The colour of family business is 
still very deep. 
There are many subsidiaries under the Tatung Company, the parent company. 
Among its investing companies, Chunghwa Picture Tube Ltd has been a most 
profitable company in Taiwan's information industry in the last five years and at 
present it is number one picture tube manufacturer in the world. In 1995, its revenue 
was ranked 29th of the manufacturing companies in Taiwan and it will be a publicly 
listed company in 1998. Other important companies are Taiwan telecommunication 
Industry Company, Forward Electronics Company, Tatung Fujitsu Company, and 
Tatung OTIS Elevator Company (see Appendix 3). 
In this research, the profit centre of Electronic Plant, which won a Prize for 
"Zero Defects" from IBM in 1985, was chosen as an independent operation within the 
Tatung Company, to compare with Tatung (U.K.) Ltd., because both plants have a 
similar environment and scale. Their main products are monitors and colour 
television, but monitoring products comprise more than 70% of their production 
value. 
5.3 Case 2: Lite-On 
In 1975, a group of engineers from Texas Instruments corporation in Taiwanls 
including Raymond Soong and Y. S. Lin set up Taiwan Liton Electronic Co., Ltd. 
with the financial support ofY. W. Tsen, the former chairman of the Lite-On group. It 
is the leading company and was the start of the Lite-On group. 16 
From 1975 to 1985 Taiwan Liton Electronic Company concentrated on its 
LEDs products, but with the development of personal computers it started to produce 
power suppliers for the PC industry in 1985. Due to continual growth, Taiwan Liton 
became a publicly listed company in 1983. It is currently divided into two business 
units: the Opto Division and the Power Conversion Division. With twenty years 
experience in the optoelectronic industry, Liton of Taiwan has become one of the 
world's leading developers and manufacturers of high-performance LED 
14 From 1996. 6. 7 Economic Daily News. 
IS Texas Instrument planned to drop the LED products in 1975 (1996. 9. 13 Taiwan Daily News). 
16 Most of the data in this section comes from Lite-On Group Profile. annual reports. and interviews. 
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optoelectronic products for a wide variety of computer, communications and 
consumer applications. The company has also built up a . strong presence in the 
international computer peripherals market through its Power Conversion Division, 
which produces a wide range of reliable power supplies for use in computer and 
communication equipment. 
To achieve its goal of complete customer satisfaction, Taiwan Liton 
implements a stringent Total Quality Management programme which covers all 
aspects of its operations, from product development to manufacturing and after-sales 
service. "Product quality always number one" is the operating philosophy of the Lite-
On group.17 At present, all their plants have been awarded ISO-9000 international 
quality certifications. Its efficient infrastructure enables the company to deliver high 
quality products at extremely competitive prices. Its employees number almost 1,200 
and the company has production facilities in Taiwan, Malaysia, and Britain and 
contract manufacturing plants in Mainland China and the Philippines. In addition, to 
providing closer support for its customers, the company has established a global 
distribution and service network, including branch offices in Europe, the USA, Hong 
Kong, Japan, Singapore, and Korea, as well as a team of carefully selected agents and 
distributors in over 1 7 more countries. At present, famous information companies, 
like IBM, NEC, Compaq, and Digtal, are all important customers. 18 Over the past 
twenty years the company has always been profitable and its rate of return based on 
shareholders equity fluctuated between 15% and 20% over the past three years (see 
Appendix 4). It was and will continue to be a very successful company. 
In over 20 years, the Lite-On group has become a world leader in the design 
and manufacture of a broad spectrum of cutting-edge products, from sophisticated 
electronic components to state-of-the-art computer peripherals, and has built up a 
global network of manufacturing, service and distribution facilities. At the same time , 
the group has successfully diversified into such areas as real estate development and 
financial services. Because the philosophy between Soong and Tsen was so different 
and Tsen had a financial problem in the late 1980's, Raymond Soong took over from 
Tsen as the group chairman from 1990. 
As the inspirational figure, the chairman actively devoted himself to business 
operations and improved the group image. In addition to continually developing the 
group's technical advantages, he stressed the importance of global manufacturing and 
global service. At present the group's manufacturing bases are scattered around the 
world including Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, Mainland China, America, Mexico and 
Britain. The group established a good manufacturing-base setting its manufacturing 
17 Quotation from the interview with the president of Taiwan Liton Co. 
18 From 1996. 9. 6 Economic Daily News. 
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plants in Asian countries in previous years to produce goods at lower cos~ so that the 
group quickly increased its revenue and profits in the past three years. Today, the 
group companies deliver goods and services ranging from optical products, computer 
peripheral products, electronic components and communications products to real 
estate investment and development, and building management. At the moment, the 
LED (dual) division is number one in Taiwan and within the top 6 in the world; the 
multi-power supplier division is number two in Taiwan and within the top lOin the 
world. However, in desk-top PC it is the number one power supplier company in the 
world 19; the rubber products division for computers and communications is number 
one in Taiwan and in the top five in the world; the computer keyboard division is 
number one in Taiwan and number three in the world; the colour monitor section is 
number three in Taiwan and number five in the world; and the CIS section of Dyna 
Image Corporation is number one in Taiwan and the world. 
Lite-On was set up by a group of engineers from Texas Instrument Corporation 
including the present chairman Raymond Soon in 1975. With the business growth, the 
group continually absorbed more talent from that company. They learned lots of 
management concepts from American companies, as its president described: 
"Although the company is a Chinese company, we adopted the multinational 
management system from American multinational companies. We enforce the 
basic system and some disciplines from those companies, but we adopted only 
their operating approaches and operating concepts and we still leave some 
management space for overseas subsidiaries." 
Although Lite-On still has a motto, "integrity and honesty, excellence, and 
innovation", and it strictly adheres to the same shared philosophy of "delivering high 
quality products and services that meet the needs of our customers20", basically its top 
management emphasises a belief in a rational management theory more than shaping a 
strong corporate culture. Its president expressed his view about corporate culture: 
"I think a so called theory of management will show fewer cultural factors if it 
is to become a global bench mark. If the people we sent to overseas operations 
had a strong mission, hoping to get the expected results quickly, the results 
would be negative. Sometimes, weak corporate culture is more helpful to the 
development of a multinational corporation." 
They keep an open mind about management, as its president said: "I emphasise 
that business heads of my company must be reasonable, opening their mind to listen to 
others opinions ... There is a strong desire for learning existing in our company and it 
is our cultural characteristic." 
19 From 1999.96 Economic Daily News. 
20Quotation from 1995 Lite-On Group Profile. 
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The managing director of. its British operation also said: "Taiwanese 
headquarters do not ask us to follow their corporate culture .... We try to adopt their 
culture more here because we are owned by them." 
"Lite-On slowly progresses in its professional management system.21 " Lite-On 
appreciates the need to study constantly and implement new management techniques 
and strategies that will allow them to make their operations even more efficient, enable 
them to improve quality, reduce costs, and upgrade productivity.22 At the moment the 
group emphasises state-of-the-art technology, product quality, continuous product 
innovation, and global manufacturing and global service under professional 
management. The group has achieved this position not only by providing high quality 
products and services that satisfy the requirements of customers, but also by fostering 
an entrepreneurial and risk-taking culture that has allowed them to take full advantage 
of new business opportunities arising from changes in technology and the global 
economy.23 
The group currently operates in 22 countries through 26 offices and 27 
manufacturing facilities, and has over 11,500 employees (35% in Taiwan). In 1995, 
the group attained NT$3 7.4 billion in sales and NT$23. 7 billion in total assets.24 The 
group has achieved this position not only by providing high quality products and 
services that satisfy the requirements of their customers, but also by fostering an 
entrepreneurial and risk-taking culture that has allowed them to take full advantage of 
new business opportunities arising from changes in technology and the global 
economy. Most of their companies were built after 1987, but they became very 
successful within a short time, such as the Lite-On Technology Corporation, which 
after only six years history, became one of the top 40 manufacturers in Taiwan in 
1995. Professional management is another important characteristic in Lite-On. As its 
chairman said: "The information industry is a highly technological industry. The 
company needs to hire professional experts to do professional matters.2S " Within the 
framework, each company operates independently, without mutual control, but as a 
part of the synergy of the group and sharing the market channels and overseas 
outlets.26 
Because of the diversification of products and services, each company or SBU 
in Lite-On enjoys adequate space for decision making. To foster a dynamic and 
entrepreneurial culture that responds rapidly to changes in the high-tech market place, 
the group strives to empower employees fully and give member companies a high 
21Quotation from the interview with the deputy controller. 
22Quotation from 1995 Lite-On Group Profile. 
23Quotation from 1995 Lite-On Group Profile. 
24 From Common Wealth Magazine. 1996 August. 
2S From 1996.9. 13 Taiwan Daily News. 
26 From 1995. 8. 17 Financial Daily Infonnation. 
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degree of autonomy in their operation.27 Within the Lite-On group, each member 
company operates independently and without mutual control but as a part of the 
synergy of the group, and sharing market channels and overseas points.28 In Taiwan 
Liton Corp., each manager according to his management level has different powers of 
authorisation, and if the subsidiary is directly subordinated under the president (not 
directly reporting to each SBU) then its manager enjoys more decentralisation.29 
However, as the group always emphasises harmony and its scale still cannot compare 
with other big corporations, the authorisation still has some limitations, as its president 
said: "The system is stable in the long-term, but you need to consider what is feasible 
in present reality." 
As to risk attitude, Lite-On is a little conservative. The group always chose to 
invest in those proposals which needed not too much money but provided a 
satisfactory rate of return of investment. Chairman Soong says: "The group's financial 
position still can not compare with many big financial groups, so we cannot go too 
fast. For example investing in DRAM, a project normally needs NT$20 billion, and 
can only produce $1 output per $1 investment, but opto-semiproductor is more 
efficient and it can produce $1.5 output per $1 investment. ,,30 He continued: "The 
group has always been very successful working on the present basis. Then we 
continually seek more broad strategies. This manner of conservative success is the 
main reason why the group showed no deficit in the past 20 years.,,31 However, talking 
of product quality and development, the chairman confidently and aggressively said: 
"The group's total investment will attain NT$30 billion and the revenue will attain 
NT$100 billion in 2000. For continuing growth, each manager of a Lite-On business 
sets the products' objective as being in the top three in the world, at least in the top 
five. ,,32 As to overseas investment, the group always considers the political risk very 
prudently, especially investment in mainland China.33 The president of Taiwan Liton 
Corporation also said: "We keep 15% to 20% of rate of return of investment per year 
as our target, by which we can sufficiently motivate our employees and shareholders." 
The corporation kept about a 15% stable growth rate of turnover in the past few years. 
As to ownership, since its financial supporter Y. W. Tsen was enforced to 
leave the Lite-On group, it lacks strong shareholders. Like Taiwan Liton, its 
individual holders of shares are over 70%, and the total share of the directors of the 
27 Quotation from 1995 Lite-On Group Profile. 
28Quotation from 1995. 8.17 Financial Fast News. 
29Quotation from the interview with its controller. 
30Quotation from 1995. 6. 9 Economic Daily News. 
31Quotation from 1995.6.9 Economic Daily News. 
32Quotation from 1995. 6. 9 Economic Daily News. 
33From 1995. 7. 13 Industry Business Daily News. 
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board is only 10.43%.34 In addition, except for a small percentage mutual holding 
share within group companies, each company is basically independent. There is no 
group headquarters and each company is managed by its board of directors and 
president. The management core, and board of directors, unless they now increase 
share percentages by relevant group companies, need to get support from their 
employees and shareholders. 
Since the Lite-On group was formed in 1975, it has become one of the most 
successful international conglomerates based in Taiwan. With two major business 
units (Table 5.2), Electronics and Information, and Investments, the Lite-On group is a 
truly global enterprise that has built up a world-wide reputation for its commitment to 
excellence in leading-edge product development, advanced technologies, efficient 
manufacturing, and responsive customer service. The group has seven main 
companies in the electronic and information business and three main companies in the 
investment business and cultural activities. Among them (see Appendix 3) there are 
three publicly listed companies including Taiwan Liton Electronic Company, Silitek 
Corporation, and Lite-On Technology Corporation; Dyna Image Corporation also 
offered its stock on the counter market; also, Lite-On Power Semiconductor 
Corporation entered the top 1,000 manufacturing industries, and Strong Electronic 
Co., Ltd. and Lite-On Incorporated entered the top 500 service industries in Taiwan in 
1995.35 According to the estimate of the group chairman, the group revenue would 
achieve NT$130 billion and all products will be in the top five in the world in 2000.36 
More and more facilities would be placed in overseas countries and actually its 
production value abroad has already exceeded domestic facilities since 1994. With the 
continuing trend, Lite-On needs to globalise more quickly for optimal global 
production and marketing, but from an integrated view, most of the Lite-On group 
companies are very young companies and seem to have great potential energy and 
power, and of course the group will be a great shining star in the future. 
In this research, for easy comparison with the management control system of 
Lite-On Limited, a subsidiary of Taiwan Liton in the UK, the Power Conversion 
Division, and a business unit of Taiwan Liton, were selected. Both operations belong 
to Taiwan Liton, products are all power suppliers, and their size is also similar. 
34 According Taiwan Liton 1995 Annual Report. 
3S From Common Wealth Magazine, 1996 June. 
36 From 1996. 5. 25 Economic Daily News. 
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Company Start Rankin Main product 
year 1995* 
Electronic and information business unit 
Taiwan Liton Electronic Co., 1975 Manufac. LED optoelectronic products & power 
Ltd. 77 supplies. 
Silitek Corporation 1978 Manufac. rubber products for computer and 
311 communication, keyboard, and scanner 
products 
Lite-On Technology Corp. 1989 Manufac. monitor 
40 
Dyna Image Corporation 1990 Manufac. semiconductors and modules for 
628 advanced image processiI!g applications 
Lite-On Power 1991 Manufac. power semiconductor devices 
Semiconductor Corp. from 653 
Silitek 
Lite-On Inc. 1987 Service multi-layered printed circuit boards 
316 
Strong Electronics Co., Ltd. 1995 Service electronic components sales agent for 
448 leading international brands. 
Investment Business Unit & Cultural Activities 
Silport Investment Corp. 1987 - real estate development and security 
service and system 
Dyna Investment Co., Ltd. 1989 - real estate development and financial 
service industry 
Lite-On Cultural Foundation 1993 - promoting charitable activities, 
supporting the healthy development of 
children, and taking care of corporate 
culture. 
* From 1996, June, Common Wealth Magazine 
5.4 Case 3: Mitac 
Mitac, one of the leading computer companies in Taiwan, markets and services 
a wide range of computer products.37 Founded in 197438, Mitac initially introduced 
microcomputer technology to Taiwan, contributing to the building of the island's high-
tech industrial foundation. In the early 1980's, Mitac was number one computer 
company and always took a pioneer role in the initial information stage in Taiwan. In 
the later 1980's Acer jumped and replaced Mitac as the number one computer 
company. Mitac is still a PC giant in Taiwan, second only to Acer but bigger than FIC. 
At the moment the Mitac group's business has expanded to include not only 
manufacturing, but also system integration, distribution and other services. The group 
now employs 3,300 people working in a wide range of business. The expansion in its 
37 Most of the data from "The sto!), of Mitac" by Business Week. C. M. Tang, company introduction. 
newsletter. and annual reports. 
38 Mitac was created by C. S. Ho, the group vice-president. 
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workforce is matched by the growth in consolidated revenues which reached NT$37.8 
billion in 1995 an increase of about 73.6% on 1994. The members of the Mitac group 
are able to draw not only on the formidable resources of the group itself, but also on 
the Lien-Hua group, an investor and affiliated conglomerate. Together, the Mitac and 
the Lien-Hua groups provide a range of financial, technological and manpower 
resources that support the business activities of all member companies. Altogether the 
Lien-Hua and Mitac group attained revenue of NT$47.5 billion in revenue and 
NT$39.3 billion in assets in 1995.39 
Mitac International Corporation originally belonged to a division of Mitac Inc., 
and it became an independent company with NT$0.02 billion capital in Hsin-Chu 
Science Park at the end of 1982. At present its capital attains nearly NT$4.4 billion, 
about 220 times of the initial capital. After Mitac International became a publicly listed 
company in 1990, with over-expending and recession in the information industry the 
company suffered serious losses until 1992. With enterprising re-engineering from 
1991 to 1993 through a modularised manufacturing system, re-organising, establishing 
a global net-work organisation managing through the network to handle production 
and marketing, increasing the OEMIODM ratio, and strict financial control, the 
company has become a profitable company again since 1994. According to the 
combined financial figures (see Appendix 4), its sales grew by 45% in 1994 and 89% 
in 1995. Due to forming a strategic alliance with Compaq, the top PC company, it is 
expected that the company will maintain high growth in the future. Now it owns three 
main product lines in the company. According to the actual 1995 figure, its desk-top 
PCs comprised 56%, notebook PCs 21 %, and monitors 23%. In total its combined 
sales attained NT$28.2 billion, and among them own brand occupied about 42% and 
OEM/ODM occupied the rest. With its exceptional product quality, world-class design 
and engineering expertise, and large and flexible manufacturing capacities, Mitac 
International has been highly successful as an OEMIODM partner for major computer 
firms around the world. The company owns big OEMIODM customers and at present, 
according to its policy, they only accept the top 20 PC companies, especially Compaq 
and IBM. According to 1995 statistical data, the top three OEMIODM customers 
already occupied 39% of the whole company total combined sales. At present it owns 
assembling facilities in Taiwan, Mainland China, Australia, Britain, and America. In 
addition, Mitac International's manufacturing capacities are complemented by a world-
wide marketing reach, with ten overseas subsidiaries and over 70 distributors in more 
than 60 countries. At present the company employs nearly 100 MIS engineers 
. all d" I bal I . . 40" responding to Its so-c ego ogtstics management. 
39 From Mitac internal report. Its figures differ from those reported in 1996 August Common Wealth 
Magazine. 
40 From 1996. 8. 27 Financial Daily Information. 
Compared to the other three firms, Mitac adopted more of an American 
management and philosophy. Its spiritual figure, chairman Matthew Miau, went to 
America when he was in his teens. He grew up in America, and worked in the 
American Intel company for many years. In addition, most of its senior managers are 
more or less affected by the management of American computer companies. 
As to the Mitac corporate culture, its chairman said: "Authorisation, discipline. 
and transparency are our important aims." To attain those purposes, they developed a 
network organisation. The chairman explained: 
"The network organisation is just like the client-server framework in fashion. 
Each subsidiary can not only develop its independent operating function, but 
can also quickly and correctly exchange mutual information." 
He said further: "The key point in developing the network organisation is one 
layer management." So-called one layer management considers the most important 
thing is completely open information. Through the integration of computer system and 
telephone communication facility, each employee can directly and quickly transfer 
information to anyone. The company operates the E-mail system. He said: "We input 
all information into the network system and whoever handles the greater amount of 
information has the greater power." For communicating necessary information, they 
develop the common protocol communication language. The chairman said with 
satisfaction: "Through the mail system, our organisation becomes more mature, 
because each manager knows whom to mail, when to mail, and how to mail. Besides, 
they know who needs copy. For simplifying the use of the system, we also design 
some easy format documents." Under the network system, "no communication, no 
promotion" has become another Mitac slogan. The president of Mitac International 
thought the network system could give Mitac new life and he emphasised: "To correct 
employees' concepts is not so easy. For popularising one layer management, I 
encourage employees to have the bravery and habit of reporting independently on their 
supervisors through the computer network, because in the new organisation, class 
consciousness should not hamper the information flOW!41" For emphasising the 
discipline over overseas operations, as well as traditional financial reports, they design 
a "BEPAID" report42 to handle critical strategic factors. It can offer the group a self 
diagnostic system checking their own health any time. In addition. they have another 
HOT slogan, that is honesty, optimism, and team work. The chairman especially 
emphasises team work and he said: "If an operation has a good team of sales. 
technical. and financial managers, then the operation could be successful." 
4lQuotation from "The Story of Mitac". 
42 "BEPAIO" report is designed as a global report in Mitac. "B" represents billing. "E" represents 
expense. "P" is profit. "A" represents accounts receivable. "I" is inventory. and "0" represents debt. 
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Mitac's operating strategy succeeded excellently and produced abundant 
financial benefits, such as the selling of subsidiaries, mergers and alliances, especially 
alliances with famous companies. Its vice chairman said: "We are moving from being 
technically-oriented into being marketing-oriented, and now we are stepping into 
being financially-oriented.,,43 In 1985, the group sold its subsidiary, Kanhai Computer 
Company, an agent of Digital mini-computer, to the American Digital Company. The 
group made huge profits and the chairman said: "It is our success that a big foreign 
company could spend quite huge amounts of money to merge with a small company in 
Taiwan." On strategic alliances, due to excellent language ability and daring, the 
chairman started to negotiate and cooperate with some famous companies, such as 
Britain's LEX Group, American Westinhouse, Lockheed Martin, General Electronic 
Corporation, Intel Corporation, Compaq Corporation, and other Taiwanese big 
companies or institutes. In addition, for the purpose of global marketing and leading 
technical advantage, the group also participated in investment in or merged with lots 
of American companies. The chairman is nicknamed "Mr. 10int-Venture". He said: 
flU sing limited funds results in unlimited business. ,,44 This describes how he strives to 
build international alliances. His great global view is "All around the world is our 
warehouse and laboratory. ,,45 
Compared to Acer group which puts greater emphasis on volume-orientation, 
Mitac group actually owns different technical excellencies. Mitac offers more multiple 
informative services, especially in software, and it has the ability to integrate different 
techniques. It made its reputation by providing leading-edge products that also meet 
customer requirements, and will continue this tradition in the future.46 They are 
dedicated to meeting the full range of needs of their customers. "To get customers' 
trust is our pride and our responsibility" has become a slogan in Mitac. The second 
key to ensuring the Mitac group's continuing success is a strict focus on those areas in 
which it can provide the most value to its customers.47 The aim of each member 
company is to develop competitive advantage by developing its special areas of 
expertise. Furthermore, the operations of these strongly-focused companies are co-
ordinated so that powerful synergy-based complementary strengths can be achieved. 
Mitac always decentralises decision making step by step. Its chairman said: 
"We keep on changing our corporate culture. At first we used a centralised system but 
decentralised by and by. We encourage creation but emphasise discipline. All 
information must remain open." Its vice chairman, the group founder, also said: "We 
43Quotation from "The Story of Mitac". Z.M. Tan, July, 1, 1995. 
44Quotation from "The Story of Mitac", Z.M. Tan, July, 1, 1995. 
4SQuotation from "The Story of Mitac", Z.M. Tan, July, I, 1995. 
46From "The profit of Mitac Group." 
47From "The profit of Mitac Group." 
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are slowly becoming decentralised in decision making: most branch companies 
developed from a segment or profit centre to a company." He described the 
development of the leadership framework as follows: 
"In the past, the decision system was a top down line approach, from chairman, 
vice-chairman and then to the president. In other words, that is a design in 
which the top management core complements the professional managers, but I 
realise the future growth of Mitac must be built on the framework of group 
leadership. In that situation it can produce continuing energy.48" 
In 1994, the decision framework of the Mitac group entered the new area of 
group leadership. The group was split into three subgroups and each subgroup had a 
professional president. The chairman Miau, the big boss, still directs the management 
philosophy of the whole business group; the vice-chairman handles the future 
development strategic planning; and the president of each subgroup is really 
responsible for routine operations within the sub-group company.49 Under the new 
framework its president of Mitac Inc. said: 
"Overall, from the view of organisational development, the group has more 
decentralisation, otherwise the organisation couldn't be developed. The group 
puts more emphasis on localisation. Our philosophy is looking for the best 
management approach from the individual company, so obviously variances 
have already appeared." 
Mitac has a three-pronged management strategy for ensuring continued growth 
to propel it into the top ranks of the global information technology industry. The three 
elements of Mitac's strategy are technology, business focus, and globalisation. Mitac 
made its reputation by providing leading-edge products that also meet customer 
requirements, and it will continue this tradition. On business focus, the member 
companies of the Mitac group work to identify those areas in which the group can 
provide the best value to its customers and then allocate resources accordingly. The 
aim is for each member company to develop competitive advantage by developing its 
special areas of expertise. Furthermore, the operations of these strongly-focused 
companies are co-ordinated so that a powerful synergy based on complementary 
strengths can be achieved. Globalisation is the only way to ensure that the group 
continues to thrive in the ruthlessly competitive information technology industry. 
Although the group is already a global enterprise, well-established in all the world's 
major markets such as the USA, Europe, and Asia Pacific, Mitac will continue this 
kind of global outlook, solidifying its position as an international vendor of 
information technology. 
48Quotation from "The Story of Mitac". 
49From "The Story of Mitac," Z.M. Tan, July, I, 1995. 
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On risk attitude, the group is more conservative. Because Chairman Matthew 
Miau came from a traditional business family, his father always taught him to "keep 
conservatism foremost in running a business." He said: 
"With my background I consider the risks very much. The total risks in 
business (market) multiply, so we do not need additional financial risk. 
Because our industry already involves a big business risk, we need to decrease 
our financial risk." 
In 1985 the American ITT company gave a big order (OEM) to Mitac. Mitac 
faced whether to enlarge greatly its production scale or to keep a conservative 
operation. Finally, they accepted only part of the order according to their maximum 
capacity and transferred the rest of the order to Acer company. Mitac and Acer shared 
the risk. The Acer company took that excellent opportunity, becoming a big company 
within a few years. Chairman Miau said: "From the final result, we regret we did not 
go quickly when we could do, but you know we cannot faiL" Facing the high growth 
PC industry, he confessed his conservative manner and said: "Acer is more aggressive 
than us. We are more conservative. We keep to stable growth even when we have a 
big market. We keep the growth rate under 1 00%, but the global strategy is the same 
as Acer's." He remained prudent and said: "It is unbelievable that a company grows 
1 00% per year! Under a rapidly enlarging situation, the company may suffer great risk 
due to a small event at anytime." Owing to their different risk attitudes, Acer and 
Mitac's marketing strategy on area is quite different, as Miau said: "Area development 
strategy is quite different. Acer develops strongly in third world countries, but we 
focus on developed countries, especially in English-speaking countries ... We tread 
carefully in third world countries, because we are concerned about the risk, especially 
political risk." As a result, Acer developed faster than Mitac, but the chairman said: 
"If we were to start again, we would still choose our own way." 
With regard to ownership, Miau's family essentially controls the group through 
their relevant family companies and family membership. Mitac International individual 
shareholders account for only about 50%, and its seven directors of the board hold 
36.5% of the total shares. so The chairman, Miau, is a totally professional expert in the 
PC industry and management area. He has excellent management talents and uses 
many modern management concepts and systems from big American companies, but 
sometimes he still needs to be concerned with his family interests, which enforces him 
to take more conservative strategies, especially in financial matters. Besides, most of 
his senior managers perform solely as professional managers and hold only a small 
number of shares, so most of them feel they are still like an employee. However, some 
excellent, aggressive, talents left the company in past years. 
so According to 1996. 7. 10 open explanation manual for increasing capital. 
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The group is now represented by more than 25 sales and marketing offices 
world-wide, with over 120 resellers and distributors in 95 countries supplying Mitae 
products. Its member companies are more than 40 around the world and among them 
the core companies are Mitac Inc. focusing on system integration, Mitac International 
Corp. focusing on system manufacturing, and Synnex Technology International 
focusing on distribution activities. Among them Mitac Inc. is like a parent company, 
and Mitac International and Synnex Technology International are publicly listed 
companies. After group re-engineering, in 1994 Chairman Miau decided on further 
decentralising these companies presidents. At present three core companies all own 
many subsidiaries and have their own sub-headquarters, and their presidents will 
gradually develop different management styles and operating directions. Besides, the 
group still owns Synnex Information Technologies in America and Getac for defense 
and aerospace electronics (see Appendix 3). 
In this research, the management control systems of Mitac International in 
Mitac Europe Limited and Mitac Hsin-Chu plant were compared. The Hsin-Chu plant, 
the Taiwan manufacturing base, now owning three product business units, was 
established at the end of 1982. Mitac Europe Limited, the British manufacturing base, 
was built at the end of 1988 and started its assembling facility in 1993. Due to its 
strategic alliance with Compaq, Mitac Europe continually expanded its capacity to 
cope with the PC demand from Compaq, and its sales increased from 37.9 million 
pounds to 110.5 million pounds, increasing roughly 192% in 1995. The increasing 
trend will continue in the future, and according to estimation, after its expansion it 
will jump into the top five PC manufacturers in Britain.51 Both operations are under 
the umbrella of Mitac International, and all have similar products. 
5.5 Case 4: Acer 
The Acer Group was founded by Stan Shih In 197652 as Multitech 
International Corporation, with registered capital of NT$1 ,000,000 and 11 employees 
as a trade agent of micro-products and relevant components. 53 With the transformation 
from a trade-oriented to a manufacturing-oriented firm, Acer Incorporated was 
established at Hsin-Chu Science Park with a capital of NT$1 0 million in 1981 for 
producing universal microprocessor development systems, Chinese computers, and 
synthesising boards and systems for computer language. With strong demand for 
SI From 1995.3. 15 Economic Daily News. 
S2 Stan Shih left Qualitron Industrial Corporation because the family members who own the prosperous 
company starved Qualitron by diverting its capital to shore up their other enterprises. . 
S3 Most of the data from "Me-too Is Not My Style" by Stan Shih. Compliments of the Acer FoundatIon; 
Acer profile; Collection of Stan's speeches; Acer news; annual reports; and interviews. 
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personal computers in the 1980s, Acer Inc. almost doubled its growth each year in the 
1980s and quickly became a number one computer company in mid-1980. The 
original Multitech International Corporation, changing its name to Acer Sertek 
Incorporated, later became a subsidiary of Acer Inc. In 1987 due to a disputation with 
a "Multitech" American firm, the Acer group changed its brand name from 
"Multitech" to "Acer." In 1988 Acer Inc. officially became a publicly listed company 
and started its move towards globalisation. 
Taking advantage of unprecedented prosperity in Taiwan's stock market, Acer 
was able to raise enough cash54 within a short time to embark on the task of 
globalisation. In 1989, Leonard Liu, vice-president of mM, was invited to be 
president of Acer Inc. A series of great mergers and investments was made at the same 
time. Because of over-expectation and over-investment, plus suffering recession in the 
information industry, Acer made a great loss. Losing its star quality, Acer started its 
re-engineering in 1990 to 1992. 
The Acer group divides its business units (Figure 5.1) into SBUs and RBUs 
(regional business units). The SBUs focus on product development while the RBUs 
emphasise sales activities. In response to the demands of an increasingly "dis-
integrated" IT industry in the 1990s, Acer has developed a flexible "fast food style" 
business model for its world-wide different tiers of RBUs and an effective "client-
server" organisation structure, as a basis of co-ordination within its BUs, and it is 
decentralised in decision making between headquarters and BUs. For successfully 
developing its marketing and business, Acer uses an integrated "global brand, local 
touch" strategy to ensure lasting business success. The re-engineering was quite 
successful and Acer started its high growth again. Its revenue grew 47% in 1993, 850/0 
in 1994, and 70% in 1995. Acer has kept its top seven world PC company position 
since 1994. 
54 In 1988 Acer increased its cash capital NT$0.378 billion at $47 (par value $10) and in 1989 it also 
increased its cash capital NT$0.7 billion at $66. Totally it got funds of almost NT$6.4 billion and 
among them paid-in capital about NTSS.3 billion (its total capital at the end of 1989 was only NT$3.64 
billion). 
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Figure S.1 The Acer Group Profile 
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Compared to the other three firms, Acer seems to have more traditional 
Chinese management. The chairman always believes "human nature is essentially 
good" and he shares benefit and risk with other people. He said: "From the beginning 
of business nearly 19 years ago we have always used separated management and a 
risk-sharing approach. We share with one another, no matter whether in the stock 
share, management, or profit sharing." Its auditing director, the wife of the chairman, 
also said: "The most important thing in developing business is that you need to look at 
it as a public property, not your personal property ... Everyone pursues 'money' and 
'position', so pay nothing and you enjoy nothing." She continued: "We have the spirit 
of 'yielding'." The chairman Stan Shih likes to use persuasion instead of ordering, as 
the second managing director of the German operation said: "That is Stan's 
management style! He has lots of business ideas but he always uses the persuasive 
approach instead of giving orders .... We often saw him around the European countries 
talking about his operating philosophy and he always persuades country heads how to 
run the business to achieve the company objective." In addition, the chairman fully 
applied the entrepreneurial spirit which believes the "Chinese people would rather be 
the head of a chicken than the tail of a cow" in his management philosophy. He 
encourages his managers "Better to be a leader in a small segment than 'also-ran' in the 
mainstream." Acer's delegation and intrapreneurship in the client-server framework 
answer to the needs of its aggressive talents and bring them "the sense of achievement 
of being a little boss." 
The chairman Stan Shih also emphasises cultivating corporate culture. Acer 
culture is closely associated with Taiwanese culture as well as conventional Chinese 
culture. The chairman of Acer clearly described the direction it took in corporate 
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culture: "I continually promote Acer's corporate culture in four directions: a belief that 
human nature is essentially good, the customer is the first priority, the pursuit of 
excellence, and emphasising practicability. " He believes that "human nature is 
basically good", so that he could fully delegate and trust his subordinates, creating an 
atmosphere of teamwork. People share risks and benefits on the basis of long-term 
commitment, and as their slogan says "The master reveals all 'trade secrets' to his 
pupils", they work with open mind. Its auditing director said: "In Acer all employees 
have 'respect' and 'environment', and that is the energy directing working hard." The 
chairman asks every Acer employee to "contribute wisdom" to realise the dragon 
dream, challenge leading-edge technology, and pursue entrepreneurial achievement. 
He also teaches his colleagues the need to "be pragmatic and accountable", to learn 
commoner culture, develop the marathon spirit, and foster independent financial 
management. Besides, he emphasises "Acer 1-2-3" policy; that means the customer is 
always number one, and then employees and then shareholders. 
Acer always keeps a great ambition to pursue excellence. The name of "Acer" 
originated from the Latin word meaning "active, sharp, clear, incisive". Acer has built 
its corporate culture on a combination of these qualities, and desires to stand out from 
amongst fierce competition as a company that has established world-class quality and 
recognition. 55 They always follow great visions which seem difficult, or even 
impossible, to pursue. They design a series of slogans to motivate employees, to give 
confidence to customers, and to attract new talents. They offered different slogans at 
different stages, such as "The microprocessor gardeners" at the beginning of the 
company, then "Bridge the gap to a better tomorrow" and "Global vision through 
technology", until today's "Technology for everyone. ,,56 
The Acer group emphasises basic practicability. There are no luxury offices at 
any branch. They urge on their employees "Frugal operation leads to clever, cost-
effective solutions" and "keep the marathon spirit.,,57 In addition, its top management 
strongly emphasises the feasibility of its operating plans. The chairman said: "The 
most important thing among them is whether you can actually carry them out. In fact, 
assumptions are often right, but the ability to execute them is not always good 
enough." "Don't risk what you can't afford to lose" has become another of their 
slogans. 
"Challenge difficulties, break through bottlenecks, and create value" not only is 
the chairman's personal motto, but the philosophy is also applied to his management. 
He said: "Growth represents an opportunity, and also a risk, but according to our past 
sSQuotation from a collection of Stan Shih's speeches. 
S6Quotation from a collection of Stan Shih's speeches. 
57 Quotation from a collection of Stan Shih's speeches. 
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experiences and lessons, growth certainly does not involve too much risk. 58" He 
promoted the slogan "the achievement of a little boss" and tried to generate a sense of 
achievement for employees by inviting them to take part in the employee share 
programme. He prefers using some slogan or so-called "long-term vision" to encourage 
his colleagues to pursue great dreams. He tolerates employees mistakes and is willing 
to pay uition for the intelligent growth of employees, and that is why Acer can keep 
lots of aggressive talents in the company. He always keeps extremely patient to get 
consensus from his colleagues and prefers to use persuasion and communication 
instead of imposed order. 
Acer continues to employ independent and professional companies to cope 
with their management and marketing requirements under the slogan "global brand, 
local touch." Their goal is to localise their business structure thoroughly and establish 
Acer as a top international brand in all regions of the world. To cope with fast change 
and strengthen competitiveness, speed in time and turnover rate are the key successful 
factors in their operating. Its chairman said: "Speed is the factor that will separate the 
winners from the losers. In IT business, speed is a really beautiful thing."s9 They 
redefined production structure and produced in the same way as fast food, a plan by 
which Acer ships modular PC components to franchise locations around the world for 
standardised local assembly. Motherboards are flown to these locations directly to 
ensure delivery of the newest technologies, while CPUs, hard drives and memory are 
sourced locally to fill individual user requirements. This strategy allows Acer to 
maintain control over product quality and keep its inventory to a minimum level. The 
technique also provides firm international support to local assembly sites, resulting in 
even greater value added for today's low-margin environment. Customers also benefit 
from the site's ability to assemble competitively-priced PCs quickly on a "made-to-
order" basis. 
Acer follows a highly decentralised system in decision making. They divided 
the group into several business units including SBUs and RBUs. The SBUs were 
formed to take full responsibility for R&D, manufacturing, product management, and 
OEM sales, while RBUs took over distribution, service, and marketing. Each BU 
operates independently of the others. One of the vice presidents said: "Basically, the 
SBU and RBU in the group have no difference, because no matter whether in 
operating or finance they are all equal." Based on those BUs, Acer formed a 
decentralised structure called the client-server system. The new structure allowed for 
faster decision-making based on changing conditions in each region, while 
independent ownership and responsibility provided added motivation and incentive. 
S8 From 1995. 4. 4 Economic Daily News. 
S9Quotation from a collection of Stan Shih's speeches. 
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This led to more focused management in each region or segment and a better 
understanding of Acer's overseas markets. The heads of business units within Acer 
have all been with the company for more than ten years, and the resulting client-server 
relationship gives Acer a strong competitive advantage. Its chairman said: "So at the 
moment the client-server system results in a lot of internal competitiveness, even 
fighting on the price, that is the risk-consciousness built-in." The unlimited flexibility 
and growth potential of this client-server organisation structure allows Acer to make 
optimal use of all its resources, while enabling individual ownership and decision-
making throughout the group. Its chairman said: "The only thing we can do for them 
is to give them a basic system framework and some approaches to business sense." 
On risk attitude, Acer always shows its aggressive ambition. At the moment 
they are challenging the top five companies in the world as their short-term target and 
mission. Besides, they set some long-term visions challenging the impossible as their 
goals, such as "2,000 in 2,000", "21 in 21", ... etc. Its chairman said as follows: 
"Our visions are integrated with strategies. We integrate the visions with 
organisational characteristic, operating philosophy, and operating strategy. We 
also integrate with corporate culture. Under this situation, all employees very 
clearly understand their objectives, challenges, and achievements, so the 
morale is better than in other companies. The slogan "21 in 21 ", for example, 
is a simple and clear slogan but hides lots of meaning. " 
Acer's basic operating philosophy is to struggle to break through all 
bottlenecks.6o The chairman said: "The limitation of Acer's growth is the capacity of 
its employees. We could not grow above our employees' capacity. We limit our 
overexpectation but we can't lose our opportunities to grow." He even said: "If there 
are opportunities and abilities to grow and I do not take them, I am a historical 
criminal. I always tell myself to utilise this good opportunity to create a computer 
empire for Taiwan ... So if only I have ability, I cannot stop growing." He tolerates his 
managers' mistakes and looks at them as paying a "tuition fee" for talents. He said: "If 
you do not let executives get some lessons exploring the uncertain future, they can not 
grow up." He added: "A real leading pioneer company has no precedent case to refer 
to, and the only way is to build a learning organisation." In addition, f you only 
follow the American or Japanese approach, you will always be second-class.61 As he 
is deeply affected by chess theory, he did well in the competitive game. He said: "I use 
a circuitous approach instead of a direct approach to face our prime competitors, and I 
overcome business problems by means of time. We can expend ten years instead of 
three years. Although we developed faster than other companies, we have been 
6OQuotation from KPMG videotape ofS~ Shih's inter:view. 
61 Quotation from "Me-too is not my style by Stan Shih, 1996. 
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persistent longer than others. We depend on our abundant energy and long life to 
overcome any difficulty and we will succeed in the end." 
Because Acer was established by a group of partners, no one had a strong 
financial background. Even the chairman Stan and his wife, Acer founders who once 
owned 50% of the shares when the business was started, at present control 
approximately 12%62. In 1983 when coping with the need for big funding for Acer 
Peripherals Inc., chairman Stan invited the boss of the Continental Engineering 
Corporation, Z. H. lng, to invest in Acer Peripheral and let him have 25% of the total 
shares. Since that time Z. H. Ing has become a financial supporter. However, with 
Acer Peripheral fast expansion and becoming a publicly listed company in 1995 
lng's ownership of shares was dramatically declining. Acer's employees still hold 
relatively important shares63 and the chairman Stan essentially handles the company 
operation. Most of the directors and supervisors in Acer Incorporated are handled by 
Acer's founders and professional senior managers. On leadership, Stan presents a low-
key style, as he said: "Though I am the CEO, I deem myself a partner instead of a 
'boss'. ,,64 He always discusses and shares experiences with his colleagues and this is 
the hinge on which Acer is able to establish mutual trust. As to regional companies 
abroad, Acer invited local agents to participate in its operation and allowed them more 
shares than Acer65 . The ocal touch strategy has proved very successful in third 
world countries. At present, Acer is the number one brand in Latin America, 
Southeast Asia, and over ten other countries. But Acer still needs markets in America 
and Europe, because at present Acer holds only a 3.7% market share in America and 
2% in Europe66• 
Relying on its extensive development, manufacturing and distribution 
strengths, at present Acer produces personal computers, motherboards, peripherals, 
fax machines, dynamic random access memory (DRAM), application-specific 
integrated circuits (ASICs), hybrid microelectronics and software. At the moment, 
Acer operates ten manufacturing plants and 39 assembly sites around the world. Acer 
is currently among the world's top five suppliers of motherboards, ASICs, monitors 
and keyboards. Constant innovation over the years has given Acer more than 360 
patents and over 100 major awards around the world. At present, the firm is also 
moving aggressively to develop new products for the consumer electronics and 
communications fields. Acer operates 80 offices in 35 countries around the world and 
62 From 1996. 7. 23 Economic Daily News. 
63 According to 1996. 1. 29 Financial Daily Information, in 1988 when Acer became a publicly listed 
company, its 3,000 employees owned 70% of total stock share. 
64 Quotation from "Me-too Is Not My Style" by Stan Shih, p.20. . 
65 According to 1996. 1. 29 Financial Daily Information, Acer occupies only 20% of shares In most of 
Latin American countries and 330/0 in Mexico. 
66 From 1996. 1. 29 Financial Daily Information. 
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employs 15,000 people from 50 nations. The "global brand" is a common resource of 
Acer group companies and also Acer's weapon of "local touch." Acer uses its so-
called "7-3-4 model67" to create its continual high growth. It expended big funds in the 
global market in past years and about NT$3 billion was expended on global marketing 
in 199568, At present its PC brand name accounts for about 70%69 of its total sales. 
Currently Acer is the number one PC company and the biggest import and export 
company in Taiwan, and the seventh largest PC brand in the world. In 1995, its group 
attained NT$151.2 billion in total sales and held NT$99.4 billion in total assets. Its 
original long-term vision "2000 in 2000" meaning in 2000 Acer will achieve the sales 
objective of NT$200 billion seems in need of revision. Following the steps of Mitac 
and Compaq, Acer and IBM became another strategic alliance in September 1996.70 
With its perfect global logistic system, it is expected Acer will step forward to another 
business peak. However, over the past twenty years, Acer has become a national star 
and Stan Shih is a hero in Taiwan's IT industry. 
In total, the Acer group has more than 70 companies around the world and 
some of them belong to subsidiaries of Acer's subsidiaries. In addition to Acer 
Incorporated, a parent company and headquarters of the group, there are many sub-
headquarters around the world. At present Acer's group owns five publicly listed 
companies including Acer Incorporated, Acer Peripheral Incorporated, Acer Sertek 
Incorporated in Taiwan; Acer Computer international in Singapore; and Acer-
Computer Latino America in Mexico. TI-Acer now is in the top 52 in Taiwan 
manufacturing industries and should become a publicly listed company in 1997 also. 
Besides, Acer still owns some successful companies such as Acer laboratories 
incorporated, Ambit Microsystems Corporation, Acer TWP Corporation, Acer 
America Corporation, and Acer Computer B. V. (see Appendix 3). Acer has strong 
ambitions to pursue its long-term vision "21 in 21", which means that before the 21 st 
century Acer would have 21 publicly listed companies around the world. 
In this research, comparison is made between Acer management control 
system in its European operations (including Holland, Germany, and Britain) and Acer 
Global Incorporated. Basically, they all belong to second-tier subsidiaries of the Acer 
group, and all own PC assembling plants and are similar in scale. 
67 7-3-4 model means if the profit was generated by 70% of the operation. 30% of it must be used to 
invest for the future, which means the current real profit is only 40%. 
68 From 1996. 7. 23 Economic Daily News. 
69 From 1996.9. 5 Financial Daily Information. 
70 1996. 9. 4 Economic Daily News. 
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5.6 Summary 
The four case firms in the research have been presented above. Each firm has 
its special background and leadership style which may affect its control style and the 
transference of its management control systems. The research will continue to probe 
their relationships in the following chapters. 
6. Comparisons between Taiwanese and European 
Operations within MNCs 
6.1 Introduction 
6.2 Objective Setting 
6.3 Participation 
6.4 Long-term and Short-term planning 
6.5 Decentralisation 
6.6 Formality 
6.7 Controllability-filters 
6.8 Feedback extent and frequency 
6.9 Contingent Rewards 
6.10 Group Rewards 
6.11 Long-term Rewards 
6.12 Summary 
6.1 Introduction 
III 
In this chapter the data from in-depth interviews at operational level will be 
analysed through comparing different operations within the same case firm. Ten sub-
propositions in proposition 1 will be examined component by component in this 
chapter. 
6.2 Objective Setting 
Proposition 1-1: Taiwanese operations will employ more top-down planning in 
objective-setting than their European counterparts. 
The purpose of this proposition is to compare the style of objective-setting 
between the Taiwanese and European operations within each case firm. Four themes, 
approach, participation, budget preparation, and planning procedure, from the main 
interview questions on objective setting will be analysed as the criteria for comparison. 
6.2.1 Tatung 
Concerning the process of objective setting, a similarity existed between the 
Taiwanese and British operations (Table 6.1). Both operations had highly top down 
planning and formal procedures. They also had a whole management team to 
participate in the budgeting lasting more than three months. Although both sides used 
the top down approach on objective setting, some things were still slightly different. 
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Because Taiwan's Tatung is a big company and many operations participate in the 
budgeting, and although many senior managers at headquarters as a team assist in 
setting corporate objectives, it is impossible for top management to set detailed 
objectives for each operation and to communicate these down through the 
organisation. I As the chief accountant of Tatung's Taiwanese operation stated: 
"Because the whole company has a total objective and may have a difference in the 
combination from different plants, we use a two-stage approach. In the first stage we 
prepare only the sales and profit budget for the purpose of comparing with the total 
objective of the company. Then, the top management adjusts each plant's objective to 
be consistent with the total objective, and then each plant starts to prepare its detailed 
budget. 2 " 
Table 6.1 A Comparison of Objective Setting between the Taiwanese and British Operations 
'th' T t WI In a un2 
Items Taiwanese operation British operation 
Approach Highly to~ down Highly top down 
Participation 
• Total objectives Top management Key managers· 
• Detail bude:et Whole management team Whole management team 
Bud2et preparation Long time (more than 3 months) Long time (more than 3 months) 
Procedure 
• Process Highly formal Highly formal 
• Type of bude:et By units and products By units and products 
* Include the president and two managing directors 
Compared to the Taiwanese operations, the British operation was more 
independent and the president and two managing directors set the objectives and 
decided important policies and strategies. "According to the profit and performance of 
the previous year, the president and two managing directors determine the policies and 
strategies before budgeting and they discuss a total objective. Then from September we 
start to prepare our budgets which need a long period of paper work.3" "About the 
process of top-down or bottom-up, I would think it is on balance. If we are talking 
about setting the objective, I would say it is top-down, but if we talk of building the 
budget then I would say it is bottom-up.4" Obviously, Tatung's British top management 
were strongly involved in the process of integrated objective setting. 
Overall, both operations were similar in the objective setting process, but the 
British operation used a top-down approach more directly through a smaller team. The 
top managers in the British operation focused more on operations, including more 
review-and-discussion meetings, and more directives from supervisors, but the 
integrated budget system was still more formal and standard in the Taiwanese 
operation. 
I From the interview with the director of electronic plant. 
2 Quotation from the interview with the chief accountant of Tatung's Taiwanese operation. 
J Quotation from the interview with the executive director of Tatung (UK) Limited. 
4 Quotation from the interview with the operating manager of Tatung (UK) Limited. 
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6.2.2 Lite-On 
Strong differences in objective setting existed between the Taiwanese and 
British operations (Table 6.2). In Taiwan, the company emphasised planning and 
budgeting, and its plan and budget were divided into two SBUs, the Opoto Division 
and the Power Conversion Division. They prepared strategic planning first, and then 
the annual budget. Each year the planning started in August or September, taking 
more than three months. "Before strategic planning, top management will give some 
clear goals, then we start to develop a three-year strategic plan based on "SWOT" 
analysis. According to our strategic planning and middle range goals, we start to 
prepare the annual budget.s" Basically, the process of objective setting was top down: 
its planning director described the need for this: 
"The top management have their goals and objectives. They have some 
expectations and a framework to the corporation to match whole group goals 
and objectives, so they will give some clear guidelines in advance. 
The budgeting is from the bottom, but the basic goals or objectives are from the 
top and then we will find and adjust the balance point." 
When the budget is discussed within the SBU, all senior managers and 
department heads are invited to participate in the discussion. 
Table 6.2 A Comparison of Objective Setting between the Taiwanese and British Operations 
within Lite On 
-
Items Taiwanese operation British operation 
Approach Top down More bottom up 
Participation 
• Total objectives Top management Key managers* 
• Detail bude:et Department heads Controller and sales manager 
Bud2et preparation Long time (three months) Short time (one month) 
Procedure 
• Process Formal Less formal 
• Type of bude:et By units Plant-wide basis 
* Including the managing director, executive manager, and the controller. 
Compared to the Taiwanese operation, the objective setting in the British 
operation was more bottom up. "The company budgeting is a bottom up approach and 
has full communication.6" The managing director also described their process: 
S From the interview with the deputy controller ?f Taiwan Liton ~Iectroni.c ~o. 
6 Quotation from the interview with the production manager of Llte-On Limited (UK). 
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"The budgeting is put together by department managers and each is asked for 
their needs. The main point of the budget is marketing driven, so the initial 
budgeting is toward sales forecasting we believe achievable. Once we create 
that and review it, then each department looks at the resources we need to 
support the budget, and then we create the total bUdget." 
The budgeting in the British operation was less formal and took a shorter 
preparation time than the Taiwanese operation. Most of the budget prepared by its 
financial controller and the strategic planning was also quite rough.7 In addition, 
compared to the Taiwanese operation, only a few key managers participated in high-
level discussions. 
Overall, there were strong differences in objective setting between the two 
operations. The Taiwanese operation used more formal and top down approach, while 
the British operation used an informal and bottom up approach. 
6.2.3 Mitac 
Some differences in objective setting were found between the Taiwanese and 
British operations (Table 6.3). The Taiwanese operation had a clear process for 
objective setting, including more senior managers participating in important strategies 
and development directions such as significant expenditures or advertisement 
expenses, and new products and markets8; more discussions and meetings; longer time 
for budgeting; and more deep and detailed involvement in budgeting. Before the 
process of budgeting, the sales department would discuss it with related departments, 
then work out a business plan, and then develop the investment and capacity plan. 
There was a series of meetings to discuss those plans, and it then began to prepare a 
detailed plan and each department would refer to its past years' record before preparing 
its budget.9 As to the objective process, top management preferred to set some clear 
financial goals and communicate down through the organisation, just as its controller 
described: 
"Top management will set some important targets such as R&D, profit, and 
turnover according to the past years' record, so it will be more efficient in 
budgeting and can cut budgeting time." 
7 From the interview with the financial controller of Lite-On Limited (UK). 
8 From the interview with the controller of Mitac International Corporation. 
9 From the interview with one of the A VPs of Hsin-Chu plant of Mitac International. 
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Table 6.3 A Comparison of Objective Setting between the Taiwanese and British Operations 
within Mitac 
Items Taiwanese operation British operation 
Approach Top down Top down 
Participation 
• Total objectives Senior managers Managing director 
• Detail bud2et Departmental heads Controller and sales managers 
Bud2et preoaration About two months About one month 
Procedure 
• Process Formal Less formal 
• Type of bud2et By units Plant-wide basis 
Compared to the Taiwanese operation, the British operation prepared its budget 
simply on a plant-wide basis. The sales department prepared the annual sales forecast, 
then the financial department with this forecast finished the master budget. Apart from 
the sales department, other units lacked full participation. If headquarters did not agree 
with its objective, then they would need to adjust the financial objectives. So compared 
to the Taiwanese operation, there were fewer meetings for discussion and participation 
and the managing director and financial controller played critical roles. In the objective 
setting process, its financial goals were also significantly affected by its top 
management and communicated down through the organisation, as its logistics director 
described: 
"The pre-meeting will set out what is likely to change in the following year in 
terms of profit, production, sales channel, overheads, and personnel, all the key 
factors in the forecast. Highlights and some directions are given to the way we 
should go." 
6.2.4 Acer 
Table 6.4 A Comparison of Objective Setting between the Taiwanese and European Operations 
within Acer 
Items Taiwanese Dutch operation German operatior British operation 
operation 
AJlllrOach Top down Top down Top down More bottom up 
Participation 
• Total objectives Top management Senior managers Key managers· Senior managers 
• Detail budget All unit managers Department heads Controllers and Controller, logistic 
sales manager and sales managers 
Budget More than two About one month About one month About one month 
Ipreparation months 
Procedure 
• Process Formal Less formal Informal Less formal but better 
than Dutch operation 
• Type of budlet By units By department Plant-wide basis Plant-wide basis 
. . 
• Including two managmg directors and the controller 
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Different objective setting existed among the operations, especially between 
the Taiwanese operation and the European operations (Table 6.4). Generally speaking, 
in the Taiwanese operation each manager had his right role in the objective setting, 
procedures and budget meetings were more formal, managers spent more time on 
budgeting, and supervisors had more influence on their subordinates in objective 
setting or standard setting. Its plant director described the situation: 
"We start our budget in September or October. Headquarters sets a long-term 
plan containing mission, objective, strategy, and forecast. Firstly, the plan is 
sent to each manager and overseas managers. All managers must offer their 
comments ... The objectives, including turnover, profit, ROE, and market 
share, are very clear. We need to discuss them and decide whether to change 
them .... Most of these processes are considered from the top-down approach. 
Then all field sites or relevant managers need to propose their business plans in 
response to the question of how to reach these targets." 
Normally, before preparing the sales budget, top management will express how 
much bottom line will be achieved the following year. Then they will look at the sales 
budget and overhead budget to see whether the bottom line could be attained. If the 
difference is significant, then they maybe need a special meeting for discussion or to 
present the scheme to top management for approval. 10 
The planning period needed more than two months and lots of meetings were 
held for budgeting. On the profit objective, two targets were set: one a financial target 
and the other for management. The purpose of the financial target was for preparing 
external financial reports, but the management target was for purposes of internal 
evaluation. II The plant director described them as "more aggressive" and 
"conservative" targets, and he said: "Each type of target involves different 
assumptions, but if we cannot reach the aggressive one, then we need at least to keep 
in view the target most likely to be attained." 
Compared to the Taiwanese operation, European operations were less formal 
and less time was spent in planning. Among European operations, the British operation 
spent more time on strategic planning and discussions than others. All operations put 
more emphasis on sales planning and like the Taiwanese operation set objectives for 
both financial and management purposes. 
In the Dutch operation, the objective setting was more from headquarters, as its 
financial controller said: "The real budget committee is at Taiwan headquarters." and 
the general controller of Europe explained the reason: 
I 0 From the interview with the chief accountant of Acer Global Inc. 
II Quotation from the interview with the president of Acer Global Inc. 
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"Acer uses the top-down approach. Maybe because top management at 
headquarters has a broader and clearer picture, they set the big target first and 
then communicate down to make plans." 
Because targets had a close relation to operations' incentives, each operational 
head always prepared a somewhat conservative budget. So negotiation was often 
needed. 12 Although broad views from top management presented a better picture, 
getting relevant information from the bottom was still very important to the operation. 
"The environment is changing so fast, so we need to consider special local conditions. 
At this time bottom-up can reflect some relevant information. 13" 
In the German operation, there was a quite special approach in bUdgeting. Key 
managers including two managing directors and a controller determined the 
developing directions and gave some basic figures first. Then they started preparing 
the budget. "We decide some basic guidelines which disclose how much growth rate 
we need, where the focus point we need to control lies, and how much inventory 
turnover we need. 14" The controller was responsible for budget preparation so he 
needed to communicate fully with departmental heads. Its first managing director 
described the process: 
"We have a preliminary budget meeting where every departmental head has a 
discussion with the controller and final budgeting will be done by the top 
management together with the controller." 
The budget was finally prepared on a whole company basis, not by department, 
and the preparation time was shorter than in other operations. As to objectives, they 
also set two types for different purposes: (l) optimistic and (2) conservative for 
financial and management purposes. 
The British operation had more discussions and was a little more formal in 
budget procedure than other European operations. Before preparing the annual budget, 
they discussed strategic planning first. Each manager, especially of the marketing and 
production departments, needed to prepare for some discussion about future 
strategies. IS Once the strategies were formulated, then they started to prepare the 
budget. They started the sales forecast by sales department, then prepared source 
requirements. Before preparing the sales budget, the managing director normally 
would give some target instructions such as the expected growth the following year. so 
from the sales budget viewpoint, the company was very top-down revenue-oriented. 16 
12 From the interview with the president of Acer European headquarters and Acer Computer B.V. 
13 Quotation from the interview with the financial controller of Acer Computer B.V. 
14 Quotation from the interview with the first managing director. of A~er Computer GmbH. . . 
IS Quotation from the interview with t!'e c~ntroller (now managm.g ~Irector) of Acer U.K. Limited. 
16 From the interview with the marketing director of Acer U.K. Lmuted. 
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Revenue was top-down, but cost and expense still somewhat bottom-up. When 
preparing resource requirements, basically departmental heads prepared only the 
inquiry but the budget was prepared by the financial department. The discussions and 
communications in budgeting were quite good, as its controller said: "Obviously there 
has to be more and more a bottom-up approach, because we emphasise the cost base. 
Now, we involve more people in deciding the budget." As to the objective, it still had 
two types of target including internal target and external target. 
6.2.5 Conclusion and Discussion 
This proposition was broadly supported by the study. Overall, Taiwanese 
operations employed more top-down planning in objective setting than their European 
counterparts. The result was conformity with Hofstede's (1980/1984, 1991) cultural 
theory. With a high power distance, ordering relationships between the senior 
managers and their subordinates, and collective society, Taiwanese operations 
employed more top-down planning in their objective setting. Even though this research 
is a pioneering comparative study between Europe and Taiwan, the results can still be 
compared with prior research (such as Harrison et aI., 1994 between Australia! United 
States and Singaporel Hong Kong; Chow et al., 1994 between United States and 
Japan). Clearly, the Oriental countries studied used more top-down planning than 
Western countries. 
While national culture seemed an important factor in the process of objective 
setting, the factor of the case firm still constituted another important element. Further 
careful examination of individual case firms showed Tatung had similarities between 
its Taiwanese and European operations, Lite-On proved strongly different, and Mitac 
and Acer were in the middle. Except for Lite-On, which showed a strong difference 
between its Taiwanese and European operations, other case firms' supervisors 
significantly influenced their subordinates in objective setting or standard setting. 
Taiwanese expatriate senior managers in the European operations of Tatung, Mitac, 
and Acer obviously played an important role in the process of objective setting (Ferner. 
1996; Schneider, 1988; Latham and Napier, 1989). 
The style of objective setting of the European operation of a multinational firm 
is shaped by three main streams. National culture is the first and it may broadly affect 
each operation. The second stream comes from its headquarters. As a foreign 
operation, it needs to follow some policies of objective setting from headquarters. In 
addition, expatriate senior managers from headquarters are used to the ways in their 
home countries. Some Taiwanese firms, such as Tatung. prefer to select their 
expatriate senior managers from their in-group (Triandis & McCusker. 1990; Whitley, 
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1992). These senior managers may strictly obey their headquarters' policy and keep the 
ways of objective setting used in their home countries as far as possible. The more 
senior managers selected from the in-group, the more similarities in objective setting 
there may be. In other words, whether the proposition is accepted or rejected may 
depend on the cases chosen. The third stream comes from the characteristics of senior 
managers. Especially, the education and experience of senior managers significantly 
affects a firm's MCSs (Merchant et aI., 1995). Probably this factor can explain why the 
studies, which were based on Hofstede's cultural theory, of Harrison et aI. (1994) and 
Chow et al. (1994) could not find support for their hypotheses. 
6.3 Participation 
Proposition 1-2: Taiwanese operations will be less participative in planning than 
their European counterparts. 
The purpose of this proposition is to compare the component of participation in 
planning between the Taiwanese and European operations within each case firm. Three 
themes, including budget committees, participation in discussion, and communication 
between upper management and lower management, from the main interview 
questions on participation will be analysed as the criteria of comparison. 
6.3.1 Tatung 
Table 6.5 A Comparison of the Participation between the Taiwanese and British Operations 
'th' T t WI ID a un2 
Items Taiwanese operation British operation 
Budget committee 
• Form Fonnal budget committee F onnal budget committee 
• Committees Divisional & functional heads Divisional & functional heads 
• Budeet manual F onnal manual F onnal manual 
Participating discussion 
• Operating meeting F onnal monthly meeting F onnal monthly meeting 
• Managerial meeting Fonnal weekly meeting and lots of Weekly meeting and lots of 
meetings when needed meeting when needed 
• Discussion form Fonnal communication and Formal communication and 
discussions discussions 
Communication Two-way communication, but A little better two-way 
between upper and more strong on the side of upper communication than its 
lower mana~ement management counterpart 
Lots of similarities in planning participation existed between the Taiwanese 
and British operations (Table 6.5). Both operations had budget committees for 
discussing the annual budget, each department had to participate in the budgeting and 
to prepare a departmental budget, and many meetings were held for discussing and 
-----
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communicating budget problems, but from the extent of budgeting participation, the 
managers of the British operation sought more subsidiary advice and had more 
discussions and two-way communication than did the Taiwanese operation. "Each 
departmental head has more opportunities to develop his budget and present it to the 
president. Of course we cannot expect that he will accept the whole budget. It needs 
lots of discussions between them. 17" Its executive director described the situation in 
detail: 
"At Tatung UK Company each departmental head is the boss of the 
department. They can evaluate their subordinates but they need to follow 
company policies and procedures and budget. Maybe this point is different 
from Taiwan Tatung corporation. Their units' budgets are all prepared by 
themselves. Although we determined them through communication and were 
somewhat centralised, I asked them to sign their own name in commitment to 
the budget." 
Compared to the sales budget of Taiwanese operations, the British operation 
was more detailed than the Taiwanese operation. Its sales budget was prepared not 
only by product line and territory, but also by salesman; that means each salesman, 
territory, and product had its targets, the bases for calculating an individual's bonus. 18 
The communication within each department was emphasised, as its operating manager 
said: "I ascertain that my departmental heads know about the figure I put forward. I 
don't put the figure forward unless they have made a contribution towards it. Yes, I do 
believe they should make a contribution toward the budget, certainly." 
Generally speaking, both operations had the same budgeting process and style, 
but as the British operation was more independent than the Taiwanese operation its 
senior managers focused more easily on fuller participation. 
6.3.2 Lite-On 
On participation, basically there were some differences between the two 
operations (Table 6.6). The Taiwanese operation had more and deeper discussions, but 
the British operation respected its managers' opinions more. The Taiwanese operation 
focused more on strategic planning and budget, expending a lot of time on discussing 
and revising, and the process contained both top-down and bottom-up. 19 All important 
senior managers participated in the budget meeting. Each SBU reviewed its budget 
many times before sending it to the budget meeting. Because of the stable growth in 
17 Quotation from the interview with the financial controller of Tatung (UK) Limited. 
18 Quotation from the interview with the marketing and sales manager. 
19 From the interview with the controller of Taiwan Liton Electronic Co. 
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recent years, the annual budget and middle-term planning had a good linkage and more 
accuracy. 20 
Table 6.6 A Comparison of the Participation between the Taiwanese and British Operations 
within Lite-On 
Items Taiwanese ooeration British operation 
Budget committee 
• Form Formal committee Infonnalcommittee 
• Committees All senior managers Key managers· 
• Bude:et manual Budget guideline Lackin2 a formal guideline 
Participating discussion 
• Operating meeting Monthly Irregular, when necessary . 
• Managerial meeting Irregular but formal Irregular and informal 
• Discussion form More formal communication Less formal communication 
Communication Two-way communication, more Two-way communication, more 
between upper and focus on strategic planning respect for managers' opinions 
lower manae:ement 
• Including the managing director, executive manager, controller, sales manager, and production 
manager. 
The managing director and the executive director of the British operation both 
strongly emphasised participation, as its managing director said: "We try to motivate 
people by bringing them into the operation. Their contribution is part of what we are 
achieving. They are needed by this company so they have some value themselves." Its 
production manager, a newcomer, also felt the encouragement: 
"I participate very much ... I have many meetings and discussions, and they 
respect my opinions ... Since I came to Lite-On, I am always asked for my 
input, always! Maybe my decision is wrong, is incorrect, but they accept it." 
However, owing to the historical background, total participation still needs to 
improve continually, just as its personnel officer said: 
"Before, the Lite-On company was run by a management team who made 
decisions and passed the decisions down to everybody else ... At the moment 
we try to let everybody participate instead of a one way approach. That means 
working together with them to achieve the objectives of the company. Now we 
are trying to change the corporate culture ... Basically I think we need really 
good training. You cannot expect the people to change their attitude to the way 
we carry on. And it is important in managers' training as well." 
All in all, the two operations strongly emphasised the participation in planning, 
but the Taiwanese operation had more formal procedures and more managers 
participated in the discussions. 
20 Quotation from the interview with the controller (now vice-president) is of Taiwan Liton Electronic 
Co. 
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6.3.3 Mitac 
Strong differences on participation existed between the Taiwanese and British 
operations (Table 6.7). In the Taiwanese operation, the budget was prepared by 
product line and department. Each department and product line head and senior 
managers needed to participate in budgeting meetings. One of its associate vice 
presidents said: "Before preparing the budget, I need to review all situations and 
communicate with other departments. " Its controller felt that he needed more 
participation with other departments, otherwise he could not offer valuable information 
to departments. Each department prepared its budget and then combined to produce a 
company draft budget. Then the top management group, including vice president level, 
discussed its content and some changes and adjustments were possible.21 
Table 6.7 A Comparison of the Participation between the Taiwanese and British Operations 
within Mitac 
Items Taiwanese operation British operation 
Budget committee 
• Form Formal Informal 
• Committees All heads and senior managers Key managers· 
• Bud2et manual Formal manual Lacking manual or guideline 
Participating discussion 
• Operating meeting Formal monthly meeting Per half year but informal 
• Managerial meeting Irregular but formal Irregular and informal 
• Discussion form More formal communication More personal contacts 
Communication More time and opportunities for Less opportunities for two-way 
between upper and two-way communication communication 
lower mana2ement 
• Including managing director, logistics manager, marketing managers, and the controller. 
In the British operation, only a little time was expended on budget meetings 
and discussions. The budget was quickly prepared by the financial department 
according to some simple guides and past years' margins. Except that the marketing 
department participated more in the estimation of sales forecast, budget was completed 
by the financial department and they expended only very little time on budgeting and 
discussion.22 
Although the operation took only a few budget meetings, they had many 
channels for discussion, including the open mail system, managers meetings. and 
face-to-face talking and discussing at any time.23 
21 From the interview with one of the AVPs of Hsin-Chu plant of Mitac international. 
22 Quotation from the interview with the assistant controller of Mitac Europe Limited. 
23 From the interview with the logistics director of Mitac Europe Limited. 
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Obviously, the Taiwanese operation allowed more participation in the planning 
process than the British operation. 
6.3.4 Acer 
Strong differences on participation existed among operations (Table 6.8). 
Objectively, the Taiwanese operation had deeper and better participation in the 
planning process than did the European operations. Each departmental manager was 
required to participate in strategic planning and propose his plan to make sure of 
achieving the target. When managers were preparing departmental budgets, the 
accounting department offered them relevant historical information for reference. The 
opinions of departmental heads were respected by their senior managers. "Top 
management always respects each departmental head's opinion, so if the budget figures 
are not too abnormal there is no problem.24" Acer's chief accountant has a similar 
description: "If we cut the units' budgets, we certainly return them to their managers to 
see whether they have any difficulty in the execution." 
Table 6.8 A Comparison of the Participation between the Taiwanese and European Operations 
within Acer 
Items Taiwanese operatioll Dutch operation German British operation 
operation 
Budget committet 
• Form Formal committee Informal committee No committee Informal committee: 
• Committees Each unit's head Each unit's head Key managers· Senior managers 
• Bud2et manual A simple guideline No formal2Uideline No guideline No guideline 
Pa rticipating 
discussion 
• Operating Monthly Monthly Irregular Per half year 
meeting 
• Managerial Weekly Irregular Irregular and Irregular 
meeting informal 
• Discussion form More formal Less formal Informal Less formal 
Communication More and better two- .Better communicatiol1 Communication Better two-way 
between upper way communicatioll between Chinese between key communication 
and lower managers managers only 
mana2ement 
• Including two managing directors and the controller. 
The Dutch operation had better participation in planning than other European 
operations. Each departmental head had to participate in the planning and preparation 
of the departmental budget. Also, as the European headquarters is at the centre of the 
operation, many senior Taiwanese managers coming from Taiwan also naturally used 
the same participating approach in budgeting. "Although top managers have a more 
24 Quotation from the interview with the service manager of Acer Global Inc. 
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decisive and more global view, there are many different views between top managers 
and each department. Therefore we consider the final decision with each department. 
There are lots of communications within the budget process.2S" 
Compared to the Taiwanese and Dutch operations, the German and British 
operations had less participation in budgeting. Apart from the sales department, other 
departments had little participate in the budget. In Germany two managing directors 
and a controller reviewed the strategy and decided basic figures, and then its controller 
handled most of the bUdgeting. In the UK its managing director normally gave some 
target instructions and then distributed the mission to lower ranks. "The budget has a 
great function in fixing the objective, but the integrated framework of the budget, 
finance, and operation is still not enough and most of the time still depends on 
managers' judgement.26" As to budgeting, as in the German situation, the controller 
handled most matters. 
6.3.5 Conclusion and Discussion 
This proposition was rejected by the research and the direction is the reverse. 
Taiwanese operations had more participation than European operations. In addition, 
the factor of the case firm also significantly affected participation and a strong 
interaction between area and company also existed among the case firms. Except for 
Tatung which had a similar participation between its Taiwanese and European 
operations, other firms had obvious differences and the direction was in the reverse. 
Lite-On had only a small difference in participation, but Acer and Mitac had a strong 
difference between the two sides. The influence of national culture could still be found 
in Tatung and Lite-On, but it could not be seen in Acer and Mitac. 
The result here was not consistent with some relevant research, such as 
Harrison (1992, comparing firms between Singapore and Australia), Chow et al. 
(1994, comparing Japanese and American firms in Taiwan). However, some prior 
research also showed a reverse direction (such as O'Connor, 1995, comparing local and 
foreign manufacturing firms in Singapore) or a complex sequence (such as Chow et 
at.. 1996 comparing Japanese, Taiwanese, and American firms in Taiwan). Inferring 
research conclusions from Hofstede's (1980/1984, 1991) cultural theory should 
therefore be treated with caution. 
However, this research using cross-border intra-firm comparison differs from 
prior research using inter-firm comparison. Leadership style from headquarters and 
some contingencies could significantly affect the result. Because most strategies and 
25 Quotation from the interview with the financial controller of Acer Computer B.V. 
26 Quotation from the interview with the logistics director of Acer U.K. Limited. 
125 
policies came from Taiwanese headquarters, obviously, as a branch or subsidiary in 
Europe it had less participation than its Taiwanese counterpart. In addition, many 
expatriate managers from headquarters often maintained poor communications with 
local personnel (Kopp, 1994; Boyacigiller, 1990). Another important reason may come 
from the different scale of operation, market focus, and the easier job of top managers. 
Owing to the smaller scale and market emphasis, some European operations were 
easily handled by their key managers. 
6.4 Long-term and Short-term Planning 
Proposition 1-3: Taiwanese operations will/ocus more on long-term planning than 
their European counterparts. 
The purpose of this proposition is to compare the focus of long-term planning 
between the Taiwanese and European operations within each case firm. Three themes, 
including budget time span, long-term planning, and matching long-term and short-
term planning, from the main interview questions on short-term and long-term 
planning will be analysed as the basis of comparison. 
6.4.1 Tatung 
Table 6.9 A Comparison of the Long-term and Short-term Planning between the Taiwanese and 
B .. h 0 . ·th· T t rltis 'J1erations WI ID a ung 
Items Taiwanese operation British operation 
Budget time span 
• Budget period One year One year 
• Review Monthly Monthly 
Long-term planning 
• Plan A seven-year budget A five-year budget 
• Content Sales and profit Sales and profit 
• Development Strict top-down approach Top-down approach 
• Form Formal Formal 
• Feedback Slack Slack 
Matching long-term and 
short-term planning 
• Linkage Long-term budget as a vision Long-term budget as a vision 
• Focus Annual budget Annual bud..&et 
Basically, both operations put more emphasis on the short-term budget, but 
they all had long-term plans which are decided only by senior managers (Table 6.9). 
The director of the Taiwanese operation described the situation: 
126 
"Originally, we ought to have a long-term plan, but because the corporation 
uses the profit centre system, each centre takes care only of its short-term 
benefit. All long-term plans use the top-down approach .... Long-term planning 
includes, for example, the expanding of new product lines, creating new 
businesses, and adjusting the organisation, and all policies are made or imposed 
from the top down." 
A slightly different time span in long-term planning existed between the two 
operations. The Taiwanese operation used a seven-year budget covering only sales and 
profit, but the British operation used a five-year budget, which lacked feedback and 
was only for reference. "The first three years are more accurate and seven years may be 
too long.27" The executive director of the British operation also said: "Of course, the 
long-term plan was always very rough, because some situations change so fast." 
Overall, there was a strong similarity on long-term and short-term planning 
between the two operations. 
6.4.2 Lite-On 
Table 6.10 A Comparison of the Long-term and Short-term Planning between the Taiwanese and 
B "f h 0 f ·th· L·t 0 rl IS .pera IOns WI In I e- n 
Items Taiwanese operation British oDeration 
Budget time span 
• Budget period One year One year 
• Review Quarterly Lacking a systematic review 
Long-term planning 
• Plan A three-year strategic plan A three-year plan 
• Content Operating results & investments Sales & profits 
• Development Divisional heads & senior managers Senior managers 
• Form Formal planning Less formal planning. 
• Feedback Review per half year Slack 
Matching long-term and 
short-term planning 
• Linkage Strategic planning links budget well Three-year plan as a vision 
• Focus Strate£dc planning Annual bud2et 
Strong differences on balancing long-term and short-term planning exist 
between the Taiwanese and British operations (Table 6.10). Compared to other 
Taiwanese companies, the group strongly emphasised long-term planning. High level 
managers were required to participate in strategic planning. The strategic planning 
including market growth, technical research and development, manufacturing 
strategies, and investment for the future three years, was suggested by SBUs and then 
the framework from each SBU was summarised for discussion.28 
27 Quotation from the interview with the chief accountant ofTatung Taiwan operation. 
28 Quotation from the interview with the president of Taiwan Uton Electronic Co. 
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In addition to the strategic planning, they also roughly estimated the revenue 
and profit of the fourth and fifth years. In addition, they reviewed their strategic 
planning every half-year. The long-term plan and annual budget were matched very 
well, as its planning director said: 
"We prepare annual budget according to a three-year plan. When we prepare 
the annual budget, we have already determined the revenue and profit in the 
three-year plan .... Because everyone agrees with the conclusion, so the budget 
and strategic planning are easy to attain. "" 
Compared to the Taiwanese operation, the British operation is still in the stage 
of loss and its scale is small. Although they also prepared a three-year plan, they were 
in a hurry to make money in the near future. They focused most of the time on an 
annual master budget. Of course, that does not mean they did not care about the long-
term plan, just as its executive director described: 
"We want to develop a long-term relationship with suppliers with a 
commitment to long period orders and a vision of how they see the business 
going, and the number of products they plan to introduce." 
Overall, there was a strong difference on long-term and short-term planning 
between the two operations. The Taiwanese operation obviously emphasised more 
long-term strategic planning than did the British operation. 
6.4.3 Mitac 
Table 6.11 A Comparison of the Long-term and Short-term Planning between the Taiwanese and 
B ThO f ·th· M·t rl IS ~era Ions WI ID lac 
Items Taiwanese operation British operation 
Budget time span 
• Budget period One year One year 
• Review Quarterly LackinA a ~stematic review 
Long-term planning 
• Plan A three years' plan A very rough five-year plan 
• Content Containing some rough indicators Rough goals and investments 
• Development Senior managers Managing director & controller 
• Form Less formal, only as some abstract Informal 
long-term visions 
• Feedback Very slack V~ryslack. 
Matching long-term 
and short-term 
planning 
• Linkage Three years' plan as a vision Lacking linkage 
• Focus Annual budget Annual budget 
There were considerable similarities on short-tenn and long-tenn planning 
between the Taiwanese and British operations (Table 6.11). Both emphasised short-
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term annual budget and only a rough long-term plan, but the time span of the long-
term plan was somewhat different and the Taiwanese operation had more clear long-
term vision. Some long-term visions were very abstract and vague, such as to "be a 
leading corporation in quality within the next three years" which lacked detailed plans 
or steps.29 They just prepared some important indicators such as revenue, profit target, 
and cash flow in the three years' long-term plan. "Of course, we have some long-term 
visions and ambitions, but we see more clearly the next year.30" They still focused on 
the annual budget. 
As to the British operation, the long-term plan had only some rough indicators 
and they almost only focused on the annual budget. Its five-year plan covered capital 
investment, capital plan, and rough goal. Its managing director said: "There are always 
significant variances from the actual figures" and its assistant controller even said: 
"The long-term forecast is nonsense for us!". Its controller objectively explained the 
situation: 
"Basically, it is not easy to prepare a long-term budget in our company, because 
we lack the consideration of policies and strategies and we just do the forecast 
for future years and go ahead." 
In all, some similarities on short-term and long-term planning were found 
between the two operations, but the Taiwanese operation emphasised somewhat more 
long-term planning and discussions. 
6.4.4 Acer 
There were strong differences in short-term and long-term planning between 
the Taiwanese and European operations (Table 6.12). Objectively, the Acer group 
focused only on the annual budget and lacked effective long-term planning but the 
Taiwanese operation still focused more on long-term planning than its European 
operations. It had clearer long-term vision, such as NT$l.S billion sales target in 2000, 
and its three-year long-term plan covered in more detail the operating fund plan, 
capital investment plan, and other important strategies.31 
29 From the interview with one of AVPs of Hsin-Chu plant of Mitac International. 
30 Quotation from the interview with the controller of Mitac International. 
31 From the interview with the plant director of Acer Global Inc. and some internal documents. 
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Table 6.12 A Comparison of the Long-term and Short-term Planning between the Taiwanese and 
E uropean Ooerations within Acer 
Taiwanese Dutch operation German operation British operation 
Items ooeration 
Budget time 
span 
- Budget period One year One year One year One year 
-Review Monthly I Quarterly I Quarterly I Quarterly 
Long-term 
planning 
- Plan A three years' plan A five years' plan Long-term visions A three years' plan 
- Content Visions and goals Sales & profits Rough goals Sales and profits. 
- Development Top management Based on Taiwan's Based on Taiwan's Senior managers 
long-term visions long-term visions 
-Form Informal contents Informal planning Highly informal Less formal 
- Feedback Per half year Slack Lacking Per half year 
Matching long-
term and short-
term planning 
• Linkage Budget matches Lacking linkage Lacking linkage Lacking linkage 
visions 
• Focus Annual budget and Annual budget Annual budget Annual budget 
vision 
Compared to the Taiwanese operation, European operations as a RBU for 
marketing battle missions lacked independent long-term planning, just as its general 
controller of European headquarters said: "Some long-term plans here are based on 
Taiwan's planning." No matter that Holland had a five-year plan or the UK a three-year 
plan, they were only a rough vision, normally including only sales and profit 
expectations. The president of the European headquarters described the situation: 
"Although we have prepared a five-year plan, actually we execute everything 
just for the short-term on an annual budget. The long-term plan is only like a 
vision, and somewhat like a slogan." 
The German operation even had no official long-term plan, but its managing 
director explained: 
"We have long-term planning internally in management. This long-term 
planning is nothing which we find in budget... It can be called a vision, and it is 
also a long-term strategy." 
Acer group had a 21 in 21 vision. That means it will have at least 21 publicly 
offered companies in the world before the 21st century. In that time, all key managers 
will become main stockholders of their companies. It was a long-term hope for 
different operations' employees, but still significant gaps existed in some countries. 
The financial controller of the Dutch operation said: "There are a lot of long-term 
visions from Taiwan ... but the long-term vision is not easy to transfer into planning. 
and to transfer from planning into financial budget." The managing director of the 
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German operation also had the same feeling: "Of course you should not have a high 
expectation. There is a big gap between headquarters managers and me, because they 
do not know the local requirements." Compared to the German and Dutch operations, 
the managing director of the British operation showed great ambition and said: 
"We plan to become a publicly offered company and absorb key managers as 
our shareholders ... If we can attain 5% of market share and 200 million pounds 
turnover, we will become an important PC company here. Then we can easily 
become a publicly listed company here ... So it is not impossible to achieve the 
target between 1999 and 2000." 
The British operation placed emphasis more on strategic planning. It had 
strategic planning meetings before preparing the annual budget and reviewing 
meetings each half year. Its top management has showed more aggressive and long-
term views since 1994 than other European operations' leaders. 
Overall, the Taiwanese operation kept more balance between long-term 
planning and short-term planning than did European operations. 
6.4.5 Conclusion and Discussion 
This proposition could be broadly supported by the research. Overall, 
Taiwanese operations focused more on long-term planning than their counterparts. 
This result was in conformity with the earlier findings of cultural scholars (such as 
Hofstede, 1980/1984, 1991; Hofstede & Bond, 1988; Chow et aI., 1995; Ueno & Wu, 
1993; and Harrison et aI., 1994). 
A significant interaction between area and company existed; that means 
different companies had varied results. To the multinational firms, different styles of 
financial control from the headquarters could significantly affect their operations' 
planning approaches. Tatung and Mitac were similar on the balance of short-term and 
long-term planning between their Taiwanese and European operations, but Lite-On and 
Acer had strong differences between their Taiwanese and European operations. Lite-
On and Acer emphasised strategic planning or long-term visions and their managers in 
Taiwanese operation participated more in these than did their European counterparts. 
6.5 Decentralisation 
Proposition 1-4: Taiwanese operations will have less decentralisation than their 
European counterparts. 
The purpose of this proposition is to compare the component of 
decentralisation between the Taiwanese and European operations within each case 
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firm. Three themes, including decentralised decision making system, independent 
decisions by managers, and fmancial and personnel control, will be observed for 
comparison from the main interview questions on decentralisation. 
6.5.1 Tatung 
Table 6.13 A Comparison of the Decentralisation between the Taiwanese and British Operations 
within Tatuos! 
Items Taiwanese operation British operation 
Decentralised decision 
making system 
eForm Formal Formal 
e Followine: the rules Strictly following Except for important decisions 
Independent decision by Independent in routine decisions Consultation with top management 
manae:ers 
Financial and personnel Controlled by headquarters Controlled by top management 
control 
Basically, the Taiwanese and British operations followed a more centralised 
philosophy in running their businesses, but two operations still have some differences 
(Table 6.13). In Taiwan, the operating policies of the whole corporation were still 
handled by the chairman of the board of directors and significant decisions still needed 
to be made by the chairman32; in the British operation, though senior managers could 
make individual decisions, most important decisions followed consultation with top 
management. 33 In Taiwan, the finance and senior managers were all controlled by 
central headquarters; in the UK, they used strictly central financial control and the 
president handled most decisions directly. The operating manager of the British 
operation felt that the president should decentralise more: 
"I have a little feeling maybe he needs to be more decentralised. That is my 
observation .... I am sure that it is general observation. 80% of business can be 
swiftly dealt with, and then he can just concentrate on the significant issue." 
Both operations had a formal budgeting process and clear decentralised 
decision-making systems according to the budget and financial figures, but because of 
the bigger plant scale and longer history the Taiwanese operation had better standard 
processing and more written documents. 
As to making decisions independently, a slight difference existed between the 
two operations. Both operations preferred to discuss decisions at their operating 
meeting, and then the chairman or president finally approved them. In Taiwan, Tatung 
is a number one electronics corporation, so it needs to have a clearly decentra1ised 
decision making system and give limited scope to each responsibility centre to make 
32 Quotation from the interview with the chief accountant of Tatung Taiwan operation. 
33 Quotation from the interview with the fmancial controller of Tatung (UK) Limited. 
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its decisions independently. The management control system in the corporation is a 
good internal control system, but as the company is so huge and making decisions in a 
profit centre may relate to many relevant departments or other factors, it is impossible 
to make decisions quickly and the timing is not good.34 
In the UK the president enjoyed more decentralisation than other directors of 
the profit centre in Taiwan, so he could make decisions more independently, but 
because he used the same centralised philosophy for running the business, each 
department head could not easily make decisions by himself. "Most important 
decisions are decided by top management.3S" According to the description given by the 
operating manager, there were various ways of forming decisions: 
"The president will present the proposal and we will argue the proposal to a 
positive decision. That is one way. The other way is going to see the president 
and talking to him about your proposal. If he agrees, then I can take the 
action .... The third way is when the president realises he must make the 
decisions and pass it down as instruction." 
All in all, there was some similar decentralisation In both operations, but 
obviously the Taiwanese operation was more clear and independent than the British 
operation. 
6.5.2 Lite-On 
Table 6.14 A Comparison of the Decentralisation between the Taiwanese and British Operations 
within Lite-On 
Items Taiwanese operation British operation 
Decentralised decision making 
system 
• Form Formal Informal 
• Following the rules Strictly following Flexible 
Independent decision by managers Ind~endent Less independent 
Financial and 'p"ersonnel control Controlled by headquarters Controlled by top management 
Strong differences on decentralisation existed between the Taiwanese and 
British operations (Table 6.14). The Taiwanese operation had a clear decentralised 
paradigm for each level of management and written documents to regulate the 
authority of each management level to approve decisions, especially with regard to 
finance.36 
Because of different environments including products, markets, manufacturing 
technologies, and competitors, each SBU in Taiwan Liton enjoyed relative 
34 Quotation from the interview with the chief~ccountant ofTatung Taiwan o~~tion. 
3S Quotation from the interview with the ~nanclal controller of Tatung.(UK). ~1~lted.. . 
36 From the interview with the planning director of the Power Conversion DIVISion of Taiwan Llton. 
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decentralisation with good discipline. They could make decisions very independently 
and enjoyed full decentralisation. "We have some rules regulating decentralised 
decision making, but basically we have a full decentralisation in routine activities. 37" 
The financial system was very powerful in the Taiwanese operation and each job was 
clearly described. 
The British operation still lacked a clearly decentralised decision making 
system. Most people were still used to the central pyramid structure and did not like to 
make decisions themselves. Now the top management are striving to encourage their 
managers to make more decisions, just as its managing director said: 
"We have tried to change the method of decision-making within the company. 
The old fashioned way in the UK was a very centralised pyramid structure. 
Business in general is levelling in nature, recutting levels, trying to achieve 
better results. The other way we try to do that is to allow more responsibility to 
the individuaL .. What we are saying is you are perfectly capable of making a 
decision. " 
"We are encouraging people from the bottom to come up with the idea, and we 
are trying to make them believe that they participate in the running.38" Its top 
management felt that their people should be more involved in the operation,39 but from 
the view of its controller, because the budget was settled by department heads, if they 
had a budget, they could make decisions independently. In addition, it was necessary to 
make an independent decision if the answer was required very quickly.40 However, 
total decentralisation in the British operation still needs continually to improve. 
6.5.3 Mitae 
Table 6.15 A Comparison of the Decentralisation between the Taiwanese and British Operations 
within Mitac 
Items Taiwanese oDeration British operation 
Decentralised decision making 
system 
• Form Fonnal Less fonnal 
• Followintz the rules Strictly following Flexible 
Independent decision by Independent Less independent 
mana2ers 
Financial and personnel control Controlled by headquarters Controlled by headquarters 
37 Quotation from the interview with the vice-president of the Power Conversion Division of Taiwan 
Liton. 
38 Quotation from the interview with the personnel officer of Lite-On Limited (UK). 
39 From the interview with the executive director ofLite-On Limited (UK). 
40 From the interview with the production manager ofLite-On Limited (UK). 
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Strong differences on decentralisation existed between the Taiwanese and 
British operations (Table 6.15). The Taiwanese operation had more decentralisation, 
each function had a clear authority, and each head could independently make 
decisions; but the British operation emphasised team work, and departmental heads 
could not easily make decisions independently. 
Although the Taiwanese operation failed in its SBU organisation about 1991 
and has been forced to restore functional organisation since that time, actually each 
function or department has still kept clear authorisation and each departmental head 
easily made independent decisions. Its controller said: "In the financial and accounting 
aspects, we completely follow the flow chart." The quality A VP also said: "Our 
decentralisation is clearly regulated in the documents of ISO #9001, and its technical 
AVP also described his authorisation: 
"I feel I can independently make decisions 100%. That's complete 
decentralisation ... .1 clearly understand what decisions belong to me. Unless the 
amount is very significant or out of budget, then I will report to top 
management by E-mail; otherwise, relating to my activities only I make a 
decision at once, even for a very significant amount if it is an urgent matter, I 
still make the decision myself, and that is the way which the top manager 
encourages us to take." 
Because each department had clear power to make decisions independently and 
some functions even could directly report to top management, sometimes there was not 
enough co-ordination and team work in the operation.41 
Compared to the Taiwanese operation, the British operation had an absolutely 
different management style in authorisation. It had less decentralisation and often 
made decisions by team. Each unit needed to consult the others and most of the 
decisions called for consultation with the managing director. Its logistics director said: 
"Because we are just a young company, we all work together for a long time. We make 
team decisions and we consult each other." Its managing director also described the 
situation: 
"I control the payroll and important decisions. Other matters are responded to 
by each department and we use the matrix system under which each function or 
department needs often to contact relevant units at headquarters. Of course, 
they will give me E-mail copy and on some important decisions they will 
consult me in advance. Because I have handled this company since 1989, I 
know each function very well." 
41 From the interview with the vice president of Hsin-Chu plant of Mitac international. 
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Objectively speaking, there were obvious differences in decentralisation 
between the two operations. The Taiwanese operation had greater decentralisation than 
the British. 
6.5.4 Acer 
Strong differences in decentralisation were found among operations (Table 
6.16). The Taiwanese operation had a clearer decentralised system under which 
managers easily made independent decisions and their responsibilities were easily 
followed up. Its president said: "The company's philosophy is that after giving you the 
position you are fully authorised. The company would like you to bear the 
responsibility of success or failure." Its logistics manager said: "I feel I have great 
authority. Actually from my point of view, there are lots of decisions to be made at 
managerial level... I can directly make decisions and implement them at once." Its 
maintenance manager also had the same feeling: "I feel our company has very clear 
decentralisation in decision making, especially in finance and personnel.... The 
company fully authorises its managers so we can make decisions and do everything 
very quickly." Its chief accountant concluded: "Except for very significant matters, 
each departmental manager has high authority." They also set clear targets or criteria 
which covered financial indicators and non-financial indicators for each unit for 
evaluating purposes. As its president said: "The model for setting targets for our 
departments or centres is the same as headquarters' model setting targets for its BUs." 
Table 6.16 A Comparison of the Decentralisation between the Taiwanese and European 
Operations wit In Acer h' 
Taiwanese Dutch operation German operation British operation 
Operation operation 
Decentralised 
decision making 
syste'm 
• Form Fonnal Less fonnal Informal Less fonnal 
• Following the Strictly following Flexible Flexible Flexible 
rules 
Independent Independent Independent for Less independent Independent in 
decision by Taiwanese managers sales department 
mana2ers 
Financial and Controlled by Controlled by Controlled by Controlled by 
personnel control operation's manager operation's manager operation's manager operation's manager 
and regional and regional and regional 
headquarters headquarters headquarters 
In European operations, generally speaking their decentralisation system could 
not compare with the Taiwanese operation. As the European headquarters was at the 
Dutch operation and more senior Taiwanese managers stayed there, it had more 
decentralisation than other European operations. Most of the Taiwanese managers held 
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senior positions and they enjoyed the same decentralisation as the Taiwanese 
operation, but most Dutch managers at middle and basic level had a different feeling, 
"The decentralisation is not so high !4211 
In the German operation, except for those basic routine activities, the 
decentralisation was less and more informal. Its controller described the situation: 
"The president uses a more centralised system. He prefers to be more involved 
and he is responsible ... Under some situations he authorises some decisions to 
his subordinates but he needs to make sure they have an ability to carry them 
out first." 
The president also agreed with the above description, and said: 
"The decision making process is limited, but the more he engages and the more 
his learning and the more we see his ability to manage things, the more 
responsibility he will have to bear." 
As to routine activities, there were clear processes. Some relevant regulations 
were even set in the MIS system, "the computer as a warner.4311 
In the British operation, "the basic organisation framework and responsibility 
divisions are very clear.44" Each departmental head had his target and responsibilities 
and that was obviously different from other European operations. However, its top 
management emphasised team work, so independent decision seems a rarity, as its 
controller described: 
"As to decentralisation, it depends on the department... As I see it, the 
Taiwanese way is that no one seems to make a decision but what happens is 
that people focus on their discussions and move the discussions to the result 
they want." 
The marketing department enjoyed more decentralisation than the production 
department. Basically, they can make decisions quite flexibly within the 
decentralisation. 
All in all, the Taiwanese operation obviously carries more decentralisation than 
European operations, and the three European operations showed lots of similarities on 
decentralisation. 
6.S.S Conclusion and Discussion 
This proposition was rejected by the research and the direction is the reverse. 
Taiwanese operations significantly owned more decentralisation than their European 
42 Quotation from the interview with the financial controller of Acer Computer B.V. 
43 Quotation from the interview W!th the manag~ng d!rector (second) of Ac~r ~omputer GmbH. 
44 Quotation from the interview with the managmg dIrector of Acer U.K. Limited. 
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counterparts. Tatung had only a slight difference, Acer and Lite-On had strong 
differences, and Mitac was in the middle. 
According to Hofstede's (198011984, 1991) cultural theory, high power 
distance and collective societies have less decentralisation than low power distance 
and individual societies. In prior cross-cultural inter-firm research, many studies (such 
as Birnbaum & Wong, 1985; Lincoln et aI., 1986; and Harrison et al., 1994) supported 
the theory. However, Chow et ai. (1994) could not find enough support in his 
comparative study between Japan and America, and the main reason as he explained is 
that both national cultures do not have a large enough gap in terms of power distance 
in Hofstede's 100-point index. Owing to using the cross-border intra-firm comparison 
in this research, national culture is not the only influence upon the component of 
decentralisation. Relatively, leadership styles significantly affect operations' 
decentralisation through organisational controls. The research result fully showed the 
importance of the firm factor on the components of decentralisation. The next two 
chapters in the thesis will further discuss this topic. In addition to the leadership 
factors, some situational factors, including scale, age, history, and business focus as 
described in the chapter 9, may also have some influence on this proposition. 
6.6 Formality 
Proposition 1-5: Taiwanese operations will have less formality than their European 
counterparts. 
The purpose of this proposition is to compare the components of formality 
between the Taiwanese and European operations within each case firm. Three themes, 
including documentation, implementing regulations, and standard budget process, 
from the main interview questions on formality will be observed for comparison. 
6.6.1 Tatung 
Generally speaking, a strong similarity on formality existed between the 
Taiwanese and British operations (Table 6.17). Both operations belong to the ISO 
9001 plants which need basic operational manuals and documents. Both operations 
also kept a formal budgeting process; Taiwan's Tatung especially owned more 
standardised processes. The two operations used standard cost for costing and 
controlling purposes. In addition, both operations set formal rules and procedures for 
management purposes and strictly followed them. 
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Table 6.17 A Comparison of the Formality between the Taiwanese and British Operations within 
T atuOl! 
Items Taiwanese operation British operation 
Documentation 
-Operating manual Highly formal Highly formal 
-Job description Formal Formal 
-Written ree:ulations Formal Formal 
Implementing regulations 
- Following regulations Strictly obeyed Strictly obeyed 
-Written evaluations Formal Formal 
Standard budget process 
-Budget manual Highly formal Highly formal 
-Process Highly standardised Standardised 
-Written variance record Formal Formal 
-Chane:ine: bude:et Highly difficult Highly difficult 
In the British operation, most procedures involved written documents and each 
unit was asked to prepare written documents including job descriptions.45 The 
company kept documents, regulations, and procedures very formal, but it still could be 
changed when managers felt they were not suitable.46 
The Taiwanese operation had prepared basic documents well since it got the 
first ISO 9001 in 1992. Most managers were very satisfied with its basic systems and 
documents within the operation. "Compared to other Taiwanese companies, the 
corporation already has an excellent system.47" "Of course the documents were limited 
only at the basic level: as to high level operation, an understanding of the meaning of 
top management and their past instructions is necessary and it is not easy to keep 
documents on that.4s" 
Overall, strong similarities on formality existed between the two operations. 
6.6.2 Lite-On 
Some differences in formality existed between the Taiwanese and British 
operations (Table 6.18). Both operations got the certificate of ISO #9001, and they had 
basic written documents and rules on routine business, but because the British 
operation is currently changing its business culture and organisation, it needs more 
documents and rules now. 
45 From the interview with the executive director of Tatung (UK) Limited. 
46 Quotation from the interview with the managing director of Tatung (UK) Limited. 
47 Quotation from the interview with the production and sales manager of Taiwan electronic plant. 
48 Quotation from the interview with the director of Taiwan electronic plant. 
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Table 6.18 A Comparison of the Formality between the Taiwanese and Britisb Operations within 
Lite-On 
Items Taiwanese operation British operation 
Documentation 
• Operating manual Formal Formal 
• Job description Formal Formal in manufacturing unit 
• Written ree:ulations Formal Less formal 
Implementing regulations 
• Following regulations Obeyed Flexible 
.Written evaluations Formal Less formal 
Standard budget process 
• Budget manual Formal guideline Lacking a formal guide 
• Process Standardised Flexible 
• Written variance record Formal Informal 
• Cbane:ine: bude:et Under reasonable situations Under reasonable situations 
In the Taiwanese operation top management emphasised formality. Its rules, 
regulations, and procedures kept stable and it was not easy to change them unless there 
was a clear need for change.49 Most of the tables and reports in the budget guideline 
for preparing a middle range plan were the same as in past years. 50 
In the British operation, production followed a series of manufacturing and 
auditing procedures. "Without sufficient documentation, the scheme is dead!sl" 
However, as the firm was at the stage of changing organisational and management 
style, the formal documents were still not enough. What the top management was 
doing was documenting their business more, just as its managing director described: 
"The hierarchy here is much stronger in the Northeast than other parts of the 
UK. I come from the south so it took me a very long time to understand the 
culture here .... We had to make the culture change first, so we try very hard to 
introduce flexibility here to allow people to make decisions ..... We now have to 
look very closely at the process. So what we are doing is we are documenting 
our process here ... Anyway, our system has gone from formality to flexibility, 
and now we are moving back to formal-flexibility." 
In finance, "We will have a more clear budget by department in the futureS2,,; 
and in personnel, "People can team together under the guidelines.s3" Formal structure, 
regulations, procedures, guidelines, and even job descriptions seem very necessary at 
this stage. 
49 From the interview with the associated vice-president (now vice-president) of the Power Conversion 
Division of Taiwan Liton. 
SO From the interview with the vice president of the Power Conversion Division of Taiwan Liton. 
5 1 Quotation from the interview with production manager of Lite-On Limited (UK). 
52 Quotation from the interview with the financial controller of Lite-On Limited (UK). 
53 Quotation from the interview with the personnel officer of Lite-On limited (UK). 
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All in all, the British operation is still changing its management style and 
preparing formal documents, so on formality, except for some production procedures 
and documents, it could not compare with the Taiwanese operation at the moment. 
6.6.3 Mitae 
Table 6.19 A Comparison of the Formality between the Taiwanese and British Operations within 
Mitac 
Items Taiwanese operation British operation 
Documentation 
-Operating manual Formal manuals Informal 
-Job description Formal Less formal 
-Written re2ulations Formal Less formal 
Implementing regulations 
- Following regulations Obeyed Flexible 
-Written evaluations Formal Less formal 
Standard budget process 
-Budget manual Formal guideline Lacking formal guideline 
-Process Standardised Flexible 
-Written variance record Formal Informal 
-Chan2ine: bude:et Under special situations Flexible 
There were different formalities between the Taiwanese and British operations 
(Table 6.19). The Taiwanese operation got its certificate of ISO #9001 in 1993 and 
their managers completely followed its regulations. They prepared more basic written 
documents than did the British operation and had a standardised budgeting process. 
Both operations used employees' self-evaluation every half year and if they had any 
opinion they could express it on the self-evaluation form, but the Taiwanese operation 
still owned a more formal review system than the British operation. Formality and 
discipline were better in the Taiwanese operation, but owing to the uncertain 
environment, some regulations still needed to keep on changing, as its quality A VP 
described: 
"Mitac consider quality first. Basically, we follow our procedures, but 
sometimes due to facing a special situation we discuss together to bring out a 
temporary and special procedure." 
Its financial manager also talked about the situation: 
"We strictly follow the procedures or regulations in financial and accounting 
areas, but in other areas because the corporation policy is not clear enough, I 
feel some things change often. That means it is still very volatile and flexible." 
Compared to the Taiwanese operation, the British was more informal and 
flexible. "Except for personnel regulations, most of them are non-written and easily 
changed at managerial meetings. 54" "If we feel it is better to change. then we change it 
54 Quotation from the interview with the assistant controller of Mitac Europe Limited. 
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quickly.55" Only a few regulations, rules, and procedures could be maintained for a 
long time in the company, but in general they obeyed those rules in day-to-day 
operation. 56 It might be the strategy of the managing director, because he came from 
Tatung (UK) Company and he wanted to create a competitive managing strategy. He 
commented: 
"Only a few regulations are kept as written documents. We keep informal and 
greatly flexible. Each function can discuss with headquarters by E-mail any 
time and change their actions and I only watch some important things ... 
Compared to the Tatung (UK) company which is more hierarchical, we are 
more flexible and informal." 
Overall, different formalities existed between the two operations, and the 
Taiwanese operation obviously was more formal than the British operation. 
6.6.4 Acer 
Table 6.20 A Comparison of the Formality between the Taiwanese and European Operations 
within Acer 
Taiwanese Dutch operation German operation British operation 
Items operation 
Documentation 
.Operating manual Formal Informal Informal Informal 
.Job description Less formal Informal Informal Informal 
.Written regulations Less formal Informal Informal Informal 
Implementing regulations 
• Following regulations Obeyed Flexible Obeyed Flexible 
.Written evaluations Informal Informal Informal Informal 
Standard budget process 
• Budget manual Formal guideline Informal N/A N/A 
.Process Standardised guideline Flexible Less standardised 
.Written variance record Formal Flexible Informal Informal 
.Changing budget Difficult to Informal Difficult to change Difficult to change 
change targets Difficult to targets targets 
change targets 
• N/A: No budget guideline 
There was limited formality in the Acer group. Most managers emphasised 
flexibility and most operations lacked written documents and formal procedures. 
Among these operations, the Taiwanese operation still used more basic documents and 
formal procedures than European operations (Table 6.20). Although it was set up just 
two years ago, originally it belonged to a section of Acer International Corporation 
plant which owns a certificate of ISO #9001. So compared to European operations. it 
still used basic operating documents. 
European operations lacked formal documents and operational procedures. The 
president of the European headquarters said: "We discuss and set some basic common 
55 Quotation from the interview with the logistics director of Mitae Europe Limited. 
56 From the interview of the controller with Mitac Europe Limited. 
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guidelines, but we do not regulate in detail." The general controller of European 
headquarters also said: "At the moment Acer puts more emphasis on people than on 
the system. So until now it still lacks an integrated system. Different managers have 
different management styles and the results are absolutely different." Because IT 
products changed so fast, Acer needed to choose the flexible approach for survival. 57 
The personnel manager of the Dutch operation accurately described the situation: 
"All kinds of regulations in the company are very changeable, that is, I will say 
also flexible, and that is also reasonable because we never have long-tenn 
planning. In my opinion, we do not have enough fonnal rules." 
In the Gennan operation, documentation was considered very necessary. Its 
controller felt there was not enough paper work and he suggested: 
"From the financial view, I think European headquarters need to set a 
decentralised system in decision making and clearly set out the game theory. 
We lack those documents at present and you can not believe people instead of 
the system." 
Once having rules, its managers followed them very well. Its personnel officers 
said: "The regulations are obeyed in day to day operation, but it is possible to change. 
If conditions change then each departmental head can reflect some of the actual 
conditions. " 
The British operation had a few more written documents and budget 
procedures than did the Dutch and Gennan operations. Its controller confidently said: 
"Certainly this company is a relatively fonnal company," and its managing director 
described the situation: 
"Taiwanese managers do not always care and also cannot design the procedures 
and processes but only care about the result. Here if you cannot carry out 
successfully the procedures and processes, a series of problems will happen. 58 
How to use minimum processes and personnel to achieve the maximum output 
and let the customers get maximum infonnation is the manager's 
responsibility. " 
Apart from production and finance, in other functions, especially in marketing, 
regulations were unwritten and were easy to change. The marketing department faced a 
strongly fluctuating environment without guidance, as its marketing director described: 
"The company is very flexible and may be too flexible: we have no strong guides to 
help us. We are still slowly learning." 
57 From the interview with the logistics director of Acer Computer B.V. 
58 The content is almost the same as the interview with the vice president of Europa Magnetic Co. 
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All in all, even though fonnality in Acer was not strong, its fonnality in the 
Taiwanese operation still differed strongly from its European operations. As to the 
difference among European operations the interview data show only a few differences. 
6.6.5 Conclusion and Discussion 
This proposition was rejected by the research and the direction is the reverse. 
Taiwanese operations were significantly more fonnal than their European counterparts. 
However, the factor of company still significantly affected the difference. With the 
ranking of Tatung, Lite-On, Mitac, and Acer, the differences were stronger and 
stronger. Obviously, financial control factors and some situation factors such as 
business focus and the scale of operation significantly affected the degree of fonnality. 
Prior research using cross-cultural inter-finn comparison on this component 
showed a complexity of findings. Some scholars (such as Chow et aI., 1994~ Chow et 
aI., 1996) were supported by their findings, some (such as Birnbaum & Wong, 1985; 
Ueno & Sekaran, 1992; Ueno & Wu, 1993) were not, and some (Van et al., 1992~ 
Harrison et aI., 1994) even had equivocal findings. National culture seems difficult to 
use as a single criterion to predict the direction of the component of fonnality. The 
extent of formality seems more related to control styles, especially within a 
multinational firm. The results of the research showed the importance of the finn 
factor on the component of formality. In addition, the extent of fonnality needs to 
match situational factors, especially in an operation's scale and business focus. 
6.7 Controllability-filters 
Proposition 1-6: Taiwanese operations will have fewer controllability-jilters than 
their European counterparts. 
The purpose of this proposition is to compare the component of controllability-
filters between the Taiwanese and European operations within each case finn. Three 
themes, including evaluating criterion, considering uncontrollable factors, and 
changing objective, will be observed for comparison from the main interview 
questions on controllability-filters. 
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6.7.1 Tatung 
Table 6.21 A Comparison of the Controllability-filters between the Taiwanese and British 
o 'perations within TatunS! 
Items Taiwanese operation British operation 
Evaluatin2 criterion Focusing on budget objectives Focusing on budget objectives 
Considering uncontrollable Little consideration Little consideration 
factors 
ChanS!in2 objective Difficult to change Difficult to change 
Strong similarities on controllability-filters existed between the Taiwanese and 
British operations (Table 6.21). Neither operation automatically took account of the 
uncontrollable items in their evaluating system, but responsible managers could ask for 
a revision of the objective or full explanation in the operating management meeting. 
Normally, unless the reasons for a revision were very strong it was impossible for 
approval to be granted, especially in the Taiwanese operation. The director of the 
Taiwanese operation said: 
"Headquarters could not consider uncontrollable items for you, so if there are 
issues beyond your control you need to offer enough reasons to ask for a 
revision of the target. If top management agrees, the objective can still be 
revised ... So you need to set your objective carefully, and if you have already 
set the objective you need to strive to achieve it." 
Compared to the Taiwanese operation, the managers of the British operation 
had more opportunities to explain. One of its managing directors said: "Managers can 
always explain in the meeting and we present the budget performance in the operating 
meeting." That means it is still not easy to revise their targets. Of course, if some 
assumptions or situations changed, he could explain in the meeting, but basically he 
needed to think how to achieve his budget. 59 
6.7.2 Lite-On 
Table 6.22 A Comparison of the Controllability-filters between the Taiwanese and British 
o . h' L' 0 
.perations Wit ID Ite- n 
Items Taiwanese operation British operation 
Evaluating criterion Focusing on strategic objective and Focusing non-financial indicators 
accounting indicators 
Considering Considering uncontrollable factors A little consideration 
uncontrollable factors 
Chanslioa objective Reasonable to change Accepting managers' explanations 
Although the control function was not strong in Lite-On group, there were still 
strong differences on controllability-filter between Taiwanese and British operations 
59 Quotation from the interview with the operating managers ofTatung (UK) Limited. 
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(Table 6.22). In the Taiwanese operation, they defined and considered the 
controllability-filters more clearly and reasonably when setting the strategic planning60• 
When the budget objective was not reached, if there were uncontrollable factors the 
manager could give reasonable explanations. If these were good reasons, it was easy to 
accept the explanations. "The top management cares about what work attitude you 
have or whether you make right decisions, and if there are problems, we solve them in 
meetings. 61 " 
Compared to the Taiwanese operation, the British operation's budget was 
prepared on the plant-wide basis. The budget lacked the units' objectives or standards 
so that the controllability-filters were not necessary to departmental managers on the 
evaluation of budget performance. For special events on the plant-wide basis, the 
operation still considered uncontrollable items such as material costs could be affected 
by outside supply, time, and volume, and they also accepted its managers' 
explanations62. 
Overall, although the two operations considered controllability-filters, the 
Taiwanese operation took them more clearly, formally and in systematised fashion 
than did the British operation. 
6.7.3 Mitac 
Table 6.23 A Comparison of the Controllability-filters between the Taiwanese and British 
o f 'th' M't 'pera IOns WI ID lac 
Items Taiwanese operation British operation 
Evaluatine: criterion Focusing on profit target Focusing on profit tar~et 
Considering Little consideration Little consideration 
uncontrollable factors 
Chane:ine: ob.iective Reasonable to change Acccm.ting managers' explanations 
There were no obvious differences on controllability-filters between the 
Taiwanese and British operations (Table 6,23), Except for the profit target, neither 
operation cared too much about the individual variance between budget and actual 
amount. and it was easy to explain uncontrollable items at the meetings. Because of the 
uncertain factors and departmental heads caring less about budgeting, there were 
always significant differences between the actual and budget figures on individual 
items,63 
In the British operation, "the control system was only considered for the whole 
company and the system lacked deep analysis, Normally each measure was compared 
60 From the interview with the planning director of the Power Conversion Division of Taiwan Liton. 
61 Quotation from the interview with the deputy controller of Taiwan Liton. 
62 From the interview with the financial controller of Lite-On Limited (UK). 
63 Quotation from the interview with the controller of Mitac International. 
146 
with the previous year's figure. The uncontrollable items were not inspected in the 
system. 64 " The evaluation of managerial performances always depended on the 
judgement of the managing director. The managing director was in direct touch with 
each department and the budget criterion was useless for evaluating managerial 
performance.6S 
Overall, though the Taiwanese operation had more space in explaining those 
uncontrollable items, basically both operations kept similar on the component of 
controller-filters. 
6.7.4 Acer 
Some differences on controllability-filters existed between different operations 
(Table 6.24). Generally speaking, the British and Taiwanese operations considered 
more controllability-filters under special conditions than did Dutch and German 
operations. 
Table 6.24 A Comparison of the Controllability-filters between the Taiwanese and European 
o f ·th· A 'pera Ions WI m cer 
Taiwanese Dutch operation German British operation 
Items operation operation 
Evaluating criterion Focusing on Focusing on Focusing on Focusing on bottom 
bottom line bottom line bottom line line and non-
financial indicators 
Considering Little Little Little Considering in special 
uncontrollable factor cases 
Changing objective Considering in Difficult Highly difficult Considering in special 
special cases cases 
In the Taiwanese operation, although managers needed to bear "the 
responsibility of success or failure", if there was a special uncontrollable item, 
managers could still possibly ask to revise their targets, as its logistics manager said: 
"I set targets for my subordinates, but I still look at whether any abnormal 
matter happens. In addition, if there is any uncontrollable item we can report it 
at the monthly operating meeting." 
In the Dutch operation, top management did not consider uncontrollable items 
too much, as its president described: 
"Normally we do not consider uncontrollable items in the performance 
evaluation, but sometimes we ease difficulties. It is not easy to classify 
controllable and noncontrollable items in this industry and if we consider them 
we always have a lot of arguments to sort out!" 
64 Quotation from the interview with the controller of Mitac Europe Limited. 
6S Quotation from the interview with the controller of Mitac Europe Limited. 
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Its financial controller agreed and said: "Under special conditions they can 
discuss and argue with us." 
In the German operation, top management did not normally consider 
uncontrollable items in performance evaluation. "Everyone needs to take care of the 
bottom line and that is our main responsibility and mission.66" Its controller said: "To 
us even the currency exchange is still a controllable item." 
In the British operation, top management considered more uncontrollable items 
than did other European operations. Its controller said: "We consider uncontrollable 
items and discuss with managers", but he continued: "You cannot make too much 
allowance for the uncontrollable items, otherwise these items will go on." Its 
marketing director agreed: "Generally speaking, the bottom line is important, but not 
absolutely important. The company is still a small company and if we sustain a loss we 
can still show our future trend." 
The above interview data show that the difference between the Taiwanese 
operation and the European operations is not significant. 
6.7.5 Conclusion and Discussion 
This proposition was rejected by the research and the direction is the reverse. 
Overall, Taiwanese operations used more controllability-filters than their European 
counterparts. Further checking of individual companies showed that except for Lite-On 
which reflected strong differences and Tatung which showed a strong similarity, Mitac 
showed a similarity and Acer had some differences but these were not significant. 
It seems difficult to use the factor of national culture as a single criterion to 
predict the direction of controllability-filters. The prior studies of Chow et al. (1994) 
and Van et al. (1992) could not be supported. The proposition seems to reflect this 
situation. In the research, even Taiwanese operations used more controllability-filters 
than their European counterparts. The firms showed obvious differences. A firm's 
control style significantly affects the component of controllability-filters within a firm. 
With a tight control style, Tatung showed a strong similarity between its Taiwanese 
and European operations. In addition, the characteristics of the operations' head and the 
backgrounds of operations may have some influences on the proposition. The case of 
Lite-On with strong differences between its Taiwanese and European operations 
reflects this situation. 
66 Quotation from the interview with the managing director (first) of Acer Computer GmbH. 
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6.8 Feedback Extent and Frequency 
Proposition 1-7: Taiwanese operations' managers will employ a more relaxed 
feedback system, including frequency and extent, than their European counterparts. 
The purpose of this proposition is to compare the component of feedback 
extent and frequency between the Taiwanese and European operations within each 
case firm. Three themes, including main means of feedback, feedback frequency, and 
feedback extent, from the main interview questions on feedback extent and frequency 
will be observed for comparison. 
6.S.1 Tatung 
Table 6.25 A Comparison of the Feedback Extent and Frequency between the Taiwanese and 
B "f h 0 f . h' T ra IS 'oera IOns Wit ID atunl! 
Items Taiwanese ooeration British operation 
Main means of feedback 
• Means Perfonnancereports Performance reports 
• Performance indicators Multiple indicators Focusing on sales & profit tantets 
Feedback frequency Weekly and monthly basis Weekly and monthly basis 
Feedback extent 
• Costing Standard costing Standard costing 
• Variance analysis Monthly Monthly 
• Cost control Highly tight Highly tight 
Basically, both operations had a formal warning system, and strong similarities 
between the two operations (Table 6.25). Both operations used standard cost for 
costing and controlling purposes, and they used performance reports as means of 
feedback. The budget was always followed up in a short time span and discussed in the 
operational meeting. The executive director of the British operation said : 
"We examine the objective attainment, especially the sales objective, at the 
operating meeting each week, and we examine the expense and profit and loss 
per month. In the meeting we always analyse the differences between budget 
and actual results." 
The Taiwanese operation was somewhat more formal than the British 
operation. They used multiple indicators to appraise the operating result of 
independent centres, including sales(24%), profit (24%), rate of return of investment 
(24%), inventory management (14%), and human resources efficiency (14%). The 
corporation used six grades to evaluate each indicator performance and gave centres 
different incentives. In addition, the function of the operating meeting was also more 
formal than in the British operation, just as the chief accountant of the Taiwanese 
operation described the reality: 
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"The monthly perfonnance reports will be sent to each unit's head and those 
reports will still be reviewed at the monthly operating meeting. The committee 
members belonging to the operating meeting will go to each plant for face-to-
face communication. Besides, each plant director needs to report at the 
operating meeting each quarter." 
Compared to the Taiwanese operation, the British operation was less fonnal 
but more flexible. In addition to the weekly meeting, if there were special important 
events they would hold "a lot of unscheduled meetings67" to discuss. The senior 
manager focused more on the budget variances. 
Overall, the two operations had a strong feedback function, but this was 
somewhat more fonnal in the Taiwanese operation than in the British operation. 
6.8.2 Lite-On 
Table 6.26 A Comparison of the Feedback Extent and Frequency between the Taiwanese and 
B 't' h 0 f 'th' L't 0 rI IS 'pera Ions WI In I e- n 
Items Taiwanese operation British operation 
Main means of feedback 
• Means Performance reports Operating reports 
• Indicators Multiple financial indicators Multiple financial indicators 
Feedback frequency Monthly and weekly basis Monthly basis, but MIS could not 
support on-time information. 
Feedback extent 
• Costing Actual costing Actual costing 
• Variance analysis Monthly, about 10%-20%. Informal, over 20%. 
• Cost control Less tight Loose 
There were some similarities and differences on feedback extent and frequency 
between the Taiwanese and British operations (Table 6.26). Both had weekly and 
monthly meetings for discussing and reviewing their operating results, and prepared 
monthly budget perfonnance reports as a means of feedback. 
However, comparing the feedback extent, obviously the Taiwanese operation 
did better than the British. The Taiwanese operation followed up each week, month, 
and half year, and its MIS maintained and controlled each department's expense.68 
They focused not only on the comparison between actual and budget figures but also 
the feasibility of attaining the budget for the next month or quarter.69 In the British 
operation, because of lacking responsibility units in budgeting, the budget feedback 
was not easy to exercise. In addition its MIS still could not produce relevant 
infonnation on time70, so it was difficult to produce feedback efficiently. 
67 Quotation from the interview with the financial controller ofTatung (UK) Limited. 
68 From the interview with the planning director of the Power Conversion Division of Taiwan Liton. 
69 From the interview with the vice president of the Power Conversion Division of Taiwan Liton. 
70 From the interview with the financial controller ofLite-On Limited (UK). 
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Objectively, the budget control was not too strict in both operations, especially 
in the British operation. In the past two years the budget variances in Taiwan were 
about 10% to 20%7., but in the British operation they were often more than 20%72. The 
associate vice president of the Taiwanese operation described the situation: 
"I feel the budget control system is not really good, no real budget control. 
Although the capital budget and labour budget are strictly controlled by each 
departmental budget, with other items we lack a real system or person to 
control. " 
In the British operation, the executive director also felt the financial and budget 
control were not enough for the company, and he was trying to teach the management 
team more financial control. 
Generally speaking, the two operations had some similarities in budget control 
style, but on the feedback extent, the Taiwanese operation did somewhat better than 
the British operation. 
6.8.3 Mitac 
Objectively, the group strongly emphasises feedback operating results, but it 
focused more on the information of the actual result than on budget performance 
(Table 6.27). Essentially, the feedback system lacked linkage with responsibility and 
motivation, so the real effect of feedback on budget performance was very low in both 
operations, especially in the British operation. The two operations had almost the same 
feedback frequency containing monthly operating meeting and weekly plant meeting 
and all successfully used MIS and E-mail systems quite well, but there were a few 
differences on the extent of feedback. 
Table 6.27 A Comparison of the Feedback Extent and Frequency between the Taiwanese and 
B .. h 0 . ·th· M· ntis 'peratlons WI ID Itac 
Items Taiwanese operation British operation 
Main means of feedback 
• Means Performance reports Operating reports 
• Indicators Multiple fmancial indicators Focusing on sales & profits 
Feedback frequency Monthly and weeklv basis Monthly and weeklv basis 
Feedback extent 
.Costing Actual costing by products & units Actual costing by whole operation 
.Variance analysis Monthly Monthly 
.Cost control Less tiszht Lacking segment reports to control 
In Taiwan, the monthly reports called the "green report" contained lots of 
financial information and were designed for different management levels. They 
71 from the interview with the controller of Taiwan Liton. 
72 From the interview with the executive director ofLite-On Limited (UK). 
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covered financial reports, ten main customers, inventory and so on, and they were sent 
to different management levels through the E-mail system and MIS system, and to a 
higher level more concisely.73 In addition, in its "green report" they also selected some 
important figures compared with the previous month for the convenient purpose of a 
managers' review. 
Although the feedback extent in the Taiwanese operation was very broad and 
covered critical strategic factors, for budget performance it was still not enough. The 
budget function in planning was better than that in controlling.74 The financial 
manager also directly described the condition: 
"I felt we did not follow the budget. The actual is actual and budget is budget. 
Although the president is very concerned about the monthly operating result, 
the execution of budget is not good. All middle and lower managers are 
unconcerned with the budget, though sometimes they talk of it in meetings but 
that's all." 
In the British operation the feedback was not so detailed. It compared only on 
the basis of the whole operation. In addition to the financial reports, it was required to 
send to headquarters a monthly "BEPAID" report which is a group's uniform report, 
covering some critical strategic operating factors. As the budget system lacked 
segment objectives the performance report was useless for appraising managers' 
performance. Its controller said that they always judged the performance by experience 
or by comparing with previous years.75 The monthly report reflected only whole 
company performance and its managers needed to push their subordinates by other 
channels, especially for regular review targets, as its managing director described: 
"I always give my subordinates clear targets and ask responsible managers to 
finish them within a reasonable period. Normally I will ask about their progress 
at the weekly Monday meeting. We need continually to push their work." 
All in all, both operations kept similar on the component of feedback extent 
and frequency. 
6.8.4 Acer 
Although the totally controlling function was not strong in Acer, strong 
differences on the variable of feedback extent and frequency still existed between 
operations (Table 6.28). The British and Taiwanese operations had deeper feedback 
than the German and Dutch operations. 
73 From the interview with the controller of Mitac International. 
74 From the interview with technical A VP of Hsin-Chu plant of Mitac International. 
7S From the interview with the controller of Mitac Europe Limited. 
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In the Taiwanese operation, the monthly operating meeting which all 
department heads were required to attend discussed and explained monthly 
performance. If there was significant variance, top management always asked the 
manager to explain. Its plant director said: "Because we already fully understand all 
conditions in the meetings under a regular reviewing system, the variances at the end 
of year are not important. Ultimately, the result will determine everything." 
Table 6.28 A Comparison of the Feedback Extent and Frequency between the Taiwanese and 
EO' uropean 'peratlons within Acer 
Taiwanese Dutch operation German British operation 
Operation operation operation 
Main means of 
feedback 
- Means Performance reports Performance report Operating reports Operating reports 
- Indicators Multiple fmancial Focusing on bottom line Focusing on Multiple financial 
indicators bottom line and non-financial 
indicators 
Feedback Monthly and weekly Monthly Monthly Monthly and 
frequency Quarterly 
Feedback 
extent 
-Costing Actual costing Actual costing. Actual costing Actual costing 
-Variance Monthly Quarterly Irregular Irregular 
analysis 
-Cost control Reasonably tight Less tight Loose Less tight 
Its management information system supported offering operating information 
to each level of management. The maintenance manager was satisfied to get the data of 
profit or loss of parts and lead time information76, but until now it had only whole 
company data and reports and lacked overhead data in departmental detail. 77 
In the Dutch operation, the monthly reports were a basic means of feedback, 
but the budget feedback was more slack than other operations. They looked at their 
budget variances on a quarterly basis, and top management always cared about the 
bottom line figures. "If the bottom line is profitable, the content is not so important.7S" 
At the moment except for the profit target, the budget control function is quite weak. 
Because the budget was so rapidly out of date, it could not be a good warning system. 
The only warning system is if you compare with last month. 79 
In the German operation, the monthly operating reports were a basic feedback 
means, but top management focused on some critical indicators for management 
purposes, as its managing director said: 
76 From the interview with the maintenance manager of Acer Global Inc. 
77 From the interview with the chief accountant of Acer Global Inc. 
78 Quotation from the interview with the financial controller of Acer Computer B. V. 
79 From the interview with the financial controller of Acer computer B. V. 
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"The bottom line about our profit and loss is the most important figure. but 
there are some key indicators and these indicators we have to review every 
month, like accounts receivable, revenue, inventory, etc. Based on these things 
we have to take actions." 
Its controller analysed budget variances covering the changing trend and 
whether they could achieve the expectation the following month for top management 
and Dutch headquarters per month, but because of lacking departmental budgets, the 
feedback was only on the whole company basis. Basically, it lacked a strong 
administrative management to assist its budget control. 
Compared to the other two European operations, the British operation had a 
better feedback system. They set strategies for their company and set different targets 
or indicators for different departments, even key persons, for evaluating purposes. In 
addition, they set some incentives closely relating to their performance. The feedback 
in the operation was broader and deeper than in other European operations. Its 
marketing director said: "We feedback about strategies based on annual budget", and 
its controller also said: "We have monthly meetings to review operating results, and 
we feedback the results to staff each quarter, and we have strategic review meeting per 
half year." However, owing to preparing a budget on a whole company basis, basically, 
the British operation still lacked a close relation between departmental budget 
performance and evaluation. 
All in all, though lacking a good control system in Acer, the Taiwanese and 
British operations still had obviously better feedback than the German and Dutch 
operations. Overall, the interview data show the differences between the Taiwanese 
and the European operations are still significant. 
6.8.5 Conclusion and Discussion 
This proposition was rejected by the research and the direction is the reverse. In 
total, the Taiwanese operations had a better feedback system than their European 
counterparts and the variance is significant. Different extents of variances happened in 
different operations. Acer had strong differences between its Taiwanese operation and 
European operations, then Lite-On, and Tatung and Mitac had similar feedback 
systems. 
It seemed difficult to use the factor of national culture as a single criterion to 
predict the direction of the component of feedback extent and frequency across 
cultures. Prior studies concerning inter-firm cross-cultural research had equivocal 
findings (such as Van et aI., 1992; Chow et al., 1996) on this component. This 
component was significantly influenced by managerial control style. especially within 
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a multinational firm. In this research, Tatung and Mitac had a tighter financial control 
than the other cases, so they showed more similarities on this component than Acer 
and Lite-On. In addition, the scale of operation also seemed to affect results 
significantly. Because Tatung's European operation was on an appropriate scale, it 
showed a strong similarity to the Taiwanese counterpart. 
6.9 Contingent Rewards 
Proposition 1-8: Taiwanese operations will give more contingent rewards than their 
European counterparts. 
The purpose of this proposition is to compare the component of contingent 
rewards between the Taiwanese and European operations within each case firm. Two 
themes, linkage between budget and financial rewards and content of contingent 
rewards, will be observed for comparison from the main interview questions on 
contingent rewards. 
6.9.1 Tatung 
Table 6.29 A Comparison of the Contingent Rewards between the Taiwanese and British 
Operations within Tatun 
Items Taiwanese operation British operation 
Linkage between budget 
and financial rewards 
-Extent of linkage 
-Rewarding unit 
-Rewarding people 
Content of contingent 
rewards 
- Content 
- Percent of contingent 
rewards 
- Difference between 
units or individuals 
High 
Profit centres 
Whole employees 
Monthly bonus (quarterly 
individual's perfonnance) + 
year-ended bonus (centre's 
operating perfonnance) 
15%-25% of pre-set salary 
Small 
Low 
Sales and marketing units 
Sales people & senior Chinese 
managers 
- Salesmen: commission 
- Senior Chinese managers: same 
as Taiwan's system 
- Salesmen: 300/0-40% of their total 
pay 
- Senior Chinese managers: 15%-
25% of pre-set salary) 
Significant between sales people 
Because of different compensation structures, strong differences in contingent 
rewards existed between the Taiwanese and British operations (Table 6.29). Taiwanese 
operations benefited from a contingent rewards systems, but in British operations, 
except for the marketing department, almost all employees' salaries were pre-set. 
ISS 
In the Taiwanese operatio~ whether the target was attained or not could affect 
salary adjustment and bonus. The bonus was always issued by the plant, a profit 
centre.80 However, within the same operation, there was only a little difference, as its 
chief accountant felt: 
"Although we set account for different product lines within the plant, 
performance evaluation often only considers the whole plant so sometime it is 
unfair to those units in which employees work harder." 
Compared to other case firms, the contingent rewards in Tatung showed a 
smaller gap between different operations and different level managers. The chief 
accountant of the Taiwanese operation explained the reason: 
"If the independent accounting doesn't match the incentive, there is no 
meaning. But because Tatung have more than ten plants, some of which are 
good and others not, so top management face a dilemma. If all operations are 
independent companies, it is easy to have different incentives; otherwise, they 
deeply fear affecting the employees' morale. The whole corporation did well 
because it is the result of team work, so there is only a small difference in 
incentive between good units and others." 
The Taiwanese operation used a strictly quarterly evaluating system which 
divided performance into four grades which would affect employees' monthly 
performance bonus, even the year-end bonus and salary adjustment. On average, the 
total contingent rewards made up about 15% to 25% of pre-set pay. 
Most of the British companies had no bonus system. So although market 
employees had commission which made up about 30% to 40% of their total income, 
the rest of the employees had no bonus. However, Chinese managers could still follow 
the Taiwanese compensation system and enjoy the same incentives. In addition, if the 
company had good profits, top management would informally give senior managers 
some symbolic bonus. To most people, if they did well, the only reward was a rise in 
their future salary. As to the bonus, just as its operating manager said: 
"British people do not look for a huge cash bonus or gift, but they just want to 
hear: 'Thank you very much, good job! It is a Christmas turkey or something.' 
There's no need for even 5 pounds to say thank you, but it just needs the words 
'thank you.' It feels so good! It is so important!" 
Overall, from interviewing and observing results, the research found that the 
Taiwanese operation had more contingent rewards than the British. 
80 Quotation from the interview with the director of Taiwan electronic plant. 
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6.9.2 Lite-On 
Strong differences in contingent rewards existed between the Taiwanese and 
British operations (Table 6.30). Because of the differences of compensation structures 
and operating results, the British operation had only the basic monthly salary for its 
employees but the Taiwanese operation's employees enjoyed abundant bonuses in 
recent years. 
Table 6.30 A Comparison of the Contingent Rewards between the Taiwanese and British 
o Iperations within Lite-On 
Items Taiwanese operation British operation 
Linkage between budget 
and financial rewards 
-Extent of linkage High Extremely low 
-Rewarding unit Whole company Lacking incentive 
-Rewardine: people Whole employees N/A* 
Content of contingent 
rewards 
- Content Bonus formula: basic bonus + So far no incentive, just monthly 
performance effect + tenure factor salary 
- Percent of contingent About 30% of salary All pre-set salary 
rewards 
- Difference between Small N/A 
units or individuals 
* NI A: not adaptIve 
In the Taiwanese operation, the better the budget performance of the company, 
the better the bonus. According to its vice-controller's estimate, the bonus totally 
accounted for about 30% of regular salary in the previous three years. Total bonus 
covered basic bonus, performance effect, and tenure elements, and performance effect 
also affected future salary adjustment and promotion. The managers in higher positions 
had more bonuses, and a few senior managers even had special and confidential 
bonuses. As to how to determine the employees' performance, its vice president said: 
"The bonus is based on the corporation's actual performance. The departmental 
heads cannot decide their subordinates' performance alone. We rank the 
sequence in each SBU, and then re-rank in the whole corporation according to 
A, B, C, and D, four grades. Each grade has different bonuses. The rating is 
very important to future promotion." 
In the British operation, because of the historical background of its 
development by the trade union, the company employees' incomes were all pre-set, as 
a monthly salary. In addition, due to continually suffering operating losses, its 
employees' salaries had already stayed the same for nearly four years. The operation's 
revenue was better and better, and the top managers estimated the operation could 
become profitable for the company in 1996. All employees hoped to have better 
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salaries. As to the bonus system, its senior managers still remained a bit conservative. 
Its managing director said: 
"I do not very greatly believe money is a big motivation. Of course it can 
help .... But if you congratulate someone for a great job , you can do that often 
and that is much better motivation." 
Its personnel officer also had the same feeling: "If the incentive system is a 
bonus, there is still a risk. Sometimes, people will be lazy when there is no bonus." 
However, its top managers are studying to set up a small incentive scheme for 1997, 
but the scheme will link two things: achieving personal objectives and company 
performance.81 
6.9.3 Mitac 
Table 6.31 A Comparison of the Contingent Rewards between the Taiwanese and British 
Of' h' M' 'pera Ions Wit ID Itac 
Items Taiwanese operation British operation 
Linkage between budget 
and financial rewards 
- Extent of linkage High linkage to profit High linkage to profit 
-Rewarding unit Whole company Sales unit 
-Rewarding people Whole employees Salesmen and senior managers 
Content of contingent 
rewards 
- Content Staff: year-ended bonus Salesmen: commission 
Workers: Monthly bonus Senior managers: bonus 
Other people: sometimes small 
bonuses 
- Percent of contingent Staff: Two months bonus (about Salesmen: about 20%-30% of total 
rewards 15%-20% of salary) pay 
Workers: about 15%-30% of salary Senior managers: 0.5-2 months' 
pay 
- Difference between Small, but larger between workers. Significant between the senior 
units or individuals managers and between the sales 
people 
There were obvious differences in contingent rewards between the Taiwanese 
and British operations (Table 6.31). On system design, the Taiwanese operation had 
more contingent bonus than the British operation. Its workers had a monthly quality 
and efficiency bonus, about 15%-30% of salary, and its staff also had a bonus of at 
least two months' pay depending on the corporation's actual operating results and if the 
corporation made money they could enjoy more special bonuses. They evaluated their 
employees' performance by four grades, and essentially the bonus would be affected by 
their grades. However. owing to the corporation's continually suffering loss in the past 
few years. actually most of its employees got only two months' bonus, which is the 
minimum level in the Taiwanese computer industry, and there was very little 
81 From the interviews with the managing director and the executive director of Lite-On limited (UK). 
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difference of bonus among the employees. As to the budget performance for units, due 
to lacking responsibility centres, there was no transparent system to build a formula 
between budget performance and bonus within the corporation. Basically, the 
contingent rewards were built on the actual operating result of the whole corporation, 
not on the budget performance. One of its A VPs described the situation: 
"Because we do not use the profit centre system, we lack a transparent system 
to build a formula between budget performance and bonus. So how much 
bonus one gets depends on the boss at present. Maybe he will give more to a 
few departments which have better performance. "" 
Another A VP also had the same feeling: "There is no link between budget and 
my rewards. At present there is no link between budget and bonus." Its financial 
manager was a little depressed and she said: "There is no direct relation between the 
budget and incentive. Until now I have not seen any feedback reward from budget 
control or saving ... No one cares whether the budget was achieved." 
Compared to the compensation system of the Taiwanese operation, the British 
operation had quite a simple structure. Except that salesmen had a commission of 
about 20-30% of their total pay based on their performance, there was no formal bonus 
system for its workers and staff. Salesmen had only a simple sales function which 
straightway determined their commission, but their managers had a complicated bonus 
structure, dependent on attaining sales-target, gross margin, and sales mix. Senior 
managers cared more about the company performance, because there was a close 
relation between budget performance and their bonus. Talking about the bonus system, 
its managing director said: 
"We follow the system of most British companies and some from the Tatung 
(UK) company. Only senior managers are closely related to budget 
performance .... 
My bonus directly relates to my budget performance. Other people have only a 
minor relation to the budget performance, but if they have super performances 
they can get a bigger bonus ... Generally only senior managers can enjoy 
bonuses, not lower managers, staff and workers, but if our performance is good 
I can ask headquarters to permit giving a little bonus for motivating purposes." 
Senior managers' bonus was about 0.5 to 2 months in the past two years, but 
semor Chinese managers could enjoy bonuses near to those in the Taiwanese 
operation. 
Basically, the British operation had only small bonus rewards for their 
managers, and lacked a transparent system to evaluate managers performances just as 
its controller described: 
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"The managers lack clear targets to motivate themselves and nobody cares 
about the company objective, except maybe the managing director." 
Overall, the Taiwanese operation originally had better contingent rewards than 
the British operation, but owing to suffering losses in recent years its employees could 
only get the minimum guaranteed two months bonus which most people regard as a 
part of routine salary. Conversely, the British operation could still maintain the 
company in profit for the past three years and its managers then had some bonuses for 
motivating. It could not obviously reflect the original spirit of the bonus system 
between the two sides at this stage. In addition, both operations lacked a transparent 
evaluating system, especially in the British operation, to evaluate its managers' 
performances. 
6.9.4 Acer 
Table 6.32 A Comparison of the Contingent Rewards between the Taiwanese and European 
o . . h' A 'peratlons Wit In cer 
Items Taiwanese operation Dutch operation German operation British operation 
Linkage between 
budget and 
financial rewards 
-Extent of Low (based on actual Low (based on actual Low (based on actual Low (based on 
linkage profit) profit) profit) different indicators) 
-Rewarding unit Whole company Marketing unit Marketing unit All units 
-Rewarding Whole employees Senior managers & Senior managers, Most staff (key peop\e) 
people marketing staff salesmen, and 
Chinese managers. 
Content of 
contingent 
rewards 
- Content Promised bonus, Salesmen: commission Salesmen: commission Salesmen: commission 
performance bonus, Senior managers: Core manages: bonus Key people: bonus 
& premium Taiwan's system Chinese managers: Chinese managers: 
Taiwan's system Taiwan's system 
- Percent of I 5%-30% of pre-set pay Salesmen: 200/0- Salesmen: \/3 of total Salesmen: 300/0-50% of 
contingent 35% of total pay pay preset salary 
rewards Senior managers: 1/3 Core managers \ 00/0- Key people: 10%·20% 
of total pay \5% Chinese managers: \/3 
Other: symbolic bonus Chinese managers: \/3 oftotaJ pay 
of total pay 
-Difference Small. but larger Larger between sales Larger between sales 
between units or between managerial Significant between people and the core people 
individuals levels sales people managers 
Obviously differences in contingent rewards existed between operations (Table 
6.32), especially between the Taiwanese operation and the German and Dutch 
operations. The Taiwanese operation enjoyed a great contingent reward system. In 
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addition to monthly salary, all people enjoyed two months' promised bonus, 
performance bonus, and premium. Performance bonus was based on whether the 
company achieved its target, and premium was based on earning distribution after 
income tax. When the company's profit was good, its employees could even enjoy the 
performance bonus, on average more than 30% of pre-set pay. Its direct workers had a 
monthly production bonus, but indirect staff enjoyed more performance bonus and 
premium. Because senior managers had more responsibilities and no overtime 
premium, normally they could receive more performance bonus and premium. The 
incentives were directly related to company profit. "There is a close relationship 
between operating results and incentives. 82", Actually when considering incentive, top 
management based rewards just on the actual profit to determine total performance 
bonus.83 Basically, they evaluated the employees performance level by level, and the 
performance would reflect on the performance bonus and future salary. Except in the 
sales and marketing departments, there was no direct linkage between departmental 
budget performance and incentives. So the budget was only for summing up the units' 
targets, and it lacked departmental budget control. 84 
In European operations, the compensation system emphasised pre-set salary, 
and was quite different from the Taiwanese system. Although they also evaluated each 
operation performance by budget objective and sometimes still had incentives, 
normally the incentive figures could not compare with those of the Taiwanese 
operation. 
In Holland, except for senior managers and salesmen, employees had only 13 
months pre-set salary. Its president described its compensation structure: 
"The people at senior management level (most of them are Chinese) are 
motivated by target, about 2/3 pre-set and 1/3 contingent; the salesmen are 
rewarded on individual sales; and other staff and employees have about 13 
months pre-set fixed salary and if there is bonus it is only very small and 
symbolic. " 
At high management level, bonus was given for individual managers' 
performance, but lower level managers and other employees had only a small bonus. 
"There is no formalised bonus system for employees, and the real bonus is only for 
general director level. 85" The departmental budget bore less relation to incentives, as 
its logistics director said: "Because of the problem of formality, we cannot link budget 
performance with incentive." Performance evaluation based on managers' judgement 
was somewhat subjective. Its personnel manager said: "Normally, the evaluation must 
82 Quotation from the interview with the maintenance manager of Acer Global Inc. 
83 Quotation from the interview with the chief accountant of Acer Global Inc. 
84 From the interview with the chief accountant of Acer Global Inc. 
85 Quotation from the interview with the financial controller of Acer Computer B. V. 
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be down the line. The top manager evaluates departmental heads once a year .... The 
performance difference only slightly affects their salary." 
In the German operation, the situation was somewhat like the Dutch operation~ 
but most of people's salary was pre-set and only special people including departmental 
heads could get a bonus. Talking of the compensation structure, its managing director 
described the conditions: 
fly ou can say all salesmen have a 2/3 fixed salary and 1/3 is based on the 
revenue, department base, and gross margin. You can also say 99% of salaries 
are fixed at the beginning of the year with the way we account it. The bonus 
system for some departmental heads is also more or less fixed, but only at the 
end of the year will we know the net bottom and everybody will know how 
much bonus he will get." 
The managing director regarded the departmental head as a "team leader". 
"guiding people towards net bottom line for their responsibilities", and he believed 
"the identification with company comes from a few higher levels." As to workers, he 
said: "People are here to earn money", and if they did their work well they would 
probably get a higher salary. 
Another managing director said: "There is a close relationship between the 
incentive and whole company target", but owing to the lack of departmental budgets 
and targets, there was no relationship between departmental budget performance and 
incentive. As to performance evaluation, he said: "The main approach was to compare 
this year's with last year's figures." Performance mainly affected people's future salary. 
In the British operation, originally the company compensation structure was 
quite simple. Except for salesmen having contingent commission, other people just 
had a monthly pre-set salary. From 1994, the new managing director, coming from 
Dutch headquarters, set broad incentives including sales-oriented and profit-oriented 
incentives for sales personnel, objective-oriented for supporting units, and a quarterly 
objective review for fixed salary employees. At present the bonus occupies about 30%-
50% of pre-set salary for salesmen and about 10%-20% for other people.86 
The incentive system is quite broad, as its controller said: "We share the 
incentive with most people. So far only a few people have not been given the 
incentive. Basically, senior managers get more bonuses." If there is a special bonus for 
achieving the objective at the year end, it is only for directors and senior management 
level.87 
For linking incentives and performance, as the controller and the director of 
logistics said. they needed to set different indicators including non-financial indexes 
86 From the interview with the managing director of Acer U.K. Limited. 
87 From the interview with the marketing director of Acer U.K. Limited. 
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for each department and key personnel, but owing to lacking departmental budget, the 
incentive was still less linked to departmental budget performance. 
6.9.5 Conclusion and Discussion 
The proposition was verified by the research. Taiwanese operations 
significantly granted more contingent rewards than their European counterparts. 
Compared with Taiwan, Europe obviously had a different compensation system. 
Further checking of individual European operations showed all operations had strong 
differences. In interviews, the philosophy of the head of operations of Acer and Mitac 
in Europe was found to have a relatively important influence on contingent rewards. 
Previous cross-cultural inter-firm research (Chow et al., 1991; Merchant et al., 
1995) could not find support based on Hofstede's cultural dimensions. The component 
of contingent rewards seems unpredictable by reference to Hofstede's cultural 
dimensions only. It appears social and political factors are considered first rather than 
the use of Hofstede's cultural dimensions to predict a direction. With the Chinese 
philosophy of "when in Rome do as the Romans do", Taiwanese firms respect the 
compensation structures and styles of European operations. The result reasonably 
reflects the real situation. In addition, because Acer and Mitac focused on the market 
more in their European operations than other cases, naturally, they used more 
contingent rewards than Tatung's and Lite-On's European operations. 
6.10 Group Rewards 
Proposition 1-9: Taiwanese operations will be more group reward oriented than 
their European counterparts. 
The purpose of this proposition is to compare the component of group rewards 
between the Taiwanese and European operations within each case firm. Three themes, 
including incentive base, participants, and main factors of consideration, from the 
main interview questions on group rewards will be observed for comparison. 
6.10.1 Tatung 
Strong differences on group rewards existed between the Taiwanese and British 
operations (Table 6.33). In Taiwan, Tatung corporation had more than ten plants and 
each plant was designed as an autonomous profit centre. Independent accounting was 
used for each centre to reflect its performance, so it was possible to give different 
incentives to different centres which had different performances. The bonus was 
designed to be issued by plant, but because those plants still belonged to the same 
163 
corporation and the corporate organisation was clearly not split fairly for each 
autonomy, the independent accounting actually did not relate well to the incentive 
system. In addition, the quarterly evaluation and salary adjustment were still 
considered by the whole corporation. Top management always considered the balance 
between different centres and the harmony of the whole corporation. As the director of 
the electronics plant said: 
"We emphasise team work, although originally we still emphasised the 
individual centre, but there were some difficulties on integrated 
operation .... There is a small difference within the whole corporation and that is 
always a special characteristic in Tatung." 
Table 6.33 A Comparison of the Group Rewards between the Taiwanese and British Operations 
·th· T WI ID atun2 
Items Taiwanese operation British operation 
Incentive base 
eBase Whole company and operation Marketing unit and senior managers 
eEmphasis Team work Individual performance 
Participants 
ePeople Whole managers and employees Senior managers and sales people 
e Difference Small Significant between sales people 
Main factors of Balancing harmony and profit Management team, British culture, 
consideration target and profit target. 
"That profitable units should cover the loss units is a part of Tatung culture. 88 " 
Tatung top management always took care of both the profitable units and the loss 
units. The gap of individual incentive was controlled within a relatively narrow range. 
As to employees within the same plant or profit centre, their performance only slightly 
affected their rewards, as its technical manager described: "The performance does not 
significantly affect the bonus, and it seems the same for everybody .... Relative 
differences among plants existed due to using the centre profit, but there is only a little 
difference within a plant. " 
In the British operation, apart from to the sales and marketing departments 
having a commission system, no formal incentive system was found, but even in the 
sales and marketing department, the incentive base still strongly differed from the 
Taiwanese operation. One of the auditing committee at headquarters described the 
difference: 
"Our bonus is designed by group. Even with the sales and marketing 
department, we still give different targets to different groups. Each time they go 
out as two or three people for integrated battle, not as individuals. but in the 
UK, we give different individual targets for the sales and marketing 
departments. In Taiwan Tatung corporation it is impossible to have a super 
salesman as in western countries." 
88 Quotation from the interview with the general plant manager of Tatung electronic plant. 
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The financial controller of the British operation also said: "The rewards are on 
an individual base: only the managers take care about the team perfonnance." "English 
people are more individual so the group bonus is not suitable for them.89" 
There were two special conditions concerning the group rewards in the British 
operation. First, Taiwanese managers still selected Taiwanese compensation and bonus 
systems. Secondly, there were team bonuses for special missions for product designs 
and special projects, such as special urgent orders.9o 
6.10.2 Lite-On 
Table 6.34 A Comparison of the Group Rewards between the Taiwanese and British Operations 
within Lite-On 
Items Taiwanese operation British operation 
Incentive base 
-Base Whole company Lacking an incentive system 
-Emphasis whole company's group Preferring team or department base (in the future) 
Pa rticipan ts 
-People Whole managers and employees N/A* 
- Difference Small N/A 
Main factors of Emphasis on co-operation and Profit target and harmony within a 
consideration harmony within the corporation team or department (in the future) 
* N/A: not adaptive 
Because of the different compensation structures, there were strongly different 
reward bases between the Taiwanese and British operations (Table 6.34). In the 
Taiwanese operation, because its top management strongly emphasised co-operation 
and harmony, the incentive base was the whole corporation, not the SBU. Its Vice 
president explained the reasons: 
"Our incentive base is the whole corporation as a team. Because each SBU has 
different products, history, scale, and investment, it is very difficult to set a 
reasonable appraisal indicator for each SBU91 • In addition, if we divide into 
different groups it is not good for harmony, for personnel rotation, and it is not 
fair. " 
Although the British operation still had no incentive, it is planning a small 
scheme from 1997 and its top managers prefer the group to the individual. Its 
managing director described his philosophy as follows: 
89 Quotation from the interview with the executive director of Tatung (UK) Limited. 
90 From interviews with the managing director and the chief accountant of Tatung (UK) Limited. 
91 Also in the interviews with the associated vice-president and the planning director of the Power 
Conversion of Taiwan Liton. 
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"If you reward individuals, you run the risk of good ideas and good practices 
being cut away. The people who do them won't ask other people to do them. 
On the other hand, if you reward the group of people performing the task, then 
they do well. It will be interesting to share the information of the group and 
perform even better ... .1 don't believe individual incentive works, and I believe 
in the group task." 
As to the incentive base, they prefer the team or department rather than the 
whole company. Its production manager said: "If we set incentive systems, I prefer 
team incentive in my department. We have six teams now." The executive director 
said: "I would prefer an incentive to the group, and in that the department would be 
considered. So every department can see its contribution to the total performance." Its 
controller agreed that it is easier to set a group incentive scheme. 
The Taiwanese operation has used the whole company as a group reward base 
for a long time and its employees enjoyed abundant group rewards. Conversely, in the 
British operation although its managers preferred team base or department base as their 
group reward in the future, its employees got nothing over the past few years. Whether 
its incentive system can succeed in the future is still in doubt. 
6.10.3 Mitac 
Table 6.35 A Comparison of the Group Rewards between the Taiwanese and British Operations 
within Mitac 
Items Taiwanese operation British operation 
Incentive base 
eBase Whole company Marketing unit and senior managers 
eEmphasis whole company's group Individual perfonnance, but sometime 
nominal bonuses were given, like the 
group bonus, to lower level people. 
Participants 
ePeople Whole managers and employees Senior managers and sales people 
eDifference Small Significant between the sales people and 
between the senior managers 
Main factors of Balancing profit target and Profit target and key management team 
consideration harmony 
Strong differences on group rewards existed between the Taiwanese and British 
operations (Table 6.35). The Taiwanese operation used the group reward based on the 
whole corporation. Its controller explained the reasons: 
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"Although we already have a framework of profit centre, it is still difficult to 
split overhead. Each centre has a different background and we have some 
strategies to consider, so if we directly compare centres' profit it is unfair and 
will destroy team work spirit. At the moment we pool group rewards, but with 
the business developing we will consider using the target of each profit centre 
to appraise their performances." 
As to the differences among individuals, basically there were only small 
differences in the team, depending how the supervisor made adjustment. Of course, if 
there were excellent teams the president would consider giving some special 
incentives.92 
Although at the moment the evaluating grades affect staff bonus little, those 
grades still significantly affect their future promotion and salaries. At present the 
contingent rewards for workers are even more different than for managerial staff. Of 
course it is not a permanent phenomenon. 
In the British operation, as small amounts of money are given to lower level 
employees, it looked like group rewards, but to the higher level enjoying more bonuses 
it looked like an individual system. "The lower you are, the more it is like group 
reward, but the higher you are, the more individual the reward.93" Even in the 
marketing department two different systems still exist, as its managing director said: 
"The foreign market section is a more individual system, but the domestic section is 
more geared to group incentive ... So we keep two systems." Overall the company used 
the more individual basis in its incentive system. He concluded: "Basically, we use 
individual rewards and few group rewards." Besides, senior Taiwanese managers still 
chose the Taiwanese compensation system so they enjoyed the same bonus as 
Taiwanese managers. 
6.10.4 Acer 
Strong differences on group rewards existed between the Taiwanese and 
European operations (Table 6.36). The Taiwanese operation put more emphasis on the 
group and regarded the whole company as a profit centre, as its logistics manager said: 
"We always emphasise the team. Because the industry changes so fast, we need to 
emphasise the team work spirit to face different changes." Its maintenance manager 
also said: "The company emphasises integration. Top management sometimes also 
considers incentive by departmental performance, but within the same department 
there is only a slight difference among the employees." 
92 From the interview with the vice president of Hsin-Chu plant of Mitac International. 
93 Quotation from the interview with the logistics director of Mitac Europe Limited. 
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Table 6.36 A Comparison of the Group Rewards between the Taiwanese and European 
o 'peratlOns within Acer 
Items Taiwanese operation Dutt:h operation German operation British operation 
Incentive base 
eBase Whole company Mangers and sales unit, Key managers and Sales unit and then 
and then other units. marketing unit other units 
eEmphasis Team work Individual and group Individual Individual performance 
oerformances performance 
Partit:ipants 
ePeople Whole managers and All managers and sale Key managers and Managers and most of 
employees people, and then other sales people employees 
people. 
eDifference Small between Significant between sales Significant between Significant between 
employees, but people and between individuals individuals. 
larger between managers especially for sales 
managers. people. 
Main factors of Profit target and team Profit orientation and Management team and Profit target and team 
consideration work management team sales growth work 
European operations gave less incentive and placed less emphasis on group 
reward than did the Taiwanese operation. The president of the European headquarters 
described the situation as follows: 
"It may be suitable to use the group concept in Europe, but because of different 
conditions in different countries, we just give a lump-sum of incentive money 
to the head of each operation based on operations' target performance. As to 
how to proceed with incentive, it will depend on the philosophy of the 
operation's head." 
The general controller of Europe also said: "There is no regional policy to 
regulate incentives ... The head of country operation can give incentives by purpose 
or for special tasks and he can also use individual or group incentives." 
In the Dutch operation although bonuses were mainly for senior managers, 
other staff could still get a small bonus according to different performance grades. The 
bonus base was quite broad and the higher the management level the more individual 
the bonus. Basically, except that its salesmen were on an individual basis, its bonus 
base was more on a group basis, as its personnel manager said: "It is more group 
style. " 
In the German operation, top management emphasised team work. The 
managing director said : "I like to have the consent of the whole team on the driving 
force." In his opinion, however, having a management team of department heads was 
of first importance, so the reward base was narrower than in other operations. Another 
managing described the idea more as follows: 
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"If we have incentive we focus on the individual. If we achieve the target we 
allocate the bonus to those main managers. We look to reward the individual 
and there is no plan to give to everybody. We recognise the main contribution 
towards achieving an objective comes from the managers." 
Its personnel officer said: "In giving a bonus, the emphasis is on the 
individual." Individual performance closely relates to managers' incentive. 
Objectively, the incentive system in the German operation was on a narrower 
and more individual basis. 
In the British operation, they used a hybrid base containing both group and 
individual rewards. Its controller said: "Our bonus is designed for the individual 
department, but within that department there is still group incentive." Even in the 
marketing department the incentive system was designed for both individual and group 
base, as its marketing director described: 
"We give a bonus by both group base and individual base and it depends on 
management level. Under middle management level bonuses are based on the 
individual, but bonuses for senior managers are based on company objective 
and individual objective." 
Compared to two other European operations, the incentive system in the British 
operation was more varied and the rewards were more hybrid. 
6.10.5 Conclusion and Discussion 
This proposition was supported by the research. Taiwanese operations differed 
from their European counterparts. A strong difference between Taiwanese and 
European operations was found in each case firm. Taiwanese firms respect the 
compensation structures and styles of European operations. The result showed that 
national culture is a major, though not sole, determinant on the component. Leadership 
factors and the philosophy of the head of operations still significantly affected the 
relative extents of the results. 
Previous cross-cultural inter-firm studies (such as Van et aI., 1992; Chowet aI., 
1994; Merchant et al., 1995) could find little support for their hypotheses or 
propositions on this component. Some studies used simple questionnaires as a survey 
instrument. However. managers' personal tastes and circumstances (Emmanuel, 1990) 
might affect reward forms. Sometimes a questionnaire survey could not reflect a 
complicated circumstance. Merchant et ale (1995) used an open-ended interview 
process to compare the Taiwanese and American firms, but he still failed to support his 
proposition on the component. The countries chosen for comparison might affect the 
result. This research compared the Taiwanese and the European operations within each 
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firm. There are two reasons to confmn the result. First, two areas belong to strongly 
different social styles. One is a capitalist society, and the other is a socialist society. 
Secondly, Taiwanese firms respect the original compensation structures and styles of 
foreign operations. As a result, the fmding in the proposition seems relatively 
reasonable. 
6.11 Long-term Rewards 
Proposition 1-10: Taiwanese operations will place more emphasis on long-term 
rewards than their European counterparts. 
The purpose of this proposition is to compare the component of long-term 
rewards between the Taiwanese and European operations within each case firm. Two 
themes, including types of long-term financial rewards and linkages between 
performance and long-term rewards, will be observed for comparison from the main 
interview questions on long-term rewards. 
6.11.1 Tatung 
Table 6.37 A Comparison of the Long-term Rewards between the Taiwanese and British 
o f 'th' T t 'pera Ions WI In a ung 
Items Taiwanese operation British operation 
Types of Long-term 
financial rewards 
• Long-term incentive Informal plan, special long-term Lacking a formal plan 
plan bonus for R&D talents. 
• Stock purchase plan Employees had a right to buy. Taiwanese managers enjoyed stock 
purchase plan. 
• Housing loan Selecting from applicants No housing loan 
.Benefits Abundant employees' benefits Many employees' and managers' 
benefit 
Linkage between Some, but relevant to tenure and Little linkage, more relevant to 
performance and long- position position. 
term rewards 
There were some differences on long-term rewards between the Taiwanese and 
British operations (Table 6.37). In the Taiwanese operation, all employees could take 
part in the stock purchase plan which could be paid in installments from the monthly 
salary. The corporation keeps their stock until they retire or leave the company. 
Because of stock-market price mark-up, most employees will gain great wealth. 
Another special long-term reward is the housing loan. With the chairman's ideal of "all 
workers having their own houses", the corporation offers its employees ten to fifteen 
years house loan and only charges very low interest (even no interest in the past). 
Strictly speaking these benefits lack relevant relation to direct performance. Every 
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employee has the right to purchase stock under the stock purchasing plan. II A senior 
employee owns equivalent stocks to a senior manager.9411 As to the housing loan, 
although nearly 1,800 people have got the benefit, it still occupies only a small 
percentage of total employees. In addition, the corporation gave a few senior R&D 
professional talents a special monthly long-term bonus as super stars. 
In the British operation only some Taiwanese managers could enjoy the same 
benefit as in Taiwan, but British people enjoyed more holidays. In addition, the 
company offered cars or traffic subsidy money to senior managers. 
There were similarities in employees' benefit between the two operations. They 
all had pension schemes, cheaper meals, health insurance, and other employees' 
benefits. 
Overall, both operations lacked a formal long-term incentive plan, but the 
Taiwanese operation's people still obviously enjoyed more long-term rewards than did 
the British. 
6.11.2 Lite-On 
Table 6.38 A Comparison of the Long-term Rewards between the Taiwanese and British 
o f ·th· L·t 0 .pera Ions WI ID I e- n 
Items Taiwanese operation British operation 
Types of Long-term 
financial rewards 
• Long-term incentive Lacking a fonnal plan No any plan 
plan 
• Stock purchase plan Employees had a right to buy No purchase plan 
• Benefits Emphasising employees' benefit. Some employees' and managers" 
benefits 
Linkage between Some, but more relevant to Lacking relation to perfonnance 
performance and long- position 
term rewards 
There were strong differences on long-term rewards between the Taiwanese 
and British operations (Table 6.38). The Taiwanese operation's employees enjoyed 
more long-term rewards than its counterpart. 
In the Taiwanese operation, its employees could participate in the stock 
purchase plan. The higher the position of the managers, the more stock they could 
purchase. They also had a pension scheme, insurance scheme, and other benefits. In 
addition, senior managers had a special health insurance scheme. Some of its senior 
managers felt that the intangible long-term rewards were still very important. "The 
94 Quotation from the interview with the deputy chainnan of auditing committee of Tatung Company. 
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corporation offers lots of opportunities to motivate managers to achieve something 
quite important.9s" The president of Taiwan Liton also described its rewards: 
"Basically, I think there are lots of approaches in rewards. It may be cash 
compensation, stock, position, or responsibility. We use them according to 
different situations and some of them are long-term rewards." 
Compared to the Taiwanese operation, the British operation lacked tangible 
long-term rewards for its employees. Its employees had only some benefits such as a 
pension scheme and the senior managers enjoyed more, including motor vehicles, 
communication expenses, and family insurance. Its executive director was striving to 
set more training programmes for its managers and employees and that is a good vision 
for the company's development in the future. 
6.11.3 Mitac 
Table 6.39 A Comparison of the Long-term Rewards between the Taiwanese and British 
o f 'th' M't 'pera Ions WI ID I ac 
Items Taiwanese operation British operation 
Types of Long-term 
financial rewards 
• Long-term incentive Lacking a formal plan Lacking a formal plan 
plan 
• Stock purchase plan All employees had a right to buy Taiwanese managers and a few 
senior European managers 
enjoyed stock purchase plan, 
• Benefits Emphasising employees' benefits Emphasising employees' and 
managers' benefits 
Linkage between Some, but more relevant to Lacking relation to performance 
performance and long- position 
term rewards 
Some differences on long-term rewards existed between the Taiwanese and 
British operations (Table 6.39). In Taiwan all employees enjoyed the stock purchase 
plan and good benefits including pension scheme, health insurance, and other benefits, 
Managers enjoyed more benefits including car purchase plan and life insurance plan. 
In addition, they had more opportunities for training, cultivating, promotion ... etc, 
In the British operation, in addition to Chinese managers being able to enjoy 
the stock purchase plan, other key local senior managers also owned Taiwan Mitac 
stock. There was a good benefit system for its employees including pension scheme, 
health insurance, holidays, ... etc" and more benefits for managers, like a company car 
and family health insurance, 
95 Quotation from the interview with the planning director of the Power Conversion Division of Taiwan 
Liton, 
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Overall, on the long-tenn rewards there were some differences between the two 
operations and the extent of differences was obviously less than in other cases. 
6.11.4 Acer 
Some differences in long-tenn rewards existed between the Taiwanese and 
European operations (Table 6.40). In the Taiwanese operation, employees enjoyed a 
stock purchase plan according to their position and tenure. In addition, the company 
offered some long-tenn benefits including a pension scheme, health insurance, and 
other benefits, but senior managers enjoyed more. 
Table 6.40 A Comparison of the Long-term Rewards between the Taiwanese and European 
o t' 'th' A 'pera Ions WI ID cer 
Taiwanese Dutch operation German operation British operation 
Items operations 
Types of Long-term 
financial rewards 
- Long-term incentive Lacking a formal Lacking a plan Lacking a plan Lacking a plan 
plan plan 
- Stock purchase plan Employees Taiwanese managers Taiwanese managers Taiwanese managers 
participated in participated in participated in participated in 
purchase plan. purchase plan. purchase plan. purchase plan. 
-Benefits Senior managers had Senior managers had Senior managers had Senior managers 
more benefits. more benefits. more benefits. enjoyed more. 
Linkage between Some. but more Lacking relation to Lacking relation to Lacking relation to 
performance and relevant to performance performance performance 
lon2-term rewards position. 
In the European operations, until now some long-tenn rewards were lacking, 
such as pension scheme, health care, and other benefits. Senior managers enjoyed more 
benefits including family health care and cars. Almost all Taiwanese managers chose 
the Taiwanese compensation system and they all enjoyed the stock purchase plan as 
Taiwan's employees. European operations follow headquarters' long-tenn vision in 
which they would all become publicly listed companies before the 21 st century. It is 
expected that they would become the main stockholders in future public companies. At 
present, maybe the less tangible rewards are more obvious than financial rewards, such 
as "Another long-tenn reward is to have more increasing learning every day, increasing 
my value every day.96", "You feel a stable future in the company and that is my best 
97 d "If . . A h 98" long-tenn reward ", an you can SUTVlve m cer you can go everyw ere. 
96 Quotation from the interview with the financi~ co~troller of Acer Comp~te~ B. V. 
97 Quotation from the interview with the marketmg drrector of Acer U.K. Limited. 
98 Quotation from the interview with the financial controller of Acer Computer B. V. 
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All of the interviewees in the Taiwanese operation were more satisfied with the 
long-term rewards than those managers of European operations. 
6.11.5 Conclusion and Discussion 
This proposition was broadly supported by the research. In-depth interviews 
showed each case firm had better long-term rewards in the Taiwanese operation than 
in the European operation. Different case firms had different extents of variances. 
Among them, Lite-On showed strong differences, then Tatung and Acer, and then 
Mitac. However, Taiwanese managers in European operations can still enjoy the same 
long-term rewards as those in Taiwanese operations, or even better. 
Chow et al. (1995) used a reverse direction to compare Taiwanese and 
American firms, and the proposition on this component was supported by their 
findings. American firms used more long-term incentives. Compared with this 
research, it seems a perplexing result. Three possible reasons may explain the 
difference. First, the two studies focused on different content. Chow et ale (1995) 
focused on measuring periods over one year, but this research emphasised the types of 
long-term rewards and their relationship with performance. It is possible to get 
different results with different content. Secondly, this research with an intra-firm 
comparison differed from Chow's research with an inter-firm comparison. Long-term 
rewards in a multinational firm normally will start from the domestic operations. This 
research reasonably reflected this phenomenon. Thirdly, perhaps national culture could 
not be enough as a single criterion to judge the direction. The development and extent 
of capitalism in America, Taiwan, and Europe seems better able to explain the 
sequence. 
6.12 Summary 
Proposition 1 containing ten components of MCSs was examined as above. 
Five out of ten components, including objective setting, short-term and long-term 
planning, contingent rewards, group rewards, and long-term rewards, conformed with 
the cultural proposition. The results were analysed and discussed in each section 
above. The rewarding and planning processes, especially the rewarding process, had a 
close relationship with cultural factors, but sufficient evidence was lacking to show a 
close relationship between the organising and evaluating processes and cultural factors 
in the case firms. In addition to cultural factors, there are other important factors 
affecting a multinational firm's MCSs, especially in the organising and evaluating 
processes. A firm's control style and some contingencies significantly affected some 
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components of MCSs compared in proposition 1. As the research framework shows in 
section 2.7, financial control factors and other situational factors could influence MCS 
design in multinational firms. The results of the research seem to show a reasonable 
extent of consistency within this framework. 
The research results show that clear differences in the rewarding process exist 
between Taiwanese and European operations within all the cases. Cultural factors still 
significantly affect the variables of contingent rewards, group rewards, and long-term 
rewards. Overall, except for the rewarding process, Tatung had strong similarities in 
MCSs between its Taiwanese and European operations, Lite-On and Acer had strong 
differences, and Mitac was somewhere around the middle. Assessing proposition 1 in 
the components of MCSs showed that only some sub-propositions conformed with the 
influence of cultural factors. Cultural factors do not seem to provide a sufficient 
explanation. Some financial control factors and situation factors could also be shown 
to have a strong relationship with the differences between Taiwanese and European 
operations within the case firms. In the next two chapters this research will explore 
how financial control factors affect the uniformity of MCSs. In addition, the 
relationship between situation factors and system transfer will be discussed in chapter 
9. 
7. Financial Control Factors and Managerial Values 
7.1 Introduction 
7.2 Degree of Control 
7.3 Budget Emphasis 
7.4 Selection of Managers 
7.5 Results and Propositions 
7.6 Summary 
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The driving assumption behind process thinking is that social reality is not a 
steady state. It is a dynamic process. It occurs rather than merely exists. 
Human conduct is perpetually in a process of becoming. 
(Pettigrew, 1997: 4) 
7.1 Introduction 
A comparison between Taiwanese and European operations within different 
firms has been presented in the last chapter. Except for the rewarding process, Tatung 
had strong similarities between its Taiwanese and British operations. Lite-On and Acer 
showed great differences between their Taiwanese and European operations. Mitac 
was in the middle. 
For exploring the factors affecting transference of MCSs between Taiwanese 
and European operations, this study will probe the effect of financial control style from 
the position of the headquarters. Three financial control factors, including degree of 
control, budget emphasis, and the selection of managers, will be discussed respectively 
in the following sections. Through in-depth interviews at firms' headquarters and 
checking their operations, some significant leadership philosophies were found and all 
of them seem to have a strong relationship with financial control factors. In addition, 
the research discovered the different patterns of each financial control factor among 
the case firms. 
Following the classification of the style of financial control, proposition 2 
concerning the relationship between national culture and financial control factors was 
also examined. Overall, the relationship between national culture of headquarters and 
these three financial control factors was not strong in the research. Different financial 
control styles form different patterns in their MCSs. Clearly. the management control 
philosophy of top management at headquarters significantly affects those MCS 
patterns. 
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7.2 Degree of Control 
Proposition 2-1: The leaders of Taiwanese headquarters affected by their cultures 
have high degrees of control in their corporations. 
The main purpose of this section is to compare the factor of degree of control 
In the case firms. Four themes, including central leadership, control objectives, 
decentralised decision making system, and headquarters-subsidiary relationship, will 
be probed. Different patterns in the case firms will be presented in each theme. As a 
result the patterns of the degree of control in the case firms will be assessed for 
examining proposition 2-1. Another purpose of this section is to contribute its result, 
with the other two factors, to evaluating the style of financial control. This topic will 
be discussed further in the next chapter. 
Table 7.1 The ComparIson of Main Items of Dee:ree of Control among Case Firms 
Main themes Tatune: Lite-On Mitae 
~entral leadership Powerful leadership 
• Stacey (1990) • Monarchic 
• Dermer/Lucas (1986). Unirational 
perspectives 
~ontrol objective J:'inancial 
• Planning influence • Moderate 
• Control influence • Tight financial 
control 
Division autonomy 
• Pluralistic 
• Multirational 
perspectives 
Strategic and financial 
~ Moderate 
~ Tight strategic 
control 
~trategic management Financial programming ~trategic control 
style 
Goold/Campbell, 1987) 
[Emphasis of MCSs] 
Decentralised decision 
rtaking system 
• Controls in firms 
Headquarters-subsidiary 
relationship: 
Strategic predisposition 
ChakravarthylPerlmutter. 
1985) 
~trategy 
~ohriaiGhoshal. 1994) 
[Planning and controlling [Strategic plans and 
functions] motivation] 
ntegratedly defining ndividually defining 
More action, result. and ~ore result and 
personnel controls personnel controls 
lMore centralised !Decentralised 
Ethnocentrism !National 
~sponsiveness 
!Low ditferentiated tit but ~igh differentiated fit 
~igh shared value ~ut low shared value 
lBusiness autonomy 
~ Oligarchic 
~ Near-unirational 
perspectives 
financial 
Ie Low 
Ie Tight financial 
control 
Financial control 
[Information and 
financial goals] 
Pefining in network 
prganisation 
~ore result and action 
~ontrols 
~ore centralised in 
~nancial decisions 
peocentrism and 
!ethnocentrism 
ntcrmcdiate 
~ifferentiated fit and 
~hared value 
Aeer 
~trong leadership 
~ Pluralistic 
Ie Multirational 
Perspectives 
~trategic and financial 
• High 
• Flexible strategic 
control 
~trategic planning 
[Objective setting and 
motivationl 
Defining in client-
server system 
More interactive and 
personnel controls 
~eparate management 
peocentrism with 
iRegiocentrism 
ntermediale-high 
~iffercntiatcd fit and 
~hared value 
From the interviews conducted at cases' headquarters. some important 
management control philosophies and practices relating to the degree of control were 
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found (Table 7.1). Tatung owns an integrated and unifonn MCS in its group, and its 
headquarters plays an important position in group management. Lite-On emphasises its 
strategic planning and uses decentralised systems under its professional management. 
Mitac puts more emphasis on systematic management through its network and 
management infonnation system, but it still retains a central and conservative attitude 
in financial decisions. Acer employs a separate management philosophy and its 
managers easily make decisions independently under its client-server system. 
Integratedly speaking, the ranked sequence of degree of central control in the cases 
studied is Tatung, Mitac, Lite-On, and Acer. Each theme will be discussed as follows. 
7.2.1 Central Leadership 
Central leadership in a finn concerns a political system and leader's belief 
concerning organisational control. A categorisation of the political system by Stancey 
(1990) was used in the research. Political system represents how the organisation is 
controlled. Three types of political systems considered in the research are monarchic, 
oligarchic, and pluralistic systems. As to a leader's belief concerning organisational 
control, the category of Denner and Lucas (1986) was used in the research. The tenns 
"unirationality" and "multirationality" representing the conception of the role of power 
were used as the criteria of classification. From a unirational perspective an 
organisation is a coordinated network pursuing common objectives (Landau, 1969; 
see Dermer & Lucas, 1986). The organisation is assumed to be made up of 
individuals, operating departments, and staff groups which are relatively 
homogeneous with regard to the criteria they use to assess the achievement of their 
interests. The multirational conception is based on the premise that political 
relationships between interest groups within an organisation playa large part in 
determining its decision process and the outcomes of that process (Denner & Lucas, 
1986: 473). Based on these two categories, different patterns of central leadership in 
the case firms are discussed as follows. 
7.2.1.1 Tatung 
Tatung corporation has a powerful headquarters which controls major 
operations' functions including finance, personnel, purchasing, automation, and some 
sales and marketing activities·. Its chairman plays a very powerful role in its group 
leadership. He disseminates his philosophy of "operating management" to all managers 
on a weekly training course. He sets strategies and targets for the finn and asks his 
subordinates to implement them. He uses weekly and monthly operating meetings as a 
1From Tatung's organisational structure. 
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means of team-work decisions and short-term feedback frequency to determine 
significant decisions and follow up performances. Each manager and controller of each 
branch or operation needs periodically to come back to attend an operating meeting. 
He also uses the opportunities of operating meetings to cultivate corporate culture and 
give instruction in significant matters. "The whole company's operating policy is 
handled by the chairman and significant decisions still need to be given by the 
chairman.2" All important matters need to be approved by headquarters and its 
operations' managers lack the power to develop or form an important strategy. He has 
kept the position of chairman for almost fifty years and his five sons and loyal 
subordinates are arranged in key positions in the firm. Naturally he has become a 
patriarchal and paternal leader. Its political system is monarchic (Stacey, 1990) and its 
control is based on unirational perspectives (Dermer and Lugas, 1986). 
7.2.1.2 Lite-On 
With the diversified product strategy and professional management, there is not 
too much control of the group by headquarters. Each member company enjoys 
relatively high decentralisation in decision making. They are independent in operating 
but share common resources like Lite-On brand, market channels, and overseas points. 
Lite-On emphasises localisation, so its operations' managers retain relative power to 
make strategies and decisions. Its operations' managers participate in the strategic 
planning and budgeting. Although its leader also gives some instructions sometimes, 
headquarters plays a reviewing and monitoring role through its reporting systems. Its 
control is based on multirational perspectives (Dermer and Lugas, 1986), and the 
pluralistic political system (Stacey, 1990) allows each division to have relative 
autonomy. 
7.2.1.3 Mitac 
Mitac's core management includes its chairman, vice-chairman (original 
founder), and three sub-group's presidents who handle different business lines 
respectively. The group is changing its system from centralisation to decentralisation 
step by step. At present they have set up three sub-headquarters including Mitac 
International, Synnex Technology International, and Mitac Inc. to handle different sub-
groups. The president of Mitac Inc. said: "Now we have lots of companies, so it is 
impossible to keep centralisation." Under the framework, each sub-group has its 
business focus and area. For example Mitac International focuses on pes in America 
and Europe, Mitac Inc. focuses on system integration and special computers in Asia, 
and Synnex Technology international as a trading company focuses on speed flow of 
2From the interview with one of Tatung's financial managers. 
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computer products around the world. The chairman and vice chairman still handle 
operating philosophy, policy, and developing direction, but under the sub-headquarters 
the professional managers start to develop their potential under a clear decentralisation. 
Although its chairman is still powerful, basically under the oligarchic political system 
(Stacey, 1990) other core managers' opinions are relatively respected. Each business 
line keeps an independent autonomy. Its core managers emphasise information 
openness and network management system. However, its chairman's philosophy still 
significantly affects the core management, and its control is still based on near-
unirational perspectives (Dermer and Lugas, 1986). 
7.2.1.4 Acer 
Acer's headquarters plays a role of strong leadership. Many long-term visions, 
missions, and strategies, most of which are generated by consensus in its so-called 
"summit conferences3", are set from headquarters. Its chairman uses a persuasive and 
encouraging approach to its managers instead of giving them orders. Different 
businesses and divisions are highly autonomous and all have their clear missions or 
objectives. Compared to the other three groups, Acer has a stronger authorisation. Its 
chairman said: "What is our basic element of success? It is separated management and 
authorisation." He used the "dis-integrated" business model as a client-server system 
splitting the business into several BUs. The chairman said: "Dis-integration means 
there will be room for more players to join and succeed, and with more players in more 
segments along the value chain, there will be greater sharing of risk.4" The advantages 
of the structure are that each business unit can make its own fast decisions in response 
to changing industry conditions, and the fact that the business is self-owned and self-
run greatly enhances motivation. Obviously, its control is based on multirational 
perspectives (Dermer and Lugas, 1986) and the politic system is pluralistic (Stacey, 
1990). 
7.2.2 Control Objective 
The control objective represents the managerial focus for control. This research 
used Goold and Campbell's typology to show different patterns of the control objective 
in the case firms. Goold and Campbell (1987: 36-44) used planning influence and 
control influence as two dimensions of the centre's influence process to classify eight 
different management approaches (or strategic management styles). Among them, 
three styles, including strategic planning, strategic control, and financial control, have 
3 Acer holds a summit conference twice a year, and all its senior managers around the world have to 
attend. They discuss the goals. missions, strategies, and other important matters in the conference. 
4 Quotation from a collection of Stan Shih's speeches. 
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often been used in prior research (such as Stacey, 1990; Coates et al., 1992). These 
three styles, and the style of financial programming, were used in this research. The 
style of strategic planning represents how the centre works with business unit 
managers to develop strategy. It may have a corporate strategy or mission guiding and 
coordinating developments across the business units. In the style of strategic control, 
the centre prefers to leave the initiative in the development of plans to business unit 
managers. The control process is an important influential mechanism for the centre. 
Targets are set for strategic objectives as well as fmancial performance. Strategic 
control firms combine moderate planning influence with tight strategic controls. In 
financial control firms, the centre's influence is exercised mainly through the budget 
process. Its firms combine a low level of planning influence with tight financial 
controls. As to the style of financial programming, it is a variant of financial control. It 
has more planning influence from the centre than those firms using financial control. 
Based on Goold and Campbell's framework, different patterns of the control objective 
in each case firm will be discussed as follows. 
7.2.2.1 Tatung 
Concerning the use of MCSs, Tatung emphasises the controlling function more 
than the planning function. Tatung's control focuses on financial objectives. With the 
design of profit centre organisation, Tatung's managers strictly control their own 
management through the budget process, setting budget targets, strictly monitoring 
implementation, evaluating short-period performance, and sanctioning budgets and 
capital expenditures. Although the chairman always keeps his long-term vision, its 
long-term strategies do not involve formal discussion by managers. Corporate 
management's role in developing strategies is limited, and operations' long-term plans 
are not reviewed by headquarters. Many strategic directions of business units are 
suggested or even dictated by the chairman. In other words, Tatung is a typical 
financial programming firm, which combines a moderate level of planning influence 
with tight financial controls (Goold and Campbell, 1987: 43). 
7.2.2.2 Lite-On 
Lite-On's control covers both strategic and financial objectives, but the 
strategic objectives are considered first. The centre leaves the initiative for the 
development of strategic plans to business unit managers. Then the centre reviews and 
criticises the plans to check on the quality of thinking of business unit managers. A 
three-year strategic planning will be developed first, then annual budgeting will be 
established. Targets are set for strategic objectives (such as growth rate, product or 
quality position, and market share) as well as financial objectives. The strategic 
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planning will be reviewed per half year and annual budget just as a means to achieve 
strategic targets. Lite-On can be classified as a strategic control firm combining 
moderate planning influence with tight strategic controls (Goold and Campbell, 1987: 
43). 
7.2.2.3 Mitac 
Mitac focuses the MCSs on opening up information for its managers. With 
their protocol communication language through MIS and mail system, they are 
gradually developing a tier network organisation. Owing to the impact from a 
conservative philosophy, its financial objectives are controlled under a series of strict 
processes, including target setting, implementation monitoring, and result evaluating. 
Each operation is a separate profit centre with independent responsibilities. The budget 
is its main means of planning and profit is a very important performance indicator of 
its operations' managers. As to the strategic planning and long-term budgeting, its 
operations' managers seem not to care about this too much. Mitac can be classified as a 
typical financial control firm combining low planning influence with tight financial 
controls (Goold and Campbell, 1987: 43). 
7.2.2.4 Acer 
Acer's managers regard the MCSs as a means of achieving greatness in their 
careers. They form ambitious targets as their dreams in their summit conference. Top 
management focuses on objective-setting and encourages Acer's managers to keep an 
entrepreneurial spirit to build their careers. Acer's control covers both strategic and 
financial objectives. However, tight controls are seldom seen in the fIrm. They prefer 
flexible to tight controls. Many clear, long-term visions of the whole group were 
established instead of individual strategic plans. Short-term targets may have to be 
compromised in order to stay on track to build a business, but Acer's leader encourages 
a more tenacious pursuit of long-term goals. The flexible control system in Acer is 
more tolerant of innovative strategies that carry with them the risk of failure. Its 
strategies evolve continuously to meet the needs of rapidly changing markets. 
Sometimes when its managers failed to achieve a strategy or mission, the top 
management regarded it as the price to pay for the lesson. To its managers, the MCSs 
are really like learning processes. Headquarters plays a strong role in setting long-term 
visions and strategies, but its top management does not keep tight control in strategic 
and financial objectives. According to the above descriptions, Acer can be classified as 
a type of strategic planning with high planning influence and flexible strategic control 
(Goold and Campbell, 1987: 43). 
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7.2.3 Decentralised Decision Making System 
The decision making system reflects the extent of decentralisation in a firm. 
Multiple aspects (Table 7.2) were observed and compared. The item "control in finn" 
is used from Merchant's (l985b) typology. Results control involves rewarding 
individuals for accomplishing particular results or achieving a particular outcome. 
Action control involves taking steps to make certain individuals act in the 
organisation's best interest. Personnel control involves using individual self-control 
and social control to push individuals to do the best for the organisation. As table 7.2 
shows, different patterns of decision making systems exist among the case finns. 
Tatung is more centralised, Lite-On and Acer are more decentralised, and Mitac stays 
midway. Each case will be discussed briefly as follows. 
T bl 72Th C a e . e omparlson 0 fD r dD .. eeentra Ise eClslon MakiDl! Systems amom Case Firms 
Main Items Tatune: Lite-On Mitae Acer 
Formality in Formal Moderate Moderate Informal 
documents 
Routine decisions Very clear and full Full delegation to Clear delegation in its Full delegation to 
(Operating delegation to centres divisions network system members of client-
management) server system 
Non-routine decisions Low delegation High delegation Conservative in High delegation 
financial decisions 
Interference from Often Seldom Often Seldom 
headquarters 
Assigning operations' Controlled by Controlled by Controlled by Controlled by 
senior managers headquarters subsidiaries headquarters regional headquarters 
and subsidiaries 
Controls in firm: 
• Results controls Regularly reporting Regularly reporting Regularly reporting Regularly reporting 
Uniform "BEP AID" but more tolerating 
diagnostic system unfavourable results 
• Action controls Procedure controls Procedure controls Procedure controls Flexible management 
and instructions and instructions 
• Personnel controls HRM and cultural Managers' selection Managers' selection Social and cultural 
JMerchant 1985b) controls and social controls controls 
7.2.3.1 Tatung 
With the company's slogan "transferring big to small, full delegation", they 
designed a profit centre system for each operation and set clear decentralisation for 
different operation levels, but as one of its auditing committees said: "We have clear 
decentralisation in decision making for different operation levels, but significant 
decisions, especially concerning policy change, need to be approved in advance." All 
senior managers in the group are handled by the headquarters. Its plant director also 
said: "All of our investment has to be sent to headquarters for approval." He continued: 
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"If you cannot attain the mission then headquarters will interfere with your 
management. At that time your independent autonomy will be limited, but if you can 
run the unit successfully, then you can develop with great flexibility." The chairman 
(as a spiritual role in the group) takes care of all employees and step by step realises 
his ideal world, but essentially he still handles great power to control most significant 
decisions. 
As to the controls, Tatung focus on them very much. It strictly monitors its 
operating result through its periodic reporting system. Under its standard costing, 
variances are analysed in detail for purposes of control. As to non-routine decisions, 
the decentralisation in Tatung is limited, and action controls, such as are approved by 
top management case by case, and instruction given by its leader in its operating 
meetings, are used very often. In addition, personnel controls are used popularly in the 
firm. Tatung always emphasises human resource management (HRM) including staff 
selection, periodic education and training, evaluation and promotion. Its chairman 
encourages self-control by developing a corporate culture built on Tatung's shared 
traditions, beliefs, and values. 
7.2.3.2 Lite-On 
Lite-On keeps a clearly decentralised decision making system in the firm. Its 
operations, especially foreign subsidiaries, could make important decisions 
themselves. The philosophy of localisation is an invisible hand to conduct the 
decentralised system. Although Lite-On emphasises "the system is the long-term stable 
foundation stone", owing to the limitation of scale of each SBU at the moment it still 
has difficulty in using a flat organisations. Each manager of SBUs or operations in the 
domestic field has clear power and responsibility and he can significantly influence 
personnel and financial affairs6, but he still needs to communicate with relevant units. 
In other words, the decentralised decision making system is initially well established in 
the firm, but the independence of each SBU is still not enough at the current stage. 
With the philosophy of harmony, most system design still emphasises whole company 
involvement, not just the SBU7• 
Lite-On relies on results controls in the firm to a great extent. It manages the 
subsidiaries through its reporting systems. Strategic and financial objectives are 
monitored in its reports. Action controls like procedure controls are also used in the 
firm, but compared to Tatung and Mitac, action controls are not too popular. In 
addition, personnel controls are emphasised. Team work and harmony are the two 
important social forces. The selection of professional managers is also a critical factor 
5Quotation from the interview with the president of Taiwan Liton Electronic co. 
6Quotation from the interview with director of corporate planning department. 
7 Quotation from the interview with the controller of Taiwan Liton Co. 
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in its personnel controls. 
7.2.3.3 Mitac 
Mitac keeps a clear decentralised decision making system in its routine 
operating management. For ensuring some uniformity in decentralisation, top 
management has built-in some rules in the network system, as the chairman said: "We 
decentralised in decision making but we have certain rules to be followed." He asks his 
managers to maintain discipline and openness in the decentralised system. Its vice 
president said; "We are more decentralised in marketing decisions but more 
conservative in financial decisions." Some important decisions of operations are still 
controlled by headquarters, as the managing director of the British operation said: "The 
personnel, payroll of senior managers, receivable allowance for accounts, investment, 
and other significant decisions belong to headquarters. We have to report to them." 
Mitac relies heavily on results controls. In addition to traditional financial 
reports, Mitac designed a "BEP AID" report system for overseas operations as a self 
diagnostic reporting system to check their health at any time. Its chairman said: "It is 
not enough to look through only the traditional financial statements to see whether the 
business is good. The business needs to start to develop its own management reporting 
system. g" Mitac use a "BEP AID" report as a simple focus and means to manage the 
global corporation. If any operation does not do well on the items in the "BEP AID" 
report, all relevant units' supervisors will take action on them at once by mail system or 
phone ca1l9• Mitac also emphasises action controls. Many procedure controls are set to 
ensure transactions are suitably followed. Its chairman also sometimes give 
instructions. As to the personnel controls, in addition obviously to professional 
managers being gradually established at senior level, Mitac could not be compared 
with the other case firms. 
7.2.3.4 Acer 
The director of management analysis said: "Headquarters handles only some 
key decisions such as important investment and finance, and other detailed matters are 
controlled by each operation." Factors that contribute to the success of Acer's client-
server organisation structure are group-wide use of the Acer global brand, reliable 
access to state-of-the-art technologies, a shared common interest in the success of all 
member entities, and firm representation on the board of directors. 10 
Under the model, there is a clear value chain in the group and less room for 
excuse among BUs. The chairman said; "We exclude too many excuses and 
8Quotation from "Contingent Empire" by S. S. Chen, p217. 
9From the interview with the chainnan of Mitac group. 
10From a collection of Stan Shih's speeches. 
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headquarters overheads. " He continued: "Our simple rule is no value added, no 
support in between." Under the client-server system, each unit has enough space for 
surviving, as its chairman said: " We provide the atomic energy to each unit. Each BU 
has the right to consider whether to accept the internal transfer price or purchase from 
outsiders, develop a product by its own brand, and pave its own marketing channels." 
BUs are managed not from headquarters but often from their board of directors, as one 
of its VPs said: "The decisions are made at local level. We discuss with local directors 
and their senior managers, not with headquarters ... Normally, each board of directors 
gives the president great powers of decision." Its senior VP also said: 
"We do not really manage them through headquarters, but work as an investor 
under the management of a board of directors .... Each company's managers have 
to respond to their board of directors, not to headquarters. The term 
'headquarters' is not even recognised by them... This framework focuses on 
controlling policies and operating directions, not on managing their systems." 
The chairman said: "I communicate my operating strategies to the operations 
with high level emphasis, that means more framework, logic, and concept." He went 
on to describe the benefit of the system: "My role in the integrated system is that of a 
coach and I seldom directly interfere in their management. The advantage of this style 
is that companies will grow quickly without confusion. All managers can learn by 
themselves in the organisation and everyone feels that we are quite different from other 
companies. II Under the group headquarters they set regional headquarters to manage 
different areas, as its auditing director said: "Headquarters need to give more authority 
to operations in different countries. After all, the most important thing is to achieve the 
whole objective. At the moment we have regional headquarters in different areas, such 
as America, Europe, and other areas. They all have a general controller to review their 
financial matters." "I would rather lose control to make money, than be in control and 
lose money.lI11 The result is just as one of its VPs said: "The chairman always enjoys 
delegating his great power and not being leader in a crowd of dragons. That means he 
uses a dis-integrated business model which is a decentralised system." Another VP 
also said: " In the past the chairman bore too much of a burden and worked very hard, 
but now he validly delegates power to each BU's head and lets them take on almost 
everything except some strategic problems." 
Acer takes a very flexible attitude to control its results and actions. The top 
management encourage subordinates to achieve their targets as ably as they can, but 
they are permitted to operate very flexibly. In addition, its top management 
encourages Acer's managers to challenge their missions with entrepreneurial spirit and 
has extreme tolerance of their failures. Essentially, Acer really uses those controls as a 
11 Quotation from the interview with the chairman of Acer group. 
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means of organisation learning. "We just want everyone to learn something from past 
experiences. The more tuition one gets, the smarter one becomes. 12" Interactive 
management controls l3 were used in Acer very successfully. Compared to other case 
firms, programmed controls are more informal. However, Acer heavily emphasises 
personnel controls, including cultural and social controls. As described in chapter 5, 
through personnel controls Acer's managers really share many beliefs and controls. 
7.2.4 Headquarters-subsidiary Relationships 
Most leaders of multinational corporations face a dilemma of how to keep the 
balance between differentiated fit and shared value (Nohria and Ghoshal, 1994) on 
headquarters-subsidiary relationship. The management control system is a function of 
national culture and financial control factors. If the national culture is a major 
determinant of effectiveness of the MCS, the use of components of MCSs does differ 
between different countries; otherwise, if the financial control factors are major 
determinants of effectiveness of MCS, MNEs will find it easy to set uniform systems 
for cross-boarder operations and the feasibility of transferring MCSs between 
countries becomes possible. As described in chapter 2, strategy significantly affects a 
MNE's control systems. Strategic predisposition (Chakravarthy and Perlmutter, 1985; 
Perlmutter, 1984; Heenan and Perlmutter, 1979) or behavioural orientation 
(Schollhammer, 1969) undoubtedly impacts on the MCS design in a MNE. Different 
firms have different strategies to adapt to their special situations. According to Heenan 
and Perlmutter's (1979) typology, there are four distinct strategic predispositions: 
ethnocentrism, polycentrism, regiocentrism, and geocentrism. Each predisposition 
represents a type of headquarters-subsidiary relationship. Ethnocentrism is a 
predisposition where all strategic decisions are guided by the values and interests of 
the parent. Polycentrism is a predisposition where strategic decisions are tailored to 
suit the cultures of the various countries in which the MNE competes. Regiocentrism 
is a predisposition that tries to blend the interests of the parent with that of the 
subsidiaries at least on a limited regional basis. Finally, geocentrism is a 
predisposition that seeks to integrate diverse subsidiaries through a global systems 
approach to decision making (Heenan & Perlmutter, 1979; Chakravarthy & 
Perlmutter, 1985). Chakravarthy and Perlmutter (1985) used the dimensions of "locus 
of relative power" and "segment where maximum value is added" to expand the 
category to six types. The types of global integration and national responsiveness were 
12Quotation from the interview with the auditing director of Acer group. 
131nteractive management controls demand regular attention from operating subordinates at all levels of 
the company. Programmed controls. by contrast, rely heavily on staff specialists in preparing and 
interpreting informatio~. Data are transmitted throu~ formal ~epo~ng procedures and operating 
managers are involved mfrequently and on an exceptIonal basIS. (SImons. 1987. 1990) 
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added. Global integration is a predisposition to ethnocentrism but the maximum value 
is added upstream. National responsiveness is a predisposition to polycentrism but the 
maximum value is added downstream. The research used Chakravarthy & Perlmutter's 
categories to identify the existence of distinctly different patterns in the case firms. 
Each case firm will be discussed as follows. 
7.2.4.1 Tatung 
Tatung always clings strongly to its corporate culture. Centralised decision 
making, patriarchal leadership style, cultivating managers' philosophy from the 
university stage, and strong uniform policy and strategy on fmance and personnel all 
form the character of Tatung's culture. Its chairman continually cultivates its 
philosophy at his course and operating meetings. Owing to managers' long-term 
affection for the firm, Tatung culture is deeply ingrained in their minds. The longer 
the tenure, the deeper the affection. So when their managers are sent to each 
operation, they take Tatung culture with them 14. As to the differentiated fit, compared 
to other groups it is more difficult to realise. Generally speaking, overseas subsidiaries 
have more authorisation than domestic operations 15. They are more decentralised in 
purchasing and personnel decisions 16, but significant decisions still need to be 
approved by its chairman. According to the above analysis, Tatung keeps its strategic 
predisposition as "ethnocentrism" and it can be classified as the type of "high shared 
values and low differentiated fit." 
7 .2.4.2 Lite-On 
Compared to Tatung, Lite-On shows weak corporate culture. Under the 
framework of professional management, they focus on state-of-the-art technology, 
product quality and innovation, and globalisation. They encourage their foreign 
operations' managers to use local resources efficiently, based on a set of core values. 
Its president said: "If the people we send to overseas companies have a strong mission 
to get an expected result quickly, it is negative." Under the concept of "enjoying local 
infrastructures 17", they use local people as senior managers when possible so they can 
run their business. As to the relationship between the headquarters and overseas 
operations, there are two types of operations: directly reporting to SBUs and directly 
belonging to the president. The president strongly emphasises the relationship between 
headquarters and operations, as he said: "I think in matters of business disciplines, 
principles, and concepts between headquarters and subsidiaries we need to spend more 
14Quotation from the interview with the deputy chainnan of the auditing committee. 
15Quotation from the interview with the secretariat director. 
16Quotation from the interview with the deputy controller. 
17 Quotation from the interview with the president of Taiwan Liton Co. 
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time to define clearly and review which things are really working by subsidiaries." 
Different levels of operations have different decentralisation, as its controller said: "If 
the subsidiary is directly subordinated under the president, such as in the British 
operation, then its manager enjoys more decentralisation." The British operation 
operates its business like an independent company in the UK. The deputy controller of 
Taiwan Liton said: "The British company enjoys high decentralisation in decision 
making. We do not get involved in its financial accounting but just review its budget 
and capital expenditure." The managing director of the British company described its 
operation as follows: 
"We are totally independent in operation, including marketing, financing, 
manufacturing, R&D, ... etc. The headquarters gives us advice, not instructions. 
They let us independently make decisions for business here. They just judge 
our performance by the profitability and return on investment, but they help us 
if we ask them." 
According to their "national responsiveness" of strategic predisposition, Lite-
On has quickly developed their own type of "high differentiated fit and low shared 
values" in the last couple of years. 
7.2.4.3 Mitac 
Mitac seems at the midway between Tatung and Lite-On. Although they 
emphasised decentralisation, they prudently kept in line and focused on discipline and 
openness, such as the uniform "BEP AID" report and protocol communicating 
language on their network organisation system. They expected localisation, but in the 
past years they have suffered many problems and they continually changed their 
directions and approaches18• "Keeping centralised thinking19" seems to be traded-off 
with localised direction. A conservative attitude and to some extent in-group selection 
of managers of overseas operations limited their localised expectation. As to the 
relationship between headquarters and overseas operations, there are different extents 
of authorisation. Its strategic predisposition is a mixed style of "geocentrism" and 
"ethnocentrism." Its vice chairman said: "We use different models for different 
countries." He continued: "Each overseas operation has a different scale, history, and 
special environment. For instance with the British operation, we give it great decision 
power including decisions for developing a new product." The British operation uses a 
matrix organisation system under which each function such as product, finance, 
personnel, sales, quality ... etc., can contact relevant Taiwanese units and 
simultaneously give their E-mail copies to its managing director. Unless decisions are 
18From the interview with the vice chairman of Mitac group. 
19Quotation from the interview with the chairman of Mitac group. 
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important, each function can communicate directly with the relevant Taiwanese units. 
Owing to the impact from a conservative philosophy, however, the decentralisation 
especially in the financial area, still has some distance to go. At the moment Mitac 
appears to fit the type of "intennediate differentiated fit and shared values." 
7 .2.4.4 Acer 
Basically Acer has a similar environment to Mitac, but Acer makes more 
allowance for decentralisation of operations and sharing more corporate values 
between headquarters and operations. They pennit local managers to make their own 
decisions, as its chainnan said: "Every manager can run his segment as his own 
business; that is, every manager is a boss." They also sent some senior managers to 
overseas operations, but compared to Tatung and Mitac they use more local people as 
senior managers. Besides, under their "local touch" strategy they have started to share 
ownership with some local partners in some areas. Differentiated fit will be the way 
for their foreign operations in the future. On the subject of shared values, Acer has 
some obvious value-sharing between headquarters and wider operations. They always 
share their aggressive mission by common slogans for pursuing excellence, keeping 
an infonnal and flexible system to face change, trusting their managers based on the 
motto "Human nature is essentially good", ranking the customer as the highest 
priority, teaching managers business sense to run their businesses. The chainnan 
disseminates them through each level of organisation and each operation head keeps 
his vow to cultivate those common values2o• Objectively, Acer has successfully built 
common values within their group. Acer belongs to the type of "intennediate-high 
differentiated fit and shared values." 
As to the relationship design between headquarters and operations, they keep 
their operations as decentralised in decision making as possible, but they keep some 
important functions at headquarters or regional headquarters to take care of 
complicated problems. Its strategic predisposition focuses on "geocentrism" with 
"regiocentrism". Each operation has the same power within the framework of client-
server organisation, but each regional headquarters plays an important role in strategy-
setting and management. Its sourcing VP said: "We decentralise to each BU as much 
as possible, but we keep some basic and comprehensive functions at headquarters for 
ease of handling an integrated situation, such as purchasing for main parts, finance, 
auditing, legal business. public relations, and market survey. Each function fully 
communicates with each BU which still has these similar functions ... That is actually a 
matrix organisation." Another VP also gave a similar description: "We put all 
complicated matters to headquarters or regional headquarters, and leave simpler 
2OQuotation from the interview with the chainnan of Acer. 
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decisions to the operational level of the business." Each business unit has the same 
power of authorisation to develop its business, as its senior VP said: "There is no 
difference between domestic operations and overseas operations. They are all our 
business units and no matter what method of operating or fmance they use they are 
equal." Even under the European RBU covering the whole European area, each 
country's operation still owns quite a large power of authorisation. The president of the 
European headquarters said: "Owing to the great distances, we cannot directly touch 
each country so we cannot but decentralise." Its general controller o( Europe also said: 
"The client-server system makes management simpler and each country can easily 
develop its system." Each country head can make its decisions quite independently in 
the autonomy, as the managing director of Acer's German Company said: "Acer in 
Germany actually manages the company entirely. More or less all decisions or all 
responsibilities are taken by the management here. There are only a few things which 
need to be approved from corporate headquarters." 
7 .2.5 Degree of Control among Case Firms 
According to above descriptions, the patterns of degree of control in case firms 
have already appeared. Tatung keeps its powerful central leadership, focuses its control 
on financial objectives, retains centralisation in important decisions, and maintains an 
"ethnocentric" strategic predisposition between its headquarters and foreign 
subsidiaries. Lite-On gives its divisions more delegation, focuses on both strategic and 
financial objectives, retains decentralised decision making system, and maintains a 
"national responsiveness" strategic predisposition between the headquarters and 
foreign operations. Mitac respects businesses' autonomy but still has a strong central 
leadership, focuses fmancial objectives and keeps centralisation in financial decisions, 
and maintains a mixed strategic predisposition of "ethnocentrism" and "geocentrism" 
between its headquarters and foreign operations. Acer has a strong central leadership, 
focuses strategic and financial objectives, retains a decentralised decision making 
system, and maintains a mixed strategic predisposition of "geocentrism" and 
"regiocentrism" between its headquarters and foreign subsidiaries. Integratedly 
speaking, the sequence in the spectrum of the extent of financial control tension is 
Tatung, Mitac, Lite-On, and Acer. 
7.2.6 Proposition and Discussion 
The proposition 2-1 could not be accepted by this research. The degree of 
control was more or less affected by national home culture (for example each case firm 
__ ~ ____ ~'~' __ ~O~~~-'~--~:--"""-----•. '--------------
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used top-down approach in the process of objective setting), but there were still 
differences among case firms in the degree of integrated control. Tatung and Mitac had 
a greater degree of control and may conform with the cultural proposition, but Lite-On 
and Acer significantly differed from the cultural proposition. 
The results showed a weak relationship between national culture and the factor 
of the degree of control. Many reasons may explain this phenomenon. One reason for 
the unexpected finding is that some of the cultural dimensions presented by Hofstede 
(1980/1984, 1991) may not have had strong effects on preferences (Chow et al., 1994). 
Many cultural researchers (such as Hofstede, 1991; Chow et aI., 1994; Merchant et al., 
1995) could support their hypotheses or propositions based on Hofstede's cultural 
dimensions. However, differing from prior studies, this research compared the degree 
of control in the case firms in Taiwan (as an intracultural analysis). The "positioning 
effect21 " could not be shown, but only the "patterning effect.22" Because Taiwan had its 
special historical background, as described in chapter 5, different management styles, 
including American, Japanese, and Chinese styles, existed in the different case firms. 
Naturally, the "patterning effect" could appear in the research. Finally, with increasing 
international contact, some aspects of Taiwanese leaders and senior managers' 
behaviour have been changing. These managers are building a new management 
culture, the way these leaders "think, feel, and act" (Hofstede, 1991; Merchant et aI., 
1995). These cultural changes are, in turn, reflected in Taiwanese firms' management 
practices (Merchant et aI., 1995). 
7.3 Budget Emphasis 
Proposition 2-2: The leaders of Taiwan headquarters affected by their cultures use 
a low budget emphasis approach to evaluate their operational performances. 
As the literature review in chapter 2 shows many researchers focus on the 
relationship between budget and management control systems. Whether a company 
emphasises the budget has a close relation to the nature of its financial control. This 
research judges whether the budget is emphasised by a firm through its budget 
practices and performance evaluation style. As a result the patterns of budget emphasis 
in the case firms will be used for the purpose of examining proposition 2-2. Another 
purpose of this section is to contribute its result, with the other two factors, to 
evaluating the style of financial control. The topic will be discussed further in the next 
chapter. 
21See section 2.2.2. 
22See section 2.2.2. 
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7.3.1 Budget Practices 
Table 7 J Th C . e omparlSon 0 fB ude:et Practices between Case Firms 
Main items TatunS! Lite-On Mitac Acer 
Use of planning Formal manual Guideline Guideline Informal guideline 
manuals 
Budget committee • Formal • Formal, but less • Formal, but less • Informal 
• Including all than Tatung than Tatung organisation 
seniors and • Including all • Including top • Including all 
heads senior managers managers senior mana~ers 
Budget preparation More than three Two months for About two months Less than two 
months three-year months 
strategic planning 
and one month for 
annual budget 
Linkage between budget Low High Low High 
and strateS!y 
Long-term budget Seven-year Three years Informal and very Using long-term 
budget, but only budget rough visions instead of 
covering turnovers long-term budget 
and profits 
Objective setting Top down Balance top down Top down Top down 
and bottom up 
Tightness of budget Strictly ti~ht Reasonable Tight Challengeable 
Accuracy of budget High Intermediate Intermediate Low 
targets 
Frequency of control Monthly reports Monthly reports Monthly reports Monthly reports 
reports 
Performance • Weekly • Monthly and • Uniform • Informal 
monitoring operating quarterly review "BEPAID" meeting 
meeting and analysis reporting system • Focusing on 
• Standard costing • Monthly review bottom line 
• Variance and analysis 
analysis 
• Periodic report 
in operating 
meeting 
Importance of meeting Very important Depending on Important Depending on 
budget targets situations situations 
Budget relating to Close relation Incentive relating Incentive relating Incentive relating 
incentives to corporate profit to corporate profit to individual 
contract 
Budget practices (Table 7.3) covering the whole budget cycle show different 
patterns in the case firms. Tatung emphasises the budget most of all. Through its 
budget cycle, formal, hierarchical, integrated, and strict planning and controlling 
practices could be easily found. Mitac also regards the budget as a main tool of 
management. Its leader designed a uniform management report ("BEP AID ") to 
diagnose whether its budget is successfully carried out. However, compared to Tatung, 
it uses a less formal, tight, and hierarchical approach in budgeting procedures and the 
integration between its planning and controlling functions also could not compare with 
}- 7 .. 
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Tatung. Lite-On does succeed in the planning function and its strategic planning and 
master budget are matched very well. However, owing to keeping long-term strategies 
and emphasis on the philosophy of harmony, its control seems loose. Acer emphasises 
setting challengeable objectives for the purpose of objective management. It broadly 
uses simple, speedy, flexible, and informal approaches in its budget practices. Its 
budget control is flexible and loose. 
7.3.1.1 Tatung 
Compared to other case firms, the budget is strongly emphasised in the Tatung 
group. Budget manual, budget committee, a long period for budgeting, standardised 
budgeting procedures, standard costing, strict budget control, and short period 
feedback frequency of operating meetings all symbolise the budget emphasis in the 
group. In the preparation stage, all senior managers and centre heads have to 
participate in the budget committee for discussion and communication. One of its 
auditing committee said: "Our budget committee consists of each head of profit centre 
and they all need to report in the meeting. All senior managers will offer their opinions 
in the meeting." He continued: "The chairman will give some instructions or 
opinions." The headquarters always gives a great amount of orders, commands, and 
advice when targets are set. 
The group also prepared a seven-year long-term budget as a vision of future 
development, but the long-term plan focuses on significant investment and equipment 
and sales and profit are only rough figures23• Individual operations focus only on short-
term budget, as the director of the Taiwanese operation said: "Because the company 
uses each profit centre to evaluate performance, each centre takes care only of short-
term benefit. All long-term plans are developed from a top-down approach." 
After preparing the budget, they have a formal procedure to control the budget. 
Its deputy controller said: "We have a powerful budget system. Once the budget is set, 
if your budget is not enough, you need to give full reasons when asking top 
management to approve more. Sometimes our budget control is even more strict than 
government institutes." One of its auditing committee also said: "We follow-up the 
budget performance weekly, monthly, quarterly, half-yearly, and yearly. It is already 
near a standard procedure and we compare relative performance." Top management 
looks at the budget target as each centre's mission, and the centre's manager is 
expected to achieve it. Its deputy auditing committee said: "We do not consider 
uncontrollable items in our budget evaluation. After setting the budget target, each 
centre manager must respond to achieve it." The director of the Taiwanese operation 
also said: "So you need to keep smart to set your targets, and once you have set the 
23Quotation from the interview with the deputy chainnan of auditing committee. 
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target you have to achieve it." The time span of feedback perfonnance to employees is 
quite short. They evaluate employees' perfonnance per quarter and divide them into 
different grades. Different grades have a different monthly bonus. 
The budget perfonnance of each operation is essentially linked to the incentive 
system. The better perfonnance the unit has, the more year-end bonus it gets. Of 
course, each operation cares about budget perfonnance, as the director of the 
Taiwanese operation said: "On the subject of whether attaining the target could affect 
the bonus and future salary ... The bonus is always issued by plant." In the British 
operation, although it lacks a fonnal bonus, the budget perfonnance still affects their 
next year's salary. Its financial controller said: "I believe when people's perfonnances 
are bad, they should get nothing. If their perfonnances are excellent, their rewards 
should be better and better." In addition to the budget figures the group still refers to 
some nonfinancial indicators, such as turnover rate, rate of return, and inventory 
control, as one of its auditing committee said: "Sales and profits are only part of the 
key figures." Owing to the impact of patriarchal philosophy, however, they emphasised 
co-operation more than competitiveness within the group so they still considered 
different situations for different units when paying the annual bonus. Nonnally the 
incentive showed only minor differences among operations, as the deputy chairman of 
its auditing committee said: "I think the incentive system is not enough to motivate 
operations." He continued: "If an operation manager achieves budget target, we need 
to give him a proper incentive; otherwise, he needs to accept a suitable 
punishment. .. We need to get more clear responsibility from the budget system." 
7.3.1.2 Lite-On 
Objectively speaking, Lite-On did its planning very well, especially the linkage 
between three-year strategic planning and its annual master plan. They expended lots 
of time discussing and revising their strategies, including market growth, technical 
research and development, manufacturing strategy, and long-tenn investment. 
Strategic planning was suggested by SBUs and then summed up as the framework for 
discussing24. Its president said: "For avoiding too much emphasis on short-tenn profit 
such as is the American way, we emphasise that senior managers need to have long-
term and middle-tenn planning ability." When they prepare strategic planning, they use 
the "SWOT" technique2S to analyse it and they review it per half year.26 Based on 
strategic planning, they prepare the annual master budget. Its controller said: "We 
expend lots of time in budgeting. All senior managers participate in the budget 
24Quotation from the interview with the President of Taiwan Liton company. 
251t is a type of means for analysing strategic planning with "SWOT" matrix. "SWOT" means 
"Strength, Weakness, Opportunity, and Threat. 
28Quotation from the interview with the deputy controller. 
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meeting. Each SBU needs to review its budget many times, then send it to the meeting. 
"Owing to stable growth in recent years, the middle planning and annual budget link is 
quite good and budget accuracy is relatively high?'" Its controller said: "We have had 
almost no need to revise the annual budget in recent years." 
As to the management relationship between headquarters and overseas 
operations, the group emphasises more systematic management. They respect the 
operation's autonomy, as its British managing director said: "When we set budget we 
are to a certain amount conservative, but we don't try to be conservative. Normally 
speaking, our budget presented to Taiwan to be reviewed is always only slightly 
changed, because they realise that we try to understand local conditions." There are 
some channels for communication, but mainly it is by a monthly reporting system. Its 
president said: "We communicate with overseas operations by monthly reporting. If 
there are problems we can discuss them by telephone or fax, but if there are consistent 
problems then we will hold a face to face discussion." 
On the control function, although they have a monthly review system, they put 
more emphasis on whole company basis. There is little control of each unit within the 
company, as one of its associate VPs described: "I feel in Lite-On culture there is no 
real budget control in each department, but the company strictly controls four items: 
operating revenue, material cost, capital expenditure, and human resources." 
As the planning model prepared through each SBU, and the incentive model 
emphasising whole company involvement are inconsistent, there is little direct 
relationship between the budget performance and the incentive system. Its controllers 
said: "We have no open transparent incentive system to let each BU understand how 
much incentive they can get under what performance level." Though they try to do as 
well as in the past year, because of fluctuating factors it is not easy to set reasonable 
levels for different BUs. Besides, the top management of the group prefer the 
philosophy of keeping harmony rather than building competitiveness within the 
company. Its controller said: "The company policy emphasises the comprehensive 
incentive system. We look upon the company as a whole, not by SBU." Obviously, the 
designing of the incentive system significantly decreases the function of budget 
evaluation for different BUs and departments within the company. 
7 .3.1.3 Mitac 
In budget preparation, Mitac has a clear process for objective setting. Its top 
management prefers to set some clear financial targets ,such as R&D, profit, and 
turnover, and communicate down through the organisation. The core management 
team participates in important strategies and development directions. Then they start to 
27 Quotation from the interview with the controller. 
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prepare the detail budgets. Mitac keeps relatively flexible in committees, processes. 
discussions and meetings. It takes about two months for budgeting, but focuses on the 
annual budget only. The long-term budget seems unimportant to the firm. 
As above, Mitac's senior managers emphasise discipline and open exchange of 
information. The chairman designed a "BEP AID" report as a uniform report for 
overseas operations as a comparative, diagnostic instrument. He said: "If an operation 
cannot attain its budget objective, then all "BEP AID" problems will happen." So 
essentially they emphasise the budget as a management tool. Its vice-chairman said: 
"We emphasise the budget objective, especially in foreign operations." Its chairman 
further described his budget attitude thus: 
"Budget is very important for management. If we want to control we need to 
use budget as an instrument. Before budgeting we need to consider company 
strategies first. .. Those strategies can easily change the budget structure. If you 
have set a budget, then actions must happen at once. For example if you want 
increased sales, you need to hire more people first." 
The president realised that "it is very important to handle whole group and 
management operations through the budget system." In domestic operations, as they 
are close to headquarters, it is easy to take control and set regulations through VCR 
meetings, but of overseas operations, its controller said: "We can only give them some 
guidance, then we ask them to report back to headquarters periodically so we can 
compare their actual performance with budget target." 
To attain the budget target is very important. Each half year they hold a kick-
off meeting including both a board of directors' meeting and an operating meeting 
simultaneously to discuss the budget objectives and how to achieve them. Its chairman 
said: "We discuss budget at the directorial board meeting first, then we start the 
operating meeting which all senior managers and operational heads have to attend and 
discuss how to attain budget objectives. The manager who could not attain budget 
would be fired." There is a fundamental relationship between budget and target system, 
but budget is not the only factor in the incentive consideration.28 Because the 
environment is different, there are relatively different incentive systems in different 
companies within the group29, but the rate of attaining the budget objective is the most 
important factor, and the weight is about two-thirds of all factors. 30 
The perception of budget emphasis is somewhat different between domestic 
operations and overseas operations. Owing to the difference in compensation structure, 
the Taiwanese operation essentially offers more contingent rewards compared to pre-
set rewards for their employees so they are all concerned about attaining budget target. 
28Quotation from the interview with the president of Mitac Inc. 
29Quotation from the interview with the president of Mitac Inc. 
30Quotation from the interview with the vice chairman of Mitac group. 
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The vice president of its Taiwanese operation said: "Financial information is quite 
important in our operations. We review monthly reports to see whether we achieve the 
budget target." However, owing to suffering loss in the past few years, employees' 
morale seems not too high. Its vice president said: "Concerning profit, we have little 
expectation because we have suffered continuous big losses in the past couple of 
years." In the British operation, except for the managing director there is no formal 
incentive system, as its managing director said: "My bonus directly relates to my 
budget performance. Other people are very little affected by the budget performance, 
but if we have super performance they can get some bonus." Headquarters evaluates 
the subsidiary in many ways, such as profit target, the six critical factors in the 
"BEP AID" report, selling products for headquarters, and sales objective, but as its 
managing director said: "Making profit is most important." 
7 .3.1.4 Acer 
Except for the profit target, Acer's top managers did not emphasise the 
traditional budget too much: "Budget is not Bible" has become a popular slogan. Its 
director of management analysis said: "We focus only on some key figures not the 
detailed budget." Its auditing director also said: "We review the budget performance 
but we focus on finding the reasons we cannot achieve, not on following up who is 
responsible. We just want everyone to learn something from past experiences. The 
more tuition one gets, the smarter one becomes." In face of a fast changing industry, 
the forecast ability for the budget figures suffered a strict test. Its chairman said: "I 
remember in the 1980s, each year we grew more than double and always exceeded 
profit targets, but we always had significant variances between budget and actual 
figures. At the moment the estimates are more close to the budget figures, but 
variances are still significant." Acer always keeps its budgeting in an informal and 
flexible way. Its top management sets clear targets and missions before budgeting and 
then communicates down through the whole group, but each unit has relative room to 
discuss or challenge them. 
On strategy, top management keeps their business ready for change and intends 
keeping overheads and expenses behind sales revenue. Its chairman said: 
"In my philosophy, I do not emphasise the budget too much, because if you do, 
it will intangibly increase the overheads and other expenses... Because a 
situation has already changed and you are still following the original plan, big 
problems arise and I am reluctant to let that happen. I even intentionally put o!f 
some long-term overheads or expenses, such as personnel recruitment and 
long-term commitments, for as long as possible before the business activities 
are realised." 
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In budget preparation, they use the "business modee I" as a quick way instead 
of traditional budgeting. Its senior VP described their evolution in budgeting: 
"Before 1990, the group worked out its budget by very complicated processes 
and consumed a great deal of time in budget preparation, but, as the industry 
changes so fast, although we expend lots of time we still cannot overcome 
forecast problems. From 1990, we had a big change in budgeting. We started to 
emphasise business model. We asked operations' managers what their business 
model was.... If they made wrong assumptions, they could not sell their 
products well and achieve their target. At last they would lose their 
competitiveness. So when we prudently determine the definition of each 
product market, each business unit is required to propose its business model." 
Its chairman is satisfied with their business model approach and he said: "We 
expended lots of time in talking about the business model. When I went to each 
operation I often found they were wrong in preparing their budgets. Their gross profit 
rate was too high... Because they had over-expectation of gross profits, it resulted in 
excess of overheads. They will gradually lose their competitive ability because of over-
expectation in gross profit rate." So normally he asks his operation's managers to keep 
their correct business model by decreasing their gross profit rate to increase their 
market share. He continued: "By decreasing gross profit ratio and increasing 
advertisement, the administrative expense rate naturally decreases and efficiency 
increases and finally the profits will increase. We consider this policy sustainable and 
it is working." 
After setting the business model, each operation has its structure made up of 
revenue, cost and expense. It is easy to build or change the whole budget once one has 
sales estimates or the changing sales forecast. Its senior VP said: "We have no time to 
prepare a new budget, but if necessary we only adjust the budget figures on the basis of 
the original business model and change nothing in the structural percentages. 
Although top management did not emphasise the budget too much, they still 
care to a large extent about turnover and profit, especially profit. Owing to the 
incentive programme for operations, the profit objective becomes a very important 
performance indicator, especially for overseas operations under the RBU system. Its 
senior VP said: "We appraise the units' performance by bottom line. If they achieve the 
original budget targets, they can enjoy the incentive programme. So we still need 
budget objectives. If they attain their objectives they have a bonus and if they exceed 
the target they will have more. The incentive programme is linked to the budget 
target." Management in the Acer group see the main function of budget to be a means 
of motivating their managers to pursue their dream. Its chairman said: "I always set 
31 It represents the structure among revenue. gross profit, and cost and expense. 
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some objectives for an operation but I tell its head I may change the objectives in the 
next year ... I do not keep the objectives too fixed and I change them stage by stage. 
When setting objectives, we set different targets for different units... Of course the 
objectives will be reasonable, attainable, and comfortable." Normally they set their 
integrated objective in their half yearly summit meeting where each operation head and 
senior managers of BUs must attend. They also discuss in the meeting the game rules 
and directions for future development.32 Its aUditing director said: "Using the theory of 
objective management, the chairman wouldn't set high objectives for them, so that the 
targets can be easily attained and they can enjoy more incentive bonus. 
Simultaneously, each unit will control its cost and personnel expense to pursue its 
objective." Each overseas operation has great ambition to achieve their budget bottom 
line as an index of realisation of entrepreneurial spirit. Their heads focus on the budget 
target more than the top management level does and domestic operations' managers 
who put more emphasis on product and manufacturing. 
As to the long-term budget, the group uses some long-term vision instead of a 
middle plan. Its chairman said: "Because the industry fluctuates so much we can't have 
a detailed realistic middle plan, such as a five-year plan, and I realise it is not 
necessary." However, Acer successfully uses long-term vision with mission slogans, 
sharing a common aim, and with a rough middle-term plan. 
7.3.2 Performance Evaluating Style 
Table 7.4 The Comparison of Performance Evaluating Style between Case Firms 
Participants Tatung Lite-On Mitac Acer 
Central executive officer BP PC Chairman: BC NA 
(CEO) Vice-chairman:BC 
Presidents: PC 
Central financial officer(CFOl BP BP BP BP 
Taiwanese o~eration's head BP PC NA PC 
European operation's head: 
British operation BP PC BP BC 
Dutch operation - - - BC 
German operation - - - BP 
Following the classification of evaluative style by Hopwood (1971) and the 
distinction between high and low budget-emphasis by Brownell (1982), the interview 
contained the measured scale used by Otley (1978) to understand the extent of budget 
emphasis in the case fmns. In the Brownell approach, a high budget-emphasis 
contained budget constrained (BC) and budget profit (BP) styles and a low budget-
emphasis contained profit conscious (PC) and nonaccounting (NA) styles. Differing 
32Quotation from the interview with the financial VP. 
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from the literature survey of subordinates to understand leadership evaluative style, 
this research initially explored budget emphasis from headquarters, but also checked it 
at operational level. The results (Table 7.4) show that different patterns of budget 
emphasis in different firms. 
The leaders of Tatung and Mitac significantly followed the high budget-
emphasis, but the leaders of Lite-On and Acer could be classified as low budget 
emphasis. In addition, almost all central financial officers in different firms chose BP 
style. Because the case firms are all big MNEs, they more or less used budget and 
profit performances as important evaluation criteria. Perhaps they knew better than 
other managers about the important position of budget and profit in performance 
evaluation. Also, they possibly adopted a narrow viewpoint on financial position. As to 
the operational level, Tatung's operations clearly showed BP style and conformed with 
its headquarters; Lite-On's operations followed its leader's style and all followed the 
PC style; and Mitac and Acer showed inconsistency between their headquarters and 
operations. Mitac's leader and controller all followed high budget-emphasis, but its 
professional managers in Taiwanese operations cared more about profit and non-
accounting indexes especially efficiency, quality and effort. Mitac still used a 
centralised approach in financial decisions, its leader still strictly handling them, so its 
professional managers naturally chose more non-accounting indexes. In its British 
operation, however, owing to market-oriented focus, the budget of profit objective 
significantly represented its managing director's performance. In Acer, its leader Stan 
Shih obviously put greater emphasis on non-accounting factors such as handling 
people, quality, and efficiency, but under the framework of the client-server system 
each operation could independently decide its own evaluative style. In addition, its 
European regional headquarters also played a critical role on its operations' 
performance evaluation. So it seems natural that differences existed between 
headquarters and operations or even among its operations. 
According to the results of the interviews, from the viewpoint of central 
headquarters the research classified Tatung as the type of high budget-emphasis, and 
Lite-On and Acer belonged to the type of low budget-emphasis. The research classified 
Mitac as an intermediate type. 
7.3.3 Budget Emphasis among Case Firms 
From the above analyses of budget practices and leader's evaluating styles, 
Tatung obviously put more emphasis on an integrated budget system and was among 
the high budget-emphasis firms. Mitac's chairman used the budget as a main means of 
system management, but his philosophy seemed lacking in consistency with his core 
,. 
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professional managers. Lite-On focused on the planning function, especially on 
strategic planning, but compared to Tatung and Mitac, it kept a loose control on the 
budget. Acer used its budget as a means of interactive controls, and its budget control 
was very flexible and loose. Overall, the sequence of spectrum on budget emphasis in 
this research is Tatung, Mitac, Lite-On and Acer. Tatung is classified as the type of 
"high budget emphasis", Lite-On and Acer belongs to "low budget emphasis", and 
Mitac is "intermediate budget emphasis." 
7 .3.4 Proposition and Discussion 
The proposition 2-2 could not be accepted by this research. Because the budget 
is a basic means in the management of multinational firms, each case firm used a 
budget system more or less in its routine management, especially in the planning 
process. But with different leaders' philosophies, different extents of budget emphasis 
existed among case firms when they evaluated subordinates' performances. Tatung 
belonged to the style of high budget emphasis, Lite-On and Acer were the type of low 
budget emphasis, and Mitac was in the middle. 
The results showed a weak relationship between national culture and the factor 
of budget emphasis. Many reasons could explain the results of this factor on the degree 
of control (see section 7.2.6), including the shortage of Hofstede's cultural dimensions, 
patterning effect, special firm's historical background, managers' learning and 
adapting. In addition, the effect of budget evaluative style seems to have a deep 
relationship with many contingencies, such as strategies (Simons, 1987), job-related 
tension (Hopwood, 1972), and participation in budget (Kren, 1992). That would seem 
to be why some researchers (such as Hopwood, 1972 and Otley, 1978; Otley, 1978 and 
Brownell, 1982) have had contradictory findings. This research focused not only on the 
budget evaluating style but also on the budget practices in the case firms. In examining 
the budget style, in contrast with prior studies, different aspects from different 
positions were probed. 
7.4 Selection of Managers 
Proposition 2-3: The leaders of Taiwan headquarters affected by their cultures 
choose their important managers from their in-groups. 
The main purpose of this section is to compare the factor relating to the 
selection of managers in the case firms. Different patterns in the case finns will be 
" . · .... ·nr 
202 
presented in each theme. As a result the patterns of the selection of managers in the 
case firms will be assessed in examining proposition 2-3. Another purpose of this 
section is to contribute its result, with the other two factors, to evaluating the style of 
financial control. The topic will be discussed further in the next chapter. 
T bl 7 S Th C a e . e omparlson 0 fM . am Items of Managers' Selection between Case Firms 
Main items Tatung Lite-On Mitae Aeer 
The company's policy Senior, loyalty, and Ability and Loyalty and Ability and 
of manager selection I performance I performance performance I performance 
Personnel perpetuation Key positions Key positions Key positions Key positions 
developed from developed from developed from developed from 
home country local country in home or local regional 
everywhere in the their own country country headquarters 
world 
Strategy in organising • Gradually Quickly localised • Considering • Local touch 
foreign operations" localised team work • Work orientation 
managers • Chinese keep • Preferring 
senior positions Chinese as head 
Key positions in 
European operations: 
• Operation's head Chinese manager Local manager Chinese manager Chinese/local 
• Financial director Chinese manager Local manager Local manager Chinese/local 
• Logistic director Chinese manager Local manager Chinese manager Chinese manager 
• Marketing Chinese manager Local manager Local manager Local manager 
director 
Personnel evaluation Home standards determined locally Home standards determined 
and control applied for persons but are weighted regionally 
and performance to suit local 
conditions 
Considering cultural Strong Weak Medium Weak-medium 
factors 
With a strong corporate culture, Tatung has a special philosophy in the 
selection of managers. Its top management emphasises "pure blood" and uses 
managers more from the in-group, and then slowly localises in foreign operation. Lite-
On shows a different personnel philosophy. Under the framework of professional 
nlanagement, ability and performance become its most important indicators in 
selection of managers. For foreign operation, different strategies were used in Asian 
and European countries33, but all quickly localised in foreign operations. Compared to 
Tatung and Lite-On, Mitacseems in the middle. Its top management emphasises more 
the employees' loyalty and focuses on better team work in foreign operations. Using 
Chinese managers as overseas operation heads seems an obvious trend. Compared to 
Mitac and Lite-On, Acer may be in the middle on the selection of managers. Its top 
33 The company set up many plants as manufacturing bases in Asian countries through greenfield 
operations and they belonged to different SBUs. and most MeSs were transferred to new plants. In 
Europe. its operations were bought from other companies and it directly belonged to the president. It 
seemed to lack MeSs transfer and localised immediately. 
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management selects managers by focusing on their ability and performance, especially 
their aggressive talents. It emphasises local touch strategy but still keeps a few Chinese 
as key managers in each operation because of the need for work orientation. Each case 
will be discussed further as follows. 
7.4.1 Tatung 
Compared to other finns, Tatung selects its managers more from the in-group. 
Since the beginning, Tatung has adhered to the management principle of "education-
and-industry integration." The education-and-industry co-operative programme 
between Tatung Company and Tatung Institute of Technology was conceived and 
created by the founder and former Chairman Shan-Chih Lin in 1941.34 Almost all 
managers graduated from Tatung Institute of Teclmology, so they have the same 
educational background. The chairman of Tatung group, also the president and 
professor of Tatung Institute of Technology, strongly emphasises education and 
training. Each student and manager is required to attend his "operating management 
course." In his weekly seminar he not only teaches them management knowledge, but 
also cultivates the Tatung culture. In addition, he also describes corporation strategies 
and policies.35 The deputy chairman of its auditing committee said: "Because the 
chairman continually educates us in the management concept and philosophy at the 
college and company, Tatung culture is deeply cultivated in our minds." As the 
chairman has handled the group for nearly fifty years, his philosophy and behaviour 
significantly affect his managers. The deputy chairman said: "With the intangible 
impact, the senior managers and middle managers all are deeply influenced by his 
philosophy; that is Tatung culture. The longer the tenure, the deeper the affection. So 
when managers are sent to each operation, Tatung culture is there." 
Tatung is a publicly-owned corporation having more than 170,000 
stocld10lders, but still keeps some colour of the traditional Chinese family business. 
The "pure blood" is quite important in manager selection. Kin36 and in-group managers 
all occupy important positions. The concept of order is deeply rooted in employees' 
mind. Harmony and co-operation are always emphasised by senior managers. Tenure is 
still an impOltant factor "i'n promotion and young talents do not easily find impOltant 
positions. One senior manager who left Tatung many years ago said: "Tatung is more 
hierarchical and each person has his own position." and one of its senior managers said 
with deep feeling: "Tatung is not a place to show individual ability .. . Most of Tatung 
34Quotation from the speech of W.T. Lin, the president of Tatung UK company, in the 7th Annual 
Conference on Economic Promotion for Overseas Chinese in Europe, 1995. 
35Quotation from the interview with the deputy chairman of the auditing committee. 
36The chairman placed his five children in impOliant roles in the group. 
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employees keep a 'neutral manner' rather than to show their talents." 
As to the selection of managers for overseas operations, Tatung prefers to send 
their senior managers to overseas operations, but owing to cost consideration, they 
recruit basic managers locally as much as possible. Its deputy controller said: "We 
always send key managers to overseas operations from headquarters." Its secretariat 
director also emphasised the linkage between corporate culture and the personnel 
policy: "We record the chairman's philosophy, policy, and concept for everyone, 
including overseas units ... That is why we can keep Tatung culture even in overseas 
branches as well." 
In the Tatung UK company, though it bought its business fifteen years ago, its 
localisation is still quite slow. At the moment except for the president and two joint 
managing directors from headquarters, most senior positions are still held by 
Taiwanese people but more and more middle and basic managers are English. Its 
deputy controller said: "Most senior managers in the British company have stayed at 
headquarters for many years, and they are asked to come back to headquarters for 
reporting and meeting periodically. They have to contact and communicate with 
different departments of head office and they get the new operating philosophy in these 
meetings." He continued: "So even if a UK company has been local for a long time, 
actually it still keeps strong Tatung culture." From the opposite viewpoint, this 
personnel policy may hamper the localisation for overseas operations, as its secretariat 
director said: "Sending managers from Taiwan headquarters, of course, makes it more 
easy to execute company policy, but from a long-term view we still need to localise 
more." 
7 .4.2 Lite-On 
Under the framework of professional management, Lite-On shows its weak 
corporate culture by accepting lots of professional talents as their management team. 
Its president said: "Weak corporate culture is more helpful to the development of a 
multinational corporation." To foster an entrepreneurial and risk-taking culture, they 
continually use new management techniques via most advanced communication 
systems such as video conferencing and computer networks to enhance intra-group 
communication and speed up decision makin~7. 
Because of the strongly localised philosophy, they did localise quickly and 
successfully. Its president talked about his philosophy of localisation: 
37 Quotation from 1995 Lite-On group Profile. 
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"We believe when we enter a region or a country, we need to enjoy the local 
infrastructure, including market resources, people resources, and technical 
resources. So if you do not hire local people to run the business it is impossible 
to touch all those resources." 
He emphasised: "Only local people can know how to use local resources." 
They use different strategies for different types of overseas operations. For greenfield 
operations, such as operations in Malaysia and Thailand, they set up systems and 
quickly delivered these systems to local people. Its controller fully described the 
situation: "When the company was set up we always sent lots of people including each 
department head to handle each function .... Then we trained local people as managers 
and transferred our management system to them." At present in the Thai operation only 
the president comes from Taiwan headquarters. Other managers are already all local 
people; even the Malay operation, set up recently, now has only four people from 
headquarters. Its controller said: "This is our personnel style with an overseas 
company." But he still a little conservatively said: "It seems impossible to become 
totally localised. We realise at least we need to keep a president and financial manager 
there." The group seems quite to respect the operation of purchased companies as an 
autonomy, such as the British operation and other small trading companies. They trust 
local managers to run their branches. At present, the presidents of British and 
American operations are all local people and in the operations in Japan, Hong Kong, 
Singapore and most trading companies their managers are almost all local people.38 Its 
planning director said: "Because local people are familiar with the local environment 
they can easily make the right decisions." 
Lite-On took over the British operation in 1991 and they only sent one 
assistant there for convenient communication for the first two years. At present all 
managers at the British operation are British people, as its managing director said: 
"Our operation is totally independent." 
7.4.3 Mitac 
Mitac keeps a prudent attitude in its personnel policy and managers' selection, 
especially in the overseas operations. In the middle of the 1980s, as the group 
continually maintained fast growth and its managers were absorbed by big foreign 
companies, Mitac could not but begin to use lots of external human resources as its 
senior managers or consultants. Those people, however. could not blend in the real 
Mitac culture in which people are always working hard and remaining frugal.39 Of 
38Quotation from interviews with one of its VPs and the Planning Director. 
39Quotation from "The Story of Mitac." 
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course, the result was not good. Later, the chairman said: "I keep a very prudent 
attitude towards those managers from outside and I emphasise more and more the 
loyalty of employees within the company.40" Its vice present of the Taiwanese 
operation said: "The chairman strongly emphasises employees' honesty and integrity." 
The group has learned to be more localised in its overseas operations, but it 
suffered a great challenge. Its vice-chairman described the change: "We are still 
learning and changing continually. At first we sent senior managers from Taiwan, then 
we hired managers locally but we found some problems. Then we changed some 
policies and sent some managers from Taiwan, especially for matters of fmancial 
control." As they have had some past failures when hiring local managers to run 
operations, the group now prefers Chinese people as operational heads. Its chairman 
forthrightly said: "I feel Chinese managers are more suitable in this industry, so we 
use those people from headquarters or overseas Taiwanese people as operations' 
senior managers" He continued: "It is necessary to keep central thinking, follow 
corporate culture, and communicate with one another." Its controller also with deep 
feeling said: "Sending senior managers overseas is a better way, because their 
operating philosophies are more close to Taiwanese managers." At the moment except 
for operations in Japan and Mexico, Mitac uses Chinese people as general managers 
or managing directors on overseas operations, but as its vice president of the 
Taiwanese operation said: "Japanese and Mexican operations all have problems at 
present, so maybe we still need to make some personnel adjustments in those areas." 
As to the hierarchical organisation of managers in overseas operations, its 
chairman realised the management core among sales, technique, and finance is very 
important41 • If the team is organised well, the operation will easily succeed. In the 
sales and marketing area, the group used more open and decentralised manner42, so 
normally they used local people as sales and marketing managers, but in other core 
management functions they were more conservative in organising the managerial 
hierarchy. In the British operation, its managing director, manufacturing manager, 
technical manager, and vice controller are all Chinese.43 Its technical manager said: 
"Mitac handles the power of finance, technique, and personnel, but uses local people 
to handle other functions." 
Except for the general manager or managing director, basically pursuing 
localisation is still the Mitac main objective. They are still slowly transferring some 
senior positions to local people, as the president of Mitac International said: "The 
group has a clear objective. There is no difficulty in the management." 
40 Quotation from "The Story of Mitac." 
41Quotation from the interview with the Mitac chainnan. 
42From the interview with the vice chainnan of Mitac. 
43From the interviews with the managing director and the technical manager of UK company. 
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7.4.4 Acer 
With the philosophy "human nature is essentially good" and the goal of "local 
touch", Acer pursues its localisation quite aggressively. In order better to manage 
world markets and leverage their local capacities, Acer has always placed strong 
emphasis on forming partnership arrangements. Its chairman said: "The partnership 
philosophy starts with our employees, because Acer was founded with capital from its 
original employees. Therefore, Acer is an employee-owned company." He continued: 
"So when we globalise, we also like to invite first a local management team to become 
shareholders in the local business." 
Although the company keeps an open mind on the selection of managers, it still 
suffers lots of difficulties, especially recruiting people from outside. Its chairman said: 
"The managers recruited from outside brought some new ideas into Acer, but this 
challenged the traditional culture of high level managers.44" In Acer's history, there 
were nearly fifty outsider VPs. The chairman continued: "We need lots of talents 
because of high growth, but most talents did not succeed. Yes, they helped us for a 
while, but in the end we still need our second generation managers whom I originally 
thought still immature.4s " Those managers from outside were greatly ambitious, but 
they did not feel strongly about Acer culture. The chairman said: "The philosophy of 
those outside managers is quite different from mine. " 
Because of cultural and other relevant factors, Acer faces a great challenge on 
selection of managers in overseas operations. The chairman talked about the selection 
for overseas operations as follows: 
"I realise Chinese people are more suitable for logistics which require them to 
work harder to cope with complicated situations and it is not easy to delegate 
the responsibility to Western people, so I prefer Chinese people to take control 
of logistics work. Secondly, I prefer Chinese people to take control of product 
management, because it calls for greater contact with Taiwanese companies. 
For necessary communication, we need Chinese people in charge. In addition, 
if possible, I think for the first five years of a new operation the head should at 
best be a manager from headquarters, because at the beginning there are more 
problems to solve and it is necessary to get mutual trust with headquarters." 
Its senior VP also talked about the principle of managerial selection in overseas 
operations: "We think it is necessary to have at least one Chinese person among the 
president or managing director, controller, or logistics director. If there is one Chinese 
person in one of those positions, there is one control point existing and less chance of 
44Quotation from "Contingent Empire", p.222 . 
• 5Quotation from "Contingent Empire", p.223. 
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problems happening ... Secondly, if in any area or country it is important to have a local 
head representative, we hope to choose a local person. If any foreign operation 
becomes a public company, of course, we need a local person as a president." Acer's 
energy comes from their managers' mutual trust, but it is difficult to operate smoothly 
in foreign areas through an informal and flexible framework. Its fmancial VP said: 
"The belief that 'human nature is essentially good' may not be completely suitable 
abroad and it may not be easy to prevent problems, so simplifying matters abroad or 
setting a warning system are easier approaches. Besides, we set at least one person 
from headquarters in the position of head, controller, or logistics director." He 
continued: "When the managing director of a foreign operation is already a foreigner, 
normally we arrange the heads of finance and logistics to be from headquarters." 
As Acer's regional headquarters was set at the site of the Dutch operation, in 
addition to the above key managers there are other Chinese senior managers including 
product managers, financial managers, and MIS managers, so Chinese managers 
occupy about 50% of the total46• In the other two operations as few as one or two key 
managers are Chinese. Each regional headquarters has the right to replace its 
operations' managers. 
Compared to local people, managers sent from headquarters cost more, so 
principally they seek local people if possible. In addition to the reason of trust, they 
still have other reasons for sending senior managers from Taiwan. The first reason is 
that it is not easy to attract excellent talents for local operations, as its auditing director 
described: "The most difficult thing in the globalising process is the problem of 
'people.' Because we Chinese have only a short history in each country of operation, 
we have no good terms to attract the more talented people to us. However, as the terms 
become better and better, we are finding it easier to attract some excellent people." The 
second reason is for communicating purposes, as its senior VP said: "Because people 
sent from headquarters understand more about the group background and management 
style, it is easier to communicate with domestic managers than local people." Under 
the "fast food" manufacturing model, communication and speed are especially 
important factors for business. The final reason is the characteristic of the PC industry. 
As the product life cycle is very short, the PC industry changes so fast. Managers need 
to work hard and focus on business fluctuation all the time. Compared to European 
people who enjoy more time with their family, Taiwanese people readily accept 
working for a longer time and working hard. 
Leaving aside Dutch headquarters, basically Acer's localised policy is still 
successful in Europe. Under the "fast food" manufacturing structure, However, it will 
be difficult to localise totally in the next two years. Although they had lots of failed 
48From the interview with the president of European headquarters. 
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cases when trying to hire local people as senior managers, they still have successful 
cases, as in the French and German operations at present. Their heads are all local 
people and they still give good performance. The second managing director of the 
German operation felt optimistic enough to say: "They have as high expectation of 
themselves and their work attitudes as the Taiwanese managers, so I think we still have 
a good opportunity to localise totally. In the future it is possible that a local person will 
become the president of European headquarters." 
7.4.5 Managers' Selection among Case Firms 
From the above analyses, the patterns of selection of managers in case firms 
have already appeared. As Tatung keeps its "ethnocentric" strategic predisposition 
. between its headquarters and foreign subsidiaries, sending managers to foreign 
operations becomes a general policy. Except for the factor of performance, seniority 
and loyalty are the main considerations in the selection of managers. Senior Chinese 
managers keep most important positions in its European operation. Lite-On maintains 
its strategic predisposition as "national responsiveness" between headquarters and 
foreign operations. Performance and ability are the main considerations in the selection 
of managers and quick localisation in the foreign operations is its policy. At present, its 
managers in the European operation are all local people. As to Mitac and Acer, they 
are midway. However, Mitac maintains a mixed strategic predisposition of 
"ethnocentrism" and "geocentrism" between its headquarters and foreign operations. 
The factor of loyalty is still an important consideration in the selection of managers. 
Many positions at high level and financial personnel in the European operation are sent 
from its headquarters. Acer keeps a mixed strategic predisposition of "geocentrism" 
and "regiocentrism" between its headquarters and foreign subsidiaries. Except for 
special situations, its European regional headquarters has a great power to decide 
country heads and their core managers, and each country head can select other 
managers in his operation. Except for putting the factors of performance and ability 
into the selection of managers, they emphasise mutual trust to pursue their common 
objectives. Chinese managers occupy the highest position in its European regional 
headquarters, but only a few core managers are arranged in each of Acer's European 
operations. Overall, the sequence of spectrum of the extent of in-group of managers' 
selection in this research is Tatung, Mitac, Acer, and Lite-On. 
210 
7.4.6 Proposition and Discussion 
The proposition 2-3 could not be accepted by this research. Mitac, and 
especially Tatung, were more in-group oriented, but the policy of Acer and especially 
Lite-On cannot support the proposition. In Taiwanese operations, the shadow of in-
group culture existed more or less in all the case firms, but from an integrated view 
the situation has greatly changed. The concepts of professional management and 
localisation are gradually maturing in Taiwanese multinational corporations. Among 
the research cases, despite Lite-On's believing only local people know how to use 
local infrastructure, Acer is using the local touch approach, Mitac is designing a 
business focus framework, and Tatung is gradually localising its branches. 
Professional managers seem to be getting more important in the future of these 
multinational corporations. 
The results showed that the relationship between national culture and the factor 
of the selection of managers is not strong. Many reasons could explain the results of 
this factor on the degree of control (see section 7.2.6), including the shortage of 
Hofstede's cultural dimensions, patterning effect, special firm's historical background, 
and managers' knowledge and adaptability. However, in Tatung and Mitac, as in prior 
studies (such as Quinn et al., 1988; Whitley, 1992) the proposition was still supported. 
With the development of human resources management (HRM) and professional 
managers, however, some case firms will soon reject the policy of selecting managers 
from in-group. 
7.5 Propositions and Conclusions 
Proposition 2: National culture has a significant effect on the main leaders' 
financial control factors of Taiwanese corporation headquarters, including degree 
of control, budget evaluative style and manager's selection. 
Conclusion: Three sub-propositions have been assessed above and, in overall 
terms, the proposition could not be completely accepted by the research. From the 
above analysis, differences existed among the case firms. Tatung was significantly 
affected by leaders' financial control factors and could be called a "tight control style"; 
but Lite-On and Acer were little affected by leaders' financial control factors and 
could be classified as a "flexible control style." Mitac was in the middle and belonged 
to an "intermediate control style." Each firm owns its different managerial values 
based on different philosophies and backgrounds. Some firms may be consistent with 
national culture on individual points, but no consistent phenomenon could be found in 
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the study. Because the cases contained in the research all belong to multinational 
groups, they more or less learned professional management techniques and concepts 
of multinational management from advanced foreign multinational companies. So it is 
natural that national culture is gradually losing its importance to leaders' financial 
control factors. 
7.6 Summary 
Leaders' financial control factors have been discussed above and three different 
control patterns in leadership factors were found in the case firms. Tatung adopted a 
"tight control style" in financial control, Lite-On and Acer were practicing a more 
"flexible control style", and Mitac was following an "intermediate control style." 
Tatung showed a high degree of control, budget emphasis, and in-group 
orientation in the selection of managers. On the contrary, Lite-On and Acer showed a 
low degree of control, budget emphasis, and in-group orientation in managerial 
selection. Mitac seems to be in the middle. In addition, the proposition of the 
relationship between national culture and leadership factors could not be accepted by 
the research. Financial control factors represent strong managerial values based on 
operating philosophies which exist in the case fmns. 
In the next chapter, the research will probe the dynamic relationship between 
financial control factors and the transference of Mess. 
8. Financial Control Styles and the Uniformity of 'ICSs 
8.1 Introduction 
8.2 Financial Control styles and the Uniformity of MCSs 
8.3 The Degree of Control and the Uniformity of MCSs 
8.4 Budget Emphasis and the Uniformity of MCSs 
8.5 The Selection of Managers and the Uniformity of~lCSs 
8.6 Summary 
8.1 Introduction 
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In the last chapteL three financial control factors \\'ere discussed and the extent 
of their impact among the case firms was identified. In addition. the propositions 
concerning the national culture of headquarters and control factors \\Oere assessed. The 
results showed that the managerial values derived from financial control factors \n:re 
not strongly affected by national cultural values at headquarters. This chapter. based 
on the results of the last two. will continue to examine the propositions concerning 
financial control styles and the uniformity of MCSs. Further. this study will explore 
the relationship between each factor and the components of MCSs. 
8.2 Financial Control Styles and the Uniformity of MCSs 
Proposition 3: Financial control factors including degree of control, budget 
el11phasis and selection of managers have a significant impact on the components of 
1Il1lllagel11ent control system. 
Based on an evaluation of three financial control factors. including the degree 
of controL budget elnphasis. and selection of managers, different financial control 
styles in the case firms have been assessed. This proposition will examine the 
relationship bet\\Oeen financial control styles and the uniformity of Mess in the case 
firtns. 
S.2.1 Financial Control and MCSs 
,\s seen in the last chapter. the impact of financial control factors resulted in 
thrcL' groups: Tatung \\as classified as haying a "tight control styk." \ litac helonged 
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to an "intennediate control style," and Acer and Lite-On were identified as consistent 
with the "flexible control style." 
As shown by the qualitative analysis in chapter 6, apart from the rewarding 
process, the extent of similarities of MeSs between the Taiwanese operation and 
European operation within a finn follows almost the same pattern as the impact of 
financial control factors among the three groups. Tatung had strongly similar MeSs 
between its Taiwanese operation and European operation. Mitac kept some items 
similar. As for Lite-On and Acer, more items showed obvious differences. It would 
seem that, except for the rewarding process, the fmancial control style had a strong 
relationship with the uniformity of MeSs. Tatung with the style of "tight financ~al 
control" had highly similar MeSs between its Taiwanese and European operations; 
Lite-On and Acer with the style of "flexible financial control" showed obviously 
different MeSs between their Taiwanese and European operations; and Mitac was in 
the middle. 
8.2.2 Conclusion and Discussion 
Conclusion 
Uniformity of 
MCSs 
High 
Low 
Tatung 
X 
Tight 
Mitac 
X 
: Lite-On 
X 
X 
Acer' 
Flexible 
Strictness of Financial Control 
Figure 8.1 Financial Control Styles among Case Firms 
With regard to the themes of unifonnity of MeSs and style of financial 
control. different patterns are evident among the case finns (see Figure 8.1). Financial 
control factors strongly impact on the components of the management control system. 
The tighter the financial control, the more uniformity of MeSs between the 
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operations; the more flexible the fmancial control, the less uniformity of Mess 
between the operations. Except for the rewarding components, this proposition could 
be supported by the interview field data; that is, fmancial control factors including 
degree of control, budget emphasis, and managers' selection had a significant impact 
on the management control system. 
Discussion 
Although lacking direct prior studies for comparison, the research results could 
still provide some reasonable explanations. First, a firm's leader is a key to a fmn's 
control style (Dermer and Lucas, 1986; Stacey, 1990; Nahavandi & Malekzadeh, 
1993; Nohria & Ghoshal, 1994). A leader's education and experience (Merchant et al., 
1995) significantly influence control style. Secondly, the financial control style has a 
deep relationship with corporate strategy. Many researchers (such as Govindarajan & 
Gupta, 1985; Snodgrass & Grant, 1986; Govindarajan, 1988; Govindarajan & Fisher, 
1990, Daniel & Reitsperger, 1991) have found a strong linkage between strategy and 
the control system. Different financial control styles in a multinational firm will 
appear under different corporate strategies (Chakravarthy & Perlmutter, 1985; Goold 
& Campbell, 1987; Stacey, 1990). Thirdly, as described in the last chapter, many 
prior studies concerning individual factors, including degree of control, budget 
emphasis, and selection of managers, have established the relationships of financial 
systems with these individual factors. 
Because of the different extents of impact from degree of control, budget 
emphasis, and managers' selection among the case firms, the research will continue to 
probe how each financial control factor affects the components of MCSs within each 
firm. Of course, some impacts from the interaction of financial control factors are not 
easy to break up clearly and explain, but finding some clues can still help us to 
understand how the transference of MCSs has occurred. 
8.3 The Degree of Control and the Uniformity of MCSs 
Proposition 3-1: The greater the degree of control by the headquarters' leaders, the 
fewer the differences of Mess between the Taiwanese and European operations. 
The degree of control by headquarters could affect the MCS of operations. The 
greater the degree of control, the more possibility there is of a uniform system 
between operations. The greater the degree of control, the more the policies and 
instructions will flow from headquarters with more hierarchical procedures. From the 
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analysis in the last chapter, the rank from high to low of the degree of control of cases 
is Tatung, then Mitac, and then Lite-On and Acer. Each process will be carefully 
examined in this section. 
8.3.1 Planning Process 
Generally speaking, the degree of control of headquarters had relative 
significantly impacts on the planning process of operations. The greater the degree of 
control by headquarters' leaders, the less the difference in the planning process, 
especially in the approach of top-town objective-setting and the participation of the 
management team. Tatung with its tight degree of control in finance had more detailed 
instructions, bureaucratic procedures, and interference from the centre in objective 
setting, and more formal discussions but fewer managers' negotiations between line 
levels and managers' involvement in strategies and visions in participation. Lite-On 
and Acer with their flexible control in finance had fewer detailed instructions, 
bureaucratic procedures, and interferences from the centre in objective setting, and 
less formal discussions but more negotiations and involvement from their managers. 
Mitac stayed in the middle. As to the component of long-term and short-term 
planning, it seemed to be easily influenced by strategic management styles. Owing to 
a sharper focus on financial control, Tatung and Mitac emphasised short-term 
planning more than did Lite-On and Acer. Each case firm will be further discussed as 
follows. 
8.3.1.1 Tatung 
In Tatung, significant decisions, especially concerning investment and changes 
in policy, must be presented to its chairman for approval. I Before budgeting, 
headquarters first sets the total objective and then each operation prepares a rough 
budget for the combined objective purpose, to see whether the total objective can be 
achieved.2 Almost standardised procedures were regulated by its budget manual. In 
addition, a formal budget committee could be found in both Taiwanese Tatung and 
British Tatung. With a very strict financial control, annual budget was strongly 
emphasised by both operations and the long-term planning lacked real feedback. A 
great number of formal discussions were held at weekly and monthly operating 
meetings in which significant matters were discussed by their managers. When 
operations had finished their budgets, the chairman normally would increase the 
operations' targets.3 Although the Taiwanese operation had a participating team to set 
I From the interview with the deputy chainnan of auditing committee of Tatung Company. 
2From the interview with chief accounting of Taiwanese operation ofTatung Company. 
3From the interview with the director of Taiwanese operation of Tatung Company. 
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the objective according to the total corporation objective, its head had a great impact 
and the final target was ultimately controlled by the chairman. The process of top-
down on objective-setting was very obvious. Following Taiwan's Tatung procedures, 
the British president, like the chairman in Taiwan, held great powers of decision. 
Before budgeting, the president discussed the company objective containing the 
policies and strategies with two managing directors.4 Initially the objective used a top 
down approach and then each unit built up their budgets. 5 
Overall, with the impact of Tatung's tight control, both operations focused on 
short-term planning and used very similar top-down objective-setting and team work 
for planning and budgeting, but owing to its smaller scale the British operation had 
slightly stronger top down objective-setting and smaller team work for budgeting. 
8.3.1.2 Mitac 
"Mitac group is slowly stepping towards decentralisation from centralisation.6" 
As well as the headquarters, they set up three sub-headquarters to handle different 
affiliated companies. Although below the level of sub-headquarters they cultivated 
many professional managers, basically the headquarters and three sub-headquarters 
still played important roles within the whole group. They retained a greater degree of 
decentralisation in marketing and still remain relatively conservative in finance. 7 They 
designed a "BEP AID" report with financial strategic factors for monitoring overseas 
operations and amalgamated the key important reports8, and it is their hope to manage 
their operations through statements or reports.9 With a tight financial control, annual 
budget objectives were emphasised by the Taiwanese and British operations, and both 
operations were not over-concerned with long-term planning. They emphasised 
discipline, set certain rules to be followed lO, developed a network organisation 
protocol language to encourage their people to use E-mail and MIS systems to keep 
freedom of information. II The matrix system in the British operation is quite 
obvious. 12 
On objective setting, in the Taiwanese operation top management would set 
some important targets including profit, turnover, and R&D according to previous 
years records. 13 Then each department head would attend the meeting for discussing 
4From the interview with the executive director of Tatung (U.K.) Company. 
SFrom the interview with the operating manager of Tatung (U.K.) Company. 
6Quotation from the interviews with the chairman and the vice chairman of Mitac group. 
7 Quotation from the interview with the vice chairman of Mitac group. 
8Quotation from the interview with the chairman of Mitac group. 
9Quotation from the interview with the president of Mitac International. 
IOQuotation from the interview with the chairman of Mitac group. 
t tFrom the interview with the chairman of Mitac group. 
t2From the interview with the managing director of Mitac Europe Ltd. 
t3Quotation from the interview of the controller Mitac International. 
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the annual business plan including significant strategies and developing directions. So 
basically its objective setting was still a top-down approach~ but more managers 
participated in the budgeting. In the British operation~ except for a sales budget Mitac 
did not prepare a segment budget but a company-wide budget. 14 Only a few key 
managers participated in the budgeting, especially the controller, sales manager, and 
logistics manager. Its managing director played an important role in objective setting 
and negotiated a budget target with headquarters. If headquarters did not agree to the 
budget target, then the operation would adjust the financial target until top 
management at headquarters agreed with it. IS Its controller described the situation: 
"When we set the budget objective, headquarters always determines our objective ... 
Our objective setting is a top-down approach." The British operation used an obvious 
top-down approach in objective setting and only a few key people participated. 
Overall, with the impact of conservation of financial control, a top-down 
approach in objective setting was found in both Taiwanese and British operations, but 
owing to the obvious differences in scale and business focus, the two operations had 
different levels of participation in the planning process. In addition, both operations 
focused on short-term planning only. 
8.3.1.3 Lite-On 
Generally speaking, Lite-On is a very diversified group. Headquarters plays a 
weak role but its leaders can affect policies and directions of subordinate corporations 
through each board of directors. "Each corporation has a professional management 
team to run its business, and each manager according to his management level has 
different powers and responsibility. 16" 
In Taiwan, the budget was divided and prepared by SBUs and each SBU 
manager had his own powers and responsibility. He could significantly affect 
personnel and financial affairs. I' Before developing three-year strategic planning, top 
management would set some clear basic goalS. 18 Each SBU manager had to have 
ability to present his plan and all senior managers had to take part in the discussion. 
The strategic planning was reviewed every half year and the annual budget was 
prepared on the basis of strategic planning. The basic goal came from top 
management, but the budgeting was from the bottom. Then they would find and adjust 
the balancing point. 19 In the British operation, as it was directly subordinated under 
the president of Taiwan Lite-On, its managing director enjoyed more 
l4From the interview with the controller of Mitac Europe Ltd. 
lSQuotation from the interview with the assistant controller of Mitac Europe Ltd. 
l6Quotation from the interview with the controller of Taiwan Liton. 
l'Quotation from the interview with the planning director of Taiwan Liton. 
l8Quotation from the interview with the deputy of controller of Taiwan Liton. 
19Quotation from the interview with the planning director of Taiwan Liton. 
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decentralisation.2o They used the bottom up approach for strategic planning and 
budgeting, and they focused on annual budget more than on strategic planning. "The 
budgeting is put together by department managers and each is asked the needs. 21" 
Compared to the Taiwanese operation, its planning process appeared to involve fewer 
bureaucratic procedures and to remain more flexible. The managing director. 
executive director, and controller were the main roles in determining the company 
objective. Normally the budget when presented to the Taiwanese president to be 
reviewed showed only a small change.22 Other managers just participated in the 
meeting, not in the budgeting, and most of the budget was prepared by the controller. 
Overall, with the impact of the philosophy of national responsiveness, the 
Taiwanese and British operations had developed their different styles in objective 
setting and participation. In objective setting, the Taiwanese operation kept a balance 
between a top-down approach and bottom-up approach and British operations used a 
more bottom-up approach. In planning participation, the two operations had some 
differences in formality but also showed some similarity in managers' negotiations and 
involvements. As to the long-term and short-term planning, long-term strategic 
planning was used in the Taiwanese and British operations, but because the British 
operation was still in the survival stage, it still focused more on short-term planning. 
8.3.1.4 Acer 
Because many subsidiaries or branches owned less than 50% of group shares, 
they were often managed through their board of directors. "The framework focuses on 
controlling policies and operating directions not on directly managing their 
systems.23" "Each company's managers were required to respond to their board of 
directors, not to headquarters. There was not even the term 'headquarters' of the whole 
group to them.24" "Under the client-server system, each operation has enough room 
to develop.2s" In overseas operations, each RBU has its own headquarters to monitor 
its operations; for example, headquarters of European RBU takes charge of all 
European operations. 
On objective setting, Acer asked their operations to prepare dual objectives, 
for both financial and management purposes. Normally they formed their consensus 
on whole objectives in their so~called "summit meeting" which each operation 
20Quotation from the interview with the controller of Taiwan Liton. 
21Quotation from the interview with the managing director of Lite-On Limited (UK). 
22Quotation from the interview with the managing director of Lite-On Limited (UK). 
23Quotation from the interview with the senior vice president of Acer Inc. 
24Quotation from the interview with the senior vice president of Acer Inc. 
2SFrom the interview with the chainnan of Acer group. 
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manager had to attend every half year. Then the group's headquarters decided some 
critical figures and delivered down, especially the extent of the growth rate. 26 
The top-down objective setting and full participation were very obvious in the 
Taiwanese operation. Based on long-term visions, top management drafted a plan 
guide containing objectives, mission, and strategy and delivered it to the operating 
meeting for discussion before budgeting. Each departmental head had to take part in 
the meeting and the content might be revised there. Following the discussion, each 
department started to prepare its annual budget. In Europe, as well as attending the 
summit meeting held by the whole group, each country head was also required to 
attend the quarterly meeting held by European headquarters for discussing important 
decisions and strategies, and forming an objective consensus. In the European area, a 
different extent of participation and top down objective setting existed in different 
operations. The German operation used more top down objective setting and only key 
managers participated in the setting; in the Dutch operation, top managers set the 
target and then sought negotiation with the relevant units in budgeting; and in the 
British operation, they got consensus in the strategic meeting and then top 
management gave instructions about the target before budgeting. Three European 
operations used different extents of a top down approach in objective setting, and 
European headquarters in which all senior managers are Chinese people significantly 
affected the process of objective setting of its European operations. Basically, each 
operation set its objective depending on the objectives of the group and of European 
headquarters.27 
Overall, with the philosophy of separate management and loose financial 
control from the centre, Acer formed its common consensus of long-term visions and 
clear missions through discussions with its operations' managers. Each operation more 
or less used a top down method to deliver its objectives based on the common 
consensus. However, each operation's head had the right to decide the approach of 
objective setting and the way of participation by himself. As described in the above, 
the Taiwanese and British operations showed obviously different ways of objective 
setting and participation in planning process. As to long-term and short-term planning. 
both operations pursued their long-term visions together, but with a market focus, 
annual budget targets were still carefully watched by them, especially for the 
European operations. 
26From the interview with the logistics director of Acer UK Company. 
27From the interview with the managing director of Acer UK Company. 
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8.3.2 Organising Process 
The degree of control by headquarters could significantly affect its operations' 
organising process. European operations could copy their decentralisation and 
formality from headquarters. Generally speaking, the greater the degree of control by 
headquarters, the less the decentralisation in their operations. Further, the greater the 
degree of control by headquarters, the more the formality in their operations. Tatung 
with its tight control style had more financial controls from the centre and less 
independence in decision-making at the operational level; Acer and Lite-On held the 
opposite position; and Mitac kept its position midway. On formality, Tatung had more 
formal documents, rules and procedures, Lite-On and Acer kept their systems more 
flexible, and Mitac also stayed in the middle. Each case firm will be discussed further 
in detail as follows. 
8.3.2.1 Tatung 
From the viewpoint of the organising process, the Tatung UK company was 
like a miniature version of Tatung's Taiwan Corporation. Both operations had strong 
financial and personnel controls, formal and periodic operating meetings, detailed 
operating manual and documents, formal rules and procedures, a clearly decentralised 
decision system for routine activities, and formal budgeting process. Objectively 
speaking, both Taiwanese and British operations were more or less centralised and 
quite formal. 
8.3.2.2 Mitac 
Compared to Tatung, Mitac had a moderate degree of control by its 
headquarters. They controlled overseas operations through the "BEP AID" report 
system and for daily communication they used the transparent information system and 
E-mail system. 
Its Taiwanese operation used a clearly decentralised decision making system 
and each department followed the decentralised rule to make decisions independently. 
Although it was more centralised in finance, in other fields it had some degree of 
decentralisation. On formality, they followed the regulations of ISO #9001 and kept a 
basic formal operating manual and documents, maintained a formal budget process, 
and followed financial rule and procedures, but they still kept relative flexibility for 
their managers. When facing a special situation, they discussed it together to find a 
temporary and special procedure.28 
28Quotation from the interview with the associate vice president in quality of Mitac International. 
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In the British operation, the factor of the degree of control by headquarters' 
leaders seemed less to affect its organising process. Although it still followed some 
basic rules, regulations, and uniform reports and protocol communication language set 
by headquarters, it was obviously less decentralised and formal than the Taiwanese 
operation. Apart from the demand for market-orientation, there are two main reasons. 
First, the scale of the British operation is obviously smaller than the Taiwanese 
operation. "The managing director has handled it since the beginning of the company, 
so he knows each function very well.29" So, only a few important regulations were 
kept in written form. Its managing director used weekly meetings to make team 
decisions and ensure cooperation. Secondly, its managing director, logistics director. 
and technical manager all came from the Tat,ung UK company which has a different 
corporate culture from Mitac. Basically they still kept a more centralised style and 
most decisions still called for consultation with the managing director. However, 
compared to Tatung, they are more flexible and informal.3o 
8.3.2.3 Lite-On 
Lite-On used a professional management framework and kept less degree of 
control by headquarters' leaders within the group. Its operational managers essentially 
enjoyed a relative decentralisation. In the Taiwanese operation there was a clearly 
decentralised decision-making system and each SBU manager could make decisions 
independently. In the British operation its top management encouraged its managers to 
make decisions independently, but owing to the historical background, their managers 
still did not like to make decisions independently. As to formality, obviously, the 
Taiwanese operation was more formal than the British. The Taiwanese operation kept 
more written rules and documents and maintained them more constantly. Obviously, 
its British operation could organise its own procedures with almost no interference 
from headquarters. 
8.3.2.4 Acer 
Under the framework of the client-server system, Acer had less degree of 
control by headquarters and each operation was given enough space for development. 
Its chairman said: "We have a basic system framework, but we do not regulate in 
detail. I ask operations' managers to follow the fluctuating local situation to change 
their approach flexibly." Decentralisation and flexibility seem to be the special 
characteristics of the Acer group. 
29Quotation from the interview with the managing director of Mitac Europe Limited. 
30Quotation from the interview with the managing director of Mitac Europe Limited. 
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In the Taiwanese operation, each level of management was fully decentralised 
in decision making, but had to bear the full responsibility of success or failure. 
Formality in documents and procedures was lacking and the final result was the main 
focus. The Taiwanese operation still maintained more formality than its overseas 
operations. 
In the European area, the heads of the Dutch and British operations were more 
decentralised, but the head of the German operation kept a more conservative 
decentralisation. Different management styles of operational heads caused significant 
variances in decentralisation. As its chairman said: "The only way we can operate is to 
give them a basic system framework and some knowledge of business sense." 
Generally speaking, different operations had obviously different extents of 
decentralisation. As to the formality, they strongly lacked written regulations and 
documents, and their managers were still "to follow the changing of local situations to 
change their approaches flexibly." 
8.3.3 Evaluating Process 
The degree of control by headquarters' leaders could sometimes affect the 
evaluating process. Those companies which had a greater degree of control by 
headquarters managers were more strict on their controllability-filters. Tatung gave 
little consideration to controllability-filters and managers' explanations, with Mitac, 
Acer and Lite-On giving progressively more attention to this component. In addition, 
the greater the degree of control the companies had, the more strict were they in 
financial control, procedural control, and directives given at meetings. This resulted in 
shorter frequency and deeper feedback. The sequence of information detail and the 
extent of feedback from high to low is Tatung, Mitac, and Lite-On and Acer. Each 
case firm will be discussed further in detail as follows. 
8.3.3.1 Tatung 
On controllability-filters, in both Taiwanese and British operations, although 
all unit heads had opportunities to explain uncontrollable items, it was very difficult 
for them to revise their targets. Their top management gave little consideration to the 
effect of uncontrollable operating factors. As to the feedback extent and frequency, 
both operations did emphasise strict control. They used standard costing to control 
their capacity, efficiency, overheads, and expenses, and they emphasised procedure 
control through monitoring capital expenditure, approving a discretionary programme, 
and discussing performance variances in a series of meetings. In addition, the 
chairman of Tatung group and the president of the British operation preferred to give 
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some directives at meetings such as conclusions, suggestions, or future operating 
strategies and directions. 
8.3.3.2 Mitac 
Controllability-filters were not inspected in its control system, but both 
operations' managers had opportunities to explain uncontrollable items and under 
some special conditions top management could still accept their explanations. As to 
the feedback extent and frequency, two operations have similar feedback frequency 
and uniform main reports31 , but owing to different scales between the two operations 
there were obvious differences on the extent of feedback. The Taiwanese operation 
had a deeper extent of feedback than the British operation. The budget was controlled 
by the product line and department in the Taiwanese operation, but the British 
operation lacked segmental budget reports and put more emphasis on procedure 
controls and more directives given by the managing director at meetings. 
8.3.3.3 Lite-On 
Compared to Tatung and Mitac, Lite-On had less control in its management. In 
both Taiwanese and British operations, if there were good reasons they could accept 
uncontrollable items, but the Taiwanese operation took them more formally and 
systematically and defined most of them in its strategic planning. Conversely, the 
British operation showed slack control. On feedback extent and frequency, owing to 
the factor of cultural background, some practical differences existed between the two 
operations. Both operations were not too strict in the responsibility feedback, but on 
the management information system and feedback frequency the Taiwanese operation 
did absolutely better than the British operation. 
8.3.3.4 Acer 
Acer used the dis-integrated model and split its business into many small 
autonomous operations. Each operation could make its decisions independently and 
top management could fully exploit the management by asking each operation to 
achieve its objective. The headquarters cared only about whether their operations' 
managers achieved their targets in the budget feedback. Whether the managers were 
committed to and guaranteed their budget targets was very important. Top 
management did not care too much about detailed feedback and the extent of feedback 
within different operations. 
On controllability-filters, both Taiwanese and European operations showed 
only small differences but the Taiwanese operation gave a little consideration to 
31 From the interview with the ehainnan of Mitae group. 
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uncontrollable items. Basically, all operations did not consider uncontrollable items 
too much. "The corporation would like to let an operation's manager bear the full 
responsibility for success and failure.,,32 On feedback extent and frequency, they 
lacked uniformity. With different styles of operation, each operation had its own 
feedback approach. Altogether, the Taiwanese and British operations had more and 
deeper feedback than the Dutch and German operations. 
8.3.4 Rewarding Process 
There was no obvious relationship between the degree of control by 
headquarters' leaders and the reward system. With the Chinese philosophy of "when in 
Rome do as the Romans do", Taiwanese frrms respect the compensation structures 
and styles of overseas operations. With the varying degree of control by headquarters' 
leaders, sometimes it was still possible that there were some different effects in the 
European operations' reward system, but basically a very weak relationship between 
the reward system and the degree of control by headquarters was found in the 
research. The case firms will be discussed in more detail as follows. 
8.3.4.1 Tatung 
A strongly different reward system existed between the Taiwanese and British 
operations. The British operation made a little change in its payment and benefit 
system, and basically headquarters respected its original compensation system. Even 
so, some employees' benefits are like those of the Taiwan Tatung Company. 
8.3.4.2 Mitac 
The managing director of its British operation followed the model of the 
Tatung UK company. No direct relationship between the degree of control by 
headquarters' leaders and the rewarding system of the British operation was found in 
this study. 
8.3.4.3 Lite-On 
The managing director of its British operation had independent powers of 
rewarding. No direct relationship between the degree of control by headquarters' 
leaders and the rewarding system was found in this study. 
32Quotation from the interview with the plant director of Acer Global Inc. 
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8.3.4.4 Acer 
Under the client-server structure, its European RBU, even each individual 
country operation under the RBU, owned absolute power to determine its rewarding 
system. Little relationship between the degree of control by headquarters' leaders and 
the rewarding system was found in the research. 
8.3.5 Summary and Discussion 
Summary 
Except for the rewarding process, basically the degree of control by 
headquarters' leaders and the transference of MCSs of overseas operations was a 
positive relation. The stronger the degree of control by headquarters' leaders, the 
greater the impact on the transference of MCSs. That means the greater degree of 
control by the headquarters' leaders, the fewer the differences between Taiwanese and 
European operations. 
In overall terms, the proposition 3-1 was broadly supported by this research. 
Except for the rewarding process, other processes were broadly affected by the degree 
of control by headquarters. This proposition was supported by most of the components 
of the MCSs. However, some situational factors found in the research also essentially 
impacted on the European operations, especially on Mitac's European operation. 
These situational factors will be discussed further in the next chapter. 
Discussion 
The results showed a reasonably logical relationship between control style and 
MCS design. The beliefs and philosophy of the central figure of the organisation are 
the principal determinant of control style (Stacey, 1990). Degree of control concerns a 
basis of power (Pettigrew, 1973). Different control styles could influence MCS 
design. Though lacking literature for direct comparison with these results, compared 
to the studies of Chakravarthy & Perlmutter (1985), Goold & Campbell (1987), and 
Stacey (1990), the research results showed a close consistency with prior research. A 
strong link between strategy, financial control style, and MCSs could be 
demonstrated. The factor of degree of control did appear to influence the uniformity of 
MCSs in case firms. 
8.4 Budget Emphasis and the Uniformity of MeSs 
Proposition 3-2: The greater the budget emphasis by the headquarters' leaders, the 
fewer the di.fferences of Mess between Taiwanese and European operations. 
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Budget emphasis could influence the uniformity of management control 
systems. Those companies putting more emphasis on the budget may have a more 
uniform system between their domestic operations and overseas operations than do 
those companies which put less emphasis on the budget. All the case firms owned 
basic budget functions, but they differed in extent. From the above chapter analysis, 
the sequence of budget emphasis is Tatung, then Mitac, and then Acer and Lite-On. 
Tatung's headquarters' leaders emphasised budget planning and controlling most 
strongly. There were some obvious procedures during the budget planning and 
controlling process. Mitac's headquarters' leaders regarded the budget as a controlling 
instrument. 33 They used the "BEP AID" report system to check the budget control, as 
its chairman said: "If an operation cannot attain the budget objective, then all 
'BEP AID' problems will happen." Compared to Tatung, however, it placed only 
moderate emphasis on the budget. Lite-On and Acer used budget as an instrument of 
objective management and objective setting, and they lacked real budget control, 
focusing more on the bottom line. Lite-On emphasised planning, but not the 
controlling function. Under the harmony philosophy, it lacked competitive spirit 
within the corporation and focused more on the objective of whole company profit. 
Acer's slogan, "Budget is not Bible", reflected its high level managers' operating 
philosophy. They just used objective management to motivate their managers. 
8. 4. 1 Planning Process 
Budget emphasis bore a close relation to the uniformity of the planning 
process. On objective setting and participation, the greater the emphasis on the budget 
the stronger the similarity in budget setting and procedures, and the balance between 
long-term and short-term planning still was easily affected by the extent of budget 
emphasis. On the variables of objective setting and participation, Tatung with a tight 
control style had characteristics of standard budget procedures and detailed financial 
objectives in objective setting, and more formal participation through segment budgets 
and hierarchical review. Acer with a flexible control style was on the opposite side. 
However, owing to different emphases on budget functions, although Mitac and Lite-
On displayed differences in budget emphasis, they were very close in objective setting 
and participation. As to the variable of long-term and short-term planning, Acer and 
Lite-On focused more on visions or strategies, but Tatung and Mitac pleased more on 
emphasis the annual budget. Each case firm will be discussed further in detail as 
follows. 
33From the interview with the ehainnan of Mitae group. 
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8.4.1.1 Tatung 
Tatung emphasised the budget very much. As its deputy controller said: "We 
have a powerful budget system." Sometimes their budget control was even more strict 
than that of government institutions.34 On the objective setting, a nearly standardised 
process was employed and a period of more than three months for budgeting was 
evident in both Taiwanese and British operations. On participation, both operations 
were quite similar. The budgets were prepared by department and product line in each 
operation, and each department was required to participate in the budgeting. Each 
departmental head communicated with the others in a series of budget meetings. As 
well as the annual budget, both operations have seven or five years' long-term 
planning, containing significant investment and critical operating figures. The annual 
budget was emphasised more by both Taiwanese and British operations. Objectively 
speaking, the attitude of budget emphasis of headquarters' leaders significantly 
affected its Taiwanese and British operations. 
8.4.1.2 Mitac 
The Mitac chairman regarded the budget as an important management 
instrument. Their rate of attaining the budget objective occupied nearly two-thirds of 
the weight when the performance of operations' heads was appraised.3s Its chairman 
said: "Managers who could not attain their budget objectives were even fired." 
On objective setting, they had many budget meetings discussing some 
significant strategies and developing directions before preparing departmental 
budget.36 The chairman said: "Strategies will change the integrated budget structure." 
They held board of directors' meetings and operating meetings of the whole group at 
the same time each half year to discuss the budget objectives and how to achieve 
them.37 Although top management will set some important targets before budgeting, 
almost all senior managers including departmental heads more or less participate in 
the objective setting in these meetings, but in the British operation, some financial 
goals were significantly affected by headquarters.38 Then a few senior managers as a 
management team discussed the budget objective and some significant strategies and 
directions, and then communicated them down through the company. The spirit of 
budget emphasis seems only to have involved a few critical managers. 
In Taiwan, the budget was prepared by product line and department. Each 
department had to participate in the budgeting and each departmental head had to 
34Quotation from the interview with the deputy controller of Tatung Company. 
3SFrom the interview with the vice chairman of Mitac group. 
36From the interview with the controller of Mitac international. 
37From the interview with the chairman of Mitac group. 
38Quotation from the interview with the logistics director of Mitac Europe Limited. 
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attend a series of budget meetings. In the British operation, except that the sales 
budget was prepared by the marketing department, almost the whole budget was 
completed by the financial department. 39 They expended a little time discussing the 
budgeting, but they used the open mail system fully, weekly managers meetings, and 
face-to-face talking and discussion as communication channels.4o 
As to the long-term and short-term planning, the group did not care about 
long-term planning too much. Although the Taiwanese operation had a long-term 
plan, it only contained some rough important indicators prepared by the financial 
department. No department had any firm long-term or middle range plan41 ; that means 
they only had some abstract long-term missions and visions and lacked any detailed 
plan or steps.42 In the British operation, although its five year plan also covered capital 
expenditure, capital increment, and rough goals43, it lacked formality and seemed only 
for top management reference. Its long-term plan lacked the consideration of policies 
and strategies44, as its assistant controller described: "Long-term forecasting is 
nonsense!" Generally speaking, both operations emphasised short-term planning and 
did not care too much about the long-term plan. 
8.4.1.3 Lite-On 
Lite-On leaders strongly emphasised the planning process. Under the 
professional management framework, each level of managers could have relative 
input. In objective setting, there was clearly a two-stage process: strategic planning 
and annual budget. They linked strategic planning and the annual budget better than 
other groups. Although, before planning, top management set some basic goals, they 
used team participation to set objectives. Each SBU needed to present its proposal and 
they spent a long time in budgeting. Participation was very good in the Taiwanese 
operation, as each different level of manager and department had to join in the 
discussions. Each manager's opinion could be relatively respected by his supervisor. 
Long-term planning was emphasised more than in other case firms. They used 
"SWOT" technology to assist their three years strategic planning, and they reviewed 
the strategic planning each half year. Once they finished their strategic planning, the 
annual budget was prepared exactly as planned.4s 
The British operation seemed not to have learned from the Taiwanese 
operation. It used a more bottom up approach for budgeting and only key managers 
39From the interview with the assist controller of Mitac EW'Ope Limited. 
40From the interview with the logistics director of Mitac Europe Limited. 
41 Quotation from the interview with the A VP of quality management of M i~c I nternati~nal. 
42Quotation from the interview with the AVP of material management ofMltac International. 
43From the interview with the logistics director of Mitac EW'Ope Limited. 
44Quotation from the interview with the controller of Mitac Europe Limited. 
4SFrom the interview with the planning director of Taiwan Liton. 
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participated in setting objectives, to a small extent, and these lacked participation in 
the segment budgets prepared by each department or product line. Its top management 
encouraged more communication on co-operating but not on budgeting. As to long-
term and short-term planning, it tried to learn the way of the Taiwanese operation. 
They prepared both a long-term plan and annual budget as in Taiwanese operations. 
but they still focused more on annual budget than did the Taiwanese operation. The 
linkage between long-term planning and short-term planning still could not compare 
with Taiwanese operations. 
8.4.1.4 Acer 
Acer's top managers did not emphasise the budget too much.46 They 
encouraged their managers to pursue their targets instead of controlling their budget in 
detail. They asked their operations' heads to understand fully their business model, the 
basic operating structure of the financial statements, and not to spend too much time 
in budgeting. 47 Their senior managers at headquarters focused on objective 
management instead of monitoring their operations' budget control. 
On objective setting, owing to different business focuses, many differences 
existed between Taiwanese and European operations. The Taiwanese operation 
expended a longer time in budgeting of a more formal kind, but some similarities 
could still be found among operations: first, after each operation selected its business 
model, their managers could focus only on sales and the bottom line in budgeting. The 
German and British operations did not even have a detailed segment budget. 
Secondly, they did not expend too much time in budgeting, especially European 
operations. Thirdly, they prepared likely and most likely dual objectives for financial 
and management purposes. 
The Taiwanese operation obviously had broader and deeper participation than 
European operations. In the European area, each operation with a marketing-
orientation had its different extent of participation depending on its leadership style. 
Because European headquarters was set in the Dutch operation and more budgeting 
practices were learned from Taiwanese operations, the Dutch operation had more 
participation than the German and British operations. 
As to short-term and long-term planning, Acer smartly and successfully used 
some simple slogans representing their long-term visions, such as "2000 in 2000, 21 
in 21" ... etc., as their common objectives. The Taiwanese operation followed Acer's 
long-term visions and kept clear missions for its long-term and short-term goals. 
However. owing to uncertain situational factors and leaders' philosophy. each 
46From the interview with the chairman of Acer group. 
47From the interview with the senior VP of Acer Inc. 
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European operation focused only on its annual budget. Although some of them still 
had so-called long-tenn plans, they lacked real meaning. The managing director of the 
German operation described its internal long-term plan: "This long-term planning is 
nothing ... it is only like a vision and also a long-term strategy." 
8.4.2 Organising Process 
The budget emphasis by headquarters' leaders had a rather close relationship to 
the organisation process. The more the budget emphasis, the more strict the financial 
control and the more fonnality in budgeting procedures. The relationships among the 
case firms on the components of decentralisation and formality are broadly consistent 
with the extent of budget emphasis. Each case will be discussed further in detail as 
follows. 
8.4.2.1 Tatung 
The budget was very important to each unit in Tatung. If there was no budget, 
any expenditure needed to be approved in advance. Without enough reasons, it was 
not easy to gain approval. "Budget control sometimes is even more strict than 
government.48 " Its budget represented a part of decentralisation. Its Taiwanese and 
British operations used strongly centralised financial control. 
Budget emphasis had a close relationship with formality. Both operations 
emphasised formal budget procedures and written documents. Both operations had 
similar formal budget manuals and near standard procedures. 
8.4.2.2 Mitac 
Mitac always keeps its philosophy conservative, especially in financial 
management, and budget is its efficient means of financial management. In its 
Taiwanese operation, it had a clearly decentralised flow chart on financial aspects and 
their managers completely followed that flow chart.49 In the British operation, owing 
to the smaller scale and marketing focus, the managing director followed its leaders' 
philosophies but he used a more strictly centralised financial control system, learning 
from the Tatung UK companySO, and only a little financial decentralisation. 
The budget emphasis affected only weakly the formality of the British 
operation. Obviously, the British operation owned less formality than the Taiwanese 
48Quotation from the interview with the deputy controller of Tatung company. 
49Quotation from the interview with the controller of Mitae International. 
SOFrom the interview with the managing director of Mitae Europe Limited. 
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operation. They kept more flexible and informal and only a few important regulations 
were kept as written documents. 5 I 
8.4.2.3 Lite-On 
"From the view of financial system, the Taiwanese operation owns a very clear 
decentralisation. 52" The financial system was powerful and each unit had to follow 
the decentralised rules. The British operation lacked a formal decentralised system 
such as its Taiwanese counterpart had, but the budget figure of each overhead was 
their managers' decentralised responsibility, as its controller said: "If they have the 
budget, they can make decisions independently, so the decentralisation is very clear." 
However, owing to lacking a detailed segment budget, the decentralised responsibility 
within the operation still had serious problems. Headquarters managed the 
performance of the British operation only through a monthly reporting system. 
Regarding formality, the two operations had obvious differences. The British 
operation remained at the learning stage. Although it also belonged to an ISO #9001 
plant, it was still less formal than the Taiwanese operation, especially in the budgeting 
documents, regulations, and procedures. 
8.4.2.4 Acer 
Under the client-server organisation, each operation, no matter whether 
domestic or foreign, had relative power to make decisions independently. As to the 
decentralisation in different operations, it depended on the philosophy of operational 
heads and their different situations. The factor of budget emphasis seemed to have low 
impact on their decentralisation. 
As to formality, except for simple guidelines, Acer strongly lacked uniform 
budget documents, reports, regulation, and procedures even within similar European 
RBUs.53 In Europe, each operation easily developed its own system, but they 
frequently lacked formal budget documents and procedures. Overall, Acer's budget 
system was very "informal but flexible54." 
8.4.3 Evaluating Process 
Budget emphasis had a relatively close relationship with the evaluating 
process, especially in the feedback context. Generally speaking, the greater the budget 
5 I From the interview with the managing director of Mitac Europe Limited. 
52Quotation from the interview with the planning director of Taiwan Liton. 
53 From the interviews with the director of management analysis section of Acer inc., the general 
controller of Acer European headquarters, and the controller of Acer Computer GmbH. 
54Quotation from the interview with the senior VP of Acer Inc. 
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emphasis, the deeper and shorter the feedback. The attitude of budget emphasis 
obviously impacted the feedback extent and frequency among case finns. However, 
this was not so for the controllability-filters. Each case will now be discussed in 
further detail as follows. 
8.4.3.1 Tatung 
The Taiwanese and British operations had weekly and monthly operating 
meetings and managers had opportunities to explain uncontrollable items, but unless 
their reasons were very strong it was impossible to gain approval. Top managers of 
both operations seemed to give little consideration to the impacts of uncontrollable 
factors. 
On feedback, Tatung fully developed its warning system to monitor its 
operations. They used weekly and monthly operating meetings to monitor sales and 
profit performance, and applied standard costing to analyse different cost variance for 
controlling. With their leaders fully focusing on the running of the business, both 
operations maintained a strong warning system. 
8.4.3.2 Mitac 
On controllability-filters, OWIng to lacking emphasis on individual items, 
neither of its two operations identified or inspected the uncontrollable items. As to 
significant uncontrollable items which significantly affect the profit target, they 
considered them only in special circumstances. Generally speaking, the Taiwanese 
operation still more clearly identified the uncontrollable items than the British 
operation did. 
On feedback, in addition to traditional fmancial reports they designed a 
uniform "BEP AID" reporting system containing some key strategic factors to check 
their overseas budget performance. Monthly performance reports were their basic 
instruments of performance evaluation. Overall, both operations had similar feedback 
frequency, but the feedback extent in the Taiwanese operation was obviously wider 
than in the British operation. 
8.4.3.3 Lite-On 
The budget controlling function was not strong in Lite-On. Its Taiwanese and 
British operations' senior managers could all accept explanations about uncontrollable 
items, but the Taiwanese operation had clearly-defined segment budgets and better 
definition about the uncontrollable items considered in their strategic planning. 
Compared to the Taiwanese operation, the British operation lacked control over its 
segments but analysed only the uncontrollable items by a company-wide budget for 
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understanding the operating results. Essentially, the factor of budget emphasis from 
headquarters had little effect on controllability-filters. 
Both operations had a monthly performance reporting system as a basic means 
of feedback and regular meetings, but as the British operation lacked responsibility 
units, its feedback extent obviously could not compare with that of Taiwanese 
operations. 
8.4.3.4 Acer 
As Acer focused on the profit objective when evaluating operational 
performances 5 , each operation head regarded the bottom line as his mission. Almost 
all operations did not inspect uncontrollable items, but the extent was a little different 
among operations. Obviously, the budget evaluation style strongly affected its 
operational heads' behaviour. 
On feedback extent and frequency, except for monthly performance reports 
Acer allowed great freedom to its operational managers. Comparatively, the British 
and Taiwanese operations had deeper feedback than the German and Dutch 
operations. The factor of budget emphasis only weakly affected operations' feedback. 
8.4.4 Rewarding Process 
Budget emphasis from headquarters strongly affected the rewarding system of 
Taiwanese operations, but had little impact on European operations. In other words, 
unless combining the factor of managers' selection or degree of control, budget 
emphasis seemed to have little relationship with the uniformity of the rewarding 
system in the case firms. Each case firm will be discussed in further detail as follows. 
8.4.4.1 Tatung 
The Taiwanese and British operations used completely different compensation 
systems. The Taiwanese operation used certain contingent rewards, more group 
incentives, and more long-term rewards, but the British operation used a pre-set 
reward system, more individual incentives, and more short-term rewards. The factor 
of budget emphasis seemed an irrelevant factor to the uniformity of the rewarding 
system. Each case firm is more discussed in further detail as follows. 
8.4.4.2 Mitac 
Each operation had a different rewarding system. The Taiwanese operation had 
more contingent rewards, group rewards, and long-term rewards. The British 
SSFrom the interview with the senior VP of Acer Inc. 
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operation except for sales and marketing people, lacked a formal bonus system. Its 
salesmen's bonuses were granted more on an individual basis and despite some 
benefits its staff lacked long-term rewards. If the company attained its budget profit 
objective, its employees could enjoy a small bonus,56 but basically the factor of budget 
emphasis lacked a direct relation to the transference of the rewarding system. 
8.4.4.3 Lite-On 
Each operation had an absolutely different rewarding system. The Taiwanese 
operation kept contingent rewards, emphasised group rewards, and balanced both 
short-term and long-term rewards; but in the British operation, they used pre-set 
rewards and no incentive system or long-term rewards in the past five years. The 
factor of budget emphasis had a very weak relation to the transference of the 
rewarding system. 
8.4.4.4 Acer 
Different compensation systems existed among different operations. The 
Taiwanese and European operations had obviously different systems. The Taiwanese 
operation had more contingent rewards, group rewards, and long-term rewards; but 
European operations used a pre-set salary system, more individual rewards, and 
focused on short-term rewards. "If they achieve their targets, they can enjoy some 
small performance bonus,57 but how will depend on the operation head. 58" The factor 
of budget emphasis had little relation to the rewarding systems. 
8.4.5 Summary and Discussion 
Summary 
In assessing the relationship between budget emphasis from headquarters and 
the uniformity of Mess within case firms, budget emphasis had little relation to the 
rewarding process. Generally speaking, the greater the emphasis on the budget, the 
more the uniformity on other processes. In some cases such as the variables of 
objective setting, participation, long-term and short-term planning, decentralisation, 
formality, and controllability-filters, the impacting extent of budget emphasis from 
headquarters lacked complete consistency with the budget emphasis styles. In 
particular, some confusions existed between firms with intermediate emphasis and 
those with low emphasis. The firms with high emphasis seemed better at keeping a 
clear separation and being more consistent than those with a lower emphasis. 
56 From the interview with the managing director of Mitac Europe Limited. 
S7From the interview with the president of Acer European headquarters. 
S8From the interview with the president of Acer European headquarters. 
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As a result, proposition 3-2 could not be sufficiently supported by the research 
as regards the whole system or process. But some components, like the variables of 
long-term and short-term planning and feedback extent and frequency, were clearly 
supported. 
Discussion 
Because previous literature focused on inter-firm (such as Hopwood, 1972: 
Otley, 1978, Brownell, 1982; Brownell & Hirst, 1986; Simons, 1987, 1990; Dunk, 
1991; Kren, 1992) or cross-border (such as Harrison, 1992, 1994) studies, direct 
comparison with these results seems difficult to fmd. Hence these results seem a little 
perplexing. However, many reasons can strongly support the research results. The 
main reason is that different functions of the budget were emphasised by different 
case firms, and an "indented effect" was found among the cases of Mitac, Lite-On, and 
Acer. However, owing to its emphasis on all budget functions, Tatung showed in its 
budget system a great similarity between its Taiwanese and European operations. That 
is why the proposition could be broadly supported between Tatung and the other three 
case firms. In addition, the effect of budget evaluative style seems to have a deep 
relationship with many contingencies, such as strategies (Simons, 1987), job-related 
tension (Hopwood, 1972), and budgetary participation (Brownell, 1982; Kren, 1992). 
Some moderators may also change the proposition expectation. And that is perhaps 
why some researchers (such as Hopwood, 1972 and Otley, 1978; Otley, 1978 and 
Brownell, 1982) have had contradictory findings. Finally, the budget system has a 
close relationship with situational factors. Many situational factors, as discussed in the 
next chapter, essentially influenced the proposition expectation. 
8.5 Selection of Managers and the Uniformity of MCSs 
Proposition 3-3: The more relatives or in-group subordinates used in European 
operations, the jewer differences oj MeSs between Taiwanese and European 
operations. 
The selection of managers could significantly influence the uniformity of 
management control systems. Those companies putting more emphasis on an in-group 
may have a more uniform system between their domestic operations and overseas 
operations than do those companies which put less emphasis on an in-group. Tatung 
obviously not only focused on managers' loyalty and tenure but also sent whole 
managerial teams to its foreign operations. It is classified as a "high in-group" firm. 
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Lite-On emphasised professional managers and hired localised managers as soon as 
possible. It can be put in the type of "low in-group." Mitac and Acer were midway but 
Mitac kept a little more of an in-group, and they may be classified as the type of 
"intermediate in-group." The impact of the selection of managers and uniformity of 
MCSs will be discussed as follows in further detail for each of the case firms. 
8.5.1 Planning Process 
The extent of in-group selection of managers had an obvious impact on the 
planning process of European operations. Senior managers coming from the 
headquarters played important roles as commanders, policy-supporters, decision-
makers, and planners in their European operation, and they did significantly affect 
their planning systems. The more in-group subordinates used in European operations, 
the more similar the objective setting process, communication style and approach, and 
focus on short term financial objectives or long-term strategic objectives to Taiwanese 
operations. Each case firm will now be discussed in further detail as follows. 
8.5.1.1 Tatung 
Owing to having strong in-group managers from Taiwan's Tatung, they 
followed the Tatung system in the planning process. The president of the British 
operation is the son of the chairman of Tatung group, and he played a role as the 
chairman of Taiwan Tatung Company. He asked his employees to follow the Tatung 
operating philosophy and spirit. He set objectives with two managing directorsS9 and 
then communicated them down to the basic managerial level to carry them out. 60 In 
addition, all other senior managers also came from headquarters, so they easily 
followed the president's instructions. 
The Tatung British operation used a top-down approach for objective setting. 
Its management team also participated in discussions through weekly and monthly 
formal operating management meetings, and their managers focused on short-term 
planning. However, the whole planning process remained similar to the Taiwanese 
operation and their Chinese managers play critical roles. 
8.5.1.2 Mitac 
Although the managing director and some senior managers are Chinese, it 
seems there was less transference in the planning process from the Taiwanese 
operation. The managing director of the British operation was from Tatung UK 
S9From the interview with the executive director of Tatung (U.K.) Company. 
60From the interview with the deputy controller of Tatung Company. 
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company since the company was set up in 1988 and he used a more centralised 
management style, learning from the Tatung company. However, he kept more 
informal and flexible systems in Mitac. With a special relationship with the chairman, 
he matched and followed the headquarters' objective very well and used a top down 
approach in his operation and then communicated them down through the 
organisation. In addition, headquarters also sent some people as key managers in the 
British operation. Only key managers participated in the objective setting and the 
budget was built simply on a company-wide basis. The participation in budgeting in 
the British operation could not compare with the Taiwanese operation, but under its 
production structure of modularised manufacturing system (MMS), Chinese managers 
not only affected the style of participation, but also could help with lots of 
communications between headquart~rs' managers and local managers. As to long-term 
and short-term planning, its managing director seemed easily to follow the style of the 
Taiwanese operation. Both operations had only very rough long-term plans, and they 
all emphasised the short-term budget. 
8.5.1.3 Acer 
On objective setting, Acer used a top-down approach to determine the basic 
objective for its operations. About the middle of October, top management would 
decide the initial objectives for each operation, and if operations had difficulty in 
achieving targets they had to present reasons to headquarters to be approved. 6 1 
Because the total objectives already had a consensus in summit meeting, its chairman 
said: "Of course the objectives will be reasonable, attainable, and comfortable." 
Normally most operations could accept their objectives. According to the Acer 
culture, each operation could argue the budget target with headquarters, but its 
manager needed to present strong persuasive reasons and figures. 62 Owing to the close 
relationship between objective and incentive, country heads always remained a little 
conservative and there were some negotiations in budgeting.63 Though they had lots of 
arguments, actually their results figures always exceeded budget targets in past 
years.64 Chinese managers could easily follow this model and play important roles in 
European operations. 
On participation, owing to cultural differences communication in European 
operations is more difficult than in Taiwanese operations. Facing a quickly changing 
industry and "fresh food" operating model, it is necessary to keep close contact 
between Taiwanese operations and European operations. Communication was kept 
61 From Acer 1995 budget guideline. 
62Quotation from the interview with the controller of Acer Computer GmbH. 
63Quotation from the interview with the president of Acer European headquarters. 
64From the interview with the managing director of Acer U.K. Limited. 
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both informal and flexible. Chinese managers acted as bridges between headquarters' 
managers and local managers. 65 They could communicate with headquarters' 
managers faster than could local managers. 66 
On short-term and long-term planning, they focused adequately on the annual 
budget but they set some long-term strategies and goals. Actually, as their long-tenn 
visions could not easily transfer into a clear plan and financial budget67, their long-
term plans lacked executive power. All managers had a consensus focusing on short-
term planning, but Chinese managers seemed more confident to follow their long-term 
visions than did European managers. 
8.5.1.4 Lite-On 
With the philosophy of "only local people know how to use local resources68", 
Lite-On used local managers at their overseas operations as much as possible. 
Although in the British operation at the moment all managers are English, as its 
managing director has already been in co-operation with headquarters for more than 
fifteen years he shares some of the same values with headquarters and has learned 
some corporate culture from the Taiwan Liton CO.69 
On objective setting, the British operation used more of a bottom up approach 
in budgeting than did the Taiwanese operation, but in participation the managing 
director followed some team discussion methods from Taiwan Liton, and he asked his 
managers to make more input in budgeting. As to long-term and short-tenn planning, 
following Taiwan Liton they also developed a rough three years of strategic planning, 
then the annual budget, but basically they still put more emphasis on the annual 
budget. 
8.5.2 Organising Process 
A relatively close relationship existed between the in-group managers' 
selection and the uniformity of the organising process. Wherever possible, senior in-
group managers retained similar organising processes as did their Taiwanese 
operations. More in-group firms showed more similar decentralisation and fonnality 
in the organising process between their Taiwanese operation and European operation. 
Each case firm will now be discussed in detail as follows. 
65Quotation from the interview with the president of Acer European headquarters. 
66From the interview with the senior VP of Acer Inc. 
67From the interview with the controller of Acer Computer B.V. 
68Quotation from the interview with the president of Taiwan Liton. 
69From the interview with the managing director of Lite-On Limited (UK). 
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9.5.2.1 Tatung 
The in-group managers kept the British operation's hierarchy but with a clearly 
decentralised system in routine matters. They followed routine decentralisation, but 
significant decisions always needed to be approved by top management as in Taiwan 
Tatung. In addition, they also kept basic formal procedures and written documents as 
in Taiwanese operation. Overall, the British operation had a strongly similar 
organising process to the Taiwanese operation. 
8.5.2.2 Mitac 
Significant differences in decentralisation existed between the Taiwanese and 
British operations. The Taiwanese operation was more decentralised in decision 
making, but the managing director of the British operation still followed closely the 
conservative financial philosophy of Mitac's top management. In addition to the 
managing director controlling personnel and making significant decisions, he also 
arranged for Chinese people to be in charge of purchasing and treasury work for 
financial security reasons.70 
On formality, the British and Taiwanese operations had obvious differences. 
The Taiwanese operation kept relative formality, but the British operation was quite 
informal and flexible. Only a few regulations had written documents and things could 
easily be changed. The factors of size and marketing orientation seemed to make 
significant impact on the system design. 
8.5.2.3 Acer 
In European operations, Chinese managers significantly played important roles 
in the organising process of management control systems. Most followed a 
decentralised management style as in the Taiwanese operations. In the Dutch 
operation, in addition to the head from headquarters, nearly 50% of the managers were 
from Taiwan and they occupied most of the senior positions. The decentralisation was 
quite clear at senior management level on a team work basis, but under the middle 
management level the decentralisation was not too high 71. In the German operation, 
for ethnic and historical considerations Acer selected a German as the first managing 
director, but it sent a second managing director from headquarters, as it had done in 
the American and Japanese cases.72 In addition, the controller also came from 
headquarters. Although two senior managers shared some power under the first 
managing director, basically the decentralisation in the German operation could not 
compare with that in the Dutch operations. In the British operation, as its managing 
70From the interviews with the managing director and the technical managers of Mitac Europe Limited. 
71 Quotation from the interview with the controller of Acer Holland Company. 
72From the interview with the second managing director of Acer Computer GmbH. 
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director came from European headquarters, he followed Acer's decentralised approach 
and made significant decisions by team discussion. They focused on their discussions 
and moved the discussions to the result they wanted.73 Overall, Chinese managers 
with a high authorisation, especially country heads, had obvious impacts on the 
decentralisation. 
On formality, Acer always focused less on regulations and procedures but put 
more focus on flexibility. Its chairman described his viewpoint: "It is characteristic of 
us that we fear to cultivate in managers a dead concept which may lead them to do 
things inflexibly, so we always train managers at their place of work. They learn 
experiences directly from their work but only a little from class training. They learn 
lessons from real cases by reviewing what has happened in their work surroundings." 
Flexibility rather than formality was strongly disseminated through all overseas 
operations by their managers from headquarters. Compared to the Taiwanese 
operation, European operations were more flexible. 
8.5.2.4 Lite-On 
On the organising process, Taiwanese and British operations had obvious 
differences. The Taiwanese operation was more decentralised and formal than the 
British operation. The British operation's leaders were trying to change their culture. 
They hoped to take their company from a centralised pyramidal structure to one more 
decentralised in decision making74 and to be more flexible while maintaining proper 
formal documents. Essentially its organising process seemed little influenced by 
Taiwanese headquarters. 
8.5.3 Evaluation Process 
Generally speaking, the in-group in managers' selection had an obvious 
relationship with the evaluating process. The more in-group companies had more 
similar controllability-filters and deeper feedback. Each case firm will now be 
discussed in detail as follows. 
8.5.3.1 Tatung 
Compared to other groups, Tatung had a strict and uniform culture control. 
Chinese senior managers preserved the culture well in the British operation. On 
controllability-filters, they asked their managers to report and explain variance items 
in operating meetings but little consideration was given to changing their targets or 
73Quotation from the interview with the controller of Acer UK Company. 
74From the interview with the managing director of Lite-On Limited (UK). 
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standards. They used performance reports based on standard cost as a basic feedback 
means. In addition, its top management played an important role in procedure control 
and gave directives in different meetings. Essentially, Chinese managers strongly 
upheld Tatung's traditional evaluation system in the British operation. 
8.5.3.2 Mitac 
Taiwanese and British operations had similar approaches on controllability-
filters. Top management in both operations could consider the explanation of 
uncontrollable factors under special conditions. In the Taiwanese operation its 
managers' performances were evaluated tier by tier, but basically they emphasised 
work attitudes more. In the British operation its managing director could totally 
handle the evaluation of managers' performance. "The managers' performance always 
depends on the managing director's judgement. 75" Because the company scale was still 
small and he knew each department very well, he could directly contact each 
department and controllability-filters seemed unimportant to him. 
Taiwanese and British operations had some similarities in feedback extent and 
frequency. Their managers used "BEPAID" report system to check their operating 
performance and they shared the same focus and the same operating philosophy, 
especially on accounts receivable and inventory management. Chinese managers 
showed an obvious impact on the feedback process. 
8.5.3.3 Acer 
Acer put more emphasis on objective management but less on strict budget 
control. They encouraged their managers to compete with one another to pursue their 
objectives, but normally they did not consider uncontrollable items in the performance 
evaluation76. In the European area, the budget bottom line was the only formal 
criterion for performance evaluation and they compared and analysed by different 
countries.77 Under special conditions, they still accepted discussions and arguments. 78 
Sometimes European headquarters would agree to the special conditions in advance, 
excluding them in operation performance evaluation.79 Generally speaking, Chinese 
managers found it easy to follow this approach, as its president of European 
headquarters said: "Because the language and thinking are the same and they have 
stronger determination to finish their missions", Chinese managers in Europe had 
relative impacts on controllability-filters. 
75Quotation from the interview with the controller of Mitac Europe Limited. 
76Quotation from the interview with the president of Acer European headquarters. 
77 From the interview with the general controller of Acer European headquarters. 
78From the interview with the financial controller of Acer Computer B.V. 
79From the interview with the general controller of Acer European headquarters . 
242 
Acer had moderate feedback in the European area. Each operation had to send 
its monthly performance reports to European headquarters. Some senior Chinese 
managers at headquarters took charge of the main functions, including those of 
general controller, treasury director, and product managers to review financial 
conditions, cash management, and inventory management. Hence, feedback of some 
important functions of European operations happened at European headquarters. The 
feedback of budget items in different countries seemed quite slack. Good warning 
budget systems were lacking in European operations: even comparing with the 
previous month is better than comparing with the budget. 80 
8.5.3.4 Lite-On 
The British operation considered uncontrollable items and accepted managers' 
explanations as in Taiwanese operation, but it lacked clear definition and a formal 
system. In addition, it built its budget on the whole company basis, so it often lacked 
enough financial data to feedback each unit's performance. Its senior managers used 
more non-financial targets to measure their managers' performance through weekly 
and monthly meetings. The monthly performance report obviously lacked the function 
of deep feedback. liThe firm needs to teach managers more financial control within the 
company.Stll Overall, it seemed there was little relationship between the managers' 
selection and transference of the evaluating process within Lite-On. 
8.5.4 Rewarding Process 
The rewarding process of European operations in the case firms was more or 
less affected by the factor of managers' selection. They used the Taiwanese 
compensation system for Chinese managers. As a result, dual systems existed in an 
operation. In addition, with the influence from Chinese managers, some rewarding 
practices were gradually brought into European operations. Each case firm will now 
be discussed in detail as follows. 
8.5.4.1 Tatung 
Compared to other processes, the top management of the British operation 
seemed to have more respect for the British compensation system. It still kept more 
pre-set rewards, individually based, and with short-term emphasis, for British people, 
but senior Chinese managers always selected the Taiwanese compensation system 
containing some contingent rewards on more of a group basis and with more long-
80From the interview with the fmancial control of Acer Computer B. V. 
81Quotation from the interview with the executive director of Lite-On Limited (UK). 
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term rewards. Basically they used a different compensation system for Chinese 
managers, but asked their Chinese managers to follow Taiwan Tatung's work system 
including more work time and fewer holidays. Managers' selection seems to have had 
relative impact on the rewarding process, especially contingent rewards. 
8.5.4.2 Mitac 
The managers' selection had some impact on the rewarding process in the 
Mitac's British operation. Although the British operation had no formal bonus system 
and most people had only 12 months pre-set salary, senior managers still had some 
bonus. The managing director's reward was strongly connected to the budget 
performance and all senior Chinese managers could select the Taiwanese 
compensation system. The lower levels of marketing people got more group 
incentives than individual ones. As to long-term rewards, Chinese managers and a few 
senior European managers participated in the stock purchase plan of Taiwan Mitac. 
8.5.4.3 Acer 
Chinese managers had some impact on European operations' rewarding 
process. First, owing to the tax consideration almost all Chinese managers chose the 
Taiwanese rewarding system. Secondly, European headquarters also set some small 
contingent reward schemes to encourage their operations to achieve targets and their 
operation heads also preferred, to some extent, group rewards. Comparing three 
European operations, the Dutch and British operations led by Chinese heads were 
more group oriented than the German operation handled by a German. On long-term 
rewards, except for Chinese people in European operations European employees could 
not take part in the stock purchase plan, but under its "local touch" plan all managers 
will become main shareholders of European companies in the future. 
8.5.4.4 Lite-On 
A strongly different rewarding system existed between the Taiwanese and 
British operations. The Taiwanese operation focused on pre-set and contingent 
rewards, group rewards, and short-term and long-term rewards, but the British 
operation used only a simple pre-set salary system. In addition, owing to continual 
losses, no salary increase had been given in the previous four years. It lacked any 
transference of rewarding system from its headquarters, except that its top managers 
plan to use a group bonus scheme in the future. 
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8.5.5 Summary and Discussion 
Summary 
• 
First, except for the rewarding process overall the factor of in-group managers' 
selection affected the MCS transference by the extent of in-group managers' selection. 
The more in-group managers' selection the more impact on the transference, and vice 
visa. Secondly, in-group managers' selection still had relatively significantly impact 
on the rewarding process, but it seems not to be related to the extent of the in-group. 
The philosophy of the operation's head and the extent of decentralisation may result in 
some differences. Overall, except for Lite-On which had no Chinese manager in the 
British operation, other firms maintained a dual compensation system for Chinese and 
European managers and they did not intend greatly to change their European 
operations' rewarding systems. Thirdly, Acer and Mitac were classified in the type of 
"intermediate in-group", but Acer had a slightly stronger impact than Mitac. There are 
two main reasons: less degree of control by headquarters and more shared values. 
Under the framework of the client-server structure, Acer had a more clearly 
decentralised structure than Mitac. Naturally, its Chinese managers, especially 
operation heads, in European operations had more power to change some systems. 
The relationship between in-group managers' selection and the uniformity of MCSs 
was moderated by the degree of control from headquarters. All senior Chinese 
managers in Acer's European operations came from Taiwanese operations or 
headquarters, and they strongly shared the same management values, especially at the 
spiritual level. In Mitac's European operation, however, its managing director and 
some senior managers came from the Tatung UK Company, and more or less retained 
the Tatung culture and lacked such strong consensus with headquarters as Acer. 
Except for the rewarding process, proposition 3-3 was broadly supported by 
this research. In addition, if the case firms were reclassified as an in-group (Tatung, 
Mitac, and Acer) or non-in-group (Lite-On), the proposition in the rewarding process 
seemed consistent. That means the in-group frrms still had clear impacts on the 
transference of their rewarding systems, but the situation could not be found in Lite-
On. Overall, the variable of in-group managers' selection had more power than the 
other two factors in the transference of MCSs. 
Discussion 
The result reflected a very reasonable logical relationship between MCSs and 
managers' selection. Many studies (such as Quinn et aI., 1988; Triandis, 1989; 
Triandis & McCusker, 1990; Hofstede, 1991; Fuller & Peterson, 1992; Whitley, 1992; 
Li. 1993) have shown in a collective society such as Taiwan, corporations' leaders 
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have preferred selecting their managers from their in-group. This research found, 
except in the case of Lite-On, that this feature also existed to a greater or lesser extent. 
Managers selected from their in-group are very important bridges in host 
countries (Boyacigiller, 1990; Ferner, 1996). Expatriate managers in top positions 
easily introduce country-of-origin systems into host country operations. Ferner (1996) 
found that expatriate managers significantly affect human resource management in 
MNCs. Some leaders of Multinational firms attempt to decrease or eliminate cultural 
differences through human resource management (Schneider, 1988). Though lacking 
literature for direct comparison, according to prior research these research results 
seem reasonable. 
8.6 Summary 
This chapter has examined the relationship between the financial control style 
and the uniformity of MCSs within the case firms. Through examining three financial 
control factors at the cases' headquarters, three different control styles in reality could 
be found in the case firms according to the extent of financial control. These results 
have been linked with the extent of uniformity of MCSs (analysed in chapter 6) 
between the Taiwanese and European operations in the case firms. Except for the 
rewarding process, the extent of financial control style appears to have a close 
relationship with the similarity of MCSs between Taiwanese operations and European 
operations within the case firms. That means the financial control style has a strong 
relationship with the transference of MCSs. 
Further examination of three sub-propositions by three financial control factors 
showed that the proposition that managers' selection had an obvious relationship with 
the transference of MCSs could be broadly accepted by the research. The proposition 
of degree of control, except for the rewarding process, still could be broadly accepted 
by the research. As to the proposition of budget emphasis, it was difficult to accept the 
whole MCS or process, and thus only some components could be accepted. However, 
the proposition was supported in the planning, organising, and evaluating processes 
between the firms with a "high budget emphasis" and the those with a "non-high 
budget emphasis." Some other factors or moderators may also exist between budget 
emphasis and the uniformity of MCSs. 
Overall, financial control factors had obvious impacts on the process of the 
transference of MCSs, but less on the rewarding process. National culture and some 
political and social-economic factors seem more important to the compensation 
system. 
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Having discussed the relationship between financial control factors and the 
uniformity of MCSs, this research will continue in the next chapter to explore the 
impact of situational factors on the process of the transference of MCSs. 
2-'7 
9. Other Situational Factors and the l:niformity of ~ICSs 
9.1 Introduction 
9.2 Size of Operation 
9.3 Age of Operation 
9.4 Approach to Acquisition 
9.5 Business Focus 
9.6 Summary 
9.1 Introduction 
National culture and financial control factors are important determinants of the 
design of MeSs within multinational firms. but some situational factors related to 
their local operations also significantly impacted on the uniformity of MeSs. This 
research has discussed the impact of national culture in chapter 6. and the impact of 
financial control factors in chapters 7 and 8. This chapter \\Oi II continue to discuss the 
impact of other situational factors on their European operations. :\s Table 9.1 sho\\s. 
four situational factors. including size. age. approach to acquisition. and business 
focus, will be observed in this research. Four propositions representing these four 
situational factors will be examined as follo\\s. 
Til 91AS ale . ummary 0 fS· Ituatlona IF . th E actors m e uropean o . h· C F· 'pera Ions" It m ase Irms 
Situational factors Tatung British Mitac British Acer European Lite-On British 
operation operation operations operation 
Si/l' of operation 600 280 UK: 70 130 
(~l11ploy~~s ) Holland: 120 
Germany: 130 
[size of the 
rai\\ ,lI1l'SC [I, I 00] [1.000] [ 130] [I SO I 
COlllIll'rpartl 
Starting date of 1981 At the end of 1988 All in 1989 1991 
()pcration 
:\pproach to Purchase Greenfield Greenfield and PlIrcha-..c 
acquisition purchasl.! 
Business focus Production- Marketing Marketing Prodllction-
marketing oriented oriented oriented marketilH!. oriented 
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9.2 Size of Operation 
Proposition 4-1: The size of European operations has relative impacts on firms' 
management control systems. The larger the European operation, the fewer MCS 
differences between the European and Taiwanese operations. 
The size of operation had significant influences on the uniformity of 
management control systems. The research intended to control for the size of 
comparative samples between the Taiwanese and European operations in each of the 
case firms, but as Table 9.1 shows there were difficulties in doing this. The operations 
producing equivalent products were considered first in choosing sample pairs and then 
the size of operation. Tatung showed different numbers of employees between its 
Taiwanese and European operations in 1996, but both operations had the scale of a 
large company and they had a close basis for comparison with each other. Mitac 
showed obviously different scales between its Taiwanese and European operations. As 
described in the last chapter, the size of operation obviously impacted on the 
uniformity of MeSs in Mitac, especially in the components of objective setting, 
participation, decentralisation, and formality, between the two operations. Acer and 
Lite-On seemed to have equivalent scale. However, even with an equivalent scale of 
operations between the Taiwanese and European operations in the case firms, 
normally the Taiwanese operations could share more common functions and resources 
with their other Taiwanese operations within the case firms. 
For the European operations, a large operation easily follows the system of its 
Taiwanese counterpart, because it normally has the same organisational structure. On 
the contrary, a small and middle operation often emphasises only a few functions and 
lacks the comprehensive organisation of its Taiwanese operation. By numbers of 
employees of the case firms, the European operations can be classified into two 
groups: a large company like Tatung (U.K.) Limited and SME (small and medium 
enterprise) groups including the European operations of Mitac, Acer, and Lite-On. 
9.2.1 Large Operation 
In 1996, Tatung (U.K.) Limited employed nearly 600 people and before 1991 
more than 1,000 employees. Its Taiwanese and European operations all had a large 
and equivalent scale. With rapid change and severe competition in the European 
market, its parts manufacturing was transferred to Thailand which has about 1,000 
employees at the moment. The British operation followed its parent company setting 
up different departments including marketing, R&D, purchasing, production, sales, 
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service, and finance to handle different functions. I In its hierarchical structure, Tatung 
(U.K.) Limited is like a miniature of Taiwan Tatung. Because of similar structures, 
Tatung (U.K.) easily followed procedures used in the parent company. Because 
Tatung (U.K.) had enough size to follow its parent company, of course, it easily had a 
similar planning process, organising process, and evaluating process. Objectively, the 
size of operation is not a prerequisite term like financial control factors on the 
transference of the Tatung management control system, but obviously it is an 
important supplemental term. 
9.2.2 SME Group 
In this group, owing to their small size, their basic organisation structures 
could not compare with their parent companies. Although they still could keep some 
of the spirit of MCSs from their parent companies, basically they often lacked the 
ability to follow a formal system from their parent companies. Overall, the organising 
process and the evaluation process were strongly affected by their small size. 
9.2.2.1 Mitac 
With the strategic alliance with Compaq, Mitac Europe Limited quickly 
increased its employees from 150 people to about 280 at the end of 1995. Obviously 
its size could not compete with the Taiwanese operation which employed nearly 1,000 
at the same time. Although it owned an assembly plant producing PC products, its 
techniques were all supported by the Taiwanese operation and most key components 
were also supplied from there. Comparing its Taiwanese and British operations, 
obviously, the British operation lacked the function of R&D and some functions had 
only one head or a few managers.2 Owing to the dependent relationship and work 
necessary, each function needed to communicate with its Taiwanese operation. The 
network system3 or matrix system4 was very popular within the Mitac group. Given 
the environment, the spirit of some management control systems can be easily 
transferred from headquarters. However, owing to its small size, simple and informal 
systems seemed naturally to become its aim. Compared to the Taiwanese operation. 
Mitac's European operation took a simpler way determined by key managers to set its 
objectives. It used a company-wide budget instead of a segment budget and spent little 
time in budgeting. It followed up its budget and financial results on a whole company 
basis, lacking segment control. It lacked clear decentralisation in decision making and 
I From the organisational charts of both Taiwan Tatung Corporation and Tatung (U.K.) Limited. 
2From the organisational charts of both Taiwan Mitae Corporation and Mitae Europe Limited. 
3From the interview with the ehainnan of Mitac group. 
4From the interview with the managing director of Mitae Europe Limited. 
250 
easily changed its rules and regulations. Its managing director played an important 
role in the management process through a series of informal meetings and discussions. 
As described in the last chapter, The size of operation played an important moderating 
variable between the relationship of uniformity of MeSs and the degree of control, 
budget emphasis, and the selection of managers in Mitac, especially the budget 
emphasis. Though Mitac and Tatung all more strongly emphasised financial control, 
the uniformity of MeSs between their Taiwanese and European operations showed 
obvious differences, especially on the components of objective setting, participation, 
decentralisation, and formality. However, some of them could be influenced by other 
factors, but the size of operation was an essentially important moderating factor on the 
relationship of financial control factors and the uniformity of MeSs. 
9.2.2.2 Lite-On 
Lite-On's British operation employed only about 130 people, a small company. 
Most employees were involved in manufacturing activities including production, 
quality control, engineering, and R&D, and only a few staff handled marketing and 
administrative activities, including two top managers, five marketing personnel, and 
eleven administrative staff.s For reasons of survival, "business in general is levelling 
in nature, re-cutting levels, trying to achieve better results.6" Some departments had 
only one person or a few people. The financial director managed even the personnel, 
materials control, accounts, and MIS departments and there were only two people in 
the financial department. 7 Departmental functions were not clearly divided.8 In 
production, there were clear procedures to follow set by ISO #9000, but in other fields 
or decision procedures they were still kept very informal and flexible.9 In budgeting, 
except that the production and sales and marketing departments participated more, 
most of the rest was prepared by the financial department which then asked 
departmental heads to commit themselves to the budget. Basically, the budget was 
built on a company-wide basis. The budget control and evaluative function was 
obviously insufficient within the company, as its financial director described: "It is not 
a real control system at present. " 
9.2.2.3 Acer 
The size of Acer's Dutch and German operations in Europe was like Lite-On's, 
and its British operation employed only about 70 people. Although each operation 
SRefer from the organisational chart of Lite-On Ltd (UK). 
6Quotation from the interview with the managing director of Lite-on Ltd. 
7From the organisational chart of Lite-On Ltd. 
8Quotation from the interview with the financial director of Lite-On Ltd. 
9From the interview with the personnel officer of Lite-On Ltd. 
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enjoyed great latitude for decentralisation in decision making, they lacked a basic 
organising and evaluating process. However, Acer smartly used the principle of "The 
simpler the matter, the easier the management. IO" They placed some complicated 
functions at European headquarters, even Taiwanese headquarters, believing country 
operations simpler and easier to manage on location. It set up the Acer European 
Business Unit as a regional headquarters of Acer group to manage ten subsidiaries in 
Europel1 . Its total head count of all subsidiaries already neared 400 and it neared large 
company scale. Several key corporate functions were centralised in the regional head 
office, including treasury, legal, logistics, purchasing, controllership, MIS, marketing 
and product marketing functions. 12 Each individual country operation could get 
support from European headquarters. From the viewpoint of the operational level, 
each operation, owing to its small size, lacked formality and a deep control function, 
but some significant factors were continually monitored by regional headquarters. So 
from the viewpoint of the regional business unit, it still easily handled all of its 
subsidiaries. Each operation seemed better for having informality and flexibility than 
the Lite-On and Mitac British operations. 
Basically, each Acer European operation shared its objectives with 
headquarters. Each operation head used a top down approach to determine its budget. 
They took little time to build their budget. Except for the Dutch operation, other 
operations developed their budgets only on the company-wide basis. Full 
authorisation and flexibility were obvious characteristics in their organising process. 
They almost did not consider controllability-filters in their evaluation systems and 
their feedback focused only on turnover and profit. 
9.2.3 Summary and Discussion 
Summary 
A comparison of the components of MCSs between Taiwanese operations and 
European operations shows a close relationship between the fmanciaI control style and 
the uniformity of MCSs among case firms. Tatung obviously had more similarities 
between its Taiwanese and European operations than Lite-On. Mitac, and Acer. Mitac 
had more similarities than Lite-On and Acer, but as described above the size of 
operation significantly moderated the uniformity between its Taiwanese and European 
operations. In addition, in Europe, Tatung (U.K.) Company, as a large company, 
showed significant differences from the SME group and it was better placed to follow 
its parent company's MCSs than other companies. The two groups (see Table 9.2) in 
lOFrom the interview with the financial VP of Acer group. 
II From the business summary of Acer Europe Business Unit. 
12From the business summary of Acer Europe Business Unit. 
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the European context showed strong differences on the variables of objective setting, 
participation, formality, and feedback extent and frequency. Tatung had a more formal 
and integrated top down process on objective setting, more managers participated in 
its budgeting, and they kept more formal and written documents. In addition, Tatung 
also under took a deeper feedback than those operations in the SME group. Tatung 
was large enough to divide its business into an information division and television 
division so it differed from other companies which dealt with their companies as a 
whole. With a detailed departmental budget and standard costing, naturally Tatung 
could feedback more detailed information than did other companies. In the SME 
group, they spent little time and followed a more informal and simple way in objective 
setting and participation. Their formal documents, regulations, and procedures could 
not compare with Tatung's European operation and they were easy to change with 
different situations. In addition, their MeSs did not design for detail and deep 
feedback as in Tatung's European operation. 
Table 9.2 The Comparison between Tatun2 and o ther Firms in the European Operations 
Variable Large operation SME group 
(Tatun2) (Mitae, Lite-On. & Aeer) 
Objective setting • Formal planning committee • Informal process or procedure 
• Standard and long period for • Short period for budgeting 
budgeting • Less bureaucratic reviews 
• More bureaucratic reviews • Less formal objective-setting 
• Formal too-down orocess process 
Participation • More discussions and meetings • Informal discussions and meetings 
between superiors and subordinates • Short period for participation 
• Long period for budget participation • Less discussions between 
• Formal and periodic management departments 
operating meetings 
Formality • Standard budgeting process • Informal budget process 
• Formal rules and procedures • Informal rules and procedures 
• Difficult to change rules • Easy to change rules 
Feedback extent and • Segment budget control • Plant-wide budget control 
frequency • Standard costing • Rough budget for comparison 
• Detailed variance analysis • Focus critical figures 
Except for the rewarding process, the proposition could be broadly supported 
by the research, especially on the processes of objective setting and participation, 
formality, and feedback extent and frequency. Owing to the difference in size, Tatung 
obviously was better able to keep a similar system between its Taiwanese and 
European operations compared to other companies. 
Discussion 
Size is the most frequently considered contingent variable in the literature of 
contingency research (such as Hickson et., 1986; Negandhi, 1975; Lincoln et al .• 
1978; Rockness and Shields, 1984; Lincoln et al., 1986; Demirag, 1970; Wong and 
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Birnbaum-More 1994; Dedousis, 1995). Most of these researchers' could support their 
hypotheses or propositions. The results of this research showed a great consistency 
with prior research. Some management systems need to change to match operations' 
size. Mitac's European operation, with an obviously different scale from its Taiwanese 
counterpart, could not follow many systems from its parent company. Small European 
operations like those of Acer, Lite-On, and Mitac needed to keep a simple, informal, 
and flexible system. In contrast, Tatung's European operation had a size consistent 
with a large company. It could easily learn management systems from the Taiwanese 
counterpart. The research results reasonably reflected this situation. 
9.3 Age of Operation 
Proposition 4-2: The age of European operations has a relative impact on firms' 
management control systems. The older the European operations, the fewer MCS 
differences between the European and Taiwanese operations. 
Except for Tatung (U.K.) set up in 1981, all other companies invested in 
Europe between 1988 and 1991. Tatung belongs to the early group, and other 
companies are classified as the late group. The difference in the time of investment 
meant firms faced a different investing environment, and it is very difficult to see the 
individual influence on the components ofMCSs in the research. However, time could 
gradually eliminate some cultural discrepancies and bring more consensus between 
Chinese managers and local managers, even between managers and employees. 
9.3.1 Early-established Firm: Tatung 
At the beginning of 1980, the Tatung Company was confronted with rapid 
economic change and severe competition in the world market. Tatung's top 
management forecasted that regional economic organisations were to be formed and 
the trade protection policy of the European Community seemed inevitable. Its 
chairman decided to establish a foothold in Europe to meet the needs of European 
customers. 
In 1981, Tatung acquired radio and television manufacturing interests in Decca 
Limited, including its distribution network and research and development laboratory. 
Tatung sent many managers from Taiwan's Tatung to take charge of relevant 
departments. At that time the trade union was very strong and it could not compare 
with the present. 13 "It was a bad time really, just when Tatung took over. 14" Some 
13Quotation from the interview with the executive director of Tatung (U.K.) Ltd. 
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cultural conflicts happened and many negotiations with the trade union were needed at 
that time, but, except for the rewarding system, Tatung still moved its management 
control systems in force to the British operation through its managers. With the 
economic decline, the trade union was fmding little excuse for a strike. In addition, 
through continuing communication, at present the trade union understands the 
company's difficulty more clearly and workers have worked with the company for a 
long time, so they have gradually come to get along well with the company. "It is 
better year by year, and the degree of variation has got smaller and smaller. IS" 
9.3.2. Late Groups: Mitac, Acer, and Lite-On 
Other firms' European operations including Mitac, Acer, and Lite-On were all 
set up in the period between the end of 1988 and the beginning of 1991. Compared to 
Tatung (U.K.) Limited., they have only a short history but they faced more 
competition at the beginning than Tatung. Owing to the European IT market falling 
into a serious recession since 1990, almost all their European operations stayed at the 
edge of survival and most of them suffered big losses in the past five years (see 
Appendix 4). With the economic recession, naturally the trade union became weaker 
and weaker. Those companies did not need to worry about the threat of strikes and at 
the current stage they concentrate only on their marketing. As to the management 
control system they emphasise only a basic framework and keep it simple, informal, 
and as flexible as possible. 
9.3.3 Summary and Discussion 
Summary 
The classification between the large and SME fmns is coincidentally the same 
as the grouping between the early-established and later-established firms. Tatung is a 
large and early-established firm, and other firms are SME and "late" companies. Early 
firms may learn more from their parent companies than late firms, so it is reasonable 
to presume that the differences in Table 9.2 could also come from the length of time 
firms have been established. However, further examination of the MCS of Tatung's 
(U.K.) Company found its MCS has kept almost the same since it started its business 
in the UK. As to the late firms, except that Lite-On Limited showed some little change 
after Taiwan Liton Limited took it over, no obvious changes were found in Mitac and 
Acer. In conclusion, the differences in Table 9.2 had little relationship with the length 
14Quotation from the interview with the operating manager ofTatung (U.K.) Ltd. 
ISQuotation from the interview with the operating manager ofTatung (U.K.) Ltd. 
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of time of an operation. Most differences came from the different sizes and financial 
control factors. 
However, as described above, time could gradually decrease the cultural 
conflicts. With the passage of time, local managers learn more about how to adapt to 
the management style of Taiwanese managers. Comparing the content of interviews 
between Chinese managers and European local managers in European operations of 
the case firms shows that Tatung's European operation obviously had more consensus 
on the components of its MCS than Mitac's and Acer's European operations. That 
means there was less cultural conflict and more consensus between Chinese managers 
and local managers in Tatung's European operation than in Mitac's and Acer's 
European operations at the research stage. 
The proposition could not be supported by the research. No obvious evidence 
could be given to show this. However, within the same firm's operation, the older the 
operation, the fewer the differences in MCS perception between its Taiwanese and 
local managers. 
Discussion 
The proposition was not supported as predicted. No prior literature can be used 
to compare directly with this research. However, some reasons may be given to 
explain the result. First, except for the case of Tatung's European operation, other 
cases' European operations are still very young and they are all still in the survival 
stage. At this stage, survival is the most important thing. Secondly, the factor of age 
has a strong relationship with the factor of size. Operations with a small size like the 
cases of Acer, Lite-On, and even Mitac make it difficult to transfer many systems 
from their parent companies. Thirdly, except for Lite-On's European operation, most 
senior managers in other operations came from Taiwan. Chinese leaders believe in a 
man more than a system (Whitley, 1992). As long as these senior managers continue 
to keep top positions, it is difficult to change their MCSs. Fourthly, "want to change" 
differs from "could change." Leaders' control philosophies (Stacey, 1990, Dermer & 
Lucas, 1986) and corporate strategies (Goold & Campbell, 1987; Chakravarthy & 
Perlmutter, 1985; Nohria & Ghoshal, 1994) significantly affect whether a corporation 
can transfer its MCS to its foreign operations. For these reasons, the research result 
seems reasonable. 
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9.4 Approach to Acquisition 
Proposition 4-3 The acquiring approach has relative impact on firms' management 
control systems. With the greenfield approach, there were fewer MCS differences 
between the European and Taiwanese operations than with the purchase approach. 
There are two basic approaches to opening an operation in an overseas 
country: greenfield or purchase. Mitac's European operation is a greenfield company, 
and Tatung's and Lite-On's operations are by purchase. Acer's German and Dutch 
operations are from purchase, but its UK operation was set by greenfield at first (a 
small company) and then purchased Altos Company two years later. Mitac's European 
operation is classified as a greenfield company, and other groups' European operations 
are classified as purchase groups. 
Generally speaking, the greenfield approach may easily set a new system and 
rules, but it is more difficult at the beginning of operations; on the contrary, the 
purchase approach may be a great help at the beginning of operations, but lead to 
more difficulty in setting up a new system and rules. Under the purchase approach the 
"cultural fit" is a major cause of implementation difficulties (Olie, 1994: 384), 
especially at the beginning, but under the greenfield approach cultural conflict could 
still happen in future operations. The factor of the opening approach could even affect 
the managers' selection and organisation in an operation. 
9.4.1 Greenfield Company: Mitac 
Its British operation was formed at the end of 1988, but its managing director 
and a few senior managers came from Tatung (U.K.) Limited. Compared to the 
hierarchical structure of Tatung (U.K.) Limited, its British operation is more flexible 
and informal. 16 They keep only a few basic written documents and change them when 
they feel it is better to change. Everyone calls the managing director by his name, not 
as in Tatung by his position title. On the basic management style, however, he still 
uses centralised decision making, learning from the Tatung Company. He handles 
almost all important decisions and most decisions have to be referred to him.17 He 
also uses weekly operating meetings to assign responsibility and follow up for each 
unit, and to give some instructions. There is apparently no trace of decentralisation in 
Taiwan Mitac. When the managing director formed the company, because he had 
worked in the Tatung corporation for 17 years and did not stay at Mitac headquarters, 
16Quotation from the interview with the managing director of Mitac Europe Limited. 
I'From.the interview with assistant controller of Mitac Europe Limited. 
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he could just use the Tatung system.18 He described the situation: "When I began to 
use my corporation's system, I found it was difficult to adapt. I regret that." 
The only chance to get in touch with senior managers at headquarters is in 
their global "kick-off meeting" every half year. The managing director has a good 
opportunity to discuss with senior managers at headquarters and understand 
corporation policy and philosophy, as he said: "After the meeting, I can bring some 
ideas back and build-up my management policy." Through the computer network 
organisation, they have common protocol communication language. Each function 
needs to have contact with headquarters' relevant functions. The matrix system brings 
the operation and headquarters close together and its headquarters easily manages the 
British operation in an environment of openly shared information. 
Overall, although the British operation had the chance to follow its parent 
company's system, owing to the factor of managers' selection, its management control 
system seems a hybrid system between Mitac and Tatung groups. Though its 
managing director could ask his managers to follow his lead, the cultural differences 
on the MCS perception between its Chinese managers and local managers are still 
very serious, especially in the organisation and evaluating processes ofMCSs. 
9. 4. 2. Purchase Groups 
The European operations of Tatung, Acer, and Lite-On are all purchased from 
other companies. However, owing to their facing different situations and managers' 
selection, the results of their operations show significant differences. 
9.4.2.1 Tatung 
In 1981, Tatung purchased the company from Decca Limited, a famous 
manufacturer of radio and television at that time. Tatung followed its traditional 
policy and sent many managers from headquarters, and they followed the system as in 
Taiwan's Tatung. They cancelled workers' coffee time in the morning and tea time in 
the afternoon, and prohibited workers' chat on the production line. Severe conflict 
between management and the trade union resulted from the different corporate 
cultures. "It was a tough time! 19" However, they educated their workers step by step 
and got along well with the trade union year by year.20 Compared to 15 years ago, the 
cultural conflict is declining, and compared to other case firms, Tatung has kept strong 
similarities in its MCSs between its Taiwanese and European operations. The British 
operation seems capable of establishing its unique corporate culture, as its president 
18From the interview with the managing director of Mitac Europe Limited. 
19Quotation from the interview with executive director ofTatung (U.K.) Limited. 
20From the interviews with the executive director and the operating manager of Tatung (U.K) Limited. 
258 
said: "I made a great effort to rejuvenate the newly organised company under Tatung's 
managerial motto - honesty, integrity, industry, and frugality." 
However, on further observation, the cultural problems did not seem 
completely eliminated in the past 15 years. It still uses a dual compensation system for 
Chinese people and local people, including different working hours. Local managers 
still hold their positions only on the middle and basic level. The cultural problems are 
weaker than in the past but obviously still exist. 
9.4.2.2 Lite-On 
Its British operation was incorporated in March 1991 and acquired the assets 
and business of Northern Power Electronics Limited. The company commenced 
trading on May 1991 and changed its name to Lite-on Limited. From that time 
Headquarters selected its UK agent as the managing director to run the company. 
Taiwan Liton sent only one assistant there within the first two years for 
communication convenience. At the moment no Chinese people remain in the 
operation. 
Most employees have stayed with the company for a long time, and when Lite-
On took over, about 60 people continued with the company.21 However, the old 
corporate culture is not easy to change. The hierarchy in the Northeast is stronger than 
in other parts of the UK. The company had a very strong hierarchy 10 to 15 years ago, 
as its managing director described: "The difficulty in this part of the UK is that ideas 
are very old fashioned. You have to take a high hand and then there is a very big 
pyramid structure and the ordinary factory workers just don't make a decision." He 
continued: "We push harder and harder to make this change, to transform this 
structure." They encourage people to make decisions from the bottom. However, there 
is only slight change.22 The company continually suffers losses and its people have not 
had any salary adjustment in the past four years. Its employees' morale seems still to 
remain at rock bottom. 
Taiwan Lite-On prefers local people to manage local business23, so it allows 
British managers to manage the operation fully by themselves. Top managers 
originally expect to find some different systems between the Taiwanese and British 
operations, but as the operation was gained through the purchase approach, the old 
corporate culture still seriously bothered the British operation's managers. The result 
is that little system is transferred from headquarters and also managers find it difficult 
to set up a new system. Conversely, Lite-On invested in Malaysia in 1990 and 
Thailand in 1989 through the greenfield approach. When these companies were set up, 
21 From the interview with the managing director of Lite-On Limited. 
22From the interview with personnel officer of Lite-On Limited. 
23From the interview with the president of Taiwan Liton Electronic Ltd. 
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Headquarters sent many managers to handle each function. Then they quickly trained 
local people as managers and transferred their management system to them.24 Until 
the present time, the Thai operation has had only a president from Taiwan and in the 
Malaysian operation only four people still remain. Both operations are quite 
successful. There were strongly different results between the greenfield and purchase 
approach within the Lite-On group, and the greenfield approach seemed easier for 
system transfer. 
9.4.2.3 Acer 
In 1984 Acer established its European branch office in Dusseldorf, Germany, 
for ease of handling its European business. After it became a publicly offered 
company in 1988, Acer showed its aggressive ambition and globalisation became its 
first objective. It set up lots of companies in American and European areas through the 
purchasing approach from 1989 to 1991. In 1989, Acer acquired Kangaroo Computer 
B.V. in the Netherlands and moved its European branch office into the Netherlands as 
regional headquarters.25 In the same year it purchased a 500/0 share in Ce-Tec Data 
Technology GmbH, distributor of Acer products in Germany to form Acer-Cetec 
GmbH venture. Two years later (1991), Acer got another 50% share of that company 
and changed its name to Acer Computer GmbH.26 Acer (UK) Limited was formed in 
1989 for importing and distributing computer products under the name of "Acer 
International Limited." On 1 st January 1992, the company acquired the trade, all 
business assets and liabilities of Altos Computer Systems Limited, a fellow subsidiary 
company incorporated in UK, and changed its name to "Acer (UK) Limited.,,27 The 
number of its employees rose from 10 in 1991 to 51 in 1992.28 
With a series of purchasing activities, Acer faced a dilemma in its 
management. Basically, except for sending a few senior managers to different 
operations, it flexibly set different approaches for them. Their managers seem still to 
be at the learning stage and they keep on changing. 
In the German operation, Acer shows more respect for the system and 
personnel of the original company. The original German managing director still 
handles everything. Acer has sent only two senior managers there. One is the second 
managing director to support logistic and inventory management, and the other is to 
take financial control. Its second managing director said that his missions are to bring 
in the production system and to be a bridge of communication between the German 
24From the interview with the controller of Taiwan Liton Electronic Ltd. 
2Slnfonnation taken from Acer profile. 
2~rom the interview with the managing director of Acer Computer GmbH. 
27From the 1992 annual fmancial report of Acer (UK) Limited. 
28From the 1991 and 1992 annual financial reports of Acer (UK) Limited. 
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operation and Headquarters. He said: "The company has its own culture~ and I expend 
lots of time in asking them to recognise the mother company." The system transfer~ 
however~ mainly involves the production system, MIS~ and marketing management 
system~ not the whole management control system.29 In the existing environmen~ 
except for some common values having consensus~ the original management control 
system is still followed, with only a little transference from Headquarters. 
To the British operation, owing to its small scale, Acer did not send any senior 
manager from Headquarters before 1994. After purchasing Altos Computer Systems 
Limited in 1992, different corporate cultures produced a great deal of trouble within 
the company, as its controller from Altos described: "Because people came from 
different companies, different corporate cultures led the company to fall into a very 
difficult condition so you will find that for four years the revenue was the same." 
Because the company continually suffered big losses, in 1994, Dutch headquarters 
sent two senior managers there, the managing director and the logistic director. The 
new managing director quickly improved marketing channels and inventory 
management and soon the company came into profit. 30 Its managing director followed 
Acer's operating philosophy and the better result seemed to raise its employees' 
morale. Compared to the other two European operations, the British had more MCS 
similarities with the Taiwanese operation, especially on the variables of objective 
setting, short-term and long-term planning, and feedback extent and frequency. 
Although the managing director could introduce some systems from Headquarters, it 
is still a long way from adapting its Taiwanese operation's system. 
In the Dutch operation, owing to the regional headquarters being there, about 
half the managers come from Taiwan Acer, and all of them handle different functions 
to support European operations. Local people are employed only as middle and basic 
managers at the moment. Under Acer's flexible and informal decentralised 
management style, the conflict from different corporate cultures seems not serious~ but 
their mutual trust is still not enough. "Sometimes when changing a manager, the top 
manager needs to explain and describe why the change is necessary.31" Cultural 
differences on the MCS perception between its Chinese managers and local managers 
are serious, and communication problems are still not easy to overcome at the 
moment. 
Overall, the purchase approach offered Acer better opportunities in their 
business growth~ but owing to different corporate cultures~ Acer cannot easily transfer 
or set up its MCS in European operations. They need to make some adjustments in 
different countries, as its senior VP said: "We can keep the spirit of a system, but it is 
29From the interview with the managing director (second) of Acer Computer GmbH. 
30From the interview with the managing director of Acer (UK) Limited. 
31 Quotation from the interview with the financial controller of Acer Computer B V. 
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difficult to overcome the cultural differences." However, compared to Tatung's case, 
its cultural conflict seems weaker. There are several reasons to explain the situation. 
First, Acer used a decentralised system and kept it informal and flexible. Based on the 
philosophy of "Human nature is essentially good", they tend to believe people. Given 
the environment, it is easy to lessen the cultural conflict. Of course, sometimes 
because of the lack of clear documents, some arguments may result. Secondly, as 
Acer's European operations all employ under 130 people, it is easier to manage 
through face to face communication. Thirdly, in the volatile PC environment, most 
employees are young people and they easily adapt to any change or find new jobs. 
Fourthly, Headquarters directly controls some critical common functions and lets each 
operation focus more on some simple functions. It is easy to communicate within the 
operation. Fifthly, those senior managers from Taiwan Acer all stay with Acer for 
many years and they all have a strong consensus in business operating philosophy and 
they do well as a bridge between local managers and headquarters managers. 
9.4.3 Summary and Discussion 
Summary 
It seems unavoidable that cultural conflict will happen under the purchasing 
approach. As Table 9.3 shows, strong cultural conflicts happened in the early stages in 
Tatung's and Acer's British operations. Because Tatung moved its MCS into its British 
operation, the cultural conflict was more serious than in other cases, especially as at 
that time the trade union was very strong. Under the protective umbrella of high 
growth and the decentralised system, Acer's Dutch operation seemed to avoid strong 
cultural conflict, but Chinese and local managers still lacked consensus. Localisation 
seems a good alternative to avoid cultural conflict, but some serious problems still 
need to be considered. First, it may take a long time, or even be impossible, to tum a 
disadvantaged business into a successful company, and Lite-On's and Acer's British 
operations seem good examples. Many cases shown in the research could be quickly 
turned into profitable companies following losses by changing their local heads to 
Chinese managers. Acer's British operation became a profitable company only after 
changing its head to a Chinese manager for more than one year. Secondly, localisation 
might solve the cultural conflict within the operation but still could not solve the 
cultural conflict between headquarters and the operation, and Acer's German operation 
seems an obvious example. Thirdly, it is difficult to learn some advantages from the 
parent company. The new senior managers of Lite-On's British operation made efforts 
for a long time to change its culture and system, but their results seemed limited. 
Fourthly. even though there was no change in any top managers, the cultural conflict 
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could still happen within an operation, and it seems a popular phenomenon in each 
operation listed in Table 9.3. 
T bl 93 Th 0 a e . e 'peratlons Phenomena under the Purchasinr Approach 
Operation Phenomena 
TatungUK Strong cultural contlict existed at the early stage, but in time the contlict is 
declining. 
Lite-On UK Operation was completely localised but contlict also happened and the business is 
still unsuccessful. 
Acer Holland Obvious cultural differences always existed but the contlict was not too strong. 
Acer Germany Original system and personnel were respected and maintained, and only two senior 
managers were sent to assist its operating. However, some conflicts between the 
German operation and headquarters happened all the time. 
AcerUK Strong cultural conflict existed and the business was not a success before 1994. 
Acer sent a few senior mana~ers to improve its operation from that time. 
It seems there is a better opportunity of avoiding cultural conflict and 
transferring the MCS into the new operation under the approach of a greenfield 
investment. Mitac seems to have had a good opportunity, but it lacked sufficient time. 
In 1988, Mitac was still not a large multinational firm. It lacked global managerial 
talent and professional managers (Merchant et aI., 1995). In addition, compared to 
Tatung at that time, it lacked a good MCS to transfer. As a result, a few managers 
from Tatung (U.K.) Limited were employed to set up its British operation. As it was a 
greenfield company and its stable personnel were high level, Mitac's British operation 
did not suffer serious cultural conflict. Its managing director seemed to handle his 
employees easily and well, but many differences ofMCSs between the Taiwanese and 
British operations still existed and lots of differences (especially in the evaluating 
process) of perceptions still existed between Taiwanese managers and local managers. 
Although managers could accept philosophies and policies from headquarters, 
essentially the cultural conflict still exists. 
The proposition could not be accepted by the research. The greenfield 
approach may have more opportunities than the purchase approach to decrease 
cultural conflict and transfer more systems to the European operation at the early 
stage, but it is not an absolute factor. The company philosophy, operation size, and 
other objective factors could significantly impact on the result. Tatung's British 
operation with a purchasing approach clearly had a transfer of its MCS, whereas 
Mitac's British operation with a greenfield approach did not. In addition, Acer's 
British operation was acquired by a purchasing approach in the frrst two years, but 
compared to its Dutch and German operations, no obvious cultural harmony and no 
system transfer were found in the research. 
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Discussion 
As previous literature (such as Olie, 1994; Frucot & Shearon, 1991) has 
indicated, serious cultural conflicts happened in those companies purchased by 
multinational firms. However, cultural conflicts still existed in those companies with 
the greenfield approach. Mitac chose a greenfield approach to set up its European 
operation, but still some cultural conflict existed. Compared to Tatung, only a few 
systems were learned from its parent company. The first reason is the size. Mitac's 
European operations had high growth in the past decade, and it is still in a growth 
stage. It lacked a good opportunity to transfer MCSs from Taiwanese operations. 
When the four case firms started their businesses in Europe, except for Tatung, they 
were all very small companies. Their managers seemed to manage the companies 
easily and they could not even feel any differences between their approaches to 
acquisition. The second reason relates to the leader's strategic predisposition 
(Chakravarthy & Perlmutter, 1985) described in chapter 7. The strategic 
predisposition will significantly affect MCS transfer. Tatung's leader kept an 
ethnocentric orientation and, naturally, it transferred many MCSs to its European 
operation. In contrast, Acer and Lite-on focused on national responsiveness and a 
regiocentric orientation, and their European operations were allowed to have different 
systems. The third reason may be the business focus. In their European operations, 
Acer and Mitac have more marketing orientation than Tatung and Lite-On. Different 
orientations will lead to the choice of a more or less different system. For the above 
reasons, the approach to acquisition seems to lack a strong relationship with MCS 
transfer. 
9.5 Business Focus 
Proposition 4-4 The business focus of European operations has relative impacts on 
their management control systems. Under the production-marketing orientation, 
there were fewer MCS differences between the European and Taiwanese operations 
than under the marketing orientation. 
The business focus of the overseas operation is an important factor in the 
process of MCS transfer. According to the product life cycle, Acer and Mitac are PC 
companies and their products have a short life cycle, normally less than one year. 
Tatung produces monitors and TV products and normally they have a 3-5 years' life 
cycle. Lite-On UK produces power suppliers and these have about a 3 years' life cycle 
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in PC, 7-8 years in office communication, and about 20 years in telecommunication.32 
With the life-expectancy of the product volatile, each firm has a different strategy on 
the business focus of its overseas operations. Acer's and Mitac's European operations 
focus on marketing, and Tatung's and Lite-On's European operations emphasise 
production and marketing. 
9.5.1 Marketing Oriented Group: Acer and Mitac 
Facing a volatile environment, both frrms fmally found a model as their 
integrated framework. They set their manufacturing bases in Taiwan and other Asian 
countries, and placed their marketing bases around the world under their network 
marketing channels or product brands. 
9.5.1.1 Acer 
Before 1989, Acer averaged 100% growth rate over the 13 years from when it 
was formed. After it became a public company in 1988, Acer quickly stepped on to 
the global stage. It invested in manufacturing DRAM chips with Texas Instruments 
and purchased Altos Computer Systems and many other computer companies around 
the world. Excess long-term investment actually resulted in serious financial burdens 
for the group, although they have turned out to be extremely successful in terms of 
long-term business. When the structure of the IT industry began to change, Acer was 
saddled with an organisation that had already become too big to manage effectively. 
The company quickly turned into a loss company. Its chairman said: "It was clear that 
immediate action had to be taken to enhance efficiency, cut cost and scale down the 
organisation to strengthen competitiveness." 
From 1989 to 1992, Acer started its re-engineering to build up a new global 
business model. It reorganised its group as a unique client-server management 
organisation structure that made effective use of the full range of resources available 
within the group, and the system's success can be traced to the managers who made it 
work. Acer's business works independently, but still interacts directly with other 
member entities at any time. It also redefined its European business as a Regional 
Business Unit (RBU) focusing on marketing. From 1992 Acer started to develop the 
"fast food model" in its RBUs. The components that have to be kept fresh would be 
ordered locally or shipped by air, and other parts which are least perishable could be 
sent by ship. "So the final product is just like a McDonald's hamburger: fresh, made-
to-order, and of consistently high quality.33" To support overseas assembly plants, 
32From the interview with a VP of Taiwan Liton Electronic. 
33From the collection of the speeches of Stan Shih. 
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Acer's engineers designed its "no screw" PCs so it is little more difficult to assemble 
them than to flip a burger. The "fast food" model cut Acer's companywide inventory 
by more than half, and it can franchise out very simple assembly plants around the 
world by seeking out local partners. It can easily satisfy its customers' different 
demands on both time and quality. Obviously, the new business model can meet 
speed, cost, and value. Its chairman proudly said: "Acer's success is largely due to the 
company's ability to restructure for maximum efficiency and cost-effectiveness.34" 
Under the new business model, corporate headquarters acts as a resource 
centre to help facilitate product supply logistics, and to build and maintain the 
company's world-wide brand name. European operations are defined as regional 
marketing-oriented units. If they have customers, products can be easily assembled 
within a short time. They can follow the theory of just-in-time (JIT) to control their 
inventory. Actually after 1993 each European operation showed an obvious 
improvement in inventory control (see Appendix 4): for example, Holland even 
achieved 16 times of inventory turnover, a very low inventory level. Strictly speaking 
there is no real manufacturing function. They do not need to worry about the 
production process, manufacturing control, and R&D, and they just focus on their 
marketing development. In addition to headquarters help, the European regional 
headquarters also supports some common services, such as finance, marketing 
surveys, law, technique and engineering. Its financial VP at headquarters said: "The 
simpler the matter, the easier the management." Each country head enjoys great 
decentralisation in managing his own operation. Except for a few common 
regulations, basically he has great freedom to make decisions both flexibly and 
informally, as the chairman of Acer group said: "The only way we can operate is to 
give them a basic system framework and some approaches with business sense." In 
this situation, Acer had some common spirit of system which can be found on both 
sides, but there are lots of differences in the details. 
9.5.1.2 Mitac 
Although Mitac was more conservative in its investment and operating, the 
high growth rate in the 1980s still brought Mitac some syndromes. With the recession 
and ruthless information industry competition, Mitac suffered a great loss in 1992. It 
also stepped into a re-engineering stage from that time. A series of significant 
decisions were made by top management, including changing the traditional 
production system to modularised manufacturing system (MMS), setting up the Shun-
De factory in mainland China, improving marketing channels, dropping some people, 
re-building the leadership framework, and developing a network organisation around 
34From the collection of the speeches of Stan Shih. 
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the world. Besides, it changed its original strategy focusing on own brand products to 
focusing more strongly on OEMIODM customers. Mitac accepted more big orders 
from OEM customers, especially Compaq, the top computer company in the world. In 
1994 Mitac completed most of its re-engineering tasks and ramped up its 
infrastructure. It had achieved an economy of scale both in production and logistic 
distribution.35 As its Vice Chairman said: "In 1994, we finished laying foundations for 
a strong global infrastructure." 
The British operation was constructed at the end of 1988 and in 1992 it 
became an assembly centre in Europe. From its beginning as an assembly plant, it 
tried to implement the MMS model. The PC production line was designed as a 
modularised manufacturing system just as in Taiwan or mainland China. The British 
operation can order only some basic modules, then assemble them at the local plants. 
Its assembling plants need only some modularised assembly lines. According to local 
customer demand, it can only buy highly priced components such as CPU and hard 
disk etc. locally, and then quickly assemble them for their clients. Under this MMS 
model, the British operation can greatly decrease the inventory of highly-priced parts 
which are so volatile in cases of decreasing prices. Secondly, it can offer its local 
customers a response to different demand within a short time. 
Under the MMS model, Taiwan Mitac supports all technical and quality 
service for overseas operations. The British operation can simply assemble its PCs and 
focus on marketing development. Its financial performance is better year by year and 
the inventory turnover has continually improved in the last five years (see Appendix 
4). Compared to Acer's European operations, Mitac seems still to have made no 
significant inventory improvement in 1994. Some reasons could explain the results. 
First, the re-engineering of Mitac was slower than Acer's and some potential change 
may still not have been developed. Secondly, Acer's operations can get more support 
including those for technique, quality, and management from their regional 
headquarters, and regional headquarters can also more easily monitor its operations 
than can headquarters. Thirdly, because Acer has a bigger scale in the world than 
Mitac, it has a better opportunity to use the strategy of "global sourcing, local 
purchasing"; that means its headquarters could bargain for a good price and good 
terms with main component suppliers, then overseas operations could place the order 
and it could be delivered on time. 
3SFrom Mitac minutes of the kickoff meeting, January, 1995. 
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9. 5. 2 Production-marketing Oriented Group: Tatung and Lite-On 
Compared to Acer and Mitac, Tatung's and Lite-On's British operations are 
more production-marketing oriented. Their products have a stable and longer life 
cycle, and they have their own products and markets. Although they still need to get 
technical and engineering support from their headquarters, basically they have R&D 
departments and they have to develop the new product for themselves. The production 
management is as important as its marketing planning. 
9.5.2.1 Tatung 
From 1981, the British operation was designed like an independent and big 
company. It had a similar organisation to Taiwan's Tatung. Production and marketing 
are its two main functions. Although it can get some technical support from Taiwan's 
Tatung, basically, it has to develop its own products and customers. 
In the British operation, except for the rewarding process, other processes are 
similar to Taiwanese operation. Production relevant departments participated more in 
the planning, organising, and evaluating process than did Acer's and Mitac's European 
operations. Its cost control was as important as its sales enforcement. Overall, its 
business orientation is very similar to its Taiwanese counterpart. 
9.5.2.2 Lite-On 
Before Lite-On took over the British operation in 1991, the company originally 
was a relatively independent power supplier company, and it owned its products and 
marketing. After Lite-On acquired the company, its system, personnel, and function 
were still maintained on its original lines, but it can now use the Lite-On brand and 
global marketing channels. Taiwan's Lite-On still retains its original British agent and 
rejects being merged into the British operation. The British operation needs to develop 
its products and customers by itself. Production and marketing are its main functions. 
The British operation has a similar orientation to the Taiwanese operation. 
Because it lacks a strong impact from financial control factors, their management 
control systems still show obvious differences, but the business focus still affects its 
MCS, such as more participation, more documents and regulations, and more cost 
control in production relevant departments. 
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9.5.3 Summary and Discussion 
Summary 
of Financial Data of Case Firms in 1995 
1994 to 1995 1992 to 1995 
11.4 39.9 34.5% 318.5% 
8.1 38.9 40.0% 135.2% 
Britain 7.8 42.2 92.6% 
# (110,530,000 * 40.960/25.955) 1 (150 * .8 + 280 * .2) 
As Table 9.4 shows, different financial characteristics existed between the 
production-marketing and marketing oriented groups. The production-marketing 
oriented group (the part in grey) shows lower sales per person, longer operating cycle 
(including turnover rate and receivable collection), and a lower growth rate. However, 
the marketing oriented group emphasises high speed and growth. Each operation 
maintains high sales per person, fast turnover on inventory and receivable date, and 
dramatic growth rate. In 1995, the sales of the Mitac British operation neared almost 
three times the sales in 1994 and the Acer British operation also nearly doubled its 
1994 sales. 
With the absolutely different financial characteristics, naturally, the two 
groups kept different focuses in their MeSs. As Table 9.5 shows, the marketing 
oriented group needed to proceed quickly in the planning process, flexibility of 
system, and giving more contingent rewards. The production-marketing oriented 
group needed a detailed process of objective setting and more participation than did 
the marketing oriented group. Also, they needed to keep more formal documents to 
regulate production processes and as a basis for feedback. The cost items were 
obviously analysed in a deep and detailed way. In addition, the marketing oriented 
group needed to have more motivation, and the variance of the contingent rewards 
between the two groups also reflected the situation and showed obvious difference. 
However, the contingent rewards between the Taiwanese and European operations in 
Acer and Mitac (marketing oriented group) were still far apart. 
Owing to a tight control style Tatung had strong similarities of MeS 
components between its Taiwanese and British operations, but the same business 
focus between the two operations still played an important role, especially on the 
components in Table 9.5. In Lite-On, because it kept a flexible control style, many 
differences existed in MeS components between its Taiwanese operation and British 
operation, but the components of participation, formality, and feedback extent and 
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frequency were to some extent similar between the two operations. The factor of the 
same business focus between the two operations played an important role. As to Acer 
and Mitac, the MCS components described in Table 9.5 were more or less affected by 
different business focuses between their Taiwanese and European operations, but 
Mitac with a stronger financial control style was less different than Acer. 
T bl 95 A C a e . omparlson 0 fMCSC omponents between Two Oriented Groups 
Variable Production-marketing orientation Marketing orientation 
(Tatun2 and Lite-On) (Mitae and Aeer) 
Objective setting • Focusing on integrated and • Focusing on turnover and profit 
detailed planning processes • Simplified budget as possible 
• More detailed budget analysis • Shorter time in budgeting 
• Longer time in budgeting 
Participation • Focusing on whole activities • Focusing on sales planning 
• Communicating between different • Market-driven participation 
functions 
Formality • Formal procedures, especially in • Maintaining informal and flexible 
production procedures 
• ISO certification for high quality • Keeping a few written documents 
• More written documents only 
• Easy to change regulations 
Feedback extent and • Focusing on both producing and • Focusing on marketing activities 
frequency marketing activities and inventory control 
• Tight cost control • Loose cost control 
Contingent rewards • Keeping stable pre-set salary and • Managers' financial rewards 
benefits increased as they had good 
• Fewer contingent rewards for performances 
managers • Mana2ers had more bonuses 
All in all, the proposition could be broadly accepted by the research, especially 
the components of objective setting, participation, formality, feedback extent and 
frequency, and contingent rewards. The same orientation may easily push their system 
in the same direction. The factor of business focus was an important moderating 
variable between the relationship of the financial control style and the uniformity of 
MCSs. 
Discussion 
Many prior researchers emphasised that an organisation should fit its 
environment (Child, 1972; Simons, 1990; O'Reilly III, 1991; Kay, 1993; Wright et al., 
1994, Punnett & Shenkar, 1994). Companies focusing on marketing increase their 
uncertainty and dynamism which leads to an increase in non-financial data (Gordon & 
Miller, 1976), frequency of reporting and level of aggregation (Waterhouse & Tiessen, 
1978), and a simple system model (Evan et al., 1986). Different orientations represent 
different strategies in a multinational firm. Many researchers (such as Govindarajan & 
Gupta, 1985; Snodgrass & Grant, 1986; Govindarajan, 1988; Govindarajan & Fisher, 
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1990; Simons, 1990; Daniel & Reitsperger, 1991) found a close relationship between 
strategy and the control system. In this research, the four case firms could be classified 
as having two orientations, and they were significantly different on the components of 
objective setting, participation, formality, feedback extent and frequency, and 
contingent rewards. The findings of the research are consistent with the prior research 
noted above. 
9.6 Summary 
F our situational factors - size, age, approach to acquisition, and business focus 
in European operations were observed in the research. As a result, significant impacts 
from the factors of size and business focus were found. Different operational size 
obviously resulted in the development of different MeSs, especially on the variables 
of objective setting, participation, formality, and feedback extent and frequency. A 
larger operation in Europe easily followed its MeS from its Taiwanese operation. 
Different business orientations naturally produced different MeSs, especially 
on the variables of objective setting, participation, formality, feedback extent and 
frequency, and contingent rewards. For a European operation, the greater the 
similarity in the direction of business focus to its Taiwanese operation, the greater the 
similarities between the two operations. 
As to age, no obvious evidence in the process of MeS transfer was found, and 
the research proposition could not be accepted. The method of acquisition could be 
important for a new operation in the initial stage, but with cross-sectional research it is 
difficult to make a completely longitudinal observation. From interviews in the 
research, more cultural conflicts were found in the early stage under the purchasing 
approach, but no evidence was found from the interviews that the uniformity of Mess 
under the purchasing approach was greater than under the greenfield approach. 
This research has discussed the relationships of the uniformity of Mess and 
relevant elements, including national culture, financial control factors, and situational 
factors. Each element had its impact on the transference of MeSs within a 
multinational firm. Integratedly, the element of national culture is still important in the 
uniformity of MeSs between the Taiwanese and European operations within the case 
firms, but the financial control style plays an important role in the transference of 
MeSs. As to the situational factors, they have been shown as significant moderating 
variables in the process of MeS transfer. 
10. Summary and Conclusions 
10.1 Summary of the Thesis 
10.2 Contributions 
10.3 Managerial Implications 
10.4 Limitations 
10.5 Suggestions for Further Research 
10.6 Epilogue 
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First, this chapter will briefly summarise the objectives and findings of this 
research. Then the contributions and managerial implications of the research will be 
discussed. Further, some limitations in methodology will be assessed and the 
suggestions for future research will be provided. 
10.1 Summary of the Thesis 
10.1.1 Research Purposes and Propositions 
With increasing business globalisation, it is becoming an increasingly 
important issue to MNCs to consider the feasibility of transferring management 
control systems (MCSs) across borders. If the managerial approach is regarded as 
science (Koontz 1969: 417), or the standardisation of managerial technologies and 
strategic recipes (Whitley, 1994: 106), why cannot the managerial control system be 
transferred abroad? If the MCS is regarded as an internal system in a MNC, there is no 
reason to doubt the transferability of MCS, at least on the level of the theory, 
principle, and framework of the MCS. However, many cultural researchers keep a 
different view. Management theory and principles are not applicable in materially 
different cultural environments (Crozier, 1973; Negandhi, 1975; Whitley, 1994; 
Chow, Shields, and Wu, 1996; Koontz 1969; Stening, 1979; also see Frucot and 
Shearon, 1991). Cultural interface can occur between the management of the 
subsidiary and that of the parent company. On the other hand, many researchers (such 
as Child, 1972; Gordon and Miller, 1976; Govindarajan, 1986; Gresov, 1989; 
Abernethy and Stoelwinder, 1991; O'Reilly m, 1991; Kay, 1993; Wright et al., 1994; 
Punnett and Shenkar, 1994: 41) participated in research into contingency theory. A 
great number of contingent variables are selected in the cross-border comparative 
research. Under this approach, optimal MCSs depend on the relevant elements of a 
firm's environment, and cultural factors are embedded in different contingencies. 
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To explore the reality of the transference of management control systems in 
multinational firms, the research covers the elements of national cultural factors, 
financial control factors, and situational factors. If culture matters, an organisation's 
policies can lose their effectiveness when its cultural environment changes (Hofstede, 
1980). If national cultural factors are important, then a "fitting" policy to overseas 
operations may be better than a "shared" policy. The corporation would consider the 
host national culture and situation to adjust its MCSs in foreign operations. In 
contrast, if national cultural differences are minor factors, then headquarters can more 
easily transfer its system to its foreign operations. In total, four research purposes as 
follows were included in the research: 
1. To compare the MCSs between Taiwanese and European operations within the 
case firms and to find which components of MCSs of European operations are 
affected by local culture. 
2. To examine the relationships between national culture and financial control 
factors. 
3. To explore how the financial control style of the senior managers at headquarters 
affects the MCS transfer between the Taiwanese and European operations in the 
case firms. 
4. To explore the relationships between other situational factors and MCSs of the 
case firms. 
Bearing in mind the above purposes, four important propositions were 
established as the basis for the research. Proposition 1 was set to explore the 
relationship between host national culture and host MCSs. A cross-cultural pair-
comparison between European operations regarded as the host country and Taiwanese 
operations seen as the home country was made. Following in the steps of the 
culturalists, Hofstede's cultural dimensions were used firstly to compare MCSs within 
a MNC. Proposition 2 was set for examining the relationship between the national 
culture of the home country and fmancial control factors. Hofstede's cultural 
dimensions were used to examine the relationship between the two elements. 
Proposition 3 was designed to examine financial control factors as dynamic variables 
to see how they affect host MCSs. Within the context of different financial control 
styles, the extent of uniformity of MCSs was examined. The final research proposition 
was set to examine the impact on MCS transfer arising from other situational factors. 
Four relevant situational factors were examined in the process of MCS transfer. 
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10.1.2 Research Results 
10.1.2.1 Cross-cultural Comparisons 
In regard to proposition 1 (see Table 10.1), which contains ten components in 
the cycle of MCSs, the components of objective-setting, short-term and long-term 
planning, contingent rewards, group rewards, and long-term rewards are supported by 
the research. However, the components of participation, decentralisation, formality, 
controllability-filters, and feedback extent and frequency are rejected. The comparison 
showed that the planning process and rewarding process are more affected by national 
culture than the organising process and evaluating process in the case firms. In 
comparing the components of MCSs between Taiwanese and European operations, 
strong interactions between the factors of area and company were found in the 
planning and rewarding processes. In the sub-proposition of the component of 
contingent rewards, the research results emphasise social and political factors rather 
than Hofstede's cultural dimensions. The rewarding process seems unpredictable by 
reference to Hofstede's cultural dimensions only and this result is consistent with that 
of earlier researchers (e. g., Chow et aI., 1991; Vance et al., 1992; Chow, Kato & 
Shields, 1994; Merchant et aI., 1995; also see Harrison and McKinnon, 1996, 51-53). 
In addition, the rewarding process is also affected by leaders' style and situational 
factors. Different forms of reward exist in different case firms. The effects of each of 
the various reward forms vary depending on managers' personal tastes and 
circumstances (Emmanuel, 1990: 267). With the exception that the component of 
contingent rewards is significantly influenced by social and political factors, other 
components rejected by the research have a significant relationship with leadership 
factors and situational factors. Within a MNC, national culture may often be 
embedded in relevant contingencies. 
r Table 10.1 Summary Results 0 ProPosItion 1 
Components Tatung Lite-On Mitac Acer Supported 
or rejected 
Objective-setting ~ ~ ~ ~ Supported 
Participation ? X X X Rejected 
Short-tenn and long-tenn ~ ~ ~ ~ Supported 
planning 
Decentralisation X X X X Rejected 
Formality ? X X X Reiected 
Controllability-filters ? X X X Reiected 
Feedback extent and frequency ? X X X Rejected 
Contingent rewards ~ ~ ~ ~ Supported 
Group rewards :.J ~ ~ ~ Supported 
Long-tenn rewards 
" " 
..J ..J SUPponW 
Note: ..J: Consistent with p redicted direction 
X: Not consistent with predicted direction 
?: Strongly similar and difficult to decide the direction 
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In the examination of the individual case frrms, different patterns of 
similarities and differences of MCSs between the Taiwanese and European operations 
were revealed. Tatung showed a strong similarity between the two operations, Acer 
and Lite-On had strong differences, and Mitac was in the middle. Under the 
environment of the same cultural geography, clearly, the different patterns come from 
different leaders' financial control styles and situational factors. 
10.1.2.2 Leaders' Financial Control Factors and MCS Design 
Through in-depth interviews at the cases' headquarters and checking at the 
sites of their operations, some significant operating philosophies were found and all of 
them seem to have a strong relationship with leaders' financial control factors. The 
research chose three leadership factors, namely degree of control, budget emphasis, 
and selection of managers, to identify different financial control styles in the case 
firms. 
Proposition 2 representing the relationships between national culture and 
financial control factors was examined first, but these relationships were not strong in 
the research. That means the leaders' financial control factors are influenced more by 
the leader's philosophy than by national culture. As a result, three SUb-propositions 
(see Table 10.2) representing three relationships between leadership factors and 
national culture could not be accepted by the research. The financial control factors 
seem to have a deep relationship with leaders' operating philosophies. 
Table 10.2 Summary Results of Proposition 2 
Sub-propositions Tatung Lite-On Mitac Acer Supported 
or reiected 
2-1: Hi2h de2ree of control V X V X Reiected 
2-2: Low bud2et emphasis X V X V Reiected 
2-3: In-group in the selection of V X V ? Rejected 
mana2ers 
Note: V: Consistent with predicted direction 
X: Not consistent with predicted direction 
?: Difficult to decide the direction 
Further examination of proposition 3, the relationship between leaders' 
financial control style and the uniformity of MCSs, showed a strong relationship (see 
Table 10.3). With the exception of the factor of budget emphasis which in some case 
firms had weak support (supported in the components of long-term and short-term 
planning and feedback extent and frequency), the factors of the degree of control and 
the selection of managers had strong support in the research. Overall, except for the 
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rewarding process, the values of leaders' fmancial control factors had obvious impacts 
in the process of the transference of MeSs. 
T bl 103 SRI fP a e . ummary HUtsO rODOsition 3 
Propositions Tatung Lite-On Mitac Acer Supported 
or reiected 
3: Financial control factors Supported (excluding 
(styles) significantly influence rewarding process) 
the uniformity of MCSs ~ ~ ~ ~ 
3-1: Degree of control and the Broadly supported 
uniformity of MCSs ~ ~ ~ ~ (excluding rewarding 
process) 
3-2: Budget emphasis and the Only a few variables 
uniformity of MCSs ~ ? ? ? are supported 
3-3: Selection of managers Broadly supported 
and the uniformity of MCSs ~ ~ ~ ~ (excluding rewarding 
process) 
Note: ~: Consistent with predicted direction 
?: Except for a few components, most components are not consistent with prediction 
10.1.2.3 Other Situational Factors and MCS Design 
For comparative purposes, this study not only controlled for the contingencies 
of industrial environment and technical considerations by selecting the IT industry 
only, but also selected comparative pairs within the case firms as carefully as possible. 
In addition, four situational factors including size, age, approach to acquisition, and 
business focus were observed in the research. Proposition 4 assesses whether these 
factors will significantly affect the transference of Mess from Taiwanese operations 
to European operations. 
Table 10.4 Summary Results 0 f Proposition 4 
Propositions Findings Supported 
or reiected 
4-1: Size of operation A larger operation in Europe easily followed its MCS Broadly 
from its Taiwanese operation, especially for the supported 
components of objective setting, participation, formality, 
and feedback extent and freQuency. 
4-2: Age of operation No obvious evidence in the process of MCS transfer was Rejected 
found 
4-3: Approach to More cultural conflicts were found in the early stage Rejected 
acquisition under the purchasing or merging approach, but no 
evidence was found when the interviews were carried 
out in their firms that the uniformity of MCSs under the 
purchasing approach was greater than under the 
greenfield approach. 
4-4: Business focus The greater the similarity in the direction of business Broadly 
focus to its Taiwanese operation, the greater the supported 
similarities between the two operations, especially for 
the components of objective setting, participation, 
formality, feedback extent and frequency, and contingent 
rewards. 
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Four sUb-propositions (see Table 10.4) about the above factors in the research 
were examined. As a result, significant impacts on the factors of size and business 
focus were found, but no evidence of significant impact was found on the factors of 
age of operation and approach to acquisition. With the volatile characteristics of the 
IT industry, situational contingencies still play important roles in the transference of 
MCSs within a MNC. 
10.1.2.4 Research Framework Generating 
The research framework in Figure 2.2 presented in chapter 2 provided an 
exploratory basis for the research. According to this framework, four research 
propositions were put forward for a series of qualitative analyses and examinations. 
As a result, in addition to the proposition concerning the relationships between 
national culture and financial control factors, three other propositions including the 
relationships between the uniformity of MCSs and three elements, including national 
cultural factors, financial control factors, and other situational factors, could be more 
or less supported. Each element not only played a determinant role in the transference 
of MCS, but also showed a close relationship with other elements. Combining the 
findings of these three elements, a comprehensive analytical framework of national 
culture factors, financial control factors and situational factors can be used to better 
understand and explain the cross-border transfer of MCSs. The framework can help to 
explain why one MNC could transfer MCSs more easily than another MNC. Thus the 
exploratory research framework proposed in chapter 2 would seem to provide a useful 
basis for further research. 
Three meaningful results in the framework were found in the research. Firstly, 
the components in the planning process including objective setting, participation, and 
short-term and long-term planning, obviously have more complicated relationships 
among the three elements in the transference of MCSs in multinational firms. Almost 
every element has a strong role in the transference of the components of the planning 
process. Secondly, a somewhat complementary relationship exists between the 
elements of cultural factors and financial control factors. The stronger the impact of 
financial control from the corporate centre, the less the impact from cultural factors; 
and vice versa. The element of financial control factors represents a managing value, 
and the element of national cultural factors symbolises a cultural value. The more 
managing values are involved, the more the uniformity of MCSs; conversely. the more 
cultural values are respected, the less the uniformity of MCSs. In this research, five 
out of the ten MeS components could be supported in the proposition of national 
277 
culture. The components of the rewarding process, including contingent rewards~ 
group rewards, and long-term rewards, were obviously influenced by the element of 
national culture of the host country. As shown by Tayeb (1988: 150), reward and 
punishment policies are associated with cultural factors. Of course, the elements of 
financial control factors and situational factors could also affect them, but only as 
minor elements. However, the components of objective setting and short-term and 
long-term planning showed some wide variance between the case firms. Lite-On and 
Acer having less financial control from their headquarters showed more cultural 
differences than Tatung and Mitac. Thirdly, the element of situational factors 
represents objective terms favouring the uniformity of MCSs. Each situational factor 
represents an objective term and has its different impact on the components of MCSs~ 
such that only the business focus could affect the contingent rewards. So different 
situational factors have different impacts on the uniformity of MCSs in each case. The 
more favourable the objective terms together, the more MCS transfers will happen. 
They act as important moderating variables between the relationships of financial 
control style and the uniformity of MCSs. The research found that the factors of size 
and business focus had a significant influence on the uniformity of MCSs, especially 
on the planning and organisational processes. 
Different patterns organised by the three elements existed in the different case 
firms. The four case firms in the research all maintained traditional European 
rewarding systems in their European operations. National culture seems a critical 
determinant in the rewarding process. As to other processes, the stronger the leaders' 
financial control style in a MNC, the more the MCSs were transferred to its overseas 
operation, and vice versa. The stronger the financial control style in a MNC, the 
weaker the impact of MCS transfer from host cultural factors, and vice versa. The 
sequence of the spectrum from high to low of the extent of financial control in this 
research is Tatung, Mitac, and then Acer and Lite-On. The uniformity of MCSs 
between the Taiwanese and European operations of the case firms is also consistent 
with the sequence. In addition, the more favourable the situational environment in a 
firm's overseas operation, the more the MCSs could be transferred to the overseas 
operation. Tatung's European operation offered the most favourable situational 
environment to follow its Taiwanese operation's MCSs, then Lite-On. and then Mitac 
and Acer. The case firms organise their MeSs under a complex interaction between 
the three elements. Tatung has a tight financial control style and favourable situational 
environment for the uniformity of MeSs, so it easily transfers its MeSs to the British 
operation, especially the components of the planning process, organising process, and 
evaluating process. However, in the rewarding process Tatung seems to maintain the 
traditional British system. Mitac still has a powerful control style, but compared to 
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Tatung it is more moderate and it shows greater consideration of local culture. 
However, it faces an unfavourable situational environment in MCS transfer, so when 
building its British operation' MCSs Mitac needs to consider situational factors more. 
Acer's MCSs are structured between the elements of cultural factors and financial 
control factors, and it also faces an unfavourable situational environment but the 
extent is less than in Mitac. Lite-On shows a flexible fmancial control style. and its 
MCSs are structured between the elements of cultural factors and situational factors. 
Comparison between the extent of MCS transfer in the European operations 
among the four case firms seems easier because the cultural factor appears to be 
controlled. The elements of leaders' fmancial control factors and other situational 
factors become important. However, as Acer's European RBU covers three countries 
and the other firms in Europe operate only in Britain, Acer clearly faces more 
complicated cultural problems than the other firms. Table 10.5 summarises the 
impacting result of each element on each firm, and links the ranking of the uniformity 
of MCSs in reality. In the same European cultural environment, the element of leaders' 
financial control style becomes the primary determinant in the comparison. Each case 
will be discussed further as follows. 
Table 10.5 A 
Cases' 
European 
rations 
Mitac 
Lite-On 
Acer 
n of Research Framework in Case Firms 
Financial Situational Cultural 
control style factors exposure in 
Eu 
Medium 
Flexible 
Flexible 
Favourable Less 
Unfavourable Less 
Medium Less ~vn/'\c" 
Unfavourable 
Ranking in the 
uniformity of 
MCSs 
The research framework was applied in the case firms and the results not only 
could show the influences from the different elements but also would appear to 
reasonably reflect the transference in practice. 
10.2 Contributions 
This research makes several contributions to the literature on data access, 
identifying variables, generating different analyses in cross-border comparative 
research, and the development of a research framework. 
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10.2.1 Data Access 
The research covered interviews at both headquarters and at operational level 
in each case firm. This is the first comparative research on the transfer of MCSs 
between Taiwan and Europe. In total, 74 managers agreed to an in-depth interview. In 
each case firm, the Chairman of the Board or President, Controller or Chief Financial 
Manager, Managing Director or Director of Operations, and the operations' Chief 
Accounting or Financial Director all participated in the research interviews. Some 
were very difficult to access, especially their leaders. The leaders of three firms and 
president of one other participated in the research, as it is very important to probe their 
operating philosophies and management thinking. In the European operations in 
addition to interviewing Chinese managers, the research also covered many senior 
local European managers. It is important to, understand whether their perceptions are 
consistent. 
10.2.2 Identifying Variables 
The research identifies valuable leaders' financial control and situational 
variables which have close relationships with MCS transfer. Leaders' financial control 
styles are generated by evaluating three financial control factors, including degree of 
control, budget emphasis, and the selection of managers, which represent decision-
making power, financial control, and human resources management respectively in a 
firm. The results could clearly identify different control patterns in the case firms. Of 
the other situational factors, except for the general variables of size and age of 
operation, the variables of approach to acquisition and business focus are initially 
considered in the research. In addition, following the steps of previous researchers the 
ten MCS components are included in the research. In particular, some situational 
variables, e. g., approach to acquisition and business focus, came from initial field 
work. This knowledge can also act as a reference on MCS design for their overseas 
operations for senior managers at headquarters. Some valuable findings will be 
discussed further in the section on managerial implications. 
10.2.3 Generating Different Analyses in Cross-border Analysis 
The research explored MCS transfer within MNCs from three aspects: national 
culture, leaders' financial control factors, and situational factors. The research firstly 
used Hofstede's cultural dimensions as a static analysis to analyse the similarities and 
differences between Taiwanese and European operations. Then leaders' fmancial 
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control factors were used as a dynamic analysis to probe their influences in the 
process of MCS transfer. Essentially, corporate culture and operating philosophy are 
embedded in leaders' financial control factors. Different patterns of leaders' financial 
control styles could also reflect different corporate cultures and philosophies in the 
case firms. Finally, except that some contingencies have already been controlled by 
the research, other situational factors were used as a contingent analysis to find their 
objective influences from the environment in the MCS transfer. The main purpose of 
using different analyses in the research is to explore the reality of MCS transfer in 
MNCs. 
10.2.4 Development of the Research Framework 
Owing to the dearth of literature on MCS transfer within MNCs, the research 
could discover only piece-meal literature from relevant cultural and contingency 
research. No comprehensive or integrated framework about MCS transfer was found 
in the literature. However, some linkages between different elements were identified 
and a research framework of MCS transfer was developed for exploration in this 
research. The framework comprises a close relationship between the elements of 
national culture, leaders' financial control factors, and other situational factors. The 
framework reflects a complementary relationship between the element of national 
culture and leaders' financial control factors, and it shows a contingent character 
which means "no best system" for MCS design or transfer. As the last chapter shows, 
three elements determine to what extent MCSs will be transferred in practice in the 
case firms. 
10.3 Managerial Implications 
The research findings can provide a number of implications for MNCs' 
managers on the MCS design in their foreign operations. Although this research 
focuses only on the areas of Taiwan and Europe, insights about MCS design or 
transfer within MNCs can still offer managerial inferences for other countries and 
areas. The major managerial implications here are (1) importance of "financial control 
style". (2) matching local situations, (3) keeping balance between relevant elements, 
(4) continuously improving MCSs, (5) localisation as early as possible, and (6) 
improving international human resource management (HRM). 
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10.3.1 Importance of "Financial Control Style" 
Different fmancial control styles generating from the leaders' financial control 
factors represent different firms' managing values, and they significantly impact on the 
policy of MCS transfer or design. The tighter the degree of leaders' fmancial control 
the more the MCSs are transferred, and vice versa. At the same time, the tighter the 
degree of leaders' financial control in a MNC the lower the impact from local cultures 
when MCS transfer or design is considered, and vice versa. 
From the analysis of individual leaders' fmancial control factors, the research 
finds that the selection of managers is an important factor of MCS transfer or design. 
Those firms with more in-group managers more easily maintain a similar system. 
Expatriate managers play bridging roles and naturally transfer some MCSs to overseas 
operations. The research found that those firms with more expatriate managers have 
more transference of MCSs. The factor of degree of control also significantly 
influences MCS transfer or design. The higher the degree of control the more the 
similarities of MCSs, and vice versa. Those firms with a higher degree of control at 
headquarters easily regulate some uniform systems for their foreign operations. As to 
the factor of budget emphasis, a weaker relationship with MCS transfer or design was 
found in the research. Compared to the former two factors, it is only a minor factor. 
10.3.2 Matching Local Situations 
Designing MCSs of overseas operations must leave enough room for local 
situations. As the situations mentioned in chapter 9 show, different local situations 
need different considerations in MCS design. As shown by a great number of 
experiments, the factor of size significantly affects the transference of MCSs. Small 
operations (such as Acer's, Lite-On's, and Mitac's European operations) keep less 
formality and more flexibility (especially on the MCS components of objective 
setting, participation, formality, and feedback extent and frequency) than large 
operations (such as Tatung's European operation). Another significant factor is the 
business focus. Different business orientations designed under global co-operative 
strategies need to follow different MCSs. When a European operation (such as 
Tatung's European operation) retains the same business orientation as its Taiwanese 
counterpart, it is easier to use a similar system between them. On the contrary, if a 
European operation (such as Mitac and Acer) has a different business orientation from 
its Taiwanese counterpart, it is difficult to keep a similar system between both 
operations, especially on the MCS components of objective setting, participation, 
formality, feedback extent and frequency, and contingent rewards. In addition, other 
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local situations, such as age of operation, approach to acquisition, also have some 
impact on an operation's MCS design. 
10.3.3 Keeping Balance between the Three Elements 
Transferring or designing MCSs for overseas operations calls for a balance 
between national culture, leaders' financial control factors, and situational factors. 
When a MNC designs its MCSs in overseas operations, it is very important to realise 
completely its financial control style, host country culture, and local situation 
contexts. Some components may easily be affected by specific elements, but it is 
possible for some components to be affected by multiple elements. No "best system" 
exists for MCS transfer or design, but keeping a balance among the three elements can 
be regarded as a rule of thumb. A basic common MCS framework as "internal 
isomorphism" to all operations seems very important to a MNC. However, owing to 
different local cultures and situational factors, keeping relative flexibility in MCS 
design is still necessary. The dilemma could be solved by clearly defining MCSs 
between the global corporate level and the level of local operation (Ferner, 1996: 20). 
10.3.4 Continuously Improving MCSs 
Although all the chosen case firms are big global manufacturing companies in 
Taiwan, most of their MCSs are still in the preliminary stage. No matter whether on 
the global corporate level or operational level, clear and integrated MCS definitions 
within the firms are still very few. Remaining flexible on control systems and 
depending on managers are very popular in case firms. Strictly speaking, they are all 
in the learning stage and still lack very good MCSs. When interviews were conducted 
at each site, many managers, especially financial managers, were very dissatisfied 
with their MCSs, especially in the European operations. It seems to hint that their 
managers have a strong desire to expect a better setting of MCSs. Although 
organisations in fast-growing technologies should emphasise cultural or clan forms of 
control (Ouchi, 1992: 79), however, for information and management reasons, it 
seems necessary for each firm to improve their MCSs continuously. In addition, 
clearly defining the relationship between headquarters and operations and designing a 
global basic framework of MCSs seem very important to the case firms. With 
globalisation increasing, top managers need to consider changing their MCSs to cope 
with strong competition. 
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10.3.5 Localisation as Early as Possible 
The research found no significant relationship between the age of operation 
and MCS transfer. With time passing, the cultural conflicts between local and 
expatriate managers may decrease, but the effect of the MCS transfer seems not to 
have obviously increased with the passing of time. The research found almost all 
MCSs and the structure between expatriate managers and local managers are similar 
at their start. With the quick growth of business, those firms with more expatriate 
managers from Taiwan find it is more difficult to replace them with local managers. 
Complete localisation in IT firms seems not to be a good policy. The research 
found that keeping a few expatriate senior managers in technical, logistic, and 
financial areas, or a managing director in overseas operations, seems still a good 
policy for IT firms, especially in the early stages. Compared to Lite-On which has no 
expatriate manager in its European operation and Tatung in which expatriate 
managers take all the senior positions in its European operation, Acer and Mitac seem 
to keep a neutral policy under which only a few critical senior managers are expatriate 
managers in their European operations. Comparing both the growth rate and 
profitability in the cases' European operations, Acer and Mitac were also better than 
Lite-On and Tatung (see Appendix 4). Reliance on too many expatriate managers not 
only costs more money but also hampers the goal of globalisation. It is important to 
consider the extent of localisation as early as possible and to execute a strategy from 
the beginning. 
10.3.6 Improving International Human Resource Management 
When the interviews were conducted in the case firms, different common 
identities of corporate management and MCSs were often found between local 
managers and expatriate Taiwanese managers. Strictly speaking, these case firms lack 
international HRM. Expatriate managers travel one way, from Taiwan to European 
countries only, and there are no career planning opportunities for local managers. 
Expatriate managers are very important bridges in those cross-national 
isomorphism MNCs and in those local isomorphism MNCs. Taiwanese IT firms send 
expatriate managers to overseas operations intending to fill specialised positions only. 
As a result, these expatriate managers lack the function to create a "verbal information 
network (Edstrom and Galbraith, 1977: 249)." At the current stage, "compatible 
managers (Wright et al., 1994: 222)" in a case firm seem hard to find. These case 
firms need to improve their HRM and establish an international HRM strategy. The 
transfer of managers is not only to fill positions, but also to develop managers and 
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develop an integrated organisation (Child, 1973: 3; Edstrom and Galbraith, 1977: 252-
253). An integrated and long-tenn international HRM strategy should be established 
for expatriate managers within the case firms. 
10.4 Limitations 
In addition to the possible biases in chapter 3, some limitations of the research 
will now be discussed. 
10.4.1 Narrow Research Territories and Small Samples 
Limited by time and funds, the research could choose only to observe and 
compare the MCSs between the European and Taiwanese operations within the case 
firms. The approach may be convenient for exploring factors affecting MCS design 
from the dimensions of national culture and local situational factors. It is also helpful 
to observe deeply the process of MCS transfer. In addition, its results are convenient 
for comparisons to be made and its theory also easy to apply in the case finns. 
However, from the view of a MNC the research limits its attention to one part only of 
firms' business geography. It is very difficult to get an overview of finns' integrated 
corporate culture and global strategies. If the effectiveness of MCS transfer and the 
relationship between the strategy of MCS transfer and perfonnance measurement 
could be based on the whole finns' business, the results should be more meaningful to 
its top management. Of course, it costs a large amount of money and time to collect 
samples and data. 
10.4.2 Limited to IT Industry 
For ease of comparison, this research chose case finns from the Taiwanese IT 
industry. Because case finns in the same IT industry have similar environmental and 
technical factors, some significant contingencies are controlled for in the research. As 
a result. contingent variables in the research are greatly decreased and a simple 
explanation of the framework becomes possible. However. when the theory and 
framework of the research are applied to different industries, environmental and 
technical factors should be carefully considered. 
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10.4.3 Emphasis on Formal MCSs 
This study focuses on the transference of formal management control systems. 
Following the cycle of management control systems, the research chose critical 
components for observation. However, during the field work of the research, some 
transference out of the domain of formal MeSs was found. These mechanisms include 
general control style by top management, informal control systems, and organisational 
framework. Some case firms have transferred many mechanisms from Taiwan, but 
among them only a few formal Mess. For example, Acer has transferred its client-
server organisational structure, production flow, persuasive management style, and 
flexible procedure control to its European operations, but only a few components of 
formal Mess were found. That means the findings of the research still could not 
represent the phenomena of the transference of whole management systems. 
10.4.4 Cross-sectional Analysis 
Although some events or facts have been discovered as far as possible in the 
interviews of the research, essentially this research is still a cross-sectional analysis. 
This cross-sectional analysis, like a single snapshot, cannot offer chronological and 
systematic observations. Its main disadvantage is that it cannot provide a set of 
situations in a firm to probe "why and how" problems. As a result, the approach could 
not follow changes in time to observe the process of transfer and most findings in the 
research can only represent the reality when the field work was conducted. 
10.4.5 Selection of Variables 
The research is structured on the basis that the MeS transfer is a function of 
the elements of national culture, leaders' financial control factors, and other situational 
factors. Most variables of these elements were obtained from the literature before the 
field work, but a few variables were identified from in-depth interviews. The dilemma 
of the research is how to keep the balance between the number of variables and the 
relevance of the research. It is impossible to exclude any extraneous variable in the 
causal relationship, and other variables which have not been identified in the research 
or their accumulated impacts may affect the causal inference. However, the basic 
causal inference based on prior theories was established first, and then it was assessed 
by comparative case studies. The causal relationship between Mes transfer and 
relevant variables can be reasonably validated. 
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10.4.6 Interviewer Judgements 
The researcher has kept an objective and cautious manner in the collection 
and assessment of evidence. Throughout the interviews, sensitive follow up questions 
were included and further questions probed for clarification of doubtful issues. 
Different questions were prepared to interview different functional managers, but each 
question was repeated at least once to different managers. For some important 
questions, a cross-checking interview between headquarters managers and operational 
managers was designed. Interview data were transcribed verbatim. Analytical items 
were sorted from data bases as far as possible and a cross-checking between different 
components or elements was used. However, it must be recognised that the results are 
limited by the subjective judgements made by the researcher in the data analysis and 
classification process. Reality must be interpreted by the researcher, and thus, case 
studies represent interpretations of the social reality. There can be no such thing as an 
"objective" case study (Ryan et al., 1992). 
10.5 Suggestions for Further Research 
The research has disclosed many findings on the relationship between MCS 
transfer and three elements. However, much remains unknown and some limitations 
of the research still need to be removed. A number of opportunities and directions 
exists for future research. 
10.5.1 Covering More Territories within the Case Firms 
If possible, a comparative study will be made in the future to cover more 
business territories or even all territories within a case firm. This study will be 
valuable in relation to the present research. The topics for such a study will include 
firm's culture, operating philosophy, or global strategy in the framework of MCS 
transfer. The result can more substantially and comprehensively demonstrate the 
above characteristics of the case firms. It can also serve as a better basis for comparing 
case firms more objectively. With the territories of firms' operations increasing, the 
impacts from the elements of national culture, leaders' financial factors, and 
situational factors are becoming clearer. 
10.5.2 Longitudinal Research 
The business situation will change from time to time. Naturally internal 
systems such as MeSs are easily changed in time to match environmental necessity. 
Longitudinal research can observe a set of relevant cases for a long time. As a result, it 
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is easy to compare cases within a frrm, and the effectiveness of relevant events that 
happen also can be easily observed and measured. 
Owing to limited resources, this research chooses cross-sectional analysis to 
analyse relevant data. Although the research tried to unveil more historical data, 
managers' memories seem to retain only limited facts with weak reliability. Lacking 
the "time dimension", the research could not compare historical cases one with 
another within a case firm. In the findings of the research, the rewarding and planning 
devices, especially rewarding devices, were found to be very changeable. A 
longitudinal research approach seems a better approach to improve research quality in 
this regard. 
10.5.3 Considering Other Variables 
Three important elements are contained in the research. In the element of 
national culture, Hofstede's cultural dimensions were chosen in the framework; 
leaders' financial control factors were emphasised, those variables representing the 
leaders' financial control style; and four contingent variables were selected as other 
situational factors from the literature and the field work of the research. 
The variables in each element may be added to or substituted for, and different 
results may be the outcome. Hofstede's cultural dimensions may be replaced by other 
cultural dimensions or attributes. In addition, leaders' financial control and other 
situational factors can also be easily added or substituted for different factors. The 
results may be different and could also provide interesting comparisons. 
10.5.4 Different Industrial Settings 
As the case firms of the research are chosen from the IT industry, 
contingencies in different industrial settings are ruled out in the research. The research 
framework is suitable only for investigations into the same industry. However, 
different industrial settings may have different phenomena in MCS transfer. Different 
contingencies in environments and techniques should be considered when comparing 
industries. In other words, more contingencies may need to be considered when the 
framework is applied to cross-industry comparisons. 
10.5.5 Thinking About Other Control Mechanisms 
This research emphasises formal MeSs, mechanisms for middle management 
to achieve a firm's goals and to use a firm's resources effectively. Actually. except for 
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formal MCSs, a company's control systems cover other control mechanisms such as 
, 
control mechanisms at top management level, informal control mechanisms, value 
controls, and operational controls at the basic management level. Some facts of 
transference in other control mechanisms were found during the field work of the 
research. To understand the transference of whole control systems within a MNC 
researchers need to think about other control mechanisms also. 
10.5.6 Exploring the Relationship between Firm's Strategy and MCS Transfer 
The purpose of strategy, just as for MCSs, is to achieve a firm's goals, so 
theoretically they have a close relationship. A few facts about the relationships 
between global strategies and MCS transfer or design were found in the research. 
Different extents of MCS transfer in different areas or countries were found in some 
case firms in the research. In addition, the definition of overseas operations in global 
competitive strategy has also a significant impact on an operation's MCS transfer or 
design. However, this subject seems a very interesting area for future researchers. 
10.5.7 Measuring the Effectiveness ofMCS Transfer 
This research emphasises why MCSs can or cannot be transferred and what 
elements could affect MCS transfer. Although some financial data of the case firms' 
European operations are explained in the research, essentially this research does not 
cover measurement of the effectiveness of MCS transfer. However, measurement of 
the effectiveness of MCS transfer and the relationship between performance and MCS 
transfer are very important areas for future research. 
10.6 Epilogue 
This research is devoted to exploring the transferability of MCSs in MNCs. 
Three important elements are found and an integrated framework has been developed 
to elucidate the relationship between MCS transfer and these three elements. Although 
the element of national culture is still important in MCS design and the element of 
situational factors is also significant, the element of leaders' financial control factors is 
found to be the critical element in the process of MCS transfer or design. The leaders' 
financial control factors depend on the human qualities of the leaders, on their ability 
to adapt and change cultural and situational factors. In other words, leaders have the 
main roles in the process of MCS transfer or design. 
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Some mysteries found during the field work of the research still remain in the 
researcher's mind. For example, in one of the case operations in Britain, long-teon 
losses under a series of local managing directors, could be turned over to become a 
profit-making company within one year, given a new Taiwanese managing director. In 
the interview, of course, he listed a series of his great strategies on competition and 
some of his revisions of MeSs. Does success come from better MeSs, economic 
growth, excellent leadership, or all three? Is it possible for leadership to have such 
great power? 
One power-supply company in Britain, owing to the suffering of long-teon 
losses, was purchased by one of the case frrms in 1991. Since that time the operation 
has enjoyed complete localisation. British managers took control of the fion, but it 
still suffered continuous losses. When interviews were conducted there, its top 
managers explained that the losses resulted from the existence of the old corporate 
culture and the lack of motivation. Does the failure come from its old culture, 
motivation system, or an incompetent management team? Is it too difficult to change 
its old corporate culture? In fact, its parent company is a very successful IT firm in 
Taiwan. Is it possible for it to become a very successful company within a short time 
just by changing its top manager? 
Another British operation with better Mess and strong corporate culture from 
its parent company was a profitable company in the 1980s, but it suffered losses in the 
last five years. Its senior managers explained that because of the increment in 
workers wages they transferred their parts manufacturing to an Asian country before 
1991. However, the company still continued to suffer serious losses. A review of its 
financial data revealed low sales growth, a long operating cycle, slow inventory 
turnover rate, and huge administrative expenses and interest charges. Where does the 
power of strong corporate culture exist? What is the function of MeSs? Is it possible 
to become a profit-making company by adjusting the management team? 
One case firm uses a global management reporting system based on its 
strategic factors to manage its global operations' success. Its operations' managers 
quickly and efficiently follow the policy. A good control mechanism seems not so 
difficult to apply. Sometimes, culture seems not to be an important factor and culture 
may become a good excuse for some managers. Interviews with many successful 
managers in the research showed that cultural factors seemed not to be their main 
consideration. Does culture become unimportant? Or do smart managers successfully 
use the advantages of culture? 
One of the case firms successfully uses its global organisation, marketing 
channel. logistic design, and product brand to increase its competitive capacity. It also 
smartly uses many slogans to elucidate its corporate culture and long-term visions. 
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However, it obviously lacks good MCSs in its overseas operations. In addition, its 
MCSs are developed almost by their operations' financial managers themselves and 
there are great differences between its operations. Obviously, its MCSs are not good 
as its operating results show. Is the importance of MCSs not as described by the 
textbook? Why should an intelligent leader give so little attention to MCS design? 
Objectively speaking, cultural differences and situational factors actually 
surround an operation, and a great deal of research supports those facts. However. a 
good manager can make a choice and turn the seemingly uncontrollable into the 
controllable. He can modify his strategies and tactics in accordance with cultural and 
situational factors. MCSs can be a powerful guarantee of achieving a company's 
objectives, if his subordinates can contribute their energies to the system. A good 
manager will try to know his company and competitors so he can be successful in 
marketplaces with no danger of defeat. Of course, "it is easier to acquire a large troop 
with thousands of soldiers than a good general" (Sun Tzu's, The Art of War). A leader 
should have confidence in his subordinates and delegate them enough power to carry 
out their assignments. Then these subordinates should be efficiently trained to become 
good managers. Cultural and situational factors sometimes are more complicated than 
thought, but an intelligent manager can sort them out. How to balance leadership 
factors with cultural and situational factors seems not to be a difficult problem to a 
good leader. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1 Interview Questions 
Interview I: Headquarters Senior Managers 
1 D fe t I • e2ree 0 on ro 
Interview Content DP CA 
How do you use management control systems to manage the whole company? X X 
How do you convey the company policy and operating philosophy to the X 
operations' managers? 
Does your company have a clear decentralised decision making system? How X X 
do you decentralise? 
What decisions are controlled by headquarters? What decisions belong to the X X 
manager of operations? 
How do you know the decentralisation is effective in practice? X X 
DP: Drrector of Board and/or PreSident 
OS: Other senior managers 
CA: Controller and/or accounting manager 
OM: Operations'managers 
2 B d tE h • U 12e mp as IS 
Interview content DP CA 
When evaluating managers' performance how much importance do you attach X X 
to each of the following items? Please choose and rank the three most 
important items (as card): 
• effort put into the job 
• how much profit making 
• concern with quality 
• meeting the budget 
• the ability to handle people 
• efficiency in running his unit 
• attitude towards his work 
• how well getting on with group staff 
What is the role of the budget in company management? X X 
Does your company have a formal budget planning and control manual? X 
How is the objective of each operation set? How should the company X X 
strategies and operation's special environments be considered? 
How should the performance of operations be evaluated? Does the X X 
headquarters consider the non-financial indicators? 
If an operation did not attain its objective, what does the headquarters do? X X 
Could the headquarters accept the manager's explanation? 
What is the relationship between promotion and bonuses and budget X X 
performance? 
3 S I f fM • e ec Ion 0 ana2erS 
Interview content DP AC 
What is your company's policy of manager selection? X 
Is there any difference in manager selection between the domestic and the X X 
foreign operations? 
In a foreign operation, How do you organise its operating managers? Do you X 
consider their nationality? Is there any rule? Why? 
When your company selects managers, Are cultural and age factors important X X 
considerations? Why? 
Under what conditions, do you think the company will change a manager? X 
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OS OM 
X 
X 
X X 
OS OM 
X X 
X 
X 
X X 
X 
X 
OS OM 
X X 
X 
X 
X 
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Interview II: Interview with Operations' Managers 
1. Objective Setting 
Interview content OM CA DH 
How do you detennine the company's (operation) objective (or standard)? X X X 
How is the new budget developed? Who proposes budget levels? X X X 
When setting objectives (standards), What is the extent of impact from the senior X X 
managers? What is the importance of the operating manager's contribution to the 
budget? 
Do you think everyone in the company (or operation) has the right role in the X X 
objective-setting or standard-setting process? 
How are the company policies and strategies considered in objective setting? X X 
Do you think the various budgets(standards} are tight or loose? Why? X X X 
OM: Operation's manager and/or vice-manager CA: Operation's controller and/or accounting manager 
DH: Division's heads 
2. Participation 
Interview content OM CA OH 
Does your company have a budget committee? Who participates in the committee? X X 
What is its function? 
What is the extent to which the superiors seek their subordinates' input in the X X 
budgeting process? 
How many discussion meetings are held in budgeting? X X 
How much time is spent in budgeting? 
Does your superior finalise your unit's budget without your agreement? X X 
What is the extent of upper management realising the lower management problems X X X 
and lower management understanding the upper management expectations in the 
budgeting process? 
3. Long-term and Short-term Planning 
Interview content OM CA OH 
What is the budget time span in your company? Does the company have a long-tenn X X 
budget? 
Does the company have a system of fonnallong-tenn planning? If it has, what is the X X X 
content of long-tenn planning? 
If the company (operation) has long-tenn planning, how does your company X X 
I(operation} develop it? Who participates in it? 
How does your company (operation) match short-tenn budgeting with long-tenn X X X 
lPlanning? 
4 Decentralisation • 
Interview content OM CA OH 
Does your company (operation) have a fonnal decentralised decision making X X 
system? What is the extent of company (operation) decentralisation? What decisions 
are controlled by top managers? 
Does each manager clearly know what decisions he can make himself? X X X 
Does each manager of a responsibility unit make decisions independently? 
What is the extent to which the supervisors change their subordinates' decisions? X X 
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5. Formality 
Interview content OM CA DH 
Does your company keep formal documents about the function of each department 
and the job descriptions? X X 
Does the budget process in your company have a standardised process? Does the X X 
company keep written records of budget variances? 
Does your company keep written evaluations of managers' job performances? Are the X X 
rewards in your company based on written evaluations? 
Are the regulations, rules and procedures strictly obeyed in day-to-day oj)erating? X X 
Can changes in the budget be made only after approval from higher management? X X 
6. Controllability-filters 
Interview content OM CA DH 
How do you evaluate your subordinates' performance? What are the indicators used? X X 
When evaluating managers' performance, do you think managers should be held X X X 
responsible for all budget variances or only for their controllable elements? Are 
uncontrollable factors excluded in the performance evaluation? 
Will the managers who do not meet their budget be in trouble? X X X 
Do they have sufficient opportunities to explain? 
Can operating objectives be adjusted during the budget period? Under what X X 
conditions can it be done? 
7. Feedback Extent and Freguency 
Interview content OM CA DH 
In what period of the year are management appraisals made and what is the X X 
procedure used? 
What part of the report is generally best read? Are these reports the primary signals, X X 
or feedback mechanisms, for the top management, giving them information about 
cost, status, and budget accuracy? 
Is the analysis of budget variances done frequently? How do you determine the X X 
material variances which need to be further investigated? 
Do managers know clearly the impact of variances (both positive and negative) on X X X 
their evaluations? 
Does the budget information help upper management to evaluate the performance of X X 
lower managers? What is the extent of feedback about the subordinates' rewards and 
I promotions? 
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8. Contingent Rewards 
Interview content OM CA DH 
How do you measure your subordinates' performance? Do you use multiattribute X X 
measures? Have you used non-fmancial measurements? 
Does the compensation contract clearly specify how the employees' compensations 
are related to their units' performance relative to their units' budget? 
X X 
What is the extent to which your fmancial rewards increase as your unit increasingly X X 
outperforms your unit's budget? 
How does the extent of bonus differ among the managers whose performances are X X 
different? 
What is the percentage of total annual compensation coming from pre-set salary as X X 
opposed to bonuses? 
Is it possible to have better performance by increasing performance-contingent X X 
rewards in your company? Is it possible that the pre-set salary of a unit manager will 
be reduced as a result of poor performance? 
Over the past few years has the determination of performance-dependent rewards X X 
been changed? 
9. Group Rewards 
Interview content OM CA DH 
What is the incentive base in your company? Is it based on corporate performance, X X X 
responsibility centre performance, individual performance or other base? Why? 
In addition to general reward systems which are shared by both managers and X X 
employees, does your company have an executive incentive plan? What is the content 
of the plan? 
What are the main factors considered when the company designs the reward system? X X 
Is national culture an important factor? 
Over years how have the employees responded to the company rewards system? X X 
10. Long-term Rewards 
Interview content OM CA DH 
Does your company have a long-term incentive plan? Who can share in that plan? If X X 
not, why does your company not need it? 
Does your company have a stock option or purchase plan? Does your retirement X X 
system consider the managerial performance factor? 
When your company decides the annual bonus, does the top management consider X X X 
the growth rate or other performance indicators over a long-term period (such as 3 
[years average rate) ? 
Does your company have any plan to establish a new long-term reward system? X 
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Appendix 2 Field Interviews 
Table A2 1 Field Interview Table . 
Interviewee Title Date Time 
Tatun!: headquarters 
T. S. Lin Chainnan of Tatung group 1996/09/06 10:00-1 I :00 
H. T. Liu Vice President (fmance) 1994/12/31 * 09:30-10:30 
Y. C. Chen Secretary General 1995/08121 13:30 15:00 
Charles G. F. Leu Deputy General Financial manager 1995/08124 15:00-16:10 
1. Z. Wung Vice Chainnan of Internal Auditing 1995/09/05 10:00 11:00 
E. I. Chu Member of Internal Auditing 1995/09/05 II: 10 12:00 
Tatung: Electronic General Plant (Taiwan) 
Y.Y. Wang General Manager 1995/08/29 10:00 II: 10 
Karl K. L. Hsu Accounting Manager 1995/08/29 11:20--12:30 
Yan-N ian Lin Manager of Engineering Dept. 1995/08/29 13:10--13:45 
S.F. Chen Manager of Production & Sales 1995/08129 13:50--14:35 
M.F. Wang Deputy manager of Logistics 1995/08/29 14:40--15:20 
Tatung: Tatun2 U.K. Company 
W. T. Lin President 1995/03/18 * 12:00--13:30 
Y. H. Hsieh Managing Director 1995/07/24 17:30--19:00 
Willian W. 1. YU Chief Accounting 
Y. J. Shiu Executive Director 1995/07/27 11:40--12:30 
David Pugh Financial Controller 1995/07/27 13 :20-14:30 
Roy H. Perrins Operations Manager 1995/07/27 15:00--16:00 
Acer: headquarters 
Stan C. Z. Shih Chairman of Acer Group 1995/09/10 14:00--15:00 
George S. F. Huang Senior Vice President 1995/09/12 10: 10--11 :00 
Philip G. P. Peng Vice President 1995/01104 * 09:30--11 :00 
1995/09/11 17:40--19:00 
Austin E. S. Chen Vice President (soucing) 1995/09/19 17:00-18:00 
Z. F. Ye Director of Internal Auditing 1995/09/08 14:20--15: 10 
Henry L. J. Wu Director of Management Analysis 1995/09/08 10:20--12:30 
Acer Group: Acer Global Inc. (Taiwan) 
Richard C. F. Chen2 General Manager 1995/09/11 14:00--15:00 
I. S. Tsai Plant Mana2er 1995/09/19 09:20-10:45 
Anderson J. H. Su Director of Logistics Dept. 1995/09/19 10:50--11 :30 
Jason E. M. Chen Manager of Spare Part 1995/09/19 10:35--12:15 
M. L. Yen Chief Accountant 1995/09/19 15:35--16:20 
Acer: Acer Computer B. V. (Holland) 
Teddy Lu President of Acer Europe 1995/10/19 14;30--15:45 
Eric Tien European Controller 1995/10/19 15:50-17: 10 
Howard Chan Director Treasury 1995/10/20 09:30-11 :00 
Henk Van Tongeren Financial controller 1995/10/20 11 :20-12:05 
Marienette Wemelsfelder Human Resource Manager 1995/10120 14:00-14:45 
Jackson Wei Director of L02istics 1995/10120 15:20-17:10 
Acer: Acer Computer GmbH (Germany) 
Wolfgang Griegoleit Prokurist Director 1995/10123 14:00-15:10 
Ken Su Mana2ing Director 1995/10123 16:50-18:30 
Klaus M. Muuss Managing Director 1995110124 10:30-1 I: 10 
Wilfried Thorn Product Marketing Director 1995/10124 11:30-12:15 
Mark Huang Finance Controller 1995/10124 12:30-13:00 
16:00-17:00 
316 
Interviewee Title Date Time 
Acer: Acer lJ K Limited (Britain) 
Jerry W. T. Wang Managing Director 199~ II/~ I 13:~()--1~:05 
Dave Tanner Marketing Director 199 ~ I 1, 2 I I~:I~--I~~(l 
Jimmy Su Director of Logistics 199~ II 21 16:00--16: ~() 
Graham Jackson Financial Director 199~ '11,21 I .,: 10--18: 15 
Mitac: headquarters 
Matthew F. C. Miau Chairman of M itac Group 199~ 0906 16:00--17 :00 
C. S. Ho Vice Chairman of Mitac Group 199~ 08 ~8 11:40--1") :4() 
Francis T. Tsai President of Mitac International Co. 19960924 12:00--13 :00 
Liang Su President of Mitac Inc. 1994'12 31 • 11:00--11:40* 
199~ 08")") 14:00--1 ~ :40 
Godfrey Y. C. Chen Controller 199~0831 16:00--17:00 
Mitac: lJ. K. Company (Britain) 
Lawrence T. C. Lu Managing Director 199~07117 17:00--18:30 
I·.ddy Lagrand Logistics Director 199~ 07114 17:00--18:10 
Gllrdial Duhre Finance Director 199~ 07 19 I ~ :00--16:00 
Corrina S. L. Chan Manager of Finance 199~ 07 13 I ~ :00--16:00 
Nicky C. S. Ni Technical Manager 199~ 07 12 17:00--18: 10 
Mitac: Hsinchu Plant (Taiwan) 
C. J. Ling Vice President of Manufacturing 199~ OS 3 I 10:30--1 1:40 
C. H. Wang A.V.P. of Material Division 199~ 08 31 I 1:40--12:30 
(iino S. F. Chang A.V.P. of Quality Assurance Centre 199~09 0 I 14:00--15:00 
Percv H. T. Chen A.V.P. of Technical Service Centre 199~ 0901 I ~ :00--16:00 
Asherly P. E. Tsai Manager of Finance Division 199~ 09 0 I 16:10--16:~~ 
Liton Corporation: headquarters 
Warren K. Z. Chen President 199~ 09 21 17:40--18:30 
Rick C. H. Wll A.V.P. of Finance Dept. 199~O921 16:30--17:40 
Jacob (i. T. Liao Director of Corporate Planning 
Lando C. T. Lin Associate Director of Finance Dept. 199~ 09 26 17:40--18:30 
Lite-On: Power Conversion Plant (Taiwan) 
lar Hsun Chang Vice President (Sales Marketing) 199~09 26 14:30--1 ~:30 
199~ 09'29 I I :00--1 1:40 
Richard P. S. Hu Director of Planning Dept. 199~ 09 2() 15:30--16:20 
Stolle K. W. Wang Operation A.V.P. 199~ 09 26 16:30--17:20 
Lite-On: Lite-on Ltd. (Britain) 
Peter Higgs Managing Director 1995'IIOl) 09:30--10:50 
Brian Smith Chief Executive 1995 II 09 11:20--12:30 
A filII Mohammed Financial Director 199~'11 09 12:40--13:~0 
Patricia Douglas Personnel Manager 199~11109 I 4: I 5 -- I ~ : 0 ~ 
'knn F. 1),1\ idge Director of sales & Marketing 199~ II 09 I~:I~--I~:~~ 
f\ laIcolm Humble Production Manager 199~ 1111 0 10:30--11:'~ 
C\I(': headquarters 
L. I. Yang Vice President (Finance) 1994 12 29 • 15:00--16:()()* 
Jean (i. W. Lu Supervisor of Finance 
.Jean (i. \\'. Lu Supervisor of Finance 199~ 09 14 1400--1 ~ :00 
(:\Ie: Ellropa Magnl'tic Limited (Britain) 
Smoll T..J. Wang V ice President 1l)l)~'IIIIO 14:00--1~:30 
• \ 0 tape record 
, : ... T'lhle \") .., Field Interview Time rnit: minllte 
Tatllng Acer 'I itac Lite-On Other Total 
1.010 I ,()l) ~ 1.050 "7")" ~IO ".69(1 
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Appendix 3 Important Companies in the Case Firms 
Tatung Group 
1. Tatung Corporation 
As a headquarters of the Tatung group, Tatung is a conglomerate with almost 
40 companies world-wide and sales of 3.5 billion US dollars. Its shareholders number 
almost 170,000 at present and its employees own nearly 20% of stock share. It is the 
first publicly offered electronic company listed on Taiwan's Stock Exchange and 
currently it has 30 thousand employees including 20 thousand in Taiwan and 10 
thousand in other countries. It has a branch office or manufacturing plant in the US, 
Japan, the UK, Germany, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, Hong Kong, 
Korea, Canada, Hungary, and on the Chinese Mainland. The main product sectors of 
Tatung are electronics, communications, home appliances, heavy electric apparatus, 
industrial equipment and trading. In the past ten years its turnover almost trebled, and 
the information products continually increased until now they account for nearly 70% 
of total sales. Objectively speaking, it is now a great information corporation. Its 
revenue reached NT$40.9 billion and it was ranked as 8th in Taiwan's manufacturing 
industries in 1995. 
2. Chunghwa Picture Tube Ltd. 
It was established in 1970 and after suffering 15 years losses the company 
turned into a very profitable company. Over the past three years, most of the profits of 
the Tatung group came from this company. Its tubes, ranging from 4.5 inches to 20 
inches, are available for televisions, automobiles, and high-resolution display 
monitors. It was ranked as 29th in Taiwan's manufacturing industry and its sales were 
nearly NT$23.2 billion in 1995. It is expected to be a publicly listed company on 
Taiwan's Stock Exchange in 1999. The president of the company is one of the sons of 
the group's chairman. 
3. Taiwan Telecommunication Industry Company 
The company, established in 1966, is Taiwan's leading manufacturer of 
telecommunications equipment. With the most advanced QC testing equipment, 
precise automatic machinery, and a perfect QC system, it has offered its services to 
Taiwan's telecommunication Administration and civilian companies for a long time. 
According to Common Wealth Magazine, in 1995 its turnover attained NT$2.3 billion 
and it was ranked as 362nd of Taiwan's manufacturing industries. 
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4. Forward Electronics Company 
The company produces lots of electronic and information products, including 
TV tuners, moderators, and AMlFM radio tuners, remote control units, switches, 
record/play heads, resistors, mouse, keyboard, TN, and LCD. It produces a series of 
products that are light, thin, short, and tiny. According to Common Wealth Magazine, 
in 1995 its turnover reached over NT$2.6 billion and it was ranked as 329th of 
Taiwan's manufacturing industries. 
5. Tatung Fujitsu Company 
Established in 1973, Tatung Fujitsu Company is a joint venture between the 
Tatung Company and the Fujitsu Company, the largest computer manufacturer in 
Japan. It is mainly engaged in selling and renting a full line of Fujitsu computer 
systems. Hardware systems include extra-large models, large models, medium 
models, and small models of personal computers, computer peripherals, and a series 
of Tatung personal computers. The development of software systems includes system 
design and analysis, technology support, training, and data processing. According to 
Common Wealth Magazine, in 1994 its turnover attained over NT$0.8 billion and it 
was ranked as 403rd of Taiwan's service industries. Due to the product conflict 
between the Tatung Company and the Fujitsu Company, Tatuog stopped the joint 
venture and sold its 50% of total shares. In all, Tatung made over NT$169 million 
profit in July, 1996. 
6. Tatung OTIS Elevator Company 
The Tatung OTIS Elevator Company was established In 1983 as a joint 
venture of the Tatung Company and the American OTIS Elevator Company. It offers 
total capabilities in design, manufacture, installation and maintenance of elevators and 
escalators and has been widely welcomed by customers. In 1995, its turnover attained 
nearly NT$I.8 billion and it was ranked as 451 st of Taiwan's manufacturing industries 
by Common Wealth Magazine. 
Lite-On Group 
1. Taiwan Liton Electronic Co., Ltd. 
It was established in 1975, and is currently divided into two business units: the 
opto division and Power conversion division. It became a public company in 1983. 
With twenty years experience in the optoelectronic industry, it has become one of the 
world's leading developers and manufacturers of high-performance LED 
optoelectronic products for a wide variety of computer, communications and 
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consumer applications. The company has also built up a strong presence in the 
international computer peripherals market through its power conversion division. 
Because of the development of the computer and communication industry~ the opto 
division maintains about 15-20% high growth rate and the conversion department still 
maintains 12% growth rate. Taiwan Liton's efficient infrastructure enables the 
company to deliver high quality products at extremely competitive prices. The 
company now has six production facilities in Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia and the 
United Kingdom and contract manufacturing plants in Mainland China and the 
Philippines which implement up-to-date manufacturing procedures to increase 
responsiveness to customers needs. Its turnover reached NT$9.1 billion and it was 
ranked as 77th of Taiwan's manufacturing industries in 1995 by Common Wealth 
Magazine. 
2. Silitek Corporation 
Originally established as the Silitek Rubber Corporation in 1978, the company 
reorganised in 1983 and became known as the Silitek Corporation. It produces rubber 
products for computer and communication, keyboard, and scanner products. The 
company has enjoyed stable growth and expansion throughout its history and in 1988 
it became a public company. Silitek has built up an impressive client list that includes 
some of the leading names in the world-wide computer industry. It owns many 
manufacturing facilities in Taiwan, Malaysia, USA, and Mexico, as well as branch 
offices in the UK, Japan, Korea, Singapore, and mainland China, while its products 
have garnered a large number of prestigious international and domestic awards for 
design and quality. Its turnover achieved over NT$2.7 billion and it was ranked 311 th 
of Taiwan's manufacturing industries in 1995 by Common Wealth Magazine. 
3. Lite-On Technology Corporation 
It was established in 1989 and it has become one of the top five monitor 
manufacturers in the world and OEM/ODM supplier of choice to many of the famous 
brand names in the monitor, PC, workstation, and X-terminal businesses. Lite-On 
Technology's award-winning range of display products includes state-of-the-art 21" 
CAD/CAM colour displays, 15" and 17" Multiscan monitors that are highly popular 
with high-end PC, X-window and colour workstation users, and advanced 
microprocessor controlled monitors. With a high growth rate, it became a public 
company in 1995. Having extensive experience and the expertise of the highly-
acclaimed R&D division is the key to its success in the fiercely competitive monitor 
market. Its turnover grew from NT$9 million in 1994 to nearly NU 17.5 million in 
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1995 and it was ranked 40th of Taiwan's manufacturing industries m 1995 by 
Common Wealth Magazine. 
4. Dyna Image Corporation 
Since it was formed in 1990, Dyna Image Corporation has quickly established 
itself as a world leader in the design and development of state-of-the-art 
semiconductors and modules for advanced image sensing and image processing 
applications. Its products can be divided into three major categories: contact image 
sensors (CIS) for use in fax machines, scanners, pen scanners, copiers, built-in PC 
input devices, and measuring equipment; charge coupled device (CCD) sensors for 
scanner, fax, bar code readers, OCR (optical character recognition), and spectroscopy 
applications; and camera modules for videophone, video intercom, surveillance and 
multimedia videocapture applications. With its cutting-edge technology, efficient 
manufacturing capabilities, and quick responsiveness to customer needs, Dyna Image 
has already built up an impressive client list of leading companies in the world-wide 
optical electronics companies and has established a strong foundation for continued 
expansion in the future. Its turnover is nearly NT$I.2 billion and it was ranked 628th 
of Taiwan's manufacturing industries in 1995 by Common Wealth Magazine. Its 
shares have been offered on the counter centre. 
5. Lite-On Power Semiconductor Corporation 
Lite-On power Semiconductor Corporation originally began operations as the 
Silitek Semiconductor Division of Silitek Corporation. In early 1991, the 
Semiconductor Division became the independent Silitek technology Corp., which was 
renamed Lite-On Power Semiconductor Corp. later that year to identify the company 
more closely with the parent Lite-On group. As one of the world's largest independent 
manufacturers of power semiconductors it offers a comprehensive range of reliable 
and economical power semiconductor design solutions. The company manufactures 
high-quality silicon and glass of passivated standard and faster recovery diodes for 
leading companies such as Motorola, GM, AT&T, Samsung, Sony and Siemens. The 
company operates highly-automated production facilities in Taiwan and mainland 
China, which have been awarded the internationally-recognised ISO-900 1 
certification. Its turnover is over NT$I.1 billion and it was ranked 653rd of Taiwan's 
manufacturing industries in 1995 by Common Wealth Magazine. 
6. Lite-On Inc. 
From its beginning as an electronic component sales agent. Lite-On Inc. has 
become a major producer of multi-layered print circuit boards following its merger 
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with Fu-Yu Co., Ltd. in 1990. These boards are used around the world in a variety of 
high-tech computer, computer peripheral and telecommunications applications. Its 
turnover is nearly NT$1.2 billion and it was ranked 316th of Taiwan's service 
industries in 1994. 
7. Strong Electronics Co., Ltd. 
Strong Electronics is a joint venture that was established in January 1995 
between the Lite-On Group and Arrow Electronics., the world's largest distributor of 
electronic components and computer products. The company acts as the Taiwan 
electronic components sales agent for leading international brands such as Motorola, 
AMP, Sprague, Trident, Bourns, and C-pak. Strong Electronics has built up an 
extensive distribution and service network in the Asian-Pacific region, which includes 
branch offices in Malaysia, Thailand, Korea, Hong Kong and Singapore. Its turnover 
attained over NT$0.8 billion and it was ranked as 448th of Taiwan's service industries 
in 1995 by Common Wealth Magazine. 
Mitac Group 
1. Mitac Inc. 
The Mitac brand name is well-known in industry and markets around the 
world. It founded the Taiwan computer industry as its first company in 1974. Since 
then, it has maintained its leadership, spawning companies that now comprise the 
Mitac Group, while expanding its own operations internationally. It focuses mainly on 
system integration, chain store business, and industrial computing products. Despite 
the wide range of its businesses, Mitac Incorporated maintains its focus on, and 
commitment to, directly serving the needs of end-users with solutions that represent 
the state of the art in computer technology. Its turnover is over NT$2.2 billion and it 
was ranked 1 99th of Taiwan's service industries in 1995. 
2. Mitac International 
Mitac International was founded in 1982 but today it has become a world-class 
computer and computer peripheral manufacturer with production sites in the USA, 
UK, Australia, Taiwan and China, along with assembly operations in other countries. 
Its products contain PC systems ranging from a portable desktop system up to 
multiprocessor servers, and some components including motherboards, graphics cards 
and other types of expansion cards. Mitac International also owns ten overseas 
subsidiaries and over 70 distributors in more than 60 countries. It has became a 
publicly listed company since 1990. Its turnover achieved over NU12.3 billion and it 
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was ranked 59th of Taiwan's manufacturing industries in 1995 by Common Wealth 
Magazine. 
3. Synnex Information Technologies 
Synnex Information Technologies was founded in America in 1980, and it has 
consistently posted annual revenue increases of 40 to 50 percent over the past few 
years. At present it ranks among the top ten computer distribution houses in the United 
States. It offers not only a full line of Mitac-branded desktop and notebook systems, 
monitors, and board-level components, but also some relevant computing products 
from other leading firms in the computer industry. 
4. Synnex Technology international 
Synnex Technology International, like Synnex Information Technologies, 
primarily focuses distribution on Asian countries. It was officially established in 1988 
as a joint venture between the Mitac Group and the Britain's Lex Group, and its 
experience in the distribution of computers, components and peripherals stretches back 
18 years. It has established itself as the largest distributor of computers, peripherals 
and components in Taiwan and it became a public company in 1995. Its turnover was 
nearly NT$5 billion in 1994 and over NT$7.2 billion in 1995 and it was ranked 57th of 
Taiwan's service industries in 1995 by Common Wealth Magazine. 
5. Getae 
Getac was founded as a joint venture between the Mitac Group and the General 
Electronic Aerospace Group, which was later merged with Lockheed Martin, the 
world's largest defense-related firm. Its main products focus on defence and aerospace 
electronics. 
AcerGroup 
1. Aeer Incorporated 
Organised in 1981, Acer Incorporated serves as the headquarters of the group. 
In 1988, it became a publicly offered company listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange. 
Currently, Acer is the world's seventh largest PC brand company. The company is 
actively involved in the integration of consumer electronics and communications in its 
product development efforts. Acer Incorporated employs 3,600 people and with 
reported revenue ofNT$33 billion it ranked as 11th of the manufactwing industries of 
Taiwan in 1994. In 1995 its revenue attained over NT$62.5 billion and it was ranked 
5th in Taiwan's manufacturing industries by Common Wealth Magazine. 
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2. Acer Peripherals Incorporated 
Acer Peripherals Incorporated (API) was established in 1984, and the company 
now has 5,300 employees. It owns world-class factories in Taoyuan, Taiwan and 
Penang, Malaysia. Its products include colour monitors, laser printers, key-boards, 
CD-ROM drives, X-Terminals, and fax machines. Currently, API is one of the world's 
five largest colour monitor manufacturers. In the past four years, API has grown by an 
average of around 70 percent each year, making it one of the fastest-growing 
businesses within The Acer group. It became a publicly offered company listed on the 
Taiwan Stock Exchange at the end of 1995. API reported nearly NT$16 billion 
turnover and it was ranked 34th of the manufacturing industries of Taiwan in 1994. In 
1995 its revenue attained over NT$26.3 billion and it was ranked 24th of Taiwan's 
manufacturing industries by Common Wealth Magazine. 
3. Acer Sertek Incorporated 
Acer Sertek Incorporated was originally formed in 1976 by the chairman and 
four co-founders. Its principal businesses consist of Acer's domestic brand name 
business; acting as the Taiwan agent for computer hardware, and peripherals from top 
international brands; and in-house development of multimedia equipment and 
military/industrial-use computers. At present, Sertek is also working towards 
becoming a manufacturer of integrated Video CD products. The company runs over 
130 AcerLand computer stores around Taiwan and over 100 value-added resellers. 
This makes Sertek Taiwan's first and largest chain of specialised computer retail 
outlets. The company employs nearly 800 people and reported more than NT$8.1 
billion in revenue and was ranked as 49th of Taiwan's service industries in 1995. It 
has recently become a publicly offered company listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange 
in September of 1996. 
Acer Sertek also manages Acer Market Service (AMS), a firm charged with 
marketing, sales, and service of Acer products in the mainland China market. It was 
set up in 1992 and headquarters are in Hong Kong, but it has branches or regional 
offices in major cities such as Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu, and Shenyang. Currently it 
has a staff of 50 people and its revenue was nearly US$1 0 million in 1994. 
4. Texas Instrument-Acer (TI-Acer) Inc. 
Established in 1989 as a joint venture between Texas Instruments and Acer, 
TI-Acer is Southeast Asia's first volume producer of dynamic random access memory 
(DRAM). Since coming on-line, TI-Acer has set records in time to production and 
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monthly output of DRAM chips. Among all DRAM factories invested in by Texas 
Instruments, the Hsin-Chu site in Taiwan is regarded as a model for other plants 
around the world to follow. Profit has been excellent for the past few years. It employs 
almost 1,400 people and its turnover was more than NT$8 billion and it was ranked 
65th of the manufacturing industries of Taiwan in 1994. In 1995 its revenue achieved 
over NT$14.6 billion and profits nearly NT$6.5 billion and it was ranked 52nd of 
Taiwan's manufacturing industries. It is expected to become a publicly listed company 
on the Taiwan Stock Exchange in 1998. 
5. Acer Laboratories Inc. 
Acer Laboratories Inc. (ALI) was established in 1987. It designs, manufactures 
and markets ASICs for personal computer motherboard designers and manufacturers 
around the world. In order to keep up with fast-changing ASIC design requirements, 
ALI channels approximately 10 percent of its revenue into R&D. Of the firm's 200 
employees, more than half are design engineers. Its revenue jumped to nearly NT$I. 7 
billion and it was ranked 407th of the manufacturing industries of Taiwan in 1994. In 
1995 its revenue attained over NT$2.2 billion and it was ranked 368th of the 
manufacturing industries. 
6. Ambit Microsystems Inc. 
Established in 1991, Ambit Microsystems Inc. is one of the leading hybrid 
customer module manufacturers in Taiwan. The firm was created as a fifty-fifty joint 
venture between Acer and Germany's Temic (Telefunken Microelectronics), a 
Daimler-Benz Group company. It employs nearly 300 people and its revenue grew by 
148% in 1994 to more than NT$O.4 billion. In 1995 its revenue attained over NT$I.6 
billion and it was ranked 484th of Taiwan's manufacturing industries by Common 
Wealth Magazine. 
7. Acer TWP Corporation 
It was established in 1983 and is Taiwan's largest publisher of high-tech books 
and periodicals and a leading agent and distributor for many renowned overseas 
software publishers. The company employs 200 people and its revenue reached over 
NT$O.4 billion in 1994 and about NT$0.58 billion in 1995. 
8. Acer Computer International Pte Ltd. 
Headquartered in Singapore, Acer Computer International (ACI) is the 
business group within Acer responsible for assembly, marketing. distribution, and 
servicing of Acer products in the Asian Pacific. Indian, African. and Middle Eastern 
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markets. It became a publicly offered company listed on the Singapore Stock 
Exchange in September 1995 and it is the frrst company of Taiwan to be publicly 
offered abroad. In the past four years it averaged more than 60% growth rate and it 
employed nearly 950 people and its revenue achieved nearly NTS15 billions in 1994 
and NT$16 billion in 1995. 
Under the RBU, its Acer Global Inc. having only employees 157 attained 
revenue of nearly NT$4.8 billion and it was ranked 164th of Taiwan's manufacturing 
industries in 1995. 
9. Acer-Computer Latino America 
Acer-Computer Latino America (ACLA) was established in January of 1995 as 
a joint venture between Acer Latin America and Computec de Mexico, Mexico's 
largest computer distributor and Acer's fifth most successful distributor in the world. 
ACLA is responsible for the manufacturing, marketing, and distribution of Acer 
products, as well as general management of Acer's business in the Latin American 
region. ACLA has already become a publicly listed company on the Mexico Stock 
Exchange since July 1996. It employs 420 employees and its revenue attained US$214 
million in 1994 and US$301 million in 1995. 
10. Acer America Corporation 
Located in San Jose, California, Acer America Corporation (AAC) was 
established in 1977. The company serves primarily as the business unit responsible for 
the marketing, sales, assembly, and service of Acer brand name and other products in 
north America. In addition, AAC conducts extensive R&D, software development, 
and manufacturing operations with approximately 1,300 employees. Its revenue 
reached US$858 million in 1994 and US$I,437 million. 
11. Acer Computer B.V. (Acer Europe) 
Acer Computer B.V. was established in 1985 and has headquarters in the 
Netherlands and operates subsidiaries in Germany, France, England, Belgium. 
Denmark, Norway, Italy. Austria, Hungary, and Spain. At present, the company is 
shipping more than 20,000 PCs per month from three factories located in the 
Netherlands, England, and Germany. The firm employs nearly 400 people and its 
revenue attained US$289 million in 1994 and US$462 million in 1995. 
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Appendix 4 Financial Data of Case Firms 
Table A4 1 Consolidated I . ncome Stat t fT emen 0 atung Company (Unit: million NT$) 
Item 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Operating revenue (net) 44,808 49,651 54,431 73,493 84,698 
Operating gross profit 6,447 8,335 12,448 14,430 18,365 
Operating income 2,306 3,692 6,661 7,249 11,039 
Net income before tax 484 1,573 4,305 6,398 9,250 
Net income after tax 483 1,563 4,111 6,140 6,606 
Consolidated net income 295 1,215 3,508 5,390 5,887 
after tax 
Consolidated earnings per NT$ 0.33 NT$ 1.21 NT$ 2.68 NT$ 3.00 NT$ 3.16 
share 
T bl A42 C a e . rd dB I onso I ate a ance s beet of Tatun2 Company ( Unit: million NT$) 
Item 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Current assets 20,867 21,117 24,514 33,444 39,674 
Long-term investment 2,788 2,812 3,034 2,807 3,170 
Fixed assets 31,532 34,576 36,269 35,296 45,693 
Other assets and 1,154 1,034 934 5,333 11,318 
consolidated debit 
Total assets 56,341 59,540 64,751 76,880 99,855 
Current liabilities 24,683 26,142 27,007 30,604 36,026 
Long-term liabilities 16,386 15,572 16,399 12,088 19,054 
Other liabilities and minority 759 1,112 2,133 3,517 9,648 
interest 
Total liabilities 41,828 42,826 45,539 46,209 64,728 
Capital stock 8,837 8,837 10,074 15,000 18,600 
Retained earning 5,676 7,877 9,138 15,771 16,527 
Total liabilities and 56,341 59,540 64,751 76,880 99,855 
stockholders equity 
Table A4.3 Tatung (U.K.) Limited (Unit: GTB '000) 
Item 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Turnover (net) 47,501 59,371 65,612 78,577 79,539 
Net income before tax -3,851 -1,789 -2,402 -6,691 -1,863 
Net income after tax -3,851 -1,789 -2,402 -6,691 -1,863 
Total assets 58,341 52,413 53,633 54,425 61,001 
Collection period (days) 55.3 80.6 116.1 101.7 102.8 
Stock turnover (times) 3.0 4.3 4.2 3.9 4.1 
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Table A4 4 Consolidated I State t fM· I . ncome men 0 ltac ntemational (Unit: million NU) 
Item 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 Operating revenue (net) 6,399 8,408 10,287 14,954 28,139 Operating grOSS profit 919 616 744 1,373 2,030 Operating income 61 
-482 
-269 81 542 Net income before tax 
-73 
-669 
-96 42 264 Net income after tax 
-74 
-687 9 26 193 Consolidated net income 
-74 
-698 
-87 3 154 
after tax 
Consolidated earnings per 
-NT $0.45 
-NT$ 4.28 
-NT$ 0.54 NTSO.02 NTSO.69 
share 
Table A4.S Consolidated Balance Sheet of Mitac International (Unit: million NTS) 
Item 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Current assets 3,878 3,404 3,930 5,899 10,394 
Long-term investment 272 273 238 283 271 
Fixed assets 1.000 910 1,007 1,039 1,514 
Other assets and 363 389 464 463 456 
consolidated debit 
Total assets 5,513 4,976 5,639 7,684 12,635 
Current liabilities 2,599 2,630 3,223 4,178 7,901 
Long-term liabilities 456 528 524 285 87 
Other liabilities and minority 
- 55 195 379 434 
interest 
Total liabilities 3,055 3,213 3,942 4,842 8,422 
Capital stock 1,483 1,631 1,631 2,101 2,852 
Retained earning 975 132 66 741 1,361 
Total liabilities and 5,513 4,976 5,639 7,684 12,635 
stockholders equity 
Table A4.6 Mitac Europe Limited (UK) (Unit: GTB '000) 
Item 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Turnover (net) 8,722 18,099 31,883 37,896 110,530 
Net income before tax -337 -37 II 169 48 
Net income after tax -337 -37 9 158 48 
Total assets 4,328 9,663 14,156 15,020 58,571 
Collection period (davs) 52.9 42.8 46.1 46.9 44.4 
Stock turnover (times) 4.4 4.8 5.3 5.5 6.1 
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Table A4 7 Consolidated Income Stat . t fA I emen 0 cer nc. (Unit: million NTS) 
Item 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Operating revenue (net) 26,402 23,134 34,003 63,017 107,063 
Operating gross profit 6,633 4,482 5,412 9,657 13,494 
Operating income 
-250 
-443 
-327 1,836 2,233 
Net income before tax 
-653 74 1,049 3,257 5,625 
Net income after tax 
-625 55 1,022 3,170 5,670 
Consolidated net income 
-607 56 1,029 3,100 5,536 
after tax 
Consolidated earnings per -NT$ 1.34 NT$O.l2 NT$2.21 NTS 3.88 NTS6.45 
share 
48C Table A . onsolidated Balance Sheet of Acer Inc. (Unit: million NTS) 
Item 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Current assets 12,937 12,404 17,132 24,982 47,018 
Long-term investment 2,539 3,364 4,253 6,408 10,051 
Fixed assets 4,158 3,745 3,117 3,097 3,584 
Other assets and 6,164 5,232 3,995 3,909 3,824 
consolidated debit 
Total assets 25,798 24,745 28,497 38,396 64,477 
Current liabilities 13,025 10,876 14,624 21,835 32,768 
Long-term liabilities 2,857 3,892 2953 2,570 2,921 
Other liabilities and minority 1,481 1,547 1,258 1,100 831 
interest 
Total liabilities 17,363 16,315 18,835 25,505 36,520 
Capital stock 4,524 4,598 4,646 4,770 9,451 
Retained earning 3,911 3,832 5,016 8,121 18,506 
Total liabilities and 25,798 24,745 28,497 38,396 64,477 
stockholders equity 
Table A4.9 Acer U.K. Limited (Unit: GTB '000) 
Item 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Turnover (net) 5,914 18,912 17,373 16,290 31,373 
Net income before tax -18 -221 -2,656 -682 354 
Net income after tax -18 -221 -2,647 -682 333 
Total assets 3,096 9,415 6,620 6,220 13,186 
Collection period (days) 56.1 48.7 74.5 72.5 42.2 
Stock turnover (times) 8.8 4.7 4.3 6.4 7.8 
Table A4.10 Acer Computer B.V. (Holland) 
Item 1991 1992 
Turnover (net) 172,620 110,919 
Net income before tax 1,149 3,862 
Net income after tax 1,149 3,862 
Total assets 61,440 55,908 
Collection period (days) 50.8 133.7 
Stock turnover (times) 14.7 6.8 
T bl A411 A C a e . cer t G bH (G ompu er m ermany) 
Item 1991 
Turnover (net) 89,315 
Net income before tax 3,687 
Net income after tax 3,698 
Total assets 56,679 
Collection period (days) 50.9* 
Stock turnover (times) 5.7+ 
* Bases on year-ended trade accounts recelvable. 
+ Based on year-ended inventory. 
1992 
91,727 
-5,804 
-5,788 
42,197 
50.9 
4.9 
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JUnit: 00. '000) 
1993 1994 1995 
173,942 345,102 464,183 
988 1,095 1,187 
811 665 388 
91,390 119,654 155,785 
108.8 84.4 39.9 
9.9 16.1 11.4 
(Unit: DM '000) 
1993 1994 1995 
118,767 154,058 215,756 
-8,281 
-2,417 2,760 
-8,281 
-2,417 2,608 
60,572 63,328 78,885 
53.8 46.7 38.9 
5.8 8.0 8.1 
Table A4.12 Consolidated Income Statement of Taiwan Liton Electronic Co. (Unit: million NTS 
Item 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Operating revenue (net) 3,107 3,670 4,708 6,311 8,098 
Operating gross profit 639 630 872 1,304 1,592 
Operating income 145 185 348 668 778 
Net income before tax 150 144 381 685 872 
Net income after tax 151 131 339 605 637 
Consolidated net income 151 131 339 605 637 
after tax 
Consolidated earnings per NTS 1.03 NTS 0.84 NTS 1.97 NTS 2.71 NTS2.64 
share 
Table A4.13 Consolidated Balance Sheet of Taiwan Liton Electronic Co. (Unit: million NTSl 
Item 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Current assets 1,780 2,045 2,242 3,123 3,707 
Long-term investment 187 233 309 825 951 
Fixed assets 1,119 1,077 1,100 1513 1,823 
Other assets and consolidated 30 28 25 34 60 
debit 
Total assets 3,116 3,383 3,676 5,495 6,541 
Current liabilities 847 1,099 1,039 1,793 2.289 
Long-term liabilities 212 109 51 22 20 
Other liabilities and minority 23 20 19 19 69 
interest 
Total liabilities 1,082 1,228 1,109 1,834 2.378 
Capital stock 1,412 1,553 1,724 2,102 2,417 
Retained earning 621 602 843 1,559 1,746 
Total liabilities and 3.115 3,383 3,676 5,495 6.541 
stockholders equity 
Table A4.1-t Lite-on Limited (UK) 
Item 1991* 
Turnover (net) 1,074 
Net income before tax -149 
Net income after tax -149 
Total assets 2,013 
Collection period (days) 135# 
Stock turnover (times) 3.6+ 
* From 27 March 1991 to December 1991. 
# Based on ending debtors. 
+ Based on ending stock. 
1992 
7,042 
-226 
-226 
3,513 
52.8 
15.9 
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(Unit: GTB '000) 
1993 1994 1995 
9,107 8,137 12,074 
5 -122 1.199 
.:; 
-122 -216 
2.606 4,911 5.348 
51.1 63.4 70.1 
18.2 7.5 ... .. 1.-' 
